* mpi/mpi-pow.c (USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION): New.
(mul_mod) [!USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION]: New.
(mpi_powm) [!USE_ALGORITHM_SIMPLE_EXPONENTIATION]: New implementation
of left-to-right k-ary exponentiation.
--
This is a backport from Libgcrypt commit
45aa6131e93fac89d46733b3436d960f35fb99b2
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
For the Yarom/Falkner flush+reload cache side-channel attack, we
changed the code so that it always calls the multiplication
routine (even if we can skip it to get result). This results some
performance regression.
This change is for recovering performance with efficient
algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Add keyid printing.
--
This is backport from GnuPG-2. Note that the --list-packets command
is for debugging only and not part iof the stable API.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Add arg R_NOFILE.
* g10/trustdb.c (trustdb_args): Add field no_trustdb.
(init_trustdb): Set that field.
(revalidation_mark): Take care of a nonexistent trustdb file.
(read_trust_options): Ditto.
(get_ownertrust): Ditto.
(get_min_ownertrust): Ditto.
(update_ownertrust): Ditto.
(update_min_ownertrust): Ditto.
(clear_ownertrusts): Ditto.
(cache_disabled_value): Ditto.
(check_trustdb_stale): Ditto.
(get_validity): Ditto.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Do not create a trustdb with most commands for
trust-model always.
--
This slightly changes the semantics of most commands in that they
won't create a trustdb if --trust-model=always is used. It just does
not make sense to create a trustdb if there is no need for it.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1a0eeaacd1)
Resolved conflicts:
g10/gpg.c
g10/tdbio.h
g10/trustdb.c
(indentation fixes)
* g10/options.h (IMPORT_NO_SECKEY): New.
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn, keyserver_import_cert): Set new
flag.
* g10/import.c (import_secret_one): Deny import if flag is set.
--
By modifying a keyserver or a DNS record to send a secret key, an
attacker could trick a user into signing using a different key and
user id. The trust model should protect against such rogue keys but
we better make sure that secret keys are never received from remote
sources.
Suggested-by: Stefan Tomanek
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7abed3448)
Resolved conflicts:
g10/options.h
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE): New.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_key_usage): Set new flag.
--
We do not want to use the default capabilities (derived from the
algorithm) if any key flags are given in a signature. Thus if key
flags are used in any way, the default key capabilities are never
used.
This allows to create a key with key flags set to all zero so it can't
be used. This better reflects common sense.
(cherry picked from commit 4bde12206c)
(cherry picked from commit 0a805ed160)
Resolved conflicts:
include/cipher.h
* keyserver/gpgkeys_curl.c (main): Set CURLOPT_CAINFO only if a file
has been given.
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (main): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1542
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(cherry picked from commit e957b9b3f4)
* until/iobuf.c (MAX_NESTING_FILTER): New.
(iobuf_push_filter2): Limit the nesting level.
--
This is a more general fix for the nested compression packet bug. In
particular this helps g10/import.c:read_block to stop pushing
compression filters onto an iobuf stream.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* mpi/mpi-internal.h (MPN_COPY_INCR): Make it work.
--
This bug has been with us since the version 0.0.0 of GnuPG.
Fortunately it only affects an optimized code path which is rarely
used in practice: If the shift size matches the size of a
limb (i.e.. 32 or 64); this is is_prime in primegen.c. Over there the
Rabin-Miller test may fail with a probability of 2^-31 (that is if the
to be tested prime - 1 has the low 32 bits cleared). In practice the
probability is even much less because we first do a Fermat test on the
randomly generated candidates which sorts out the majority of
composite numbers.
The bug in MPN_COPY_INCR was found by Sven Bjorn.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(back ported from Libgcrypt
commit 7f7a5ef59962ae1a819b5060f9b781469bfe27d5)
--
Except for a minor change by David Shaw, all code has been written by
me. After termination of my copyright assignment, I change that
notice to reflect the new legal state.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_ALGO_ECC): New.
* g10/keyid.c (pubkey_letter): Add letter 'C'.
--
ID 22 will be used for generic ECC, i.e. one which can be used for
ECDSA and ECDH. The only support in 1.4 will pretty printing the
algorithm id.
* mpi/mpi-pow.c (mpi_powm): Always perform the mpi_mul for exponents
hold in secure memory.
--
The attack is described in a paper to be pusblished at eprint.iacr.org:
Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel
Attack by Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner. 18 July 2013.
Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to
data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the
attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high
resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy
program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a
single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the
attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy
program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of
the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be
used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs
executing in a different VM.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* include/dotlock.h (dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim): New.
(dotlock_destroy, dotlock_remove_lockfiles): Add a flag to reclaim
memory or not.
* util/dotlock.c (dotlock_create): Use
dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim for atexit.
(dotlock_destroy_unix, dotlock_destroy)
(dotlock_remove_lockfiles): Add a reclaim flag.
(dotlock_remove_lockfiles_reclaim): New.
* g10/signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Disable flag of reclaim memory to
avoid non-async-face call.
* g10/keydb.c (maybe_create_keyring): Follow the API change.
* g10/gpgv.c: Follow the API change.
--
signal handler got_fatal_signal should not call non-async-signal-safe
functions. When malloc is interrupted by a signal, it screws up.
This issue is reported:
https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue1515http://bugs.debian.org/399904
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (get_key): Use curl_easy_setinfo to get the
HTTP status code so we can tell the difference between a successful
retrieval, a partial retrieval, a not-found, or a server failed.
* g10/import.c (valid_keyblock_packet): New.
(read_block): Store only valid packets.
--
A corrupted key, which for example included a mangled public key
encrypted packet, used to corrupt the keyring. This change skips all
packets which are not allowed in a keyblock.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1455
* configure.ac: Check for inet_ntop.
* m4/libcurl.m4: Provide a #define for the version of the curl
library.
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (main, srv_replace): Call getaddrinfo() on
each target. Once we find one that resolves to an address (whether
IPv4 or IPv6), pass it into libcurl via CURLOPT_RESOLVE using the
SRV name as the "host". Force the HTTP Host header to be the same.
Backported from 6b1f71055e
* keyserver/gpgkeys_hkp.c (main): Only default try-dns-srv to on if we
have SRV support in the first place.
Backported from 732f3d1d47
* common/http.c (send_request, connect_server): Set proper Host header
(no :port, host is that of the SRV) when SRV is used in the
curl-shim.
Backported from cbe98b2cb1
