--allow-non-selfsigned-uid allows for completey unsigned uids).
Do not choose an attribute packet (i.e. photo) as primary uid. This
prevents oddities like "Good signature from [image of size 2671]". This
is still not perfect (one can still select an attribute packet as primary
in --edit), but is closer to the way the draft is going.
The algorithms list should include #110.
--pgp2 implies --no-ask-sig-expire and --no-ask-cert-expire as those would
cause a v4 sig/cert.
Be more lenient in what constitutes a valid armor header (i.e. -----BEGIN
blah blah-----) as some Windows programs seem to add spaces at the end.
--openpgp makes it strict again
If none of the uids are primary (because none are valid) then pick the
first to be primary (but still invalid). This is for cosmetics in case
some display needs to print a user ID from a non-selfsigned key. Also use
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid to make such a key valid and not
--always-trust. The key is *not* automatically trusted via
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid.
Make sure non-selfsigned uids print [uncertain] on verification even
though one is primary now.
If the main key is not valid, then neither are the subkeys.
Allow --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work on completely unsigned keys.
Print the uids in UTF8. Remove mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid()
Show revocation key as UTF8.
Allow --not-dash-escaped to work with v3 keys.
support. That is, it handles all the data to mark a key as revoked if it
has been revoked by a designated revoker. The second half (coming
later) will contain the code to make someones key your designated revoker
and to issue revocations for someone else.
Note that this is written so that a revoked revoker can still issue
revocations: i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still revoked.
I'm not completely convinced this is the proper behavior, but it matches
how PGP does it. It does at least have the advantage of much simpler code
- my first version of this had lots of loop maintaining code so you could
chain revokers many levels deep and if D was revoked, C was not, which
meant that B was, and so on. It was sort of scary, actually.
This also changes importing to allow bringing in more revocation keys, and
exporting to not export revocation keys marked "sensitive".
The --edit menu information will show if a revocation key is present.
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC - no point in reinventing the wheel. This allows the
helper program to search the keyserver by fingerprint if desired (and the
keyserver supports it). Note that automatic fingerprint promotion during
refresh only applies to v4 keys as a v4 fingerprint can be easily changed
into a long or short key id, and a v3 cannot.
Take two copies of hextobyte() from pubkey-enc.c and getkey.c and make
them into one copy in misc.c.
keys (this is in the RFC), so that they can be (sometimes) used along
OpenPGP keys. Do not force using IDEA on an OpenPGP key, as this may
violate its prefs.
Also, revise the help text for the sig class explanation.
change default compression to 1
add ask-sig-expire and ask-cert-expire (--expert was getting absurdly
overloaded)
permit v3 subkeys
use --expert to protect adding multiple photo ids and adding photos to a
v3 key
declaration due to shadowing warnings.
* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): s/index/idx/ to avoid
compiler warnig due to index(3).
* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): Use KEYDB_HANDLE as return value.
* keylist.c (list_one): Made resname const.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow "addphoto" only when --openpgp is
not used.
* options.skel: Changed one example photo viewer to qiv.
