* g10/cipher-aead.c (write_header): Do not call set_nonce_and_ad.
(write_final_chunk): Do not increase chunkindex.
(do_flush): Call set_nonce_and_ad immediately before the first
encryption of a chunk. Bump up the chunkindex after writing the tag.
(do_free): Do not insert a zero length last chunk.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_underflow): Fix the corresponding bug.
--
This fixes a bug in writing a zero length last chunk right before the
final chunk (which has by design a zero length). We also need to
adjust the decryption part because that assumed this zero length last
chunk.
Note that we use the term "last chunk" for the chunk which directly
precedes the "final chunk" which ends the entire encryption.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3774
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/cipher-aead.c (set_nonce, set_additional_data): Merge into ...
(set_nonce_and_ad): new function.
(write_auth_tag): Print error message here.
(do_flush): Rename var newchunk to finalize.
--
There is no need to have separate functions here. We should also
print a error message for writing the final tag.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_set_nonce, aead_set_ad): Merge into ...
(aead_set_nonce_and_ad): new single function. Change callers.
(decrypt_data): Do not set the nonce and ad here.
(aead_underflow): Get rid of the LAST_CHUNK_DONE hack.
--
The main change here is that we now re-init the context only right
before we decrypt and not after a checktag.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_underflow): Factor reading and checking
code code out to ...
(fill_buffer, aead_checktag): new functions.
--
Here is a simple test script to check against a set of encrypted files
with naming convention like "symenc-aead-eax-c6-56.asc"
# ------------------------ >8 ------------------------
set -e
GPG=../g10/gpg
for file in "$@"; do
echo "${file##*/}" | ( IFS=- read dummy1 dummy2 mode cbyte len rest
len="${len%.*}"
cbyte="${cbyte#c}"
[ "$dummy1" != "symenc" -o "$dummy2" != "aead" ] && continue
echo "checking mode=$mode chunkbyte=$cbyte length=$len"
if ! $GPG --no-options --rfc4880bis --batch --passphrase "abc" \
-d < $file >tmp.plain 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Decryption failed for $file" >&2
exit 2
fi
plainlen=$(wc -c <tmp.plain)
if [ $plainlen -ne $len ]; then
echo "Plaintext length mismatch for $file (want=$len have=$plainlen)" >&2
exit 2
fi
)
done
echo "all files are okay" >&2
# ------------------------ 8< ------------------------
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/cipher-aead.c (write_final_chunk): Do not bump up the chunk
index if the previous chunk was empty.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_underflow): Likewise. Also handle a other
corner cases. Add more debug output.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 3774
This fixes the reported case when the encrypted data is a multiple of
the chunk size. Then the chunk index for the final chunk was wrongly
incremented by 2. The actual fix makes use of the fact that the
current dfx->CHUNKLEN is 0 in this case. There is also some other
reorganizing to help with debugging. The thing seems to work now but
the code is not very clean - should be reworked. Creating test files
can be done with this script:
--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
csize=6
for len in 0 55 56 57; do
awk </dev/null -v i=$len 'BEGIN{while(i){i--;printf"~"}}' \
| gpg --no-options -v --rfc4880bis --batch --passphrase "abc" \
--s2k-count 1025 --s2k-digest-algo sha256 -z0 \
--force-aead --aead-algo eax --cipher aes -a \
--chunk-size $csize -c >symenc-aead-eax-c$csize-$len.asc
done
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
A LEN of 56 triggered the bug which can be seen by looking at the
"authdata:" line in the --debug=crypt,filter output.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c (handle_send_request_error): Handle two more
error codes.
--
Handle the two possible connect failures related to missing IPv6 support
gracefully by marking the host dead and retrying with another one.
If IPv6 is disabled via procfs, connect() will return EADDRNOTAVAIL.
If IPv6 is not compiled into the kernel, it will return EAFNOSUPPORT.
This makes it possible to use dual-stack hkp servers on hosts not having
IPv6 without random connection failures.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3331
--
The above description seems to be for Linux, so it is possible that
other systems might behave different. However, it is worth to try
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Use log_info instead of
log_error for skipped packets.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Ditto.
--
log_info should be sufficient and makes this more robust. Some
tools (e.g. Enigmail) are too picky on return codes from gpg.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (get_key_status_parm_s)
(get_key_status_cb, get_key): Move to ...
* tools/wks-util.c: ...here.
(get_key): Rename to wks_get_key.
* tools/gpg-wks-server.c: Include userids.h.
(command_install_key): Allow use of a fingerprint.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* tools/gpg-wks.h (policy_flags_s): Add field 'submission_address'.
* tools/wks-util.c (wks_parse_policy): Parse that field.
(wks_free_policy): New.
* tools/gpg-wks-client.c (command_send): Also try to take the
submission-address from the policy file. Free POLICY.
* tools/gpg-wks-server.c (process_new_key): Free POLICYBUF.
(command_list_domains): Free POLICY.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
--
This can be used to build GnuPG with static versions of the core
gnupg libraries. For example:
make -f build-aux/speedo.mk STATIC=1 SELFCHECK=0 \
INSTALL_PREFIX=/somewhere/gnupg22 native
The SELFCHECK=0 is only needed to build from a non-released version.
You don't need it with a released tarball.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* kbx/keybox-search.c (blob_cmp_fpr): Avoid overflow in OFF+LEN
checking.
(blob_cmp_fpr_part): Ditto.
(blob_cmp_name): Ditto.
(blob_cmp_mail): Ditto.
(blob_x509_has_grip): Ditto.
(keybox_get_keyblock): Check OFF and LEN using a 64 bit var.
(keybox_get_cert): Ditto.
--
On most 32 bit systems size_t is 32 bit and thus the check
size_t cert_off = get32 (buffer+8);
size_t cert_len = get32 (buffer+12);
if (cert_off+cert_len > length)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
does not work as intended for all supplied values. The simplest
solution here is to cast them to 64 bit.
In general it will be better to avoid size_t at all and work with
uint64_t. We did not do this in the past because uint64_t was not
universally available.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3770
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* sm/export.c (sexp_to_kparms): Fix the computation of array[6],
which must be 'd mod (q-1)' but was 'p mod (q-1)'.
--
This bug is not serious but makes some consistency checks fail.
For example, 'openssl rsa -check' reports the following error:
$ gpgsm --out my.key --export-secret-key-raw 0xXXXXXXXX
$ openssl rsa -check -noout -inform DER -in my.key
RSA key error: dmq1 not congruent to d
--
Let me(wk) add this:
This bug was introduced with
Fixes-commit: 91056b1976
right at the start of GnuPG 2.1 in July 2010. Before that (in 2.0) we
used gpg-protect-tool which got it right. We probably never noticed
this because gpgsm, and maybe other tools too, fix things up during
import.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/asshelp2.c (vprint_assuan_status_strings): New.
(print_assuan_status_strings): New.
* agent/command.c (agent_write_status): Replace by call to new
function.
* dirmngr/server.c (dirmngr_status): Ditto.
* g13/server.c (g13_status): Ditto.
* g13/sh-cmd.c (g13_status): Ditto.
* sm/server.c (gpgsm_status2): Ditto.
* scd/command.c (send_status_info): Bump up N.
--
This fixes a potential overflow if LFs are passed to the status
string functions. This is actually not the case and would be wrong
because neither the truncating in libassuan or our escaping is not the
Right Thing. In any case the functions need to be more robust and
comply to the promised interface. Thus the code has been factored out
to a helper function and N has been bumped up correctly and checked in
all cases.
For some uses this changes the behaviour in the error case (i.e. CR or
LF passed): It will now always be C-escaped and not passed to
libassuan which would truncate the line at the first LF.
Reported-by: private_pers
* scd/app-openpgp.c (get_cached_data): Return NULL for Data Object
with no data.
--
When GET_DATA returns no data with success (90 00), this routine
firstly returned buffer with length zero, and secondly (with cache)
returned NULL, which is inconsistent. Now, it returns NULL for both
cases.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* configure.ac (HAVE_PSELECT_NO_EINTR): New.
* scd/scdaemon.c (scd_kick_the_loop): Write to pipe.
(handle_connections): Use pipe.
--
On NetBSD, signal to the same process cannot unblock pselect,
with unknown reason. Use pipe instead, for such systems.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3778
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Move error printing to the
end. Add additional check to cope for the 0je extra bytes needed for
AEAD.
--
Fixes-commit: 9aab9167bc
GnuPG-bug-id: 3780
* agent/command-ssh.c (get_client_info): Use LOCAL_PEERCRED.
--
LOCAL_PEERUID was wrong (while there is LOCAL_PEERUUID).
For FreeBSD and macOS, we can use LOCAL_PEERCRED to get uid.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3757
Fixes-commit: 28aa689058
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* configure.ac: Check ucred.h as well as sys/ucred.h.
* agent/command-ssh.c: Add inclusion of ucred.h.
--
It was T2981, adding ucred.h for Solaris. We also need sys/ucred.h
for FreeBSD and macOS.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/gpg.c (opts): Add new option.
(opt_set_iobuf_size): New var.
(set_debug): Set the option.
* tests/openpgp/armor.scm: Use this option to revert the buffer size
to the one which used to exhibit the tested bugs.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/iobuf.c (IOBUF_BUFFER_SIZE): Rename to
DEFAULT_IOBUF_BUFFER_SIZE and increase to 64k.
(iobuf_buffer_size): New var. Always use this instead of the macro.
(iobuf_set_buffer_size): New.
(struct file_filter_ctx_t): Add field delayed_rc.
(file_filter) [!W32]: Try to fill the supplied buffer.
--
I did some test to see whether this has an effect. A test program
piped 100 million random bytes to gpg to symmetric encryption only w/0
compression. Single read means the old behaviour, multi read the new
behaviour which fills up the buffer when the read(2) returned only 4k
in once call.
8k buffer single read
User time (seconds): 0.09
System time (seconds): 0.04
Percent of CPU this job got: 6%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.04
8k buffer multi read
User time (seconds): 0.08
System time (seconds): 0.05
Percent of CPU this job got: 6%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.04
64k buffer single read
User time (seconds): 0.09
System time (seconds): 0.06
Percent of CPU this job got: 6%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.20
64k buffer multi read
User time (seconds): 0.11
System time (seconds): 0.06
Percent of CPU this job got: 8%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.01
128k buffer single read
User time (seconds): 0.09
System time (seconds): 0.05
Percent of CPU this job got: 7%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.05
128k buffer multi read
User time (seconds): 0.11
System time (seconds): 0.05
Percent of CPU this job got: 8%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.01
512k buffer single read:
User time (seconds): 0.08
System time (seconds): 0.08
Percent of CPU this job got: 7%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.21
512k buffer multi read:
User time (seconds): 0.10
System time (seconds): 0.06
Percent of CPU this job got: 7%
Elapsed (wall clock) time (h:mm:ss or m:ss): 0:02.05
Does not make much of a difference :-(. Maybe it changes depending on
the type of used filters.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/cipher-aead.c (do_flush): Init ERR. Fix remaining chunklen
computation.
(do_free): Add dummy encryption. Close the cipher handle.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_underflow): Rewrite.
--
Until we have integrated test into the test suite extensive tests can
also be done with a script like this:
--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
#!/bin/sh
set -e
GPG="../g10/gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback"
GPG="$GPG --passphrase abc --batch"
MKTDATA="$HOME/b/gnupg-2.0/tools/mk-tdata"
for chunksize in 6 7 12 13 14 30; do
for count in $(seq 1 200) $(seq 8100 8200) \
$(seq 16350 16400) $(seq 20000 20100); do
if [ ! -f "testfile-$count" ]; then
$MKTDATA $count >"testfile-$count"
fi
echo "testing chunk size 2^$chunksize with $count bytes"
$GPG --force-aead --aead-algo ocb --s2k-mode 0 --cipher AES -v -z 0 \
-c --chunk-size $chunksize \
<"testfile-$count" >"testfile-$count.gpg" 2>/dev/null
$GPG -vd <"testfile-$count.gpg" >"testfile-$count.out" 2>/dev/null
if ! cmp "testfile-$count" "testfile-$count.out"; then
echo "FAILED comparing count $count" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
done
echo All good
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
