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gpg: Try to mitigate the problem of wrong CFB symkey passphrases.
* g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Check for a valid algo. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 3795 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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@ -315,6 +315,21 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
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else
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{
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gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
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/* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
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* session key is a valid OpenPGP algo. With 11 defined
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* symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
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* here. The actual checking is done later during bulk
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* decryption; we can't bring this check forward easily. We
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* need to use the GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM so that we won't run into
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* the gnupg < 2.2 bug compatible case which would terminate the
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* process on GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO. Note that with AEAD (above)
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* we will have a reliable test here. */
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if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (seskey[0]))
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{
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM);
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goto leave;
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}
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/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
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* decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
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keylen = slen-1;
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