* g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Sanitize verbose output.
--
This fixes a forgotten sanitation of user supplied data in a verbose
mode diagnostic. The mention CVE is about using this to inject
status-fd lines into the stderr output. Other harm good as well be
done. Note that GPGME based applications are not affected because
GPGME does not fold status output into stderr.
CVE-id: CVE-2018-12020
GnuPG-bug-id: 4012
(cherry picked from commit 13f135c7a252cc46cff96e75968d92b6dc8dce1b)
* g10/compress.c (handle_compressed): Fix memory leak.
--
(backport from STABLE-BRANCH-2-2 commit:
c31abf84659dbda5503dd9f3aa3449520bcd1b84)
All other calls of push_compress_filter checks ALGO,
so, do it here, too.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3898
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/trustdb.c (sanitize_regexp): Only escape operators.
--
Backport from master commit:
ccf3ba92087e79abdeaa0208795829b431c6f201
To sanitize a regular expression, quoting by backslash should be only
done for defined characters. POSIX defines 12 characters including
dot and backslash.
Quoting other characters is wrong, in two ways; It may build an
operator like: \b, \s, \w when using GNU library. Case ignored match
doesn't work, because quoting lower letter means literally and no
much to upper letter.
GnuPG-bug-id: 2923
Co-authored-by: Damien Goutte-Gattat <dgouttegattat@incenp.org>
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Fix secmem leak.
--
proc_parameter_file adds certain parameters to the list in the PARA
argument; however, these new entries are leaked because they
are added to head, while the PARA list is released by the caller
of proc_parameter_file.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1371
Signed-off-by: Ineiev <ineiev@gnu.org>
* g10/build-packet.c (do_user_id): Avoid indeterminate length header.
--
We are able to import such user ids but when exporting them the
exported data could not be imported again because the parser bails out
on invalid keyrings. This is now fixed and should be backported.
Note that in 1.4 and 2.0 this is only an issue for attribute packets.
In 2.1 user IDs were also affected.a
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (main): initialize opt.emit_version to 0
* doc/gpg.texi: document different default for --emit-version
--
The version of GnuPG in use is not particularly helpful. It is not
cryptographically verifiable, and it doesn't distinguish between
significant version differences like 2.0.x and 2.1.x.
Additionally, it leaks metadata that can be used to distinguish users
from one another, and can potentially be used to target specific
attacks if there are known behaviors that differ between major
versions.
It's probably better to take the more parsimonious approach to
metadata production by default.
(backport of master commit c9387e41db7520d176edd3d6613b85875bdeb32c)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* checks/armor.test, cipher/des.c, g10/ccid-driver.c, g10/pkclist.c,
util/regcomp.c, util/regex_internal.c: correct the spelling of
"occured" to "occurred"
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/sig-check.c (signature_check2): Not only subkey, but also primary
key should have flags.valid=1.
--
(backport of master
commit 6f284e6ed63f514b15fe610f490ffcefc87a2164)
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/gpgv.c (main): Set opt.no_sig _cache, so that it doesn't depend on
cached status. Similarly, set opt.flags.require_cross_cert for backsig
validation for subkey signature.
--
(backport of master
commit e32c575e0f3704e7563048eea6d26844bdfc494b)
It is common that an organization distributes binary keyrings with
signature cache (Tag 12, Trust Packet) and people use gpgv to validate
signature with such keyrings. In such a use case, it is possible that
the key validation itself is skipped.
For the purpose of gpgv validation of signatures, we should not depend
on signature cache in keyrings (if any), but we should validate the key
by its self signature for primary key, and back signature for subkey.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/gpg.c (main): Call set_packet_list_mode after assignment of
opt.list_packets.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Don't stop processing with
--list-packets as the comment says.
* g10/options.h (list_packets): Fix the comment.
* g10/parse-packet.c: Fix the condition for opt.list_packets.
--
(backport from 2.0 commit 4f336ed780cc2783395f3ff2b12b3ebb8e097f7b
which is backport of master
commit 52f65281f9743c42a48bf5a3354c9ab0ecdb681a)
Debian-bug-id: 828109
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/tdbio.c (create_version_record): Call create_hashtable to always
make hashtable, together with the version record.
(get_trusthashrec): Remove call to create_hashtable.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1675
Thanks to Scott Moser to reproducible script and patience.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(backport from master
commit 35a3ce2acf78a95fecbccfd8db0560cca24232df)
* g10/tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Return earlier if !CREATE. Check
the directory and create it if none before calling take_write_lock.
--
Thanks to Marc Deslauriers for the bug report and his patch.
GnuPG-bug-id: 2246
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(backport from master
commit 2f3e42047d17313eeb38d354048f343158402a8d)
* g10/options.h: Add weak_digests linked list to opts.
* g10/main.h: Declare weakhash linked list struct and
additional_weak_digest() function to insert newly-declared weak
digests into opts.
* g10/misc.c: (additional_weak_digest): New function.
(print_digest_algo_note): Check for deprecated digests.
* g10/sig-check.c: (do_check): Reject all weak digests.
* g10/gpg.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpg.
* doc/gpg.texi: Document gpg --weak-digest option.
* g10/gpgv.c: Add --weak-digest option to gpgv.
* doc/gpgv.texi: Document gpgv --weak-digest option.
--
gpg and gpgv treat signatures made over MD5 as unreliable, unless the
user supplies --allow-weak-digests to gpg. Signatures over any other
digest are considered acceptable.
Despite SHA-1 being a mandatory-to-implement digest algorithm in RFC
4880, the collision-resistance of SHA-1 is weaker than anyone would
like it to be.
Some operators of high-value targets that depend on OpenPGP signatures
may wish to require their signers to use a stronger digest algorithm
than SHA1, even if the OpenPGP ecosystem at large cannot deprecate
SHA1 entirely today.
This changeset adds a new "--weak-digest DIGEST" option for both gpg
and gpgv, which makes it straightforward for anyone to treat any
signature or certification made over the specified digest as
unreliable.
This option can be supplied multiple times if the operator wishes to
deprecate multiple digest algorithms, and will be ignored completely
if the operator supplies --allow-weak-digests (as before).
MD5 is always considered weak, regardless of any further
--weak-digest options supplied.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
(this is a rough cherry-pick of applying the following commits to
STABLE-BRANCH-1-4:
76afaed65e3b0ddfa4923cb577ada43217dd4b18
b98939812abf6c643c752ce7c325f98039a1a9e2
91015d021b3dcbe21ad0e580a4f34c523abf9e72
)
* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO): Change to AES or CAST5 or 3DES
depending on configure options.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Set opt.s2k_cipher_algo to DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO.
--
(cherry picked from commit 57df1121c18b004dd763b35eabf7b51fc9e8ec38)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/passphrase.c (stdenvnames): Add DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS.
--
pinentry-gnome3 talks to the gcr prompter via dbus. Without this
environment variable, it can't find the correct session to talk to.
* g10/trustdb.c (validate_keys): Call dump_key_array only in debug
mode.
--
I guess that is a left-over from an early attempt to output
information on the trustdb for use by other tools. Maybe related to
the former --list-trust-path command. Sending it to stdout is
probably useful so we do this now only in debug mode.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Backported to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4 from
b03a2647299a6c8764a2574590cbaccdff9e497d by dkg
* cipher/rsa.c (rsa_sign): Verify after sign.
* g10/gpg.c (opts): Make --no-sig-create-check a NOP.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove field "no_sig_create_check".
* g10/sign.c (do_sign): Do check only for DSA.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Only allow relevant algorithms for
encryption.
--
(backported from 2.1 commit c771963140cad7c1c25349bcde27e427effc0058)
* g10/getkey.c (get_seckey): Return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY when it's not
exact match.
--
In the situation of corrupted .gnupg/ where only private subkey is
available but no corresponding public key of the subkey, the code
returned public primary key which caused mysterious error (for a
user). This fix detects an error earlier.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1422
Debian-Bug-Id: #638619
* g10/free-packet.c (cmp_public_keys, cmp_secret_keys): Compare opaque
data at the first entry of the array when it's unknown algo.
* mpi/mpi-cmp.c (mpi_cmp): Backport libgcrypt 1.5.0's semantics.
--
(backported from 2.0 commit 43429c7869152f301157e4b24790b3801dce0f0a)
GnuPG-bug-id: 1962
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Check PKTLEN before calling mpi_read
et al.
--
Due to the missing length checks PKTLEN may turn negative. Because
PKTLEN is an unsigned int the malloc in read_rest would try to malloc
a too large number and terminate the process with "error reading rest
of packet: Cannot allocate memory".
Reported-by: Hanno Böck.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(backported from 2.0 commit 0aac920f23fd07e152fdb7385299c92bb9a4ade3)
* util/pka.c: Rewrite.
(get_pka_info): Add arg fprbuflen. Change callers to pass this.
* util/strgutil.c (ascii_strlwr): New.
* configure.ac: Remove option --disable-dns-pka.
(USE_DNS_PKA): Remove ac_define.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Always include PKA.
--
Note that although PKA is now always build, it will only work if
support for looking up via DNS has not been disabled.
The new PKA only works with the IPGP DNS certtype and shall be used
only to retrieve the fingerprint and optional the key for the first
time. Due to the security problems with DNSSEC the former assumption
to validate the key using DNSSEC is not anymore justified. Instead an
additional layer (e.g. Trust-On-First-Use) needs to be implemented to
track change to the key. Having a solid way of getting a key matching
a mail address is however a must have.
More work needs to go into a redefinition of the --verify-options
pka-lookups and pka-trust-increase. The auto-key-locate mechanism
should also be able to continue key fetching with another method once
the fingerprint has been retrieved with PKA.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This is a backport from master.
(backported from commit 2fc27c8696f5cf2ddf3212397ea49bff115d617b)
* g10/seckey-cert.c (do_check): Call BUG for NULL return of
get_opaque.
--
This is the suggested addition from commit 6f03218. We better run
into an fatal error than into a segv.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Check for NULL return from
gcry_mpi_get_opaque.
* g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Ditto.
--
This is a backport of 76c8122adfed0f0f443cce7bda702ba2b39661b3 from
master to the STABLE-BRANCH-1-4
On the STABLE-BRANCH-1-4, we may also want to patch g10/seckey-cert.c,
but that has not been done in this patch.
This fix extends commmit 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f.
gpg2 --export --no-default-keyring --keyring TESTDATA
With TESTDATA being below after unpacking.
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
mBMEhdkMmS8BcX8F//8F5voEhQAQmBMEnAAAZwAAo4D/f/8EhQAAAIAEnP8EhQAQ
iBMEnP8AAAAABf8jIID///8EhQYQmBMEnIUAEIgTBKT/AAAAAAUAACCA/f//BIUA
EJgTBJx/AP8ABPPzBJx/AP8ABPPz
=2yE0
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
Reported-by: Jodie Cunningham
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/armor.c (parse_key_failed_line): New.
(check_input): Watch out for gpgkeys_ error lines.
* g10/filter.h (armor_filter_context_t): Add field key_failed_code.
* g10/import.c (import): Add arg r_gpgkeys_err.
(import_keys_internal): Ditto.
(import_keys_stream): Ditto.
* g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_errstr): New.
(keyserver_spawn): Detect "KEY " lines while sending. Get gpgkeys_err
while receiving keys.
(keyserver_work): Add kludge for better error messages.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1832
Note that these changes can be backported to 1.4 but they don't make
sense for 2.1 due to the removal of the keyserver helpers. The error
reporting could be improved even more but given that this is an old
GnuPG branch it is not justified to put too much effort into it.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* include/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
This fixes sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that almost all uses
of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to use an inline
function from host2net.h.
(back ported from commit 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Whitelist allowed packet
types.
--
The keyring DB code did not reject packets which don't belong into a
keyring. If for example the keyblock contains a literal data packet
it is expected that the processing code stops at the data packet and
reads from the input stream which is referenced from the data packets.
Obviously the keyring processing code does not and cannot do that.
However, when exporting this messes up the IOBUF and leads to an
invalid read of sizeof (int).
We now skip all packets which are not allowed in a keyring.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
(back ported from commit f0f71a721ccd7ab9e40b8b6b028b59632c0cc648)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/build-packet.c (write_fake_data): Take care of a NULL stored as
opaque MPI.
--
Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
(back ported from commit 0835d2f44ef62eab51fce6a927908f544e01cf8f)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Always allocate a packet.
--
Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(back ported from commit 39978487863066e59bb657f5fe4e8baab510da7e)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/parse-packet.c (MAX_KEY_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
(MAX_UID_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
(MAX_COMMENT_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
(MAX_ATTR_PACKET_LENGTH): New.
(parse_key): Limit the size of a key packet to 256k.
(parse_user_id): Use macro for the packet size limit.
(parse_attribute): Ditto.
(parse_comment): Ditto.
--
Without that it is possible to force gpg to allocate large amounts of
memory by using a bad encoded MPI. This would be an too easy DoS.
Another way to mitigate would be to change the MPI read function to
allocate memory dynamically while reading the MPI. However, that
complicates and possibly slows down the code. A too large key packet
is in any case a sign for broken data and thus gpg should not use it.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
GnuPG-bug-id: 1823
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(back ported from commit 382ba4b137b42d5f25a7e256bb7c053ee5ac7b64)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/keygen.c (ask_algo): Add list of strings.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(backported from commit b1d5ed6ac842469afcb84868d0f6641dc286a6c7)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/keyedit.c (subkey_expire_warning): New.
keyedit_menu): Call it when needed.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1715
The heuristic to detect a problem is not very advanced but it should
catch the most common cases.
(backported from commit ae3d1bbb65b65cf3c57bb14886be120f5e31635d)
[dkg: rebased to STABLE-BRANCH-1-4]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/parse-packet.c (can_handle_critical): Check content length
before calling can_handle_critical_notation.
--
The problem was found by Jan Bee and gniibe proposed the used fix.
Thanks.
This bug can't be exploited: Only if the announced length of the
notation is 21 or 32 a memcmp against fixed strings using that length
would be done. The compared data is followed by the actual signature
and thus it is highly likely that not even read of unallocated memory
will happen. Nevertheless such a bug needs to be fixed.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
