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gpg: Reject signatures made with MD5.
* g10/gpg.c: Add option --allow-weak-digest-algos.
(main): Set option also in PGP2 mode.
* g10/options.h (struct opt): Add flags.allow_weak_digest_algos.
* g10/sig-check.c (do_check): Reject MD5 signatures.
* tests/openpgp/gpg.conf.tmpl: Add allow_weak_digest_algos.
--
(cherry picked from commit f90cfe6b66
)
Resolved conflicts:
g10/gpg.c - adjust.
tests/openpgp/defs.inc - no changes
This commit is contained in:
parent
fc30a414d8
commit
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@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ no-secmem-warning
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no-permission-warning
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batch
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no-auto-check-trustdb
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allow-weak-digest-algos
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@ -2178,7 +2178,7 @@ available, but the MIT release is a good common baseline.
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This option implies
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@option{--rfc1991 --disable-mdc --no-force-v4-certs
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--escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs
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--escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs --allow-weak-digest-algos
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--cipher-algo IDEA --digest-algo MD5 --compress-algo ZIP}.
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It also disables @option{--textmode} when encrypting.
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@ -2608,6 +2608,13 @@ necessary to get as much data as possible out of the corrupt message.
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However, be aware that a MDC protection failure may also mean that the
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message was tampered with intentionally by an attacker.
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@item --allow-weak-digest-algos
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@opindex allow-weak-digest-algos
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Signatures made with the broken MD5 algorithm are normally rejected
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with an ``invalid digest algorithm'' message. This option allows the
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verification of signatures made with such weak algorithms.
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@item --no-default-keyring
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@opindex no-default-keyring
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Do not add the default keyrings to the list of keyrings. Note that
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@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
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oDisableDSA2,
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oAllowMultipleMessages,
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oNoAllowMultipleMessages,
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oAllowWeakDigestAlgos,
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oNoop
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};
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@ -725,6 +726,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
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{ oDisableDSA2, "disable-dsa2", 0, "@"},
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{ oAllowMultipleMessages, "allow-multiple-messages", 0, "@"},
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{ oNoAllowMultipleMessages, "no-allow-multiple-messages", 0, "@"},
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{ oAllowWeakDigestAlgos, "allow-weak-digest-algos", 0, "@"},
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/* These two are aliases to help users of the PGP command line
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product use gpg with minimal pain. Many commands are common
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@ -2876,6 +2878,10 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
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opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages=0;
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break;
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case oAllowWeakDigestAlgos:
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opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
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break;
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case oNoop: break;
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default : pargs.err = configfp? 1:2; break;
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@ -3043,6 +3049,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
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opt.pgp2_workarounds = 1;
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opt.ask_sig_expire = 0;
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opt.ask_cert_expire = 0;
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opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos = 1;
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xfree(def_digest_string);
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def_digest_string = xstrdup("md5");
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xfree(s2k_digest_string);
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@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ struct
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unsigned int utf8_filename:1;
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unsigned int dsa2:1;
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unsigned int allow_multiple_messages:1;
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unsigned int allow_weak_digest_algos:1;
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unsigned int large_rsa:1;
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} flags;
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@ -243,6 +243,22 @@ do_check( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest,
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if( (rc=do_check_messages(pk,sig,r_expired,r_revoked)) )
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return rc;
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if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
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&& !opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos)
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{
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static int shown;
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if (!shown)
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{
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log_info
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(_("Note: signatures using the %s algorithm are rejected\n"),
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"MD5");
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shown = 1;
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}
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return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
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}
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/* make sure the digest algo is enabled (in case of a detached signature)*/
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md_enable( digest, sig->digest_algo );
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