* g10/packet.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_VERIFY): New.
* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): Pass new flag also to requested
usage.
(finish_lookup): Introduce a verify_mode.
--
Fixes-commit: da0164efc7f32013bc24d97b9afa9f8d67c318bb
GnuPG-bug-id: 7547
* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey): Factor code out to ...
(get_pubkey_bykid): new. Add feature to return the keyblock.
(get_pubkey_for_sig): Add arg r_keyblock to return the used keyblock.
Request a signing usage.
(get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): Remove.
(finish_lookup): Improve debug output.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature): Add arg r_keyblock and pass it
down.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
(check_sig_and_print): Use the keyblock returned by do_check_sig to
show further information instead of looking it up again with
get_pubkeyblock_for_sig. Also re-check the signature after the import
of an included keyblock.
--
The problem here is that it is possible to import a key from someone
who added a signature subkey from another public key and thus inhibits
that a good signature good be verified.
Such a malicious key signature subkey must have been created w/o the
mandatory backsig which bind a signature subkey to its primary key.
For encryption subkeys this is not an issue because the existence of a
decryption private key is all you need to decrypt something and then
it does not matter if the public subkey or its binding signature has
been put below another primary key; in fact we do the latter for
ADSKs.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7527
Backported-from-master: 48978ccb4e20866472ef18436a32744350a65158
* doc/Makefile.am: Ship gnupg.7.html with other html, not with
manpages.
--
Without this change, gnupg.7.html gets placed in /usr/share/manh/
Since it can't be correctly rendered by groff, this is undesirable.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
* g10/getkey.c (get_keyblock_byfpr_fast): Add arg primary_only and
implement.
* g10/import.c (import_one_real): Simplify filling the fpr buffer with
zeroes.
(import_one_real): Find key only by primary fingerprint.
--
This should have been done early: When looking up the original
keyblock we want to update, we need to lookup it up only using the
primary key. This avoids to find a key which has the primary key also
has a subkey.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7527
--
(proofread by the debian-l10n-french team)
Changed original patch to use positional arguments for
"un hachage de %1$u bits n'est pa[...]" and at two other places.
* g10/pkglue.c (pk_verify): When fixing R and S, make sure those are
copies.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 7426
Fixing-commit: 0a5a854510fda6e6990938a3fca424df868fe676
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
Also avoid clearing the error by the S code of a failed mpi_print of
R.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/asshelp.c (SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_AGENT): Change from 5 to 8
seconds.
(SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_KEYBOXD): Ditto.
(SECS_TO_WAIT_FOR_DIRMNGR): Ditto.
--
Experience on Windows showed that right after re-booting we may need
some more time to get things up.
* scd/app.c (new_card_lock): New.
(select_application): Scanning is serialized by NEW_CARD_LOCK.
For app_new_register, we hold the W-lock.
(initialize_module): Initialize NEW_CARD_LOCK.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 7402
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* tools/gpg-mail-tube.c (mail_tube_encrypt): Fix content type for an
attached message.
--
We can't use message/rfc822 if we encrypt this message as a simple PGP
file.
* scd/app.c (send_card_and_app_list): Only handle the case with
WANTCARD=NULL.
(app_send_card_list): Follow the change.
(app_send_active_apps): Factor out the case with WANTCARD!=NULL.
--
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/trustdb.c (validate_keys): Use log_info instead of log_error for
not found or expired UTKs.
--
Actually the not-found case used log_error for decades. The
semantically simialr expired case did thus the same. The actual
problem is for example in the import case where gpg exits with a
failure despite that a key validation was requested.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7351
* sm/minip12.c (parse_shrouded_key_bag): Increase size of salt buffer.
--
Reported on the mailing list. The change does not seem to have a big
regression risk, thus applied. See below for the mail
# ------------------------ >8 ------------------------
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2024-September/067312.html
* tools/gpg-mail-tube.c (mail_tube_encrypt): Rename var ct_text for
clarity. Replace debug diagnostic by log_info. Assume text/plain for
missing content-type.
--
Without this fix we would create message/rfc822 attachment instead of
a text/plain attachment with the encrypted body.
* tools/gpg-mail-tube.c (oAsAttach): NEw.
(opts): Add --as-attach.
(opt): Add .as_attach.
(parse_arguments): Set it.
(mail_tube_encrypt): Detect plain text and hhandle new option.
* tools/gpgtar-extract.c (extract_directory): Factor parent directory
creation out to ..
(try_mkdir_p): new.
(extract_regular): Create directory on ENOENT.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Use log_info instead of log_error if the
public key was not found for preference checking.
--
If tarball was created with
tar cf tarball file1.txt foo/file2.txt
the tarball has no entry for foo/ and thus the extraction fails. This
patch fixes this.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7380
The second patch avoid a wrong exist status status line due to the use
of log_error. But the actual cause needs stuill needs tobe
investigated.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_public_key): Increased size of req_usage to 16.
* g10/getkey.c (key_byname): Set allow_adsk in the context if ir was
requested via req_usage.
(finish_lookup): Allow RENC usage matching.
* g10/keyedit.c (append_adsk_to_key): Adjust the assert.
* g10/keygen.c (prepare_adsk): Also allow to find an RENC subkey.
--
If an ADSK is to be added it may happen that an ADSK subkey is found
first and this should then be used even that it does not have the E
usage. However, it used to have that E usage when it was added.
While testing this I found another pecularity: If you do
gpg -k ADSK_SUBKEY_FPR
without the '!' suffix and no corresponding encryption subkey is dound,
you will get an unusabe key error. I hesitate to fix that due to
possible side-effects.
GnuPG-bug-id: 6882
* g10/keyedit.c (keyedit_quick_set_expire): Use actual size of
fingerprint.
--
The size of the fingerprints is either 20 (V4) or 32 (V5). Using the
actual size of the fingerprints fixes the lookup of subkeys with V5
fingerprint.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7298
(cherry picked from commit 79298e87d8436bf0b0bd07c2c1513d10a7eb5823)
* common/homedir.c (_gnupg_socketdir_internal): Check return code
of gnupg_mkdir and handle the case of GPG_ERR_EEXIST.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 7332
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
(cherry picked from commit 71840b57f48680b7555451a29026d9c6de4fe2bc)
* build-aux/speedo.mk (speedo_w32_cflags): Remove -mms-bitfields
because it is for a long time the gcc default. Enable control flow
protection.
--
Note that due to mingw static linking problems with libssp the stack
protector is not yet enabled.
* g10/trustdb.c (copy_key_item): New.
(validate_keys): Use a stripped down UTK list w/o expired keys.
--
This patch makes sure that an expired trusted key is not used for
trust computation. The test case is to delete a trusted key from the
keyring, import a copy of that key which has already expired, check
that a signed key is not anymore fully trusted and finally import a
prolonged version of the trusted key and check that the signed key is
now again fully trusted.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7200
* g10/import.c (import_one_real): Rename non_self to non_self_or_utk.
If not set after chk_self_sigs check whether the imported key is an
ultimately trusted key.
--
The revalidation mark was only set if the imported key had a new key
signature. This is in general correct but not if the imported key is
a trusted key.
GnuPG-bug-id: 7200
* g10/trustdb.c (store_validation_status): Remove arg 'stored'.
(validate_keys): Remove keyhashtable 'stored' which was never used.
--
This has been here since 2003. The variable was never evaluated -
only stored.
Also added some comments.
