* g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Sanitize verbose output.
--
This fixes a forgotten sanitation of user supplied data in a verbose
mode diagnostic. The mention CVE is about using this to inject
status-fd lines into the stderr output. Other harm good as well be
done. Note that GPGME based applications are not affected because
GPGME does not fold status output into stderr.
CVE-id: CVE-2018-12020
GnuPG-bug-id: 4012
(cherry picked from commit 13f135c7a252cc46cff96e75968d92b6dc8dce1b)
* g10/gpg.c (main): Call set_packet_list_mode after assignment of
opt.list_packets.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Don't stop processing with
--list-packets as the comment says.
* g10/options.h (list_packets): Fix the comment.
* g10/parse-packet.c: Fix the condition for opt.list_packets.
--
(backport from 2.0 commit 4f336ed780cc2783395f3ff2b12b3ebb8e097f7b
which is backport of master
commit 52f65281f9743c42a48bf5a3354c9ab0ecdb681a)
Debian-bug-id: 828109
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Only allow relevant algorithms for
encryption.
--
(backported from 2.1 commit c771963140cad7c1c25349bcde27e427effc0058)
* util/pka.c: Rewrite.
(get_pka_info): Add arg fprbuflen. Change callers to pass this.
* util/strgutil.c (ascii_strlwr): New.
* configure.ac: Remove option --disable-dns-pka.
(USE_DNS_PKA): Remove ac_define.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_auto_key_locate): Always include PKA.
--
Note that although PKA is now always build, it will only work if
support for looking up via DNS has not been disabled.
The new PKA only works with the IPGP DNS certtype and shall be used
only to retrieve the fingerprint and optional the key for the first
time. Due to the security problems with DNSSEC the former assumption
to validate the key using DNSSEC is not anymore justified. Instead an
additional layer (e.g. Trust-On-First-Use) needs to be implemented to
track change to the key. Having a solid way of getting a key matching
a mail address is however a must have.
More work needs to go into a redefinition of the --verify-options
pka-lookups and pka-trust-increase. The auto-key-locate mechanism
should also be able to continue key fetching with another method once
the fingerprint has been retrieved with PKA.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This is a backport from master.
(backported from commit 2fc27c8696f5cf2ddf3212397ea49bff115d617b)
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Take care of canceled passpharse
entry.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1761
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(backported from commit 32e85668b82f6fbcb824eea9548970804fb41d9e)
* g10/openfile.c (open_sigfile): Factor some code out to ...
(get_matching_datafile): new function.
* g10/plaintext.c (hash_datafiles): Do not try to find matching file
in batch mode.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a warning if a possibly
matching data file is not used by a standard signatures.
--
Allowing to use the abbreviated form for detached signatures is a long
standing bug which has only been noticed by the public with the
release of 2.1.0. :-(
What we do is to remove the ability to check detached signature in
--batch using the one file abbreviated mode. This should exhibit
problems in scripts which use this insecure practice. We also print a
warning if a matching data file exists but was not considered because
the detached signature was actually a standard signature:
gpgv: Good signature from "Werner Koch (dist sig)"
gpgv: WARNING: not a detached signature; \
file 'gnupg-2.1.0.tar.bz2' was NOT verified!
We can only print a warning because it is possible that a standard
signature is indeed to be verified but by coincidence a file with a
matching name is stored alongside the standard signature.
Reported-by: Simon Nicolussi (to gnupg-users on Nov 7)
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
(backported from commit 69384568f66a48eff3968bb1714aa13925580e9f)
Updated doc/gpg.texi.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_compressed): Remove superfluous check for
an algorithm number of 0.
--
(backport from commit 88633bf3d417aeb5ea0f75508aba8e32adc8acef)
GnuPG-bug-id: 1326, 1684
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Move show_session_key code to ...
* g10/decrypt-data.c (decrypt_data): here.
--
This feature can be used to return the session key for just a part of
a file. For example to downloading just the first 32k of a huge file,
decrypting that incomplete part and while ignoring all the errors
break out the session key. The session key may then be used on the
server to decrypt the entire file without the need to have the private
key on the server.
This is the same feature as
commit 101a54add351ff62793cbfbf3877787c4791f833 for 2.1 and
commit 3ae90ff28c500967cb90b1176299d2ca01ef450f for 2.0.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1389
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* cipher/idea.c: New. Take from Libgcrypt master and adjust for
direct use in GnuPG.
* cipher/idea-stub.c: Remove.
* cipher/Makefile.am: Add idea.c and remove idea-stub.c rules.
* configure.ac: Remove idea-stub code.
* g10/gpg.c (check_permissions): Remove code path for ITEM==2.
(main): Make --load-extension a dummy option.
* g10/keygen.c (keygen_set_std_prefs): Include IDEA only in PGP2
compatibility mode.
* g10/misc.c (idea_cipher_warn): Remove. Also remove all callers.
* g10/seckey-cert.c (do_check): Remove emitting of STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA.
* g10/status.c (get_status_string): Remove STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA.
* g10/status.h (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA): Remove.
--
To keep the number of actually used algorithms low, we support IDEA
only in a basically read-only way (unless --pgp2 is used during key
generation). It does not make sense to suggest the use of this old 64
bit blocksize algorithm. However, there is old data available where
it might be helpful to have IDEA available.
This does not mean we have any kind of ECC support now. It is merely
to avoid printing a question mark for the algorithm.
Trailing white space changes as usual.
(list_keyblock_print), pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust), keyedit.c
(menu_showphoto), photoid.c (generate_photo_id, show_photos), misc.c
(pct_expando): Add %v and %V expandos so that displaying photo IDs
can show the attribute validity tag (%v) and string (%V). Originally
by Daniel Gillmor.
the literals count.
* verify.c (verify_one_file), decrypt.c (decrypt_messages): Call it
here so we allow multiple literals in --multifile mode (in different
files - not concatenated together).
pka-lookups, not pka-lookup.
* options.h, gpg.c (main), keyedit.c [cmds], sig-check.c
(signature_check2): Rename "backsign" to "cross-certify" as a more
accurate name.
(check_signatures_trust), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print,
pka_uri_from_sig), trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Some tweaks to PKA so that it
is a verify-option now.
(keyserver_import_pka), card-util.c (fetch_url): Always require a
scheme:// for keyserver URLs except when used as part of the
--keyserver command for backwards compatibility.
extra check for a bad passphrase and/or unknown cipher algorithm here.
We'll fail quite happily later, and usually with a better error
message to boot.
showing the user ID as mainproc.c:print_pkenc_list.
* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Allow translating the quotes around the
user ID.
* card-util.c, g10.c, photoid.c, trustdb.c: The last of the \"%s\" -> `%s'
quoting for things that aren't user IDs.
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): If there is no keyserver host, print the
whole URI since it is self-contained.
expired user IDs. Also, once we've established that a given uid cannot or
will not be signed, don't continue to ask about each sig.
* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc), seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check the S2K
hash algorithm before we try to generate a passphrase using it. This
prevents hitting BUG() when generating a passphrase using a hash that we
don't have.
* sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Allow using --force-mdc in --sign
--symmetric messages.
