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* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Properly handle remaking a self-sig on revoked or

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expired user IDs.  Also, once we've established that a given uid cannot or
will not be signed, don't continue to ask about each sig.

* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc), seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check the S2K
hash algorithm before we try to generate a passphrase using it.  This
prevents hitting BUG() when generating a passphrase using a hash that we
don't have.

* sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Allow using --force-mdc in --sign
--symmetric messages.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2004-07-15 21:16:54 +00:00
parent 2cba999f22
commit 673894ef48
5 changed files with 54 additions and 5 deletions
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13
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
2004-07-15 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Properly handle remaking a self-sig on
revoked or expired user IDs. Also, once we've established that a
given uid cannot or will not be signed, don't continue to ask
about each sig.
* mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc), seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check
the S2K hash algorithm before we try to generate a passphrase
using it. This prevents hitting BUG() when generating a
passphrase using a hash that we don't have.
* sign.c (sign_symencrypt_file): Allow using --force-mdc in --sign
--symmetric messages.
* g10.c (main): Alias --charset as --display-charset to help avoid
the continuing confusion and make room for possible changes in
devel.

26
g10/keyedit.c
View File

@ -492,7 +492,9 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
{
tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."),user);
if(opt.expert)
if(selfsig)
tty_printf("\n");
else if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf("\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
@ -500,11 +502,15 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
}
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
@ -512,7 +518,9 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
{
tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is expired."),user);
if(opt.expert)
if(selfsig)
tty_printf("\n");
else if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf("\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
@ -520,11 +528,15 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
}
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
@ -541,11 +553,15 @@ sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
}
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
uidnode=NULL;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}

7
g10/mainproc.c
View File

@ -304,6 +304,13 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
else
log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo))
{
log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
s=NULL;
}
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
if(!s || opt.list_only)
goto leave;

6
g10/seckey-cert.c
View File

@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
}
return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
}
if(check_digest_algo(sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo))
{
log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"),
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo);
return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
if( !sk->is_primary ) {

7
g10/sign.c
View File

@ -1145,6 +1145,13 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr)
goto leave;
}
/* We have no way to tell if the recipient can handle messages
with an MDC, so this defaults to no. Perhaps in a few years,
this can be defaulted to yes. Note that like regular
encrypting, --force-mdc overrides --disable-mdc. */
if(opt.force_mdc)
cfx.dek->use_mdc=1;
/* now create the outfile */
rc = open_outfile (fname, opt.armor? 1:0, &out);
if (rc)