windoze version works again

This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1998-10-06 12:10:02 +00:00
parent 6f73ec963a
commit f04db56311
27 changed files with 803 additions and 409 deletions

11
AUTHORS
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@ -10,11 +10,14 @@ mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca
GNUPG Natural Resources Canada 1998-08-11
Disclaims changes by Matthew Skala.
GNUPG Niklas Hernaeus ??????????
(Weak key patches)
GNUPG Michael Roth Germany 1998-09-17
Assigns changes (wrote cipher/des.c).
mroth@nessie.de
GNUPG Niklas Hernaeus 1998-09-18
Disclaims changes (Weak key patches).
nh@df.lth.se
GNUPG Michael Roth ??????????
(DES code)
TRANSLATIONS Marco d'Itri 1997-02-22
Disclaim

3
THANKS
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@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Ian McKellar imckellar@harvestroad.com.au
James Troup james@nocrew.org
Jean-loup Gailly gzip@prep.ai.mit.edu
Jens Bachem bachem@rrz.uni-koeln.de
John A. Martin jam@jamux.com
Jörg Schilling schilling@fokus.gmd.de
Karl Fogel kfogel@guanabana.onshore.com
Karsten Thygesen karthy@kom.auc.dk
@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ Max Valianskiy maxcom@maxcom.ml.org
Michael Roth mroth@nessie.de
Michael Sobolev mss@despair.transas.com
Nicolas Graner Nicolas.Graner@cri.u-psud.fr
Niklas Hernaeus nh@sleipner.df.lth.se
Niklas Hernaeus [Please don't spam him]
Nimrod Zimerman zimerman@forfree.at
Oskari Jääskeläinen f33003a@cc.hut.fi
Paul D. Smith psmith@baynetworks.com

2
TODO
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@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
* check for working mmap()
* after creating a new uid, the preferences in the trustdb are not updated.
We should always sync the trustdb in such cases.

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@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
Tue Oct 6 10:06:32 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* rand-unix.c (HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY): Fixed (was ..GETTIMEOFTIME :-)
* rand-dummy.c (HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY): Ditto.
Mon Sep 28 13:23:09 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* md.c (md_digest): New.

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_GETHRTIME
#include <sys/times.h>
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFTIME
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
#include <sys/times.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef __MINGW32__
#include <process.h>
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ fast_random_poll()
tv = gethrtime();
add_randomness( &tv, sizeof(tv), 1 );
}
#elif HAVE_GETTIMEOFTIME
#elif HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
{ struct timeval tv;
if( gettimeofday( &tv, NULL ) )
BUG();
@ -80,9 +83,12 @@ fast_random_poll()
add_randomness( &tv.tv_usec, sizeof(tv.tv_usec), 1 );
}
#else /* use times */
{ struct tms buf;
{
#ifndef __MINGW32__
struct tms buf;
times( &buf );
add_randomness( &buf, sizeof buf, 1 );
#endif
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE

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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_GETHRTIME
#include <sys/times.h>
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETTIMEOFTIME
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
#include <sys/times.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETRUSAGE
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ fast_random_poll()
tv = gethrtime();
add_randomness( &tv, sizeof(tv), 1 );
}
#elif HAVE_GETTIMEOFTIME
#elif HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
{ struct timeval tv;
if( gettimeofday( &tv, NULL ) )
BUG();

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@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ dnl Checks for library functions.
AC_FUNC_VPRINTF
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strerror stpcpy strlwr tcgetattr rand strtoul mmap)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memmove gettimeofday getrusage gethrtime setrlimit)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(atexit raise getpagesize strftime)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(memicmp atexit raise getpagesize strftime)
WK_CHECK_MLOCK

263
doc/FAQ Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
GNU Privacy Guard -- Frequently Asked Questions
=================================================
This FAQ is partly compiled from messages of the developers mailing list.
Many thanks to Kirk Fort, Brian Warner, ...
Q: How does this whole thing work?
A: To generate a secret/public keypair, run
gpg --gen-key
and choose the default values.
Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by the
matching secret key. The secret key is protected by a password, the
public key is not.
So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message with his
public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by having the secret
key and putting in the password to use his secret key.
GNUPG is also usefull for signing things. Things that are encrypted with
the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign something, a
hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some form encoded
with the secret
key. If someone has your public key, they can verify that it is from
you and that it hasn't changed by checking the encoded form of the
hash with the public key.
A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public keyring
where you store yours and your friend's public keys. You have a secret
keyring that you keep your secret key on, and be very careful with this
secret keyring: Never ever give anyone else access to it and use a *good*
passphrase to protect the data in it.
You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg -c'.
It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and secret
keys. If the person you send the data to knows that passphrase, they can
decrypt it. This is usually most usefull for encrypting things to
yourself, although you can encrypt things to your own public key in the
same way. It should be used for communication with partners you know and
where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy friend or
your wife). The advantage is that you can chnage the passphrase from time
to time and decrease the risk, that many old messages may be decryptted by
people who accidently got your passphrase.
You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg --import'
and 'gpg --export' option. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will export secret
keys. This is normally not usefull, but you can generate the key on one
machine then move it to another machine.
Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option. When you sign a
key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the
person it says it comes from. You should be very sure that is really
taht person: You should verify the key fingerprint
gpg --fingerprint user-id
over phone (if you really know the voice of the other person) or at
a key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences)
or at a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group.
Hmm, what else. You may use the option "-o filename" to force output
to this filename (use "-" to force output to stdout).
"-r" just lets you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with)
on the command line instead of typing it interactively.
Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some weird
binary format. If you want to have things appear in ascii text that is
readable, just add the '-a' option. But the preferred methos is to use
a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more).
There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefor GNUPG) system;
to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message instead of only
encrypting it.
Q: What is the recommended key size?
A: 1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain ElGamal
signatures this is sufficient as the size of the hash
is probably the weakest link if the keyssize is larger
than 1024 bits. Encryption keys may have greater sizes,
but you should than check the fingerprint of this key.
Q: Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?
A: These are ElGamal Key generated by GNUPG in v3 (rfc1991)
packets. The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm
identifier for ElGamal keys which are usable for signatures
and encryption from 16 to 20. GNUPG now uses 20 when it
generates new ElGamal keys but still accept 16 (which is
according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this key is in
a v3 packet. GNUPG is the only program which had used
these v3 ElGamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe.
Q: Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with my public key.
A: PGP Inc refuses to accept ElGamal keys of type 20 even for
encryption. They only supports type 16 (which are identical
at least for decryption). To be better interoperable, GNUPG
(starting with version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the
ElGamal subkey which is created if the default key algorithm
is choosen. You may add an type 16 ElGamal key to your public
key which is easy as your key signatures are still valid.
Q: I can't delete a user id because it is already deleted on my
public keyring.
A: Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is
no direct way to do this. However it is not so complicated
do to it anyway: Create a new user id with exactly the same name,
you will notice that there are two identical user ids on the
secret ring now. Now select this user id and delete it; both
user ids from the secret ring will be remoed.
Q: How can I encrypt a message in way pgp 2.x is able to decrypt it later?
A: You can't do that because pgp 2.x normally uses IDEA which is not
supported by GNUPG because it is patented, but if you have a modified
version of PGP you can try this:
gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ...
Q: How can I conventional encrypt a message, so that PGP can decrypt it?
A: You can't do this for PGP 2. For PGP 5 you should use this:
gpg -c --cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 --no-comment myfile
You may replace "3des" by "cast5"; "blowfish" does not work with
all versions of pgp5. You may also want to put
no-comment
compress-algo 1
into your ~/.gnupg/options file - this does not affect the normal
gnupg operation.
Q: Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?
A: The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that
we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data.
It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I
talked to Ted Ts'o and he commited that the best way to fill the
buffer is to play with your keyboard.
Good security has it's price.
What I do is to hit several times on the shift,control, alternate,
capslock keys, as these keys do not produce any output to the screen.
This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing pgp2 does).
Another problem might be another program which eats up your random bytes
(a program (look at your daemons) that reads from /dev/[u]random).
Q: And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?
A: Don't do this at all!
You should never create keys or even use gnupg on a remote system because
you normally have
no physical control over your secret keyring (which is in most cases
vulnerable to advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage
everyone to only create keys on a local computer (a disconnected
laptop is probably the best choice) and if you need it on your
connected box (I know: We all do this) be sure to have a strong
password for your account, your secret key and trust your Root.
When I check gnupg on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here ;-)
I have the same problem too: it takes *very* long to create the keys,
so I use a special option --quick-random to generate insecure keys which are
only good for some tests.
Q: How does the whole trust thing work?
A: It works more or less like PGP. The difference is, that the trust is
computed at the time it is needed; this is one of the reasons for the
trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures. If you are not
running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust parameter
(ownertrust) to a key. I have plans to use a cache for calculated
trust values to speed up calcualtion.
You can see the calculated trust value using this command:
gpgm --list-keys --with-colons
If the first field is "pub", the second field shows you the trust:
o = Unknown (this key is new to the system)
e = The key has expired
q = Undefined (no value assigned)
n = Don't trust this key at all
m = There is marginal trust in this key
f = The key is full trusted.
u = The key is ultimately trusted; this
is only used for keys for which
the secret key is also available.
You can get a list of the assigned ownertrust values (how far you trust
the owner to correctly sign another another ones key)
gpgm --list-ownertrust
The first field is the fingerprint of the primary key, the second one
the assigned value:
- = No Ownertrust value yet assigned.
n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verifiy others signatures.
m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other keys.
f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys.
u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key.
Please keep these values confidential, as they express some opiones of
you about others. PGP does store these information with the keyring, so
it is not a good idea to publish the keyring instead of exporting the
keyring - gnupg stores the trust in the trust-DB and therefor it is okay
to give the keyring away (but we have a --export command too).
Q: What is the differenc between options and commands?
A: If you do a "gpg --help", you will get two separate lists. The first is a list
of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you run GPG, you *must*
pick exactly one command (**with one exception, see below). You *may* pick one
or more options. The command should, just by convention, come at the end of the
argument list, after all the options. If the command takes a file (all the
basic ones do), the filename comes at the very end. So the basic way to
run gpg is:
gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file
Some options take arguments, for example the --output option (which can be
abbreviated -o) is an option which takes a filename. The option's argument
must follow immediately after the option itself: otherwise gpg doesn't know
which option the argument is supposed to go with. As an option, --output and
its filename must come before the command. The --remote-user (-r) option takes
a name or keyid to encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r
argument. The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options, followed
by the file you wish to encrypt. So use:
gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt
If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read:
gpg --remote-user alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
If you're saving it in a file called ".txt" then you'd probably expect to see
ascii-armored text in there, so you need to add the --armor (-a) option,
which doesn't take any arguments:
gpg --armor --remote-user alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes a bit
clearer:
gpg [--armor] [--remote-user alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt
The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want:
gpg --output secret.txt --remote-user alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), gnupg assumes this is
an option and may complain. To avoid this you have either to use
"./-a.txt" or stop the option and command processing with two hyphens:
"-- -a.txt".
** the exception: signing and encrypting at the same time. Use
gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt
[That's it for now.)]

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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Sat Oct 3 11:01:21 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* keygen.c (ask_alogo): enable ElGamal enc-only only for addmode.
Wed Sep 30 10:15:33 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* import.c (import_one): Fixed update of wrong keyblock.

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@ -1078,6 +1078,8 @@ enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk, int with_subkeys )
}
if( !sk ) { /* free the context */
if( c->iobuf )
iobuf_close(c->iobuf);
m_free( c );
*context = NULL;
return 0;

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@ -384,7 +384,8 @@ ask_algo( int *ret_v4, int addmode )
if( !addmode )
tty_printf(_(" (%d) DSA and ElGamal (default)\n"), 1 );
tty_printf( _(" (%d) ElGamal (sign and encrypt)\n"), 2 );
tty_printf( _(" (%d) ElGamal (encrypt only)\n"), 3 );
if( addmode )
tty_printf( _(" (%d) ElGamal (encrypt only)\n"), 3 );
tty_printf( _(" (%d) DSA (sign only)\n"), 4 );
tty_printf( _(" (%d) ElGamal in a v3 packet\n"), 5 );
@ -402,7 +403,7 @@ ask_algo( int *ret_v4, int addmode )
algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL;
break;
}
else if( algo == 3 ) {
else if( algo == 3 && addmode ) {
algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E;
break;
}

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@ -848,7 +848,9 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL );
if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
write_status( rc? STATUS_BADSIG : STATUS_GOODSIG );
char *us = get_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
write_status_text( rc? STATUS_BADSIG : STATUS_GOODSIG, us );
m_free(us);
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
print_keyid( stderr, sig->keyid );

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@ -111,13 +111,9 @@ add_keyblock_resource( const char *filename, int force, int secret )
if( i == MAX_RESOURCES )
return G10ERR_RESOURCE_LIMIT;
#if __MINGW32__
iobuf = NULL;
#else
iobuf = iobuf_open( filename );
if( !iobuf && !force )
return G10ERR_OPEN_FILE;
#endif
if( !iobuf ) {
iobuf = iobuf_create( filename );
@ -129,6 +125,12 @@ add_keyblock_resource( const char *filename, int force, int secret )
log_info("%s: keyring created\n", filename );
}
#ifdef __MINGW32__
/* must close it again */
iobuf_close( iobuf );
iobuf = NULL;
#endif
resource_table[i].used = 1;
resource_table[i].secret = !!secret;
resource_table[i].fname = m_strdup(filename);
@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ read_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
* all others are reserved!
* Note that you do not need a search prior to this function,
* only a handle is needed.
* NOTE: It is not allowed to do an insert/update/delte with this
* NOTE: It is not allowed to do an insert/update/delete with this
* keyblock, if you want to do this, use search/read!
*/
int
@ -706,7 +708,6 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs )
}
/****************
* Perform insert/delete/update operation.
* mode 1 = insert
@ -768,10 +769,33 @@ keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root )
}
/* create the new file */
#ifdef __MINGW32__
/* Here is another Windoze bug?:
* you cant rename("pubring.gpg.tmp", "pubring.gpg");
* but rename("pubring.gpg.tmp", "pubring.aaa");
* works. So we replace .gpg by .bak or .tmp
*/
if( strlen(rentry->fname) > 4
&& !strcmp(rentry->fname+strlen(rentry->fname)-4, ".gpg") ) {
bakfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 1 );
strcpy(bakfname,rentry->fname);
strcpy(bakfname+strlen(rentry->fname)-4, ".bak");
tmpfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 1 );
strcpy(tmpfname,rentry->fname);
strcpy(tmpfname+strlen(rentry->fname)-4, ".tmp");
}
else { /* file does not end with gpg; hmmm */
bakfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 5 );
strcpy(stpcpy(bakfname,rentry->fname),".bak");
tmpfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 5 );
strcpy(stpcpy(tmpfname,rentry->fname),".tmp");
}
#else
bakfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 2 );
strcpy(stpcpy(bakfname,rentry->fname),"~");
tmpfname = m_alloc( strlen( rentry->fname ) + 5 );
strcpy(stpcpy(tmpfname,rentry->fname),".tmp");
#endif
newfp = iobuf_create( tmpfname );
if( !newfp ) {
log_error("%s: can't create: %s\n", tmpfname, strerror(errno) );
@ -857,6 +881,7 @@ keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root )
goto leave;
}
/* if the new file is a secring, restrict the permissions */
#ifndef __MINGW32__
if( rentry->secret ) {
if( chmod( tmpfname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR ) ) {
log_error("%s: chmod failed: %s\n",
@ -865,9 +890,11 @@ keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root )
goto leave;
}
}
#endif
/* rename and make backup file */
if( !rentry->secret ) { /* but not for secret keyrings */
#if __MINGW32__
#ifdef __MINGW32__
remove( bakfname );
#endif
if( rename( rentry->fname, bakfname ) ) {
@ -877,7 +904,7 @@ keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root )
goto leave;
}
}
#if __MINGW32__
#ifdef __MINGW32__
remove( rentry->fname );
#endif
if( rename( tmpfname, rentry->fname ) ) {

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@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ signal_name( int signum )
return sys_siglist[signum];
#else
static char buf[20];
sprintf( "signal %d", signum );
sprintf(buf, "signal %d", signum );
return buf;
#endif
}
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ got_usr_signal( int sig )
caught_sigusr1 = 1;
}
#ifndef __MINGW32__
static void
do_sigaction( int sig, struct sigaction *nact )
{
@ -80,10 +80,12 @@ do_sigaction( int sig, struct sigaction *nact )
if( oact.sa_handler != SIG_IGN )
sigaction( sig, nact, NULL);
}
#endif
void
init_signals()
{
#ifndef __MINGW32__
struct sigaction nact;
nact.sa_handler = got_fatal_signal;
@ -97,12 +99,14 @@ init_signals()
do_sigaction( SIGSEGV, &nact );
nact.sa_handler = got_usr_signal;
sigaction( SIGUSR1, &nact, NULL );
#endif
}
void
pause_on_sigusr( int which )
{
#ifndef __MINGW32__
sigset_t mask, oldmask;
assert( which == 1 );
@ -114,5 +118,6 @@ pause_on_sigusr( int which )
sigsuspend( &oldmask );
caught_sigusr1 = 0;
sigprocmask( SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL );
#endif
}

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@ -86,13 +86,17 @@ tdbio_set_dbname( const char *new_dbname, int create )
}
*p = '/';
fp =fopen( fname, "w" );
fp =fopen( fname, "wb" );
if( !fp )
log_fatal_f( fname, _("can't create: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
fclose(fp);
m_free(db_name);
db_name = fname;
#ifdef __MINGW32__
db_fd = open( db_name, O_RDWR | O_BINARY );
#else
db_fd = open( db_name, O_RDWR );
#endif
if( db_fd == -1 )
log_fatal_f( db_name, _("can't open: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
@ -131,7 +135,11 @@ open_db()
TRUSTREC rec;
assert( db_fd == -1 );
#ifdef __MINGW32__
db_fd = open( db_name, O_RDWR | O_BINARY );
#else
db_fd = open( db_name, O_RDWR );
#endif
if( db_fd == -1 )
log_fatal_f( db_name, _("can't open: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
if( tdbio_read_record( 0, &rec, RECTYPE_VER ) )

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@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ verify_own_keys()
rc = 0;
leave:
enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0 ); /* free context */
free_secret_key( sk );
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
@ -1945,6 +1946,8 @@ clear_trust_checked_flag( PKT_public_key *pk )
* Update all the info from the public keyblock, the signatures-checked
* flag is reset. The key must already exist in the keydb.
* Note: This function clears all keyblock flags.
*
* Implementation of this function needs a cache for tdbio record updates
*/
int
update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock )
@ -1954,6 +1957,7 @@ update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock )
TRUSTREC drec;
int modified = 0;
int rc = 0;
ulong recno, newrecno;
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
@ -1961,20 +1965,172 @@ update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock )
rc = get_dir_record( primary_pk, &drec );
if( rc )
return rc;
#if 0
/* fixme: start a transaction */
/* now upate keys and user ids */
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fprlen;
TRUSTREC krec;
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
/* do we already have this key? */
for( recno=drec.r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
rc = tdbio_read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
if( rc ) {
log_error("lid %lu: read key record failed: %s\n",
primary_pk->local_id, g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
if( krec.r.key.fingerprint_len == fprlen
&& !memcmp( krec.r.key.fingerprint_len, fpr, fprlen ) )
break;
}
if( recno ) { /* yes */
/* here we would compare/update the keyflags */
}
else { /* no: insert this new key */
memset( krec, 0, sizeof(krec) );
krec.rectype = RECTYPE_KEY;
krec.r.key.pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
krec.r.key.fingerprint_len = fprlen;
memcpy(krec.r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen );
krec.recnum = newrecno = tdbio_new_recnum();
if( tdbio_write_record( krec ) ) {
log_error("writing key record failed\n");
rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
goto leave;
}
/* and put this new record at the end of the keylist */
if( !(recno=drec.r.dir.keylist) ) {
/* this is the first key */
drec.r.dir.keylist = newrecno;
modified = 1;
}
else { /* we already have key, append it to the list */
for( ; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
rc = tdbio_read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
if( rc ) {
log_error("lid %lu: read key record failed: %s\n",
primary_pk->local_id, g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
}
krec.r.key.next = newrecno;
if( tdbio_write_record( krec ) ) {
log_error("writing key record failed\n");
rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
goto leave;
}
}
} /* end insert new key */
} /* end packet type public key packet */
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
TRUSTREC urec;
byte nhash[20];
rmd160_hash_buffer( nhash, uid->name, uid->len );
for( recno=dir->r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = urec->r.uid.next ) {
rc = tdbio_read_record( recno, urec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( rc ) {
if( rc == -1 )
rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE
log_error("lid %lu, uid %02X%02X: read error\n"
primary_pk->local_id, nhash[18], nhash[19] );
goto leave;
}
if( !memcmp( nhash, urec->r.uid.namehash, 20 ) )
break;
}
if( !recno ) { /* new user id */
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
/* must verify this selfsignature here, so that we can
* build the preference record and validate the uid record
*/
if( !uidlist ) {
log_error("key %08lX: self-signature without user id\n",
(ulong)keyid[1] );
}
else if( (rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL ))) {
log_error("key %08lX, uid %02X%02X: "
"invalid self-signature: %s\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], uidlist->r.uid.namehash[18],
uidlist->r.uid.namehash[19], g10_errstr(rc) );
rc = 0;
}
else { /* build the prefrecord */
static struct {
sigsubpkttype_t subpkttype;
int preftype;
} prefs[] = {
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, PREFTYPE_SYM },
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, PREFTYPE_HASH },
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, PREFTYPE_COMPR },
{ 0, 0 }
};
const byte *s;
size_t n;
int k, i;
assert(uidlist);
assert(!uidlist->help_pref);
uidlist->mark |= 1; /* mark valid */
i = 0;
for(k=0; prefs[k].subpkttype; k++ ) {
s = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, prefs[k].subpkttype, &n );
if( s ) {
while( n ) {
if( !i || i >= ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD ) {
rec = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *rec );
rec->rectype = RECTYPE_PREF;
rec->next = uidlist->help_pref;
uidlist->help_pref = rec;
i = 0;
}
rec->r.pref.data[i++] = prefs[k].preftype;
rec->r.pref.data[i++] = *s++;
n--;
}
}
}
}
}
else if( 0 /* is revocation sig etc */ ) {
/* handle it here */
}
else { /* not a selfsignature */
}
}
} /* end loop over all nodes */
if( drec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED ) /* <<--- FIXME: remove this! */
modified = 1;
if( modified ) {
leave:
if( rc )
; /* fixme: cancel transaction */
else if( modified ) {
/* reset the checked flag */
drec.r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_CHECKED;
rc = tdbio_write_record( &drec );
if( rc )
log_error("update_trust_record: write dir record failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
/* fixme: commit_transaction */
}
#endif
return rc;
}
@ -2004,6 +2160,11 @@ rel_mem_uidnode( u32 *keyid, int err, TRUSTREC *rec )
*
* We build everything we can do at this point. We cannot build
* the sig records, because their LIDs are needed and we may not have them.
*
*
* FIXME: This is too complicated: Most of the stuff is duplicated in
* update_trustdb and it will be easier to use a trust record cache instead
* of the complicated lists.
*/
int
insert_trust_record( PKT_public_key *orig_pk )

View File

@ -146,13 +146,16 @@ STRLIST add_to_strlist( STRLIST *list, const char *string );
STRLIST append_to_strlist( STRLIST *list, const char *string );
STRLIST strlist_prev( STRLIST head, STRLIST node );
STRLIST strlist_last( STRLIST node );
int memicmp( const char *a, const char *b, size_t n );
const char *memistr( const char *buf, size_t buflen, const char *sub );
char *mem2str( char *, const void *, size_t);
char *trim_spaces( char *string );
int string_count_chr( const char *string, int c );
#define stricmp(a,b) strcasecmp((a),(b))
#ifndef HAVE_MEMICMP
int memicmp( const char *a, const char *b, size_t n );
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STPCPY
char *stpcpy(char *a,const char *b);
#endif

View File

@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
util/secmem.c
util/argparse.c
util/miscutil.c
util/errors.c
util/logger.c
# cipher
cipher/random.c

186
po/de.po
View File

@ -27,6 +27,192 @@ msgstr "ja"
msgid "yY"
msgstr "jJ"
#: util/errors.c:54
msgid "General error"
msgstr "Allgemeiner Fehler"
#: util/errors.c:55
msgid "Unknown packet type"
msgstr "Unbekannter Packet Typ"
#: util/errors.c:56
msgid "Unknown version"
msgstr "Unbekannte Version"
#: util/errors.c:57
msgid "Unknown pubkey algorithm"
msgstr "Unbekanntes Public-Key Verfahren"
#: util/errors.c:58
msgid "Unknown digest algorithm"
msgstr "Unbekannte Hashmethode"
#: util/errors.c:59
msgid "Bad public key"
msgstr "Falscher öffentlicher Schüssel"
#: util/errors.c:60
msgid "Bad secret key"
msgstr "Falcher geheimer Schlüssel"
#: util/errors.c:61
msgid "Bad signature"
msgstr "Falsche Signatur"
#: util/errors.c:62
msgid "Checksum error"
msgstr "Prüfsummen Fehler"
#: util/errors.c:63
msgid "Bad passphrase"
msgstr "Falsche \"Passphrase\""
#: util/errors.c:64
msgid "Public key not found"
msgstr "Öffentlicher Schlüssel nicht gefunden"
#: util/errors.c:65
msgid "Unknown cipher algorithm"
msgstr "Unbekanntes Verschlüsselungsverfahren"
#: util/errors.c:66
msgid "Can't open the keyring"
msgstr "Der Schlüsselring kann nicht geöffnet werden"
#: util/errors.c:67
msgid "Invalid packet"
msgstr "Ungültiges Packet"
#: util/errors.c:68
msgid "Invalid armor"
msgstr "Ungültige ASCII-Hülle"
#: util/errors.c:69
msgid "No such user id"
msgstr "Keine User-ID"
#: util/errors.c:70
msgid "Secret key not available"
msgstr "Geheimer Schlüssel ist nicht vorhanden"
#: util/errors.c:71
msgid "Wrong secret key used"
msgstr "Falscher geheimer Schlüssel benutzt"
#: util/errors.c:72
msgid "Not supported"
msgstr "Wird nicht unterstützt"
#: util/errors.c:73
msgid "Bad key"
msgstr "Falscher Schlüssel"
#: util/errors.c:74
msgid "File read error"
msgstr "Dateilesefehler"
#: util/errors.c:75
msgid "File write error"
msgstr "Dateischreibfehler"
#: util/errors.c:76
msgid "Unknown compress algorithm"
msgstr "Unbekanntes Komprimierverfahren"
#: util/errors.c:77
msgid "File open error"
msgstr "Fehler beim öffnen der Datei"
#: util/errors.c:78
msgid "File create error"
msgstr "Fehler beim erzeugen der Datei"
#: util/errors.c:79
msgid "Invalid passphrase"
msgstr "Ungültige \"Passphrase\""
#: util/errors.c:80
msgid "Unimplemented pubkey algorithm"
msgstr "Öffentliches Schlüsselverfahren ist nicht implementiert."
#: util/errors.c:81
msgid "Unimplemented cipher algorithm"
msgstr "Verschlüsselungsverfahren ist nicht implementiert"
#: util/errors.c:82
msgid "Unknown signature class"
msgstr "Unbekannte Signatur-Klasse"
#: util/errors.c:83
msgid "Trust database error"
msgstr "Fehler in der Trust-DB"
#: util/errors.c:84
msgid "Bad MPI"
msgstr "Falsche MPI"
#: util/errors.c:85
msgid "Resource limit"
msgstr "Zu wenig Resourcen"
#: util/errors.c:86
msgid "Invalid keyring"
msgstr "Ungültiger Schlüsselring"
#: util/errors.c:87
msgid "Bad certificate"
msgstr "Falsches Zertifikat"
#: util/errors.c:88
msgid "Malformed user id"
msgstr "Falsch geformte User-ID"
#: util/errors.c:89
msgid "File close error"
msgstr "Fehler beim schließen der Datei"
#: util/errors.c:90
msgid "File rename error"
msgstr "Fehler beim umbennen einer Datei"
#: util/errors.c:91
msgid "File delete error"
msgstr "Fehler beim löchen einer Datei"
#: util/errors.c:92
msgid "Unexpected data"
msgstr "Unerwartete Daten"
#: util/errors.c:93
msgid "Timestamp conflict"
msgstr "Zeitstempel Konflikt"
#: util/errors.c:94
msgid "Unusable pubkey algorithm"
msgstr "Unbenutzbares öffentliches Schlüsselverfahren"
#: util/errors.c:95
msgid "File exists"
msgstr "Date existier bereits"
#: util/errors.c:96
msgid "Weak key"
msgstr "Schwacher Schlüssel"
#: util/logger.c:177
#, c-format
msgid "Ohhhh jeeee ... this is a bug (%s:%d:%s)\n"
msgstr "Ohhh jeeee ... dies ist eine Wanze (Programmfehler) (%s:%d:%s)\n"
#: util/logger.c:183
#, c-format
msgid "you found a bug ... (%s:%d)\n"
msgstr "Sie haben eine Wanze (Programmfehler) gefunden ... (%s:%d)\n"
#: cipher/rand-dummy.c:106
msgid "warning: using insecure random number generator!!\n"
msgstr "Der Zufallszahlengenerator erzeugt keine echten Zufallszahlen!\n"

View File

@ -725,7 +725,22 @@ msgstr ""
#: g10/keygen.c:393
msgid "keygen.algo"
msgstr "Select the algorithm to use:Needs more explanation here."
msgstr ""
"Select the algorithm to use.\n"
"DSA (aka DSS) is the digital signature algorithm which can only be used\n"
"for signatures. This is the suggested algorithm because verification of\n"
"DSA signatures are much faster than those of ElGamal\n"
"ElGamal is a algorithm which can be used for signatures and encryption.\n"
"OpenPGP distunguishs between two flavors of this algorithms: a encrypt only\n"
"and a sign+encrypt; actually it is the same, but some parameters must be\n"
"selected in a special way to create a safe key for signatures: this program\n"
"does this but other OpenPGP implemenations are not required to understand\n"
"the signature+encryption flavor.\n"
"The first (primary) key must always be a key which is capable of signing;\n"
"this is the reason why the ecrytion only ElGamal key is disabled in this.\n"
"You should not select the \"ElGamal in a v3 packet\", because that key is\n"
"not compatible to other OpenPGP implementations."
#: g10/keygen.c:393
msgid "Your selection? "

View File

@ -19,6 +19,13 @@
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#ifdef __MINGW32__
int main( int argc, char **argv )
{
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, not yet available for Windoze\n");
exit(1);
}
#else
static int serverpid = -1;
@ -186,4 +193,4 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
#endif /* !__MINGW32__ */

View File

@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Tue Oct 6 09:53:56 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* strgutil.c (memicmp): Add HAVE_MEMICMP.
Mon Sep 21 19:45:01 1998 Werner Koch (wk@(none))
* secmem.c: New flags to allow suspend/resume of warnings.

View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "errors.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#ifndef HAVE_STRERROR
char *
@ -50,52 +51,52 @@ g10_errstr( int err )
switch( err ) {
case -1: p = "eof"; break;
case 0: p = "okay"; break;
X(GENERAL, "General error")
X(UNKNOWN_PACKET, "Unknown packet type")
X(UNKNOWN_VERSION,"Unknown version")
X(PUBKEY_ALGO ,"Unknown pubkey algorithm")
X(DIGEST_ALGO ,"Unknown digest algorithm")
X(BAD_PUBKEY ,"Bad public key")
X(BAD_SECKEY ,"Bad secret key")
X(BAD_SIGN ,"Bad signature")
X(CHECKSUM , "Checksum error")
X(BAD_PASS , "Bad passphrase")
X(NO_PUBKEY ,"Public key not found")
X(CIPHER_ALGO ,"Unknown cipher algorithm")
X(KEYRING_OPEN ,"Can't open the keyring")
X(INVALID_PACKET ,"Invalid packet")
X(INVALID_ARMOR ,"Invalid armor")
X(NO_USER_ID ,"No such user id")
X(NO_SECKEY ,"Secret key not available")
X(WRONG_SECKEY ,"Wrong secret key used")
X(UNSUPPORTED ,"Not supported")
X(BAD_KEY ,"Bad key")
X(READ_FILE ,"File read error")
X(WRITE_FILE ,"File write error")
X(COMPR_ALGO ,"Unknown compress algorithm")
X(OPEN_FILE ,"File open error")
X(CREATE_FILE ,"File create error")
X(PASSPHRASE ,"Invalid passphrase")
X(NI_PUBKEY ,"Unimplemented pubkey algorithm")
X(NI_CIPHER ,"Unimplemented cipher algorithm")
X(SIG_CLASS ,"Unknown signature class")
X(TRUSTDB ,"Trust database error")
X(BAD_MPI ,"Bad MPI")
X(RESOURCE_LIMIT ,"Resource limit")
X(INV_KEYRING ,"Invalid keyring")
X(BAD_CERT ,"Bad certificate")
X(INV_USER_ID ,"Malformed user id")
X(CLOSE_FILE ,"File close error")
X(RENAME_FILE ,"File rename error")
X(DELETE_FILE ,"File delete error")
X(UNEXPECTED ,"Unexpected data")
X(TIME_CONFLICT ,"Timestamp conflict")
X(WR_PUBKEY_ALGO ,"Unusable pubkey algorithm")
X(FILE_EXISTS ,"File exists")
X(WEAK_KEY ,"Weak key")
X(GENERAL, N_("General error"))
X(UNKNOWN_PACKET, N_("Unknown packet type"))
X(UNKNOWN_VERSION,N_("Unknown version"))
X(PUBKEY_ALGO ,N_("Unknown pubkey algorithm"))
X(DIGEST_ALGO ,N_("Unknown digest algorithm"))
X(BAD_PUBKEY ,N_("Bad public key"))
X(BAD_SECKEY ,N_("Bad secret key"))
X(BAD_SIGN ,N_("Bad signature"))
X(CHECKSUM , N_("Checksum error"))
X(BAD_PASS , N_("Bad passphrase"))
X(NO_PUBKEY ,N_("Public key not found"))
X(CIPHER_ALGO ,N_("Unknown cipher algorithm"))
X(KEYRING_OPEN ,N_("Can't open the keyring"))
X(INVALID_PACKET ,N_("Invalid packet"))
X(INVALID_ARMOR ,N_("Invalid armor"))
X(NO_USER_ID ,N_("No such user id"))
X(NO_SECKEY ,N_("Secret key not available"))
X(WRONG_SECKEY ,N_("Wrong secret key used"))
X(UNSUPPORTED ,N_("Not supported"))
X(BAD_KEY ,N_("Bad key"))
X(READ_FILE ,N_("File read error"))
X(WRITE_FILE ,N_("File write error"))
X(COMPR_ALGO ,N_("Unknown compress algorithm"))
X(OPEN_FILE ,N_("File open error"))
X(CREATE_FILE ,N_("File create error"))
X(PASSPHRASE ,N_("Invalid passphrase"))
X(NI_PUBKEY ,N_("Unimplemented pubkey algorithm"))
X(NI_CIPHER ,N_("Unimplemented cipher algorithm"))
X(SIG_CLASS ,N_("Unknown signature class"))
X(TRUSTDB ,N_("Trust database error"))
X(BAD_MPI ,N_("Bad MPI"))
X(RESOURCE_LIMIT ,N_("Resource limit"))
X(INV_KEYRING ,N_("Invalid keyring"))
X(BAD_CERT ,N_("Bad certificate"))
X(INV_USER_ID ,N_("Malformed user id"))
X(CLOSE_FILE ,N_("File close error"))
X(RENAME_FILE ,N_("File rename error"))
X(DELETE_FILE ,N_("File delete error"))
X(UNEXPECTED ,N_("Unexpected data"))
X(TIME_CONFLICT ,N_("Timestamp conflict"))
X(WR_PUBKEY_ALGO ,N_("Unusable pubkey algorithm"))
X(FILE_EXISTS ,N_("File exists"))
X(WEAK_KEY ,N_("Weak key"))
default: p = buf; sprintf(buf, "g10err=%d", err); break;
}
#undef X
return p;
return _(p);
}

View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "i18n.h"
static char pidstring[15];
static char *pgm_name;
@ -173,13 +174,13 @@ g10_log_bug( const char *fmt, ... )
void
g10_log_bug0( const char *file, int line, const char *func )
{
log_bug("you found a bug ... (%s:%d:%s)\n", file, line, func );
log_bug(_("Ohhhh jeeee ... this is a bug (%s:%d:%s)\n"), file, line, func );
}
#else
void
g10_log_bug0( const char *file, int line )
{
log_bug("you found a bug ... (%s:%d)\n", file, line);
log_bug(_("you found a bug ... (%s:%d)\n"), file, line);
}
#endif

View File

@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ init_pool( size_t n)
}
#endif
if( pool == (void*)-1 )
log_error("can't mmap pool of %u bytes: %s - using malloc\n",
log_info("can't mmap pool of %u bytes: %s - using malloc\n",
(unsigned)poolsize, strerror(errno));
else {
pool_is_mmapped = 1;
@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ void
secmem_init( size_t n )
{
if( !n ) {
#ifndef __MINGW32__
uid_t uid;
disable_secmem=1;
@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ secmem_init( size_t n )
if( setuid( uid ) )
log_fatal("failed to drop setuid\n" );
}
#endif
}
else {
if( n < DEFAULT_POOLSIZE )

View File

@ -92,17 +92,6 @@ strlist_last( STRLIST node )
int
memicmp( const char *a, const char *b, size_t n )
{
for( ; n; n--, a++, b++ )
if( *a != *b && toupper(*(const byte*)a) != toupper(*(const byte*)b) )
return *(const byte *)a - *(const byte*)b;
return 0;
}
/****************
* look for the substring SUB in buffer and return a pointer to that
* substring in BUF or NULL if not found.
@ -217,3 +206,18 @@ strlwr(char *s)
}
#endif
/****************
* mingw32/cpd has a memicmp()
*/
#ifndef HAVE_MEMICMP
int
memicmp( const char *a, const char *b, size_t n )
{
for( ; n; n--, a++, b++ )
if( *a != *b && toupper(*(const byte*)a) != toupper(*(const byte*)b) )
return *(const byte *)a - *(const byte*)b;
return 0;
}
#endif

View File

@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
# Generated automatically from Makefile.in by configure.
# Makefile.in generated automatically by automake 1.2f from Makefile.am
# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation
# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
# Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
# Copyright (C) 1995-1996 Jean-loup Gailly.
# For conditions of distribution and use, see copyright notice in zlib.h
# This is used if a systems lacks support of zlib
SHELL = /bin/sh
srcdir = .
top_srcdir = ..
prefix = /usr/local
exec_prefix = ${prefix}
bindir = ${exec_prefix}/bin
sbindir = ${exec_prefix}/sbin
libexecdir = ${exec_prefix}/libexec
datadir = ${prefix}/share
sysconfdir = ${prefix}/etc
sharedstatedir = ${prefix}/com
localstatedir = ${prefix}/var
libdir = ${exec_prefix}/lib
infodir = ${prefix}/info
mandir = ${prefix}/man
includedir = ${prefix}/include
oldincludedir = /usr/include
pkgdatadir = $(datadir)/gnupg
pkglibdir = $(libdir)/gnupg
pkgincludedir = $(includedir)/gnupg
top_builddir = ..
ACLOCAL = aclocal
AUTOCONF = autoconf
AUTOMAKE = automake
AUTOHEADER = autoheader
INSTALL = /usr/bin/install -c
INSTALL_PROGRAM = ${INSTALL}
INSTALL_DATA = ${INSTALL} -m 644
INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@
transform = s,x,x,
NORMAL_INSTALL = :
PRE_INSTALL = :
POST_INSTALL = :
NORMAL_UNINSTALL = :
PRE_UNINSTALL = :
POST_UNINSTALL = :
build_alias = i586-pc-linux-gnu
build_triplet = i586-pc-linux-gnu
host_alias = i586-pc-linux-gnu
host_triplet = i586-pc-linux-gnu
target_alias = i586-pc-linux-gnu
target_triplet = i586-pc-linux-gnu
CATALOGS = en.gmo de.gmo it.gmo fr.gmo
CATOBJEXT = .gmo
CC = gcc
CPP = gcc -E
DATADIRNAME = share
DYNLINK_LDFLAGS = -rdynamic
G10_LOCALEDIR = /usr/local//locale
GENCAT =
GMOFILES = en.gmo de.gmo it.gmo fr.gmo
GMSGFMT = /usr/local/bin/msgfmt
GT_NO =
GT_YES = #YES#
INCLUDE_LOCALE_H = #include <locale.h>
INSTOBJEXT = .mo
INTLDEPS = $(top_builddir)/intl/libintl.a
INTLLIBS = $(top_builddir)/intl/libintl.a
INTLOBJS = $(GETTOBJS)
MKINSTALLDIRS = scripts/mkinstalldirs
MPI_EXTRA_ASM_OBJS =
MSGFMT = /usr/local/bin/msgfmt
PACKAGE = gnupg
POFILES = en.po de.po it.po fr.po
POSUB = po
RANLIB = ranlib
USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL = yes
USE_NLS = yes
VERSION = 0.4.0a
ZLIBS =
l =
CFLAGS = -O -Wall
EXTRA_DIST = README algorithm.doc ChangeLog example.c
# I found no other easy way to use this only if zlib is neede
# doing this with SUBDIR = @xxx@ in the top Makefile.am does not
# work because automake doesn't scan this Makefile.am here.
#noinst_LIBRARIES = libzlib.a
libzlib_a_SOURCES = adler32.c compress.c crc32.c gzio.c \
uncompr.c deflate.c trees.c zutil.c \
inflate.c infblock.c inftrees.c \
infcodes.c infutil.c inffast.c \
zlib.h zconf.h deflate.h infblock.h \
infcodes.h inffast.h inftrees.h infutil.h zutil.h
CLEANFILES = example foo.gz
mkinstalldirs = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/scripts/mkinstalldirs
CONFIG_HEADER = ../config.h
CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES =
LIBRARIES = $(noinst_LIBRARIES)
DEFS = -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I$(srcdir) -I..
CPPFLAGS =
LDFLAGS =
LIBS = -ldl -lz
libzlib_a_LIBADD =
libzlib_a_OBJECTS = adler32.o compress.o crc32.o gzio.o uncompr.o \
deflate.o trees.o zutil.o inflate.o infblock.o inftrees.o infcodes.o \
infutil.o inffast.o
AR = ar
COMPILE = $(CC) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
LINK = $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
DIST_COMMON = README ChangeLog Makefile.am Makefile.in
DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST)
TAR = tar
GZIP = --best
DEP_FILES = .deps/adler32.P .deps/compress.P .deps/crc32.P \
.deps/deflate.P .deps/gzio.P .deps/infblock.P .deps/infcodes.P \
.deps/inffast.P .deps/inflate.P .deps/inftrees.P .deps/infutil.P \
.deps/trees.P .deps/uncompr.P .deps/zutil.P
SOURCES = $(libzlib_a_SOURCES)
OBJECTS = $(libzlib_a_OBJECTS)
default: all
.SUFFIXES:
.SUFFIXES: .S .c .o .s
$(srcdir)/Makefile.in: Makefile.am $(top_srcdir)/configure.in $(ACLOCAL_M4)
cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu zlib/Makefile
Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status $(BUILT_SOURCES)
cd $(top_builddir) \
&& CONFIG_FILES=$(subdir)/$@ CONFIG_HEADERS= $(SHELL) ./config.status
mostlyclean-noinstLIBRARIES:
clean-noinstLIBRARIES:
-test -z "$(noinst_LIBRARIES)" || rm -f $(noinst_LIBRARIES)
distclean-noinstLIBRARIES:
maintainer-clean-noinstLIBRARIES:
.s.o:
$(COMPILE) -c $<
.S.o:
$(COMPILE) -c $<
mostlyclean-compile:
-rm -f *.o core *.core
clean-compile:
distclean-compile:
-rm -f *.tab.c
maintainer-clean-compile:
libzlib.a: $(libzlib_a_OBJECTS) $(libzlib_a_DEPENDENCIES)
-rm -f libzlib.a
$(AR) cru libzlib.a $(libzlib_a_OBJECTS) $(libzlib_a_LIBADD)
$(RANLIB) libzlib.a
tags: TAGS
ID: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(LISP)
here=`pwd` && cd $(srcdir) \
&& mkid -f$$here/ID $(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(LISP)
TAGS: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) $(LISP)
tags=; \
here=`pwd`; \
list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)'; \
unique=`for i in $$list; do echo $$i; done | \
awk ' { files[$$0] = 1; } \
END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
test -z "$(ETAGS_ARGS)$$unique$(LISP)$$tags" \
|| (cd $(srcdir) && etags $(ETAGS_ARGS) $$tags $$unique $(LISP) -o $$here/TAGS)
mostlyclean-tags:
clean-tags:
distclean-tags:
-rm -f TAGS ID
maintainer-clean-tags:
distdir = $(top_builddir)/$(PACKAGE)-$(VERSION)/$(subdir)
subdir = zlib
distdir: $(DISTFILES)
here=`cd $(top_builddir) && pwd`; \
top_distdir=`cd $(top_distdir) && pwd`; \
distdir=`cd $(distdir) && pwd`; \
cd $(top_srcdir) \
&& $(AUTOMAKE) --include-deps --build-dir=$$here --srcdir-name=$(top_srcdir) --output-dir=$$top_distdir --gnu zlib/Makefile
@for file in $(DISTFILES); do \
d=$(srcdir); \
test -f $(distdir)/$$file \
|| ln $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file 2> /dev/null \
|| cp -p $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file; \
done
DEPS_MAGIC := $(shell mkdir .deps > /dev/null 2>&1 || :)
-include $(DEP_FILES)
mostlyclean-depend:
clean-depend:
distclean-depend:
maintainer-clean-depend:
-rm -rf .deps
%.o: %.c
@echo '$(COMPILE) -c $<'; \
$(COMPILE) -Wp,-MD,.deps/$(*F).P -c $<
%.lo: %.c
@echo '$(LTCOMPILE) -c $<'; \
$(LTCOMPILE) -Wp,-MD,.deps/$(*F).p -c $<
@-sed -e 's/^\([^:]*\)\.o:/\1.lo \1.o:/' \
< .deps/$(*F).p > .deps/$(*F).P
@-rm -f .deps/$(*F).p
info:
dvi:
check: all
$(MAKE)
installcheck:
install-exec:
@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
install-data:
@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
install: install-exec install-data all
@:
uninstall:
all: Makefile $(LIBRARIES)
install-strip:
$(MAKE) INSTALL_PROGRAM='$(INSTALL_PROGRAM) -s' INSTALL_SCRIPT='$(INSTALL_PROGRAM)' install
installdirs:
mostlyclean-generic:
-test -z "$(MOSTLYCLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(MOSTLYCLEANFILES)
clean-generic:
-test -z "$(CLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(CLEANFILES)
distclean-generic:
-rm -f Makefile $(DISTCLEANFILES)
-rm -f config.cache config.log stamp-h stamp-h[0-9]*
-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
maintainer-clean-generic:
-test -z "$(MAINTAINERCLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(MAINTAINERCLEANFILES)
-test -z "$(BUILT_SOURCES)" || rm -f $(BUILT_SOURCES)
mostlyclean: mostlyclean-noinstLIBRARIES mostlyclean-compile \
mostlyclean-tags mostlyclean-depend mostlyclean-generic
clean: clean-noinstLIBRARIES clean-compile clean-tags clean-depend \
clean-generic mostlyclean
distclean: distclean-noinstLIBRARIES distclean-compile distclean-tags \
distclean-depend distclean-generic clean
-rm -f config.status
maintainer-clean: maintainer-clean-noinstLIBRARIES \
maintainer-clean-compile maintainer-clean-tags \
maintainer-clean-depend maintainer-clean-generic \
distclean
@echo "This command is intended for maintainers to use;"
@echo "it deletes files that may require special tools to rebuild."
.PHONY: default mostlyclean-noinstLIBRARIES distclean-noinstLIBRARIES \
clean-noinstLIBRARIES maintainer-clean-noinstLIBRARIES \
mostlyclean-compile distclean-compile clean-compile \
maintainer-clean-compile tags mostlyclean-tags distclean-tags \
clean-tags maintainer-clean-tags distdir mostlyclean-depend \
distclean-depend clean-depend maintainer-clean-depend info dvi \
installcheck install-exec install-data install uninstall all \
installdirs mostlyclean-generic distclean-generic clean-generic \
maintainer-clean-generic clean mostlyclean distclean maintainer-clean
# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
.NOEXPORT: