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Fixed key generation with P-521. Confirmed that signature generation and verification work.

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This commit is contained in:
Andrey Jivsov 2011-01-12 21:14:45 -08:00
parent 5761a9ba74
commit b73d8ed06f
5 changed files with 27 additions and 16 deletions
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1
agent/agent.h
View File

@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ const char *get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void);
void *get_agent_scd_notify_event (void);
#endif
void agent_sighup_action (void);
int map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int openpgp_algo);
/*-- command.c --*/
gpg_error_t agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid);

8
agent/cvt-openpgp.c
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@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "agent.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "cvt-openpgp.h"
#include "../include/cipher.h" /* for PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH */
/* Helper to pass data via the callback to do_unprotect. */
@ -50,12 +49,7 @@ struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
gcry_sexp_t *r_key;
};
/* TODO: it is also in misc, which is not linked with the agent */
static int
map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int algo)
{
return (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA ? GCRY_PK_ECDSA : (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ? GCRY_PK_ECDH : algo));
}
/* Compute the keygrip from the public key and store it at GRIP. */
static gpg_error_t

8
agent/gpg-agent.c
View File

@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include "gc-opt-flags.h"
#include "exechelp.h"
#include "asshelp.h"
#include "../include/cipher.h" /* for PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH */
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{ aNull = 0,
@ -2301,3 +2302,10 @@ check_for_running_agent (int silent, int mode)
assuan_release (ctx);
return 0;
}
/* TODO: it is also in misc, which is not linked with the agent */
int
map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int algo)
{
return (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA ? GCRY_PK_ECDSA : (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ? GCRY_PK_ECDH : algo));
}

22
agent/pksign.c
View File

@ -119,12 +119,15 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t hash;
unsigned int qbits;
int gcry_pkalgo;
*r_hash = NULL;
if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
gcry_pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry( dsaalgo );
if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
qbits = gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey);
else if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
else if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
qbits = get_dsa_qbits (pkey);
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO);
@ -143,20 +146,25 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
if (qbits < 160)
{
log_error (_("%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo), qbits);
gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo), qbits);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
}
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate. */
if (mdlen < qbits/8)
/* This check would require the use of SHA512 with ECDSA 512. I think this is overkill to fail in this case.
* Therefore, relax the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it later for general case.
* ( Note that the check is really a bug for ECDSA 521 as the only hash that matches it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521 ).
*/
if( mdlen < ((gcry_pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits>521) ? 512 : qbits) )
{
log_error (_("a %zu bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key\n"),
mdlen*8,
mdlen,
gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey),
gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo));
gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo));
/* FIXME: we need to check the requirements for ECDSA. */
if (mdlen < 20 || dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
if (mdlen < 20 || gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
}

4
g10/seskey.c
View File

@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
* Therefore, relax the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it later for general case.
* ( Note that the check will never pass for ECDSA 521 anyway as the only hash that intended to match it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521 ).
*/
//if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes )
if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < ((gcry_pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbytes>(521)/8) ? 512/8 : qbytes) )
{
log_error (_("%s key %s requires a %zu bit or larger hash, used hash-algo=%d\n"),
@ -297,8 +296,9 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
return NULL;
}
/* Note that in case of ECDSA 521 hash is always smaller than the key size */
if (gcry_mpi_scan (&frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), qbytes, &qbytes))
gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo), &qbytes))
BUG();
}
else