diff --git a/agent/agent.h b/agent/agent.h
index 7716bb0c2..e31b6a78e 100644
--- a/agent/agent.h
+++ b/agent/agent.h
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ const char *get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void);
 void *get_agent_scd_notify_event (void);
 #endif
 void agent_sighup_action (void);
+int map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int openpgp_algo);
 
 /*-- command.c --*/
 gpg_error_t agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid);
diff --git a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
index 3dba79ebd..73c31f786 100644
--- a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
+++ b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include "agent.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 #include "cvt-openpgp.h"
-#include "../include/cipher.h"	/* for PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH */
 
 
 /* Helper to pass data via the callback to do_unprotect. */
@@ -50,12 +49,7 @@ struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
   gcry_sexp_t *r_key;
 };
 
-/* TODO: it is also in misc, which is not linked with the agent */
-static int
-map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int algo)
-{
-  return (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA ? GCRY_PK_ECDSA : (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ? GCRY_PK_ECDH : algo));
-}
+
 
 /* Compute the keygrip from the public key and store it at GRIP.  */
 static gpg_error_t
diff --git a/agent/gpg-agent.c b/agent/gpg-agent.c
index ca150b471..d85283a5e 100644
--- a/agent/gpg-agent.c
+++ b/agent/gpg-agent.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include "gc-opt-flags.h"
 #include "exechelp.h"
 #include "asshelp.h"
+#include "../include/cipher.h"	/* for PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH */
 
 enum cmd_and_opt_values 
 { aNull = 0,
@@ -2301,3 +2302,10 @@ check_for_running_agent (int silent, int mode)
   assuan_release (ctx);
   return 0;
 }
+
+/* TODO: it is also in misc, which is not linked with the agent */
+int
+map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int algo)
+{
+  return (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA ? GCRY_PK_ECDSA : (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ? GCRY_PK_ECDH : algo));
+}
diff --git a/agent/pksign.c b/agent/pksign.c
index ac5f4e1a0..a6dbf2509 100644
--- a/agent/pksign.c
+++ b/agent/pksign.c
@@ -119,12 +119,15 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
   gpg_error_t err;
   gcry_sexp_t hash;
   unsigned int qbits;
+  int gcry_pkalgo;
 
   *r_hash = NULL;
 
-  if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
+  gcry_pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry( dsaalgo );
+
+  if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
     qbits = gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey);
-  else if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
+  else if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
     qbits = get_dsa_qbits (pkey);
   else
     return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO);
@@ -143,20 +146,25 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
   if (qbits < 160)
     {
       log_error (_("%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
-                 gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo), qbits);
+                 gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo), qbits);
       return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
     }
 
   /* Check if we're too short.  Too long is safe as we'll
      automatically left-truncate.  */
-  if (mdlen < qbits/8)
+
+  /* This check would require the use of SHA512 with ECDSA 512. I think this is overkill to fail in this case.
+   * Therefore, relax the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it later for general case.
+   * ( Note that the check is really a bug for ECDSA 521 as the only hash that matches it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521 ).
+   */
+  if( mdlen < ((gcry_pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits>521) ? 512 : qbits) )
     {
       log_error (_("a %zu bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key\n"),
-                 mdlen*8,
+                 mdlen,
                  gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey), 
-                 gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo));
+                 gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo));
       /* FIXME: we need to check the requirements for ECDSA.  */
-      if (mdlen < 20 || dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
+      if (mdlen < 20 || gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
         return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
     }
 
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c
index 4cc9158c9..e50cf5c02 100644
--- a/g10/seskey.c
+++ b/g10/seskey.c
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
        * Therefore, relax the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it later for general case.
        * ( Note that the check will never pass for ECDSA 521 anyway as the only hash that intended to match it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521 ).
        */
-      //if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes )
       if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < ((gcry_pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbytes>(521)/8) ? 512/8 : qbytes) )
 	{
 	  log_error (_("%s key %s requires a %zu bit or larger hash, used hash-algo=%d\n"),
@@ -297,8 +296,9 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
 	  return NULL;
 	}
 
+      /* Note that in case of ECDSA 521 hash is always smaller than the key size */
       if (gcry_mpi_scan (&frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
-                         gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), qbytes, &qbytes))
+                         gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo), &qbytes))
         BUG();
     }
   else