security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-07-03 22:56:33 +02:00
Code Activity

Merged in my changes, after disk crash. Fortunately the CVS was not

Browse source 
affected - but everything else and it seems that there is no backup of
the BTS data is available :-(
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2002-04-08 15:10:51 +00:00
parent 6be3bee320
commit b725d8ec27
47 changed files with 7477 additions and 7394 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

49
TODO
View file

@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
* change the maintainer address in faq.raw
* Do we need a configure test for putenv?
* Add remarks to the man page about OpenPGP OPTIONAL algorithms and
issue warnings when such an algorithm is used (disabled by expert modus?)
* Return status information even when an imported key is already
stored. This is useful for GPGME's detailed info fucntion.
* Describe some pitfalls when using EGD. Check that ~/.gnupg/entropy
really is the default. What about needed permission?
* Using an expired key for signing should give an error message
"expired key"and not "unusable key'. Furthermore the error should
also be thrown when the defaultkey has expired. Reported by
"expired key" and not "unusable key'. Furthermore the error should
also be thrown when the default key has expired. Reported by
Eric.VanBuggenhaut@AdValvas.be.
* pause scrolling help in --edit-key and elsewhere.
@ -14,8 +24,6 @@
* Selection using +wordlist does not work.
What about adding a feature -word to the +wordlist search mode.
* add listing of notation data
* Check the changes to the gpg random gatherer on all W32 platforms.
* Put a note into readme.w32 that there is a man page and a options
@ -32,10 +40,6 @@
it's end and allow for multiple signature for one message. And
add a real grammar to the code in mainproc.c
* option to set the signature expiration time for key sigs.
Rework the way we create signature subpackets - the current code
is not easy to understand.
* Option to warn when a non MDC message is decrypted?
* If there is no secure memory, allocate more memory for the secure
@ -51,20 +55,14 @@
* Add an is_valid flag to each user ID.
* Do not create a secring.gpg if it is not needed; I have fixed this
sometime ago but it has later reappeared.
* Check for consistent spelling of user ID, key ID etc.
Replace "user id not found" in getkey.c by "no valid user ID found".
* Replace the printing of the user name by [self-signature] when
appropriate so that a key listing does not get clobbered.
* Using --list-only to check for recipients while decrypting may
yield an error about an unknown packet.
* Check that the way we select cipher and digest algorithms w/o
preferences is okay and make AES the default.
preferences is okay and make AES the default in some future.
* Concatenated encryption messages don't work corectly - only the
first one is processed.
@ -72,27 +70,11 @@
* Add option to put the list of recipients (from the encryption
layer) into the signatures notation data.
* Allow to update key signatures. It is also not possible to resign
an already revoked key signature.
* For FreeBSD only: spit out a message that rndcontrol (8) should be
used to enable the use of IRQs for entropy gathering.
* --passphrase-fd can't work with -cs: document this or find a way
to work around.
* With option -i prompt before adding a key to the keyring and show some
info what we are about to add.
* --disable-asm should still assemble _udiv_qrnnd when needed
* replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
utility and SOCKSify this utility.
[David is working on this]
* Check the beginning of file to detect already compressed files (gzip,
bzip2, xdelta and some picture formats) [Timo has some code for this]
* Get new assembler stuff from gmp 3.1
* Use new-format headers for compressed packets.
@ -101,8 +83,6 @@
* use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
or better readline.
* Print a warning if the directory mode is wrong.
* preferences of hash algorithms are not yet used.
* add test cases for invalid data (scrambled armor or other random data)
@ -117,9 +97,6 @@
verification status of the message to the output (i.e. write something to
the --output file and not only to stderr.
* The user is asked for a revocation reasons even if this one can't
be used with v3 keys.
* keyflags don't distinguish between {certify,signature}-only.
* Instead of issuing a "signature packet without keyid" gpg should