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gnupg/TODO
Werner Koch b725d8ec27 Merged in my changes, after disk crash. Fortunately the CVS was not
affected - but everything else and it seems that there is no backup of
the BTS data is available :-(
2002-04-08 15:10:51 +00:00

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* change the maintainer address in faq.raw
* Do we need a configure test for putenv?
* Add remarks to the man page about OpenPGP OPTIONAL algorithms and
issue warnings when such an algorithm is used (disabled by expert modus?)
* Return status information even when an imported key is already
stored. This is useful for GPGME's detailed info fucntion.
* Describe some pitfalls when using EGD. Check that ~/.gnupg/entropy
really is the default. What about needed permission?
* Using an expired key for signing should give an error message
"expired key" and not "unusable key'. Furthermore the error should
also be thrown when the default key has expired. Reported by
Eric.VanBuggenhaut@AdValvas.be.
* pause scrolling help in --edit-key and elsewhere.
* getkey does not return revoked/expired keys - therefore it is not
possible to override it.
* Selection using +wordlist does not work.
What about adding a feature -word to the +wordlist search mode.
* Check the changes to the gpg random gatherer on all W32 platforms.
* Put a note into readme.w32 that there is a man page and a options
file; write the registry stuff in regedit format.
* Show more info does not work from edit->trust
* set default charset from nl_langinfo.
* Check that no secret temporary results are stored in the result parameter
of the mpi functions. We have already done this for mpi-mul.c
* We need another special packet at the end of a clearsign message to mark
it's end and allow for multiple signature for one message. And
add a real grammar to the code in mainproc.c
* Option to warn when a non MDC message is decrypted?
* If there is no secure memory, allocate more memory for the secure
memory block or do it in all cases.
* add some minor things vor VMS.
* Use DSA keys with the test suite (partly done)
* Fix the bug in the mips assembler code
* Add a way to show the fingerprint of an key signator's keys
* Add an is_valid flag to each user ID.
* Check for consistent spelling of user ID, key ID etc.
Replace "user id not found" in getkey.c by "no valid user ID found".
* Replace the printing of the user name by [self-signature] when
appropriate so that a key listing does not get clobbered.
* Check that the way we select cipher and digest algorithms w/o
preferences is okay and make AES the default in some future.
* Concatenated encryption messages don't work corectly - only the
first one is processed.
* Add option to put the list of recipients (from the encryption
layer) into the signatures notation data.
* With option -i prompt before adding a key to the keyring and show some
info what we are about to add.
* --disable-asm should still assemble _udiv_qrnnd when needed
* Get new assembler stuff from gmp 3.1
* Use new-format headers for compressed packets.
The advantage is that a garbled zip files can be better detected.
* use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
or better readline.
* preferences of hash algorithms are not yet used.
* add test cases for invalid data (scrambled armor or other random data)
* add checking of armor trailers
* the pubkey encrypt functions should do some sanity checks.
* "gpg filename.tar.gz.asc" should work like --verify (-sab).
* for messages created with "-t", it might make sense to append the
verification status of the message to the output (i.e. write something to
the --output file and not only to stderr.
* keyflags don't distinguish between {certify,signature}-only.
* Instead of issuing a "signature packet without keyid" gpg should
try to get the keyID from a corresponding one-pass signature
packet (See bug report 817). This is not easy to do as we don't
store the one-pass packets.
Things we won't do
------------------
* New option --file-remove path-to-wipe-program ?