Snapshot release 0.4.2

NEWS

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.2
 -----------------------------------
+
+    * This is only a snapshot: There are still a few bugs.
+
     * Fixed this huge memory leak.
 
     * Redesigned the trust database:  You should run "gpgm --check-trustdb".
@@ -26,6 +29,15 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.2
       of packets, so that the keyservers don't accept these keys.
       Simply using "--edit-key" fixes the problem.
 
+    * New option --force-v3-sigs to generate signed messages which are
+      compatible to PGP 5.
+
+    * Add some code to support DLD (for non ELF systems) - but this is
+      not tested because my BSD box is currently broken.
+
+    * New command "expire" in the edit-key menu.
+
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.1
 -----------------------------------

README

@@ -331,11 +331,3 @@
     please subscribe before posting, see above (~line 33)).
 
 
-    Supported targets:
-    ------------------
-      powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu  (linuxppc)
-      hppa1.1-hp-hpux10.20
-
-
-
-

TODO

@@ -1,33 +1,15 @@
-    * change ringedit:
-	- avoid all copy operations
-	- delete for update by changing the packet type to a
-	  special unused packet. (export most know about this)
-	- do an append instead of an update or insert
-	- export may be used to compress a keyring.
-	- keep track of all offset in the trustbd and index them
-	  by keyid.
-	- If the lookup does not find a public key block at the
-	  stored offset disable this keyid.
-	- If the keyid was not found or is disabled, walk thru
-	  the pubring.
-	- use ftruncate to recover from keyring errors.
-	   maybe a new option to do this or simply mark the
-	   wrong part as unused.
-      This makes signature checks and imports much faster; only keys
-      given by a userid or a fingerprint (RSA only) have to walk tru
-      the ring.
 
-    * There is a new memory leak in update-trustdb
+    * There is a new memory leak in update-trustdb :-(
+
+    * Fix ;) revocation and expire stuff.
 
     * OpenBSD: dynamic loading with dlopen works on OpenBSD, but:
 	OpenBSD binaries are a.out, so every symbol begins with "_"
 
-    * use dld if we don't have dlopen.
-
     * should we flush the getkey.c caches while doing an import?
 
     * prefer a type 16 subkey for encryption because pgp cannot handle
-      type 20.
+      type 20?
 
     * calculation of marginals never yields a completely trusted key.
 
@@ -36,6 +18,11 @@
 
     * Exportable Certification Flag is ignored
 
+    * We need a maintainence pass over the trustdb which flags
+      signatures as expired if the key used to make the signature has
+      expired.	Maybe it is a good idea to store the exiration time
+      in the key record of the trustdb.
+
     * write a tool to extract selected keys from a file.
 
     * new menu to delete signatures and list signature in menu
@@ -71,8 +58,6 @@
     * add an option to re-create a public key from a secret key; we
       can do this in trustdb.c:verify_own_keys.
 
-    * OpenBSD has sometimes problems reading from /dev/random.
-
     * change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque
 
     * Is it okay to use gettext for the help system?

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.4.1a
+0.4.2

doc/DETAILS

@@ -364,6 +364,14 @@ Other Notes
       to keep them small.
 
 
+Supported targets:
+------------------
+      powerpc-unknown-linux-gnu  (linuxppc)
+      hppa1.1-hp-hpux10.20
+
+
+
+
 
 
 

doc/FAQ

@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@
     is choosen.  You may add an type 16 ElGamal key to your public
     key which is easy as your key signatures are still valid.
 
+ Q: Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages.
+ A: PGP 5.x does not accept V4 signatures for data material but
+    OpenPGP requires generation of V3 signatures for all kind of
+    data.  Use the option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate V3 signatures
+    for data.
+
  Q: I can't delete a user id because it is already deleted on my
     public keyring.
  A: Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is

doc/OpenPGP

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-		    GNUPG and OpenPGP
+		    GnuPG and OpenPGP
 		    =================
 
    The current OpenPGP draft expires 1999-02.
@@ -22,17 +22,21 @@
 
   Compatibility Notes
   ===================
-   GNUPG (>=0.4.1) is in compliance with OpenPGP despite these exeptions:
+   GnuPG (>=0.4.1) is in compliance with OpenPGP despite these exeptions:
 
     * (5.1) The critical bit in signature subpackets is currently
       ignored.	This will be fixed soon.
 
-    * (5.3) GNUPG has an option to use simple S2K for "Symmetric-Key
+
+    * (5.2) GnuPG generates V4 signatures for all V4 keys.  The option
+      --force-v3-sigs allows to override.
+
+    * (5.3) GnuPG has an option to use simple S2K for "Symmetric-Key
       Encrypted Session-Key Packets"; however a warning message is
       issued if this option is active.
 
     * (5.5.2) states that an implementaion MUST NOT create a v3 key
-      with an algorithm other than RSA.  GNUPG has an option to
+      with an algorithm other than RSA.  GnuPG has an option to
       create an ElGamal key in a v3 packet; the properties of such
       a key are as good as a v4 key.  RFC1991 does not specifiy how
       to create fingerprints for algorithms other than RSA and so it
@@ -46,7 +50,7 @@
       due to patent problems.
 
     * (12.1) states that an implementaion MUST NOT use a symmetric
-      algorithm which is not in the preference list.  GNUPG has an
+      algorithm which is not in the preference list.  GnuPG has an
       option to override this.
 
     * A special format of partial packet length exists for v3 packets

doc/gpg.1pod

@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ B<--edit-key> I<name>
        Add a subkey to this key.
     B<delkey>
        Remove a subkey.
+    B<expire>
+       Change the key expiration time.	If a key is
+       select, the time of this key will be changed.
+       With no selection the key expiration of the
+       primary key is changed.
     B<passwd>
        Change the passphrase of the secret key.
     B<uid> I<n>
@@ -303,7 +308,16 @@ B<--status-fd> I<n>
     Write special status strings to the file descriptor I<n>.
 
 B<--no-comment>
-    Do not write comment packets.
+    Do not write comment packets.  This option affects only
+    the generation of secret keys.  Output of option packets
+    is disabled since version 0.4.2.
+
+B<--comment> I<string>
+    Use I<string> as comment string in clear text signatures.
+
+B<--set-filename> I<string>
+    Use I<string> as the name of file which is stored in
+    messages.
 
 B<--completes-needed> I<n>
     Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
@@ -373,6 +387,15 @@ B<--passphrase-fd> I<n>
     can only be used if only one passphrase is supplied.
     B<Don't use this option if you can avoid it>
 
+B<--rfc1991>
+    Try to be more RFC1991 (PGP 2.x) compliant.
+
+B<--force-v3-sigs>
+    OpenPGP states that a implemenation should generate
+    v4 signatures but PGP 5.x does only recognize such
+    signatures on key material.  This options forces
+    v3 signatures for signatures on data.
+
 B<--no-verbose>
     Reset verbose level to 0.
 

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+Sun Oct 18 11:49:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* sign.c (only_old_style): Add option force_v3_sigs
+	(sign_file): Fixed a bug in sig->version
+	(clearsign_file): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): New
+
+	* keyedit.c (menu_expire): New.
+	* free-packet.c (cmp_signatures): New
+
+
 Sat Oct 17 10:22:39 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
 
 	* armor.c: changed output line length from 72 to 64.

g10/OPTIONS

@@ -51,10 +51,4 @@ run-as-shm-coprocess [request-locked-shm-size]
 # You will have to use "--status-fd" too
 # Note:  This option dioes only work if given on the command line.
 
-set-filename <name>
-# Set <name> as the filename into the plaintext packet
-
-comment <string>
-# Add <string> as comment to the output
-
 

g10/build-packet.c

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ do_public_key( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk )
 	    ndays = (u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
 	else
 	    ndays = 0;
-	write_16(a, 0 );
+	write_16(a, ndays );
     }
     iobuf_put(a, pk->pubkey_algo );
     n = pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo );

g10/free-packet.c

@@ -395,6 +395,30 @@ cmp_public_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
     return 0;
 }
 
+
+
+int
+cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b )
+{
+    int n, i;
+
+    if( a->keyid[0] != b->keyid[0] )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->keyid[1] != b->keyid[1] )
+	return -1;
+    if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
+	return -1;
+
+    n = pubkey_get_nsig( a->pubkey_algo );
+    if( !n )
+	return -1; /* can't compare due to unknown algorithm */
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_cmp( a->data[i] , b->data[i] ) )
+	    return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
 int
 cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b )
 {

g10/g10.c

@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
     oSetFilename,
     oComment,
     oThrowKeyid,
+    oForceV3Sigs,
     oS2KMode,
     oS2KDigest,
     oS2KCipher,
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
   #endif
     { oOutput, "output",    2, N_("use as output file")},
     { oVerbose, "verbose",   0, N_("verbose") },
+    { oForceV3Sigs, "force-v3-sigs", 0, N_("force v3 signatures") },
  /* { oDryRun, "dry-run",   0, N_("do not make any changes") }, */
     { oBatch, "batch",     0, N_("batch mode: never ask")},
     { oAnswerYes, "yes",       0, N_("assume yes on most questions")},
@@ -714,6 +716,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case oSetFilename: opt.set_filename = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
 	  case oComment: opt.comment_string = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
 	  case oThrowKeyid: opt.throw_keyid = 1; break;
+	  case oForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 1; break;
 	  case oS2KMode:   opt.s2k_mode = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
 	  case oS2KDigest: s2k_digest_string = m_strdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;
 	  case oS2KCipher: s2k_cipher_string = m_strdup(pargs.r.ret_str); break;

g10/getkey.c

@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ merge_one_pk_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE knode )
     for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
 	if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
 	    && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
-	    && sig->sig_class <= 0x13
+	    && sig->sig_class <= 0x30
 	    && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0]
 	    && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1]
 	    && sig->version > 3 ) {
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
 	}
 	else if( (pk || sk ) && k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
 		 && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
-		 && sig->sig_class <= 0x13 && sig->version > 3
+		 && sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
 		 && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
 	    /* okay this is (the first) self-signature which can be used
 	     * FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid

g10/keyedit.c

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ static void show_fingerprint( PKT_public_key *pk );
 static int menu_adduid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
 static void menu_deluid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
 static void menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
+static int menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
 static int menu_select_uid( KBNODE keyblock, int index );
 static int menu_select_key( KBNODE keyblock, int index );
 static int count_uids( KBNODE keyblock );
@@ -478,7 +479,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr )
     enum cmdids { cmdNONE = 0,
 	   cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
 	   cmdDEBUG, cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY,
-	   cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF,
+	   cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF, cmdEXPIRE,
 	   cmdNOP };
     static struct { const char *name;
 		    enum cmdids id;
@@ -504,6 +505,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr )
 	{ N_("deluid")  , cmdDELUID , 0, N_("delete user id") },
 	{ N_("addkey")  , cmdADDKEY , 1, N_("add a secondary key") },
 	{ N_("delkey")  , cmdDELKEY , 0, N_("delete a secondary key") },
+	{ N_("expire")  , cmdEXPIRE , 1, N_("change the expire date") },
 	{ N_("toggle")  , cmdTOGGLE , 1, N_("toggle between secret "
 					    "and public key listing") },
 	{ N_("t"     )  , cmdTOGGLE , 1, NULL },
@@ -761,6 +763,16 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr )
 	    }
 	    break;
 
+	  case cmdEXPIRE:
+	    if( menu_expire( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
+		merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
+		sec_modified = 1;
+		modified = 1;
+		redisplay = 1;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
 	  case cmdPASSWD:
 	    if( change_passphrase( sec_keyblock ) )
 		sec_modified = 1;
@@ -1149,6 +1161,117 @@ menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
 }
 
 
+
+static int
+menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
+{
+    int n1, rc;
+    u32 expiredate;
+    int mainkey=0;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;    /* copy of the main sk */
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
+    PKT_user_id *uid;
+    KBNODE node;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+
+    if( count_selected_keys( sec_keyblock ) ) {
+	tty_printf(_("Please remove selections from the secret keys.\n"));
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    n1 = count_selected_keys( pub_keyblock );
+    if( n1 > 1 ) {
+	tty_printf(_("Please select at most one secondary key.\n"));
+	return 0;
+    }
+    else if( n1 )
+	tty_printf(_("Changing exiration time for a secondary key.\n"));
+    else {
+	tty_printf(_("Changing exiration time for the primary key.\n"));
+	mainkey=1;
+    }
+
+    expiredate = ask_expiredate();
+    /* fixme: check that expiredate is > key creation date */
+
+    /* get the secret key , make a copy and set the expiration time into
+     * that key (because keygen_add-key-expire expects it there)
+     */
+    node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+    sk->expiredate = expiredate;
+
+    /* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
+    main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
+    uid = NULL;
+    for( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+	    main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	    keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
+	}
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
+		 && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY ) )
+	    sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	    uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+	else if( main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+	    if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
+		&& (	(mainkey && uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
+		     || (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18)  ) ) {
+		/* this is a selfsignature which should be replaced */
+		PKT_signature *newsig;
+		PACKET *newpkt;
+		KBNODE sn;
+
+		/* find the corresponding secret self-signature */
+		for( sn=sec_keyblock; sn; sn = sn->next ) {
+		    if( sn->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+			&& !cmp_signatures( sn->pkt->pkt.signature, sig ) )
+			break;
+		}
+		if( !sn )
+		    log_info(_("No corresponding signature in secret ring\n"));
+
+		/* create new self signature */
+		if( mainkey )
+		    rc = make_keysig_packet( &newsig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
+					     sk, 0x13, 0,
+					     keygen_add_std_prefs, sk );
+		else
+		    rc = make_keysig_packet( &newsig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
+					     sk, 0x18, 0,
+					     keygen_add_key_expire, sk );
+		if( rc ) {
+		    log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
+						    g10_errstr(rc));
+		    free_secret_key( sk );
+		    return 0;
+		}
+		/* replace the packet */
+		newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
+		free_packet( node->pkt );
+		m_free( node->pkt );
+		node->pkt = newpkt;
+		if( sn ) {
+		    newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
+		    newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
+		    newpkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature( NULL, newsig );
+		    free_packet( sn->pkt );
+		    m_free( sn->pkt );
+		    sn->pkt = newpkt;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
 /****************
  * Select one user id or remove all selection if index is 0.
  * Returns: True if the selection changed;

g10/keygen.c

@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ write_uid( KBNODE root, const char *s )
 
 
 
-static int
+int
-add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
+keygen_add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
 {
     PKT_secret_key *sk = opaque;
     byte buf[8];
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ keygen_add_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
 {
     byte buf[8];
 
-    add_key_expire( sig, opaque );
+    keygen_add_key_expire( sig, opaque );
 
     buf[0] = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
     buf[1] = CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk )
 
     /* and make the signature */
     rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, subpk, sk, 0x18, 0,
-				    add_key_expire, sk );
+				    keygen_add_key_expire, sk );
     if( rc ) {
 	log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
 	return rc;
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ ask_keysize( int algo )
 }
 
 
-static u32
+u32
 ask_expiredate()
 {
     char *answer;
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ ask_expiredate()
 		 "      <n>m = key expires in n months\n"
 		 "      <n>y = key expires in n years\n"));
     /* Note: The elgamal subkey for DSA has no exiration date because
-     * is must be signed with the DSA key and this one has the expiration
+     * it must be signed with the DSA key and this one has the expiration
      * date */
 
     answer = NULL;

g10/main.h

@@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ int delete_key( const char *username, int secure );
 void keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr );
 
 /*-- keygen.c --*/
+u32 ask_expiredate(void);
 void generate_keypair(void);
+int keygen_add_key_expire( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
 int keygen_add_std_prefs( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );
 int generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
 

g10/options.h

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct {
     int no_armor;
     int list_packets; /* list-packets mode */
     int def_cipher_algo;
-    int reserved1;
+    int force_v3_sigs;
     int def_digest_algo;
     int def_compress_algo;
     const char *def_secret_key;

g10/packet.h

@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ PKT_secret_key *copy_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *d, PKT_secret_key *s );
 PKT_signature *copy_signature( PKT_signature *d, PKT_signature *s );
 PKT_user_id *copy_user_id( PKT_user_id *d, PKT_user_id *s );
 int cmp_public_keys( PKT_public_key *d, PKT_public_key *s );
+int cmp_signatures( PKT_signature *a, PKT_signature *b );
 int cmp_public_secret_key( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk );
 int cmp_user_ids( PKT_user_id *a, PKT_user_id *b );
 

g10/parse-packet.c

@@ -608,6 +608,97 @@ parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
 }
 
 
+static void
+dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
+		 const char * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length )
+{
+    const char *p=NULL;
+
+    printf("\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*)*/
+	      critical ? "critical ":"",
+	      hashed ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)length );
+    buffer++;
+    length--;
+    if( length > buflen ) {
+	printf("too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned)buflen );
+	return;
+    }
+    switch( type ) {
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	    printf("sig created %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	    printf("sig expires %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
+	p = "exportable";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
+	p = "trust signature";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
+	p = "regular expression";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE:
+	p = "revocable";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE:
+	if( length >= 4 )
+	    printf("key expires %s", strtimestamp( buffer_to_u32(buffer) ) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_ARR:
+	p = "additional recipient request";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
+	p = "preferred symmetric algorithms";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+	p = "revocation key";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
+	if( length >= 8 )
+	    printf("issuer key ID %08lX%08lX",
+		      (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer),
+		      (ulong)buffer_to_u32(buffer+4) );
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
+	p = "notation data";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
+	p = "preferred hash algorithms";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
+	p = "preferred compression algorithms";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
+	p = "key server preferences";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
+	p = "preferred key server";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID:
+	p = "primary user id";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
+	p = "policy URL";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
+	p = "key flags";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
+	p = "signer's user id";
+	break;
+      case SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_ADD_SIG:
+	p = "signs additional user id";
+	break;
+      default: p = "?"; break;
+    }
+
+    printf("%s)\n", p? p: "");
+}
+
 const byte *
 parse_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, size_t *ret_n )
 {
@@ -648,32 +739,9 @@ parse_sig_subpkt( const byte *buffer, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype, size_t *ret_n )
 	}
 	else
 	    critical = 0;
-	if( reqtype < 0 ) { /* list packets */
+	if( reqtype < 0 ) /* list packets */
-	    printf("\t%ssubpacket %d of length %u (%s)\n",
+	    dump_sig_subpkt( reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
-	    reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)n,
+				    type, critical, buffer, buflen, n );
-	     type == SIGSUBPKT_SIG_CREATED ? "signature creation time"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE  ? "signature expiration time"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE  ? "exportable"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_TRUST	   ? "trust signature"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP	   ? "regular expression"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE   ? "revocable"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE  ? "key expiration time"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR	   ? "additional recipient request"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM    ? "preferred symmetric algorithms"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY	   ? "revocation key"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER	   ? "issuer key ID"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION    ? "notation data"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH   ? "preferred hash algorithms"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR  ? "preferred compression algorithms"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS    ? "key server preferences"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS	   ? "preferred key server"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID ? "primary user id"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_POLICY	   ? "policy URL"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS   ? "key flags"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID ? "signer's user id"
-	   : type == SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_ADD_SIG? "signs additional user id"
-			      : "?");
-	}
 	else if( type == reqtype )
 	    break; /* found */
 	buffer += n; buflen -=n;

g10/ringedit.c

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
 #include "options.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 
+#undef HAVE_LIBGDBM  /* <--- not ready */
+
 struct resource_table_struct {
     int used;
     int secret; /* this is a secret keyring */
@@ -275,6 +277,7 @@ get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos )
 	    if( !filename || !strcmp( resource_table[i].fname, filename ) ) {
 		memset( kbpos, 0, sizeof *kbpos );
 		kbpos->resno = i;
+		kbpos->rt = resource_table[i].rt;
 		return 0;
 	    }
 	}

g10/sign.c

@@ -108,6 +108,9 @@ only_old_style( SK_LIST sk_list )
     SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
     int old_style = 0;
 
+    if( opt.force_v3_sigs )
+	return 1;
+
     /* if there are only old style capable key we use the old sytle */
     for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
 	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
@@ -369,7 +372,7 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
 	/* build the signature packet */
 	/* fixme: this code is partly duplicated in make_keysig_packet */
 	sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
-	sig->version = sk->version;
+	sig->version = old_style? 3 : sk->version;
 	keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
 	sig->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo);
 	sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;
@@ -605,7 +608,7 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
 	/* build the signature packet */
 	/* fixme: this code is duplicated above */
 	sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
-	sig->version = sk->version;
+	sig->version = old_style? 3 : sk->version;
 	keyid_from_sk( sk, sig->keyid );
 	sig->digest_algo = hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo);
 	sig->pubkey_algo = sk->pubkey_algo;

g10/tdbio.c

@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
 	    rc = G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
 	}
 	break;
-      case RECTYPE_CACH:   /* cache record (FIXME)*/
+      case RECTYPE_CACH:   /* cache record */
 	rec->r.cache.lid    = buftoulong(p); p += 4;
 	memcpy(rec->r.cache.blockhash, p, 20); p += 20;
 	rec->r.cache.trustlevel = *p++;
@@ -990,7 +990,6 @@ tdbio_read_record( ulong recnum, TRUSTREC *rec, int expected )
 
 /****************
  * Write the record at RECNUM
- * FIXME: create/update keyhash record.
  */
 int
 tdbio_write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
@@ -1081,7 +1080,7 @@ tdbio_write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
 	ulongtobuf( p, rec->r.sdir.hintlist );
 	break;
 
-      case RECTYPE_CACH:   /* FIXME*/
+      case RECTYPE_CACH:
 	ulongtobuf(p, rec->r.cache.lid); p += 4;
 	memcpy(p, rec->r.cache.blockhash, 20); p += 20;
 	*p++ = rec->r.cache.trustlevel;

g10/tdbio.h

@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
 			   but we mark it to avoid duplicate checks */
 #define DIRF_REVOKED  8 /* the complete key has been revoked */
 
-#define KEYF_REVOKED  8 /* this key has been revoked (only useful on subkeys)*/
+#define KEYF_EXPIRED  4 /* this key is expired */
+#define KEYF_REVOKED  8 /* this key has been revoked */
 
 #define UIDF_CHECKED  1 /* user id has been checked - other bits are valid */
 #define UIDF_VALID    2 /* this is a valid user id */

g10/trustdb.c

@@ -2054,7 +2054,7 @@ upd_pref_record( PKT_signature *sig, TRUSTREC *drec,
 
 
 /****************
- * Note: A signature made with a secondayr key is not considered a
+ * Note: A signature made with a secondary key is not considered a
  *	 self-signature.
  */
 static void
@@ -2067,11 +2067,21 @@ upd_sig_record( PKT_signature *sig, TRUSTREC *drec,
     ulong lid = drec->recnum;
 
     if( !*uidrecno ) {
-	/* fixme: handle direct key signatures */
+	switch( sig->sig_class ) {
-	log_error("key %08lX: signature without user id\n", (ulong)keyid[1] );
+	  case 0x20:
-	return;
+	  case 0x28: /* We do not need uids for [sub]key revications */
+	  case 0x18: /* or subkey binding */
+	    memset( &urec, 0, sizeof urec ); /* to catch errors */
+	    break;
+
+	  default:
+	    log_error("key %08lX: signature (class %02x) without user id\n",
+					 (ulong)keyid[1], sig->sig_class );
+	    return;
+	}
     }
-    read_record( *uidrecno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
+    else
+	read_record( *uidrecno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
 
     if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) {
 	if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
@@ -2099,12 +2109,19 @@ upd_sig_record( PKT_signature *sig, TRUSTREC *drec,
 		urec.dirty = 1;
 	    }
 	}
-	else {/* is revocation sig etc */
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) { /* key binding */
+	    /* FIXME */
+	}
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { /* key revocation */
+	    /* FIXME */
+	}
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) { /* subkey revocation */
+	    /* FIXME */
+	}
+	else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* cert revocation */
 	    /* FIXME */
 	}
     }
-    else if( !*uidrecno )
-	; /* skip record with direct key signatures here */
     else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
 	/* We simply insert the signature into the sig records but
 	 * avoid duplicate ones.  We do not check them here because
@@ -2365,8 +2382,20 @@ upd_sig_record( PKT_signature *sig, TRUSTREC *drec,
 	}
 
     }
-    else {
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) { /* key binding */
-	/* handle other sig classes */
+	log_info(_("key %08lX: bogus key binding by %08lX\n"),
+				 (ulong)keyid[1], (ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { /* key revocation */
+	log_info(_("key %08lX: bogus key revocation by %08lX\n"),
+				 (ulong)keyid[1], (ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 ) { /* subkey revocation */
+	log_info(_("key %08lX: bogus subkey revocation by %08lX\n"),
+				 (ulong)keyid[1], (ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
+    }
+    else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* cert revocation */
+	/* FIXME: a signator wants to revoke his certification signature */
     }
 
   leave:

scripts/autogen.sh

@@ -2,34 +2,32 @@
 # Run this to generate all the initial makefiles, etc.
 
 PGM=GnuPG
-
 DIE=no
-NO_AUTOMAKE=no
 
-(autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+if (autoconf --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+    :
+else
     echo
     echo "**Error**: You must have "\`autoconf\'" installed to compile $PGM."
     echo '           (version 2.10 or newer is required'
-    DIE=yes
+    DIE="yes"
-}
+fi
 
-(automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
+if (automake --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then
-    echo
+  if (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then
-    echo "**Error**: You must have "\`automake\'" installed to compile $PGM."
+    :
-    echo '           (version 1.3 or newer is required)'
+  else
-    DIE=yes
-    NO_AUTOMAKE=yes
-}
-
-
-# if no automake, don't bother testing for aclocal
-test "$NO_AUTOMAKE" = "no" \
-     || (aclocal --version) < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1 || {
     echo
     echo "**Error**: Missing "\`aclocal\'".  The version of "\`automake\'
     echo "           installed doesn't appear recent enough."
-    DIE=yes
+    DIE="yes"
-}
+  fi
+else
+    echo
+    echo "**Error**: You must have "\`automake\'" installed to compile $PGM."
+    echo '           (version 1.3 or newer is required)'
+    DIE="yes"
+fi
 
 if test "$DIE" = "yes"; then
     exit 1

util/dotlock.c

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  * Create a lockfile with the given name. A TIMEOUT of 0
  * returns immediately, -1 waits forever (hopefully not), other
  * values are timeouts in milliseconds.
- * Returns: a char pointer used as handle for reelase lock
+ * Returns: a char pointer used as handle for release lock
  *	    or NULL in case of an error.
  *
  * Notes: This function creates a lock file in the same directory
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  *	  A temporary file ".#lk.<pid>.<hostname> is used.
  *	  This function does nothing for Windoze.
  */
-int
+const char *
 make_dotlock( const char *file_to_lock, long timeout )
 {
     int rc=-1, fd=-1, pid;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ make_dotlock( const char *file_to_lock, long timeout )
     if( !tname )
 	log_fatal( "could not create temporary lock file '%s'\n");
     log_debug( "dotlock_make: tmpname='%s'\n", tname );
-    chmod( tname, 0644 ); /* just in case an "umask" is set */
+    chmod( tname, 0644 ); /* just in case an umask is set */
     if( !(fd = open( tname, O_WRONLY )) )
 	log_fatal( "could not open temporary lock file '%s'\n", tname);
     if( write(fd, pidstr, 11 ) != 11 )
@@ -126,21 +126,21 @@ make_dotlock( const char *file_to_lock, long timeout )
 int
 release_dotlock( const char *lockfile )
 {
-    int pid = ReadLockfile( lockfile );
+    int pid = rad_lockfile( lockfile );
     if( pid == -1 ) {
-	Log_printf( LERROR, "ReleaseLock: lockfile error");
+	log_error( "release_dotlock: lockfile error");
 	return -1;
     }
     if( pid != getpid() ) {
-	Log_printf( LERROR, "ReleaseLock: not our lock (pid=%d)", pid);
+	log_error( "release_dotlock: not our lock (pid=%d)", pid);
 	return -1;
     }
-    if( remove(lockfile) ) {
+    if( remove( lockfile ) ) {
-	Log_printf( LERROR, "ReleaseLock: error removing lockfile '%s'",
+	log_error( "release_dotlock: error removing lockfile '%s'",
 							    lockfile);
 	return -1;
     }
-    Log_printf( LMESG, "ReleaseLock: released lockfile '%s'", lockfile);
+    log_debug( "release_dotlock: released lockfile '%s'", lockfile);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -156,12 +156,12 @@ read_lockfile( const char *name )
 
     if( (fd = open(name, O_RDONLY)) == -1 ) {
 	int e = errno;
-	Log_printf(LJUNK, "error opening lockfile '%s'", name );
+	log_debug("error opening lockfile '%s'", name );
-	errno = e;  /* restore errno */
+	errno = e;
 	return -1;
     }
     if( read(fd, pidstr, 10 ) != 10 ) {
-	Log_printf(LNOISE, "error reading lockfile '%s'", name );
+	log_debug("error reading lockfile '%s'", name );
 	close(fd);
 	errno = 0;
 	return -1;
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ read_lockfile( const char *name )
     close(fd);
     pid = atoi(pidstr);
     if( !pid || pid == -1 ) {
-	Log_printf(LERROR, "invalid pid %d in lockfile '%s'", pid, name );
+	log_error("invalid pid %d in lockfile '%s'", pid, name );
 	errno = 0;
 	return -1;
     }

util/iobuf.c

@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ iobuf_close( IOBUF a )
     size_t dummy_len;
     int rc=0;
 
-    if( a->directfp ) {
+    if( a && a->directfp ) {
 	fclose( a->directfp );
 	if( DBG_IOBUF )
 	    log_debug("iobuf-close -> %p\n", a->directfp );