A couple of fixes. gpg2's key generation does now work.

TODO

@@ -103,6 +103,9 @@ might want to have an agent context for each service request
 * sm/
 ** check that we issue NO_SECKEY xxx if a -u key was not found
 
+* jnlib/
+** provide jnlib_malloc and try to remove all jnlib_xmalloc.
+
 * gpg/
 ** issue a NO_SECKEY xxxx if a -u key was not found.
 ** Replace DIGEST_ALGO_SHA224

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+2006-06-30  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* misc.c (checksum_mpi): No need for nbits as they are alredy
+	included in the buffer.
+
+2006-06-29  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_signature, parse_key): Need store the
+	length of opaque data as number of bits. 
+	* card-util.c (card_store_subkey): Ditto.
+
+	* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list, check_sig_and_print): Replaced
+	log_get_stream by calls to log_printf.  This avoids the extra LFs
+	inserted by the logging function. They are a bit too smart
+	sometimes.
+	* pkclist.c (do_show_revocation_reason): Print final LF through
+	log_printf to avoid extra LFs.
+	* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Ditto.
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Fix call to gcry.
+
 2006-06-27  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
 
 	Applied patches from 1.4.x (2006-05-22 to 2006-06-23) from David:

g10/card-util.c

@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ card_store_subkey (KBNODE node, int use)
       sk->skey[i] = NULL;
     }
   i = pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo);
-  sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10);
+  sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10*8);
   sk->is_protected = 1;
   sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
   s = info.serialno;

g10/keygen.c

@@ -3701,7 +3701,7 @@ gen_card_key_with_backup (int algo, int keyno, int is_primary,
       sk->skey[i] = NULL;
     }
   i = pubkey_get_npkey (sk->pubkey_algo);
-  sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10);
+  sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, xstrdup ("dummydata"), 10*8);
   sk->is_protected = 1;
   sk->protect.s2k.mode = 1002;
   s = get_parameter_value (para, pSERIALNO);

g10/mainproc.c

@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
 		      nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
 		      strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
 	    p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
-	    fprintf(log_get_stream(),_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+	    log_printf (_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
 	    xfree(p);
 	  }
 	else
@@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 	       not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
 	    log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
 	    print_utf8_string( log_get_stream(), p, n );
-	    putc( '\n', log_get_stream() );
+	    log_printf ("\n");
 
 	    if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
 	       && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
@@ -1667,9 +1667,9 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 	    xfree(p);
 
 	    if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
-	      fprintf(log_get_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+	      log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
 	    else
-	      fputs("\n", log_get_stream() );
+	      log_printf ("\n");
             count++;
 	}
 	if( !count ) {	/* just in case that we have no valid textual
@@ -1712,11 +1712,8 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 	    else
 	      log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
             if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
-	      {
+              log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
-                putc(' ', log_get_stream() );
+	    log_printf ("\n");
-                fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_get_stream() );
-	      }
-	    fputs("\n", log_get_stream() );
 	}
 
         /* If we have a good signature and already printed 
@@ -1760,10 +1757,10 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 		      valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
 							       un->pkt->
 							       pkt.user_id));
-		    fprintf(log_get_stream()," [%s]\n",valid);
+		    log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
 		  }
 		else
-		  fputs("\n", log_get_stream() );
+		  log_printf ("\n");
             }
 	}
 	release_kbnode( keyblock );

g10/misc.c

@@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ checksum_mpi (gcry_mpi_t a)
   u16 csum;
   byte *buffer;
   unsigned int nbytes;
-  unsigned int nbits;
 
   if ( gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, a) )
     BUG ();
@@ -308,9 +307,7 @@ checksum_mpi (gcry_mpi_t a)
             gcry_xmalloc_secure (nbytes) : gcry_xmalloc (nbytes));
   if ( gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buffer, nbytes, NULL, a) )
     BUG ();
-  nbits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (a);
+  csum = checksum (buffer, nbytes);
-  csum = checksum_u16 (nbits);
-  csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
   xfree (buffer);
   return csum;
 }

g10/parse-packet.c

@@ -1490,9 +1490,10 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	if( list_mode )
 	    fprintf (listfp, "\tunknown algorithm %d\n", sig->pubkey_algo );
 	unknown_pubkey_warning( sig->pubkey_algo );
-	/* we store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
+	/* We store the plain material in data[0], so that we are able
 	 * to write it back with build_packet() */
-	sig->data[0]= mpi_set_opaque(NULL, read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+	sig->data[0]= gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),
+                                           pktlen*8 );
 	pktlen = 0;
     }
     else {
@@ -1715,8 +1716,8 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
         size_t snlen = 0;
 
 	if( !npkey ) {
-	    sk->skey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
+	    sk->skey[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),
-					  read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+                                               pktlen*8 );
 	    pktlen = 0;
 	    goto leave;
 	}
@@ -1894,15 +1895,17 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 
             || sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 ) {
 	    /* better set some dummy stuff here */
-	    sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, xstrdup("dummydata"), 10);
+	    sk->skey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque(NULL,
+                                                  xstrdup("dummydata"), 10*8);
 	    pktlen = 0;
 	}
 	else if( is_v4 && sk->is_protected ) {
 	    /* ugly; the length is encrypted too, so we read all
 	     * stuff up to the end of the packet into the first
 	     * skey element */
-	    sk->skey[npkey] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL,
+	    sk->skey[npkey] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL,
-					     read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),pktlen);
+                                                   read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),
+                                                   pktlen*8);
 	    pktlen = 0;
 	    if( list_mode ) {
 		fprintf (listfp, "\tencrypted stuff follows\n");
@@ -1942,8 +1945,9 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	PKT_public_key *pk = pkt->pkt.public_key;
 
 	if( !npkey ) {
-	    pk->pkey[0] = mpi_set_opaque( NULL,
+	    pk->pkey[0] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque ( NULL,
-					  read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0), pktlen );
+                                                read_rest(inp, pktlen, 0),
+                                                pktlen*8 );
 	    pktlen = 0;
 	    goto leave;
 	}

g10/pkclist.c

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
 	    fputs( text, log_get_stream() );
 	else
 	    fprintf( log_get_stream(), "code=%02x", *p );
-	putc( '\n', log_get_stream() );
+	log_printf ("\n");
 	n--; p++;
 	pp = NULL;
 	do {
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
 	    if( n ) {
 		pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
 		nn = pp? pp - p : n;
-		log_info( _("revocation comment: ") );
+		log_info ( _("revocation comment: ") );
-		print_string( log_get_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
+		print_string ( log_get_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
-		putc( '\n', log_get_stream() );
+		log_printf ("\n");
 		p += nn; n -= nn;
 	    }
 	} while( pp );

g10/pubkey-enc.c

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
 
         if ( pk &&  pk->is_revoked ) {
             log_info( _("NOTE: key has been revoked") );
-            putc( '\n', log_get_stream() );
+            log_printf ("\n");
             show_revocation_reason( pk, 1 );
         }
 

g10/seskey.c

@@ -220,8 +220,7 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
     {
       /* It's a DSA signature, so find out the size of q. */
 
-      unsigned int qbytes = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk?pk->pkey[1]:sk->skey[1]);
+      size_t qbytes = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk?pk->pkey[1]:sk->skey[1]);
-      size_t n;
 
       /* Make sure it is a multiple of 8 bits. */
 
@@ -259,7 +258,7 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
 	}
 
       if (gcry_mpi_scan (&frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
-                         gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), n, &n))
+                         gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), qbytes, &qbytes))
         BUG();
     }
   else

scd/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+2006-06-28  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
+
+	* app-openpgp.c (do_writekey): Fixed computation of memmove
+	length.  This led to garbled keys if E was larger than one byte.
+	Thanks to Achim Pietig for hinting at the garbled E.
+
 2006-06-09  Marcus Brinkmann  <marcus@g10code.de>
 
 	* Makefile.am (scdaemon_LDADD): Add $(NETLIBS).

scd/app-openpgp.c

@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ do_writekey (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
   if (rsa_e_len < 4)
     {
       /* Right justify E. */
-      memmove (tp+4-rsa_e_len, tp, 4-rsa_e_len);
+      memmove (tp+4-rsa_e_len, tp, rsa_e_len);
       memset (tp, 0, 4-rsa_e_len);
     }                 
   tp += 4;