security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-07-02 22:46:30 +02:00
Code Activity

Expiration time works (I hope so)

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1998-11-20 17:42:18 +00:00
parent f9d2bd8cb9
commit 47c61bafe3
35 changed files with 7147 additions and 2848 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

21
PROJECTS
View file

@ -1,22 +1,27 @@
* Urko Lusa <ulusa@lacueva.ddns.org> is working on es.po
* Check if an object (a message, detached sign, public key, or whatever)
is signed by definite user, i.e. define user
(userid, or any other unique identification) on command line.
* Change the internal represention of keyid into a struct which
can also hold the localid and extend the localid to hold information
of the subkey number because two subkeys may have the same keyid.
* signature verification is done duplicated on import: in import.c and
tehn in trustdb.c too. Maybe we can use a flag to skip the actual
verification process (this should work if we use the same keyblock,
but I'm not sure how to accomplish that). Another way is to allow
the import of bogus data and let trustdb mark these keys as invalid;
I see an advantage in this that it may help to prevent a DoS on a
keyserver by sending him a lot of bogus signatures which he has
to check - Needs further investigation.
* abstraction of the MPI
* Add a way to override the current cipher/md implementations
by others (using extensions)
* add a fast-import command which does not do the signature checks
of other keys (processing of the sdir hintlist). The signatures
may then be verified by a maintainence pass.
* Not GnupG replated: What about option completion in bash?
* Not GnuPG replated: What about option completion in bash?
Can "--dump-options" be used for this or should we place the
options in a special ELF segment?