1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* getkey.c - Get a key from the database
|
2004-08-23 19:55:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
|
2004-01-22 02:08:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
|
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
|
|
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
|
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
|
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
|
|
|
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
|
|
|
|
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <config.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#include <ctype.h>
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#include "util.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#include "memory.h"
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#include "iobuf.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "keydb.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#include "options.h"
|
1998-06-25 12:19:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#include "main.h"
|
1999-03-17 13:13:04 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#include "trustdb.h"
|
1998-09-28 21:25:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#include "i18n.h"
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-01-28 02:04:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
|
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES PK_UID_CACHE_SIZE
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES < 2
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#error We need the cache for key creation
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int exact;
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBPOS kbpos;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE found_key; /* pointer into some keyblock */
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int last_rc;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int req_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
int req_algo;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE kr_handle;
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int not_allocated;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int nitems;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC items[1];
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
|
|
|
int any;
|
|
|
|
|
int okay_count;
|
|
|
|
|
int nokey_count;
|
|
|
|
|
int error_count;
|
|
|
|
|
} lkup_stats[21];
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
typedef struct keyid_list {
|
|
|
|
|
struct keyid_list *next;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
|
|
|
} *keyid_list_t;
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct pk_cache_entry {
|
|
|
|
|
struct pk_cache_entry *next;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
|
|
|
|
} *pk_cache_entry_t;
|
|
|
|
|
static pk_cache_entry_t pk_cache;
|
|
|
|
|
static int pk_cache_entries; /* number of entries in pk cache */
|
|
|
|
|
static int pk_cache_disabled;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES < 5
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#error we really need the userid cache
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct user_id_db {
|
|
|
|
|
struct user_id_db *next;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t keyids;
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
|
char name[1];
|
|
|
|
|
} *user_id_db_t;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
static user_id_db_t user_id_db;
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static int uid_cache_entries; /* number of entries in uid cache */
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
static int lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode );
|
1998-01-05 20:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
print_stats()
|
1997-12-12 13:03:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i < DIM(lkup_stats); i++ ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( lkup_stats[i].any )
|
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
|
|
|
"lookup stats: mode=%-2d ok=%-6d nokey=%-6d err=%-6d\n",
|
|
|
|
|
i,
|
|
|
|
|
lkup_stats[i].okay_count,
|
|
|
|
|
lkup_stats[i].nokey_count,
|
|
|
|
|
lkup_stats[i].error_count );
|
1998-02-12 00:22:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
void
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entry_t ce;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( pk_cache_disabled )
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( pk->dont_cache )
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( is_ELGAMAL(pk->pubkey_algo)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|| is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
return; /* don't know how to get the keyid */
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( DBG_CACHE )
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug("cache_public_key: already in cache\n");
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( pk_cache_entries >= MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_disabled=1;
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
|
1998-11-20 20:22:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_info(_("too many entries in pk cache - disabled\n"));
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entries++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ce = m_alloc( sizeof *ce );
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ce->next = pk_cache;
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache = ce;
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ce->pk = copy_public_key( NULL, pk );
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ce->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
ce->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Return the user ID from the given keyblock.
|
|
|
|
|
* We use the primary uid flag which has been set by the merge_selfsigs
|
|
|
|
|
* function. The returned value is only valid as long as then given
|
|
|
|
|
* keyblock is not changed
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static const char *
|
|
|
|
|
get_primary_uid ( KBNODE keyblock, size_t *uidlen )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
const char *s;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (k=keyblock; k; k=k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
&& !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
|
|
|
|
|
*uidlen = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
|
|
|
|
|
return k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* fixme: returning translatable constants instead of a user ID is
|
|
|
|
|
* not good because they are probably not utf-8 encoded. */
|
* main.h: Create S2K_DIGEST_ALGO macro so we do not need to always set
opt.s2k_digest_algo. This helps fix a problem with PGP 2.x encrypted
symmetric messages. Change all callers (encode.c, g10.c, keyedit.c,
keygen.c, passphrase.c, sign.c).
* armor.c, cardglue.c, getkey.c, import.c, keygen.c: Be consistent in some
more quoted strings. Always use 'user ID', not 'user id', "quotes" for
user IDs, etc.
2004-09-24 22:34:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s = _("[User ID not found]");
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*uidlen = strlen (s);
|
|
|
|
|
return s;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
release_keyid_list ( keyid_list_t k )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
while ( k ) {
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t k2 = k->next;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
m_free (k);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
k = k2;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Store the association of keyid and userid
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Feed only public keys to this function.
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
cache_user_id( KBNODE keyblock )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
user_id_db_t r;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
const char *uid;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t uidlen;
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t keyids = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t a = m_alloc_clear ( sizeof *a );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Hmmm: For a long list of keyids it might be an advantage
|
|
|
|
|
* to append the keys */
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, a->keyid );
|
|
|
|
|
/* first check for duplicates */
|
|
|
|
|
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t b = r->keyids;
|
|
|
|
|
for ( b = r->keyids; b; b = b->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( b->keyid[0] == a->keyid[0]
|
|
|
|
|
&& b->keyid[1] == a->keyid[1] ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( DBG_CACHE )
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
|
|
|
|
|
release_keyid_list ( keyids );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
m_free ( a );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
/* now put it into the cache */
|
|
|
|
|
a->next = keyids;
|
|
|
|
|
keyids = a;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !keyids )
|
|
|
|
|
BUG (); /* No key no fun */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uid = get_primary_uid ( keyblock, &uidlen );
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( uid_cache_entries >= MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
|
|
|
|
|
r = user_id_db;
|
|
|
|
|
user_id_db = r->next;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_keyid_list ( r->keyids );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
m_free(r);
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uid_cache_entries--;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r + uidlen-1 );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
r->keyids = keyids;
|
|
|
|
|
r->len = uidlen;
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(r->name, uid, r->len);
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
r->next = user_id_db;
|
|
|
|
|
user_id_db = r;
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uid_cache_entries++;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
|
getkey_disable_caches()
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce2 ) {
|
|
|
|
|
ce2 = ce->next;
|
|
|
|
|
free_public_key( ce->pk );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
m_free( ce );
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_disabled=1;
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entries = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* fixme: disable user id cache ? */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock )
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
copy_public_key ( pk, a->pkt->pkt.public_key );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
sk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx,
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
copy_secret_key( sk, a->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk
|
|
|
|
|
* can be called with PK set to NULL to just read it into some
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* internal structures.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int internal = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
|
2004-01-28 02:04:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(pk)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Try to get it from the cache. We don't do this when pk is
|
|
|
|
|
NULL as it does not guarantee that the user IDs are
|
|
|
|
|
cached. */
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entry_t ce;
|
2004-01-28 02:04:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_key( pk, ce->pk );
|
1998-10-12 22:16:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-01-28 02:04:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* more init stuff */
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( !pk ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
internal++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* do a lookup */
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{ struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE kb = NULL;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.req_algo = pk->req_algo;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode ( kb );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( !rc )
|
|
|
|
|
goto leave;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
|
|
|
if( !rc )
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
cache_public_key( pk );
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( internal )
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
free_public_key(pk);
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk. This function
|
|
|
|
|
differs from get_pubkey() in that it does not do a check of the key
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations. This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).
* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
2003-12-11 02:07:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
to avoid recursion. It should be used only in very certain cases.
|
|
|
|
|
It will only retrieve primary keys. */
|
2002-11-13 18:43:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_fast (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid)
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock;
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations. This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).
* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
2003-12-11 02:07:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 pkid[2];
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert (pk);
|
|
|
|
|
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
|
|
|
|
|
{ /* Try to get it from the cache */
|
|
|
|
|
pk_cache_entry_t ce;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (pk)
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hd = keydb_new (0);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (hd);
|
|
|
|
|
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (hd);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
|
|
|
|
|
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations. This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).
* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
2003-12-11 02:07:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations. This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).
* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
2003-12-11 02:07:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,pkid);
|
|
|
|
|
if(keyid[0]==pkid[0] && keyid[1]==pkid[1])
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rc=G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (keyblock);
|
2002-10-05 00:12:09 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
|
|
|
|
|
properly set. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Remove function ...
* keydb.h, keyid.c (hash_public_key, do_fingerprint_md): ... and make a
new one here that shares code with the fingerprint calculations. This
removes some duplicated functionality, and is also around 14% faster.
(Every bit helps).
* import.c (import_one): No longer need the Elgamal import warning.
* getkey.c (get_pubkey_fast): This one is sort of obscure. get_pubkey_fast
returns the primary key when requesting a subkey, so if a user has a key
signed by a subkey (we don't do this, but used to), AND that key is not
self-signed, AND the algorithm of the subkey in question is not present in
GnuPG, AND the algorithm of the primary key that owns the subkey in
question is present in GnuPG, then we will try and verify the subkey
signature using the primary key algorithm and hit a BUG(). The fix is to
not return a hit if the keyid is not the primary. All other users of
get_pubkey_fast already expect a primary only.
2003-12-11 02:07:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-02-19 15:54:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkeyblock( u32 *keyid )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* no need to set exact here because we want the entire block */
|
1999-02-19 15:54:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
|
1999-02-19 15:54:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, &keyblock, 0 );
|
1999-02-19 15:54:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc ? NULL : keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Get a secret key and store it into sk
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE kb = NULL;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.req_algo = sk->req_algo;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.req_usage = sk->req_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc ) {
|
|
|
|
|
sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_end( &ctx );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode ( kb );
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( !rc ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* check the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
|
|
|
|
|
* unlock the secret key
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Check whether the secret key is available. This is just a fast
|
|
|
|
|
* check and does not tell us whether the secret key is valid. It
|
|
|
|
|
* merely tells other whether there is some secret key.
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* Returns: 0 := key is available
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
|
|
|
|
|
if ( rc == -1 )
|
|
|
|
|
rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (hd);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* Return the type of the user id:
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Please use the constants KEYDB_SERCH_MODE_xxx
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 0 = Invalid user ID
|
|
|
|
|
* 1 = exact match
|
|
|
|
|
* 2 = match a substring
|
|
|
|
|
* 3 = match an email address
|
|
|
|
|
* 4 = match a substring of an email address
|
|
|
|
|
* 5 = match an email address, but compare from end
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 6 = word match mode
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 10 = it is a short KEYID (don't care about keyid[0])
|
|
|
|
|
* 11 = it is a long KEYID
|
1999-03-08 20:50:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 12 = it is a trustdb index (keyid is looked up)
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 16 = it is a 16 byte fingerprint
|
|
|
|
|
* 20 = it is a 20 byte fingerprint
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* 21 = Unified fingerprint :fpr:pk_algo:
|
|
|
|
|
* (We don't use pk_algo yet)
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* Rules used:
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with 8,9,16 or 17 hex-digits (the first one
|
|
|
|
|
* must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a keyid; depending
|
|
|
|
|
* on the length a short or complete one.
|
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with 32,33,40 or 41 hex-digits (the first one
|
|
|
|
|
* must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a fingerprint.
|
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with a left angle, we assume it is a complete
|
|
|
|
|
* email address and look only at this part.
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with a colon we assume it is a unified
|
|
|
|
|
* key specfification.
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with a '.', we assume it is the ending
|
|
|
|
|
* part of an email address
|
|
|
|
|
* - If the username starts with an '@', we assume it is a part of an
|
|
|
|
|
* email address
|
1998-08-11 19:29:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the userid start with an '=' an exact compare is done.
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* done (This is the default).
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* - If the userid starts with a '+' we will compare individual words
|
|
|
|
|
* and a match requires that all the words are in the userid.
|
|
|
|
|
* Words are delimited by white space or "()<>[]{}.@-+_,;/&!"
|
|
|
|
|
* (note that you can't search for these characters). Compare
|
|
|
|
|
* is not case sensitive.
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
classify_user_id( const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
const char *s;
|
|
|
|
|
int hexprefix = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int hexlength;
|
|
|
|
|
int mode = 0;
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC dummy_desc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!desc)
|
|
|
|
|
desc = &dummy_desc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* clear the structure so that the mode field is set to zero unless
|
|
|
|
|
* we set it to the correct value right at the end of this function */
|
|
|
|
|
memset (desc, 0, sizeof *desc);
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* skip leading spaces. Fixme: what is with trailing spaces? */
|
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the
unhashed signature cache any longer.
* misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g),
and signer's primary fingerprint (%p).
* Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate.
* g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months,
they won't be the same thing.
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp",
since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use
ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues.
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email
field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set.
* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.
* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired
uids do not count in the web of trust.
* signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use
sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have
struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define
only the function call half of the two pairs by default.
(pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and
sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG,
and if we can't, fail with an explanation.
* signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in
this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms
(Solaris and Forte c89).
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when
listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This
is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from"
preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same
behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a
self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the
signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates,
don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively
unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs.
This is bug #181
* g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to
iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto.
* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason):
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
2003-07-10 16:30:07 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(s = name; *s && spacep (s); s++ )
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (*s) {
|
|
|
|
|
case 0: /* empty string is an error */
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '.': /* an email address, compare from end */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '<': /* an email address */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL;
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '@': /* part of an email address */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '=': /* exact compare */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '*': /* case insensitive substring search */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '+': /* compare individual words */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case '#': /* local user id */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* This is now obsolete and van't not be used anymore*/
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case ':': /*Unified fingerprint */
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const char *se, *si;
|
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
se = strchr( ++s,':');
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !se )
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0,si=s; si < se; si++, i++ ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !strchr("01234567890abcdefABCDEF", *si ) )
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* invalid digit */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (i != 32 && i != 40)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* invalid length of fpr*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for (i=0,si=s; si < se; i++, si +=2)
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.fpr[i] = hextobyte(si);
|
|
|
|
|
for ( ; i < 20; i++)
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.fpr[i]= 0;
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
s = se + 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
if (s[0] == '0' && s[1] == 'x') {
|
|
|
|
|
hexprefix = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
s += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hexlength = strspn(s, "0123456789abcdefABCDEF");
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength >= 8 && s[hexlength] =='!') {
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
desc->exact = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
hexlength++; /* just for the following check */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check if a hexadecimal number is terminated by EOS or blank */
|
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the
unhashed signature cache any longer.
* misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g),
and signer's primary fingerprint (%p).
* Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate.
* g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months,
they won't be the same thing.
* keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp",
since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use
ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues.
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email
field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set.
* options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver.
* trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired
uids do not count in the web of trust.
* signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use
sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have
struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define
only the function call half of the two pairs by default.
(pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and
sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG,
and if we can't, fail with an explanation.
* signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in
this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms
(Solaris and Forte c89).
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when
listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This
is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from"
preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same
behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a
self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the
signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates,
don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively
unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs.
This is bug #181
* g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to
iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere.
* getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep
* keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto.
* tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason):
* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
2003-07-10 16:30:07 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength && s[hexlength] && !spacep(s+hexlength)) {
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (hexprefix) /* a "0x" prefix without correct */
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* termination is an error */
|
|
|
|
|
else /* The first chars looked like */
|
|
|
|
|
hexlength = 0; /* a hex number, but really were not. */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (desc->exact)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
hexlength--;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength == 8
|
|
|
|
|
|| (!hexprefix && hexlength == 9 && *s == '0')){
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* short keyid */
|
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength == 9)
|
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.kid[0] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s, NULL, 16 );
|
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID;
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if (hexlength == 16
|
|
|
|
|
|| (!hexprefix && hexlength == 17 && *s == '0')) {
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* complete keyid */
|
|
|
|
|
char buf[9];
|
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength == 17)
|
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
|
|
|
|
mem2str(buf, s, 9 );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.kid[0] = strtoul( buf, NULL, 16 );
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s+8, NULL, 16 );
|
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if (hexlength == 32 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 33
|
|
|
|
|
&& *s == '0')) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* md5 fingerprint */
|
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength == 33)
|
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
memset(desc->u.fpr+16, 0, 4);
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < 16; i++, s+=2) {
|
|
|
|
|
int c = hextobyte(s);
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if (hexlength == 40 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 41
|
|
|
|
|
&& *s == '0')) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* sha1/rmd160 fingerprint */
|
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
if (hexlength == 41)
|
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < 20; i++, s+=2) {
|
|
|
|
|
int c = hextobyte(s);
|
|
|
|
|
if (c == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
|
1999-07-22 20:11:55 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
|
if (hexprefix) /* This was a hex number with a prefix */
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* and a wrong length */
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-12 19:43:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
desc->exact = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->u.name = s;
|
|
|
|
|
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR; /* default mode */
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
desc->mode = mode;
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return mode;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
skip_unusable(void *dummy,u32 *keyid,PKT_user_id *uid)
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int unusable=0;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock;
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyblock=get_pubkeyblock(keyid);
|
|
|
|
|
if(!keyblock)
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_error("error checking usability status of %s\n",keystr(keyid));
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Is the user ID in question revoked/expired? */
|
|
|
|
|
if(uid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE node;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(cmp_user_ids(uid,node->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0
|
|
|
|
|
&& (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
|
|
|
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired))
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
unusable=1;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!unusable)
|
|
|
|
|
unusable=pk_is_disabled(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode(keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
return unusable;
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the
|
2004-04-26 02:36:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id. if
|
|
|
|
|
* pk/sk has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return a
|
|
|
|
|
* pubkey with that algo. If namelist is NULL, the first key is
|
|
|
|
|
* returned. The caller should provide storage for either the pk or
|
|
|
|
|
* the sk. If ret_kb is not NULL the function will return the
|
|
|
|
|
* keyblock there.
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
key_byname( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, STRLIST namelist,
|
2002-12-26 23:22:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int secmode, int include_unusable,
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE *ret_kb, KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd )
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
|
STRLIST r;
|
|
|
|
|
GETKEY_CTX ctx;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE help_kb = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( retctx ) {/* reset the returned context in case of error */
|
|
|
|
|
assert (!ret_kdbhd); /* not allowed because the handle is
|
|
|
|
|
stored in the context */
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*retctx = NULL;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret_kdbhd)
|
|
|
|
|
*ret_kdbhd = NULL;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 02:36:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if(!namelist)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
ctx = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->nitems = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->items[0].mode=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
|
|
|
|
|
if(!include_unusable)
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->items[0].skipfnc=skip_unusable;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* build the search context */
|
|
|
|
|
for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next )
|
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 02:36:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *ctx + (n-1)*sizeof ctx->items );
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->nitems = n;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next, n++ )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
classify_user_id (r->d, &ctx->items[n]);
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 02:36:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->items[n].exact)
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->exact = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->items[n].mode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
m_free (ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
return G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if(!include_unusable
|
|
|
|
|
&& ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
|
|
|
|
|
&& ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
|
|
|
|
|
&& ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|
|
|
|
|
&& ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
|
|
|
|
|
&& ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->items[n].skipfnc=skip_unusable;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (secmode);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !ret_kb )
|
|
|
|
|
ret_kb = &help_kb;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( secmode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (sk) {
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->req_algo = sk->req_algo;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->req_usage = sk->req_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 1 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc && sk ) {
|
|
|
|
|
sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_kb );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (pk) {
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->req_algo = pk->req_algo;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->req_usage = pk->req_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc && pk ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_kb );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode ( help_kb );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (retctx) /* caller wants the context */
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*retctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (ret_kdbhd) {
|
|
|
|
|
*ret_kdbhd = ctx->kr_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->kr_handle = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end (ctx);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Find a public key from NAME and returh the keyblock or the key.
|
|
|
|
|
* If ret_kdb is not NULL, the KEYDB handle used to locate this keyblock is
|
|
|
|
|
* returned and the caller is responsible for closing it.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_byname (PKT_public_key *pk,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *name, KBNODE *ret_keyblock,
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd, int include_unusable )
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
STRLIST namelist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
|
2002-12-26 23:22:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
rc = key_byname( NULL, namelist, pk, NULL, 0,
|
2003-09-24 01:14:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
include_unusable, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
free_strlist( namelist );
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_public_key *pk,
|
|
|
|
|
STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-12-26 23:22:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return key_byname( retctx, names, pk, NULL, 0, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL);
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc && pk && ret_keyblock )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_keyblock );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if( ctx ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
memset (&ctx->kbpos, 0, sizeof ctx->kbpos);
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( !ctx->not_allocated )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
m_free( ctx );
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-07-21 14:53:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* FIXME:
|
|
|
|
|
* We should replace this with the _byname function. Thiscsan be done
|
|
|
|
|
* by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style.
|
1998-07-21 14:53:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_byfprint( PKT_public_key *pk,
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
|
1998-07-21 14:53:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE kb = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.exact = 1 ;
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|
|
|
|
|
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rc && pk )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode ( kb );
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-07-21 14:53:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
|
1998-07-21 14:53:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-11-13 18:43:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk. This function
|
|
|
|
|
differs from get_pubkey_byfprint() in that it does not do a check
|
|
|
|
|
of the key to avoid recursion. It should be used only in very
|
|
|
|
|
certain cases. PK may be NULL to check just for the existance of
|
|
|
|
|
the key. */
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key *pk,
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock;
|
2002-11-13 22:49:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
byte fprbuf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
|
2002-11-13 18:43:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN && i < fprint_len; i++)
|
|
|
|
|
fprbuf[i] = fprint[i];
|
|
|
|
|
while (i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
|
|
|
|
|
fprbuf[i++] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hd = keydb_new (0);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fprbuf);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == -1)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (hd);
|
|
|
|
|
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (hd);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
|
|
|
|
|
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
|
|
|
|
|
if (pk)
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
|
|
|
|
|
properly set. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Search for a key with the given fingerprint and return the
|
|
|
|
|
* complete keyblock which may have more than only this key.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
1998-06-13 19:00:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
|
|
|
|
|
size_t fprint_len )
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|
|
|
|
|
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
|
1999-02-10 17:22:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-06-13 19:00:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
|
1998-04-08 21:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* Get a secret key by name and store it into sk
|
|
|
|
|
* If NAME is NULL use the default key
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_byname2( GETKEY_CTX *retctx,
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unprotect,
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE *retblock )
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
STRLIST namelist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( !name && opt.def_secret_key && *opt.def_secret_key )
|
|
|
|
|
add_to_strlist( &namelist, opt.def_secret_key );
|
|
|
|
|
else if(name)
|
|
|
|
|
add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, 1, retblock, NULL );
|
1997-11-24 12:04:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
free_strlist( namelist );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( !rc && unprotect )
|
|
|
|
|
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-26 03:20:03 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
1997-11-24 12:04:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unlock )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return get_seckey_byname2 ( NULL, sk, name, unlock, NULL );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-07 18:05:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_secret_key *sk,
|
|
|
|
|
STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
|
1999-01-07 18:05:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-12-26 23:22:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return key_byname( retctx, names, NULL, sk, 1, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL );
|
1999-01-07 18:05:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
|
1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 1 );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !rc && sk && ret_keyblock )
|
|
|
|
|
sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME:
|
|
|
|
|
* We should replace this with the _byname function. Thiscsan be done
|
|
|
|
|
* by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style.
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_seckey_byfprint( PKT_secret_key *sk,
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE kb = NULL;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.exact = 1 ;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.nitems = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
|
|
|
|
|
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
|
|
|
|
|
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rc && sk )
|
|
|
|
|
sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode ( kb );
|
|
|
|
|
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/************************************************
|
|
|
|
|
************* Merging stuff ********************
|
|
|
|
|
************************************************/
|
1998-07-06 12:23:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* merge all selfsignatures with the keys.
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: replace this at least for the public key parts
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* by merge_selfsigs.
|
|
|
|
|
* It is still used in keyedit.c and
|
|
|
|
|
* at 2 or 3 other places - check whether it is really needed.
|
|
|
|
|
* It might be needed by the key edit and import stuff because
|
|
|
|
|
* the keylock is changed.
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
|
merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
1998-11-20 18:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 kid[2] = { 0, 0 };
|
1998-12-08 13:20:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 sigdate = 0;
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (keyblock && keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* divert to our new function */
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs (keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
/* still need the old one because the new one can't handle secret keys */
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
if( pk->version < 4 )
|
|
|
|
|
pk = NULL; /* not needed for old keys */
|
1998-11-20 18:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if( !pk->expiredate ) { /* and subkey */
|
|
|
|
|
/* insert the expiration date here */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/*FIXME!!! pk->expiredate = subkeys_expiretime( k, kid );*/
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-29 14:47:31 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0;
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
pk = NULL; sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if( sk->version < 4 )
|
|
|
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
1998-11-20 18:42:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
|
1998-12-29 14:47:31 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0;
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if( (pk || sk ) && k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
|
|
|
|
&& (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
|
1998-10-18 17:21:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
&& sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
&& !(sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x28)
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
&& sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
|
1998-12-08 13:20:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* This is not used for subkey binding signature, becuase this
|
|
|
|
|
* is done above.
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
|
|
|
|
|
* but this is time consuming - we must provide another
|
|
|
|
|
* way to handle this
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *p;
|
1998-12-08 13:20:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 ed;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( pk ) {
|
1998-12-08 13:20:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
|
|
|
|
|
if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
pk->expiredate = ed;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
1998-12-08 13:20:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
|
|
|
|
|
if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
sk->expiredate = ed;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(pk && (pk->expiredate==0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
(pk->max_expiredate && pk->expiredate>pk->max_expiredate)))
|
|
|
|
|
pk->expiredate=pk->max_expiredate;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(sk && (sk->expiredate==0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
(sk->max_expiredate && sk->expiredate>sk->max_expiredate)))
|
|
|
|
|
sk->expiredate=sk->max_expiredate;
|
1998-09-18 17:24:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
parse_key_usage(PKT_signature *sig)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int key_usage=0;
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *p;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
|
|
|
byte flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p=parse_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS,&n);
|
|
|
|
|
if(p && n)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* first octet of the keyflags */
|
|
|
|
|
flags=*p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(flags & 3)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
|
|
|
|
|
flags&=~3;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(flags & 12)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
|
|
|
|
|
flags&=~12;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(flags & 0x20)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH;
|
|
|
|
|
flags&=~0x20;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(flags)
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We set PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN to indicate that this key has a
|
|
|
|
|
capability that we do not handle. This serves to distinguish
|
|
|
|
|
between a zero key usage which we handle as the default
|
|
|
|
|
capabilities for that algorithm, and a usage that we do not
|
|
|
|
|
handle. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return key_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature
|
|
|
|
|
* associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE:
|
|
|
|
|
* - wether the UID has been revoked
|
|
|
|
|
* - assumed creation date of the UID
|
|
|
|
|
* - temporary store the keyflags here
|
|
|
|
|
* - temporary store the key expiration time here
|
|
|
|
|
* - mark whether the primary user ID flag hat been set.
|
|
|
|
|
* - store the preferences
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
const byte *p, *sym, *hash, *zip;
|
|
|
|
|
size_t n, nsym, nhash, nzip;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-15 02:30:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
sig->flags.chosen_selfsig = 1; /* we chose this one */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uid->created = 0; /* not created == invalid */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->is_revoked = 1;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return; /* has been revoked */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* this one is okay */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->selfsigversion = sig->version;
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we got this far, it's not expired :) */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->is_expired = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
uid->expiredate = sig->expiredate;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
uid->help_key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* ditto or the key expiration */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->help_key_expire = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
if ( p ) {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* of them to only have one in our keyblock */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uid->is_primary = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( p && *p )
|
2003-05-31 06:06:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uid->is_primary = 2;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* We could also query this from the unhashed area if it is not in
|
|
|
|
|
* the hased area and then later try to decide which is the better
|
|
|
|
|
* there should be no security problem with this.
|
|
|
|
|
* For now we only look at the hashed one.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now build the preferences list. These must come from the
|
|
|
|
|
hashed section so nobody can modify the ciphers a key is
|
|
|
|
|
willing to accept. */
|
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
|
|
|
|
|
sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
|
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
|
|
|
|
|
hash = p; nhash = p?n:0;
|
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
|
|
|
|
|
zip = p; nzip = p?n:0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (uid->prefs)
|
|
|
|
|
m_free (uid->prefs);
|
|
|
|
|
n = nsym + nhash + nzip;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!n)
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs = m_alloc (sizeof (*uid->prefs) * (n+1));
|
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
for (; nsym; nsym--, n++) {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].value = *sym++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
for (; nhash; nhash--, n++) {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].value = *hash++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
for (; nzip; nzip--, n++) {
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].value = *zip++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE; /* end of list marker */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* see whether we have the MDC feature */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->mdc_feature = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
|
|
|
|
|
if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x01))
|
|
|
|
|
uid->mdc_feature = 1;
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-23 00:58:39 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* and the keyserver modify flag */
|
|
|
|
|
uid->ks_modify = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n);
|
|
|
|
|
if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x80))
|
|
|
|
|
uid->ks_modify = 0;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sig_to_revoke_info(PKT_signature *sig,struct revoke_info *rinfo)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
rinfo->date = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
rinfo->algo = sig->pubkey_algo;
|
|
|
|
|
rinfo->keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
rinfo->keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs_main(KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked, struct revoke_info *rinfo)
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 kid[2];
|
2003-01-03 22:41:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
u32 sigdate, uiddate, uiddate2;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE signode, uidnode, uidnode2;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int key_usage = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 keytimestamp = 0;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 key_expire = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int key_expire_seen = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
byte sigversion = 0;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*r_revoked = 0;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
memset(rinfo,0,sizeof(*rinfo));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
|
|
|
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
|
|
|
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keytimestamp = pk->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
|
|
|
|
|
pk->main_keyid[0] = kid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
pk->main_keyid[1] = kid[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-10-04 13:16:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( pk->version < 4 ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* before v4 the key packet itself contains the expiration
|
|
|
|
|
* date and there was no way to change it, so we start with
|
|
|
|
|
* the one from the key packet */
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire = pk->max_expiredate;
|
2000-10-04 13:16:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
key_expire_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* first pass: find the latest direct key self-signature.
|
|
|
|
|
* We assume that the newest one overrides all others
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In case this key was already merged */
|
|
|
|
|
m_free(pk->revkey);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->revkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
pk->numrevkeys=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
signode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
|
2002-08-23 22:59:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
|
|
|
|
|
; /* signature did not verify */
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( IS_KEY_REV (sig) ){
|
|
|
|
|
/* key has been revoked - there is no way to override
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* such a revocation, so we theoretically can stop now.
|
|
|
|
|
* We should not cope with expiration times for revocations
|
|
|
|
|
* here because we have to assume that an attacker can
|
|
|
|
|
* generate all kinds of signatures. However due to the
|
|
|
|
|
* fact that the key has been revoked it does not harm
|
|
|
|
|
* either and by continuing we gather some more info on
|
|
|
|
|
* that key.
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
*r_revoked = 1;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sig_to_revoke_info(sig,rinfo);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if ( IS_KEY_SIG (sig) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add any revocation keys onto the pk. This is
|
|
|
|
|
particularly interesting since we normally only
|
|
|
|
|
get data from the most recent 1F signature, but
|
|
|
|
|
you need multiple 1F sigs to properly handle
|
|
|
|
|
revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and a
|
|
|
|
|
revocation key could be sensitive and hence in a
|
|
|
|
|
different signature). */
|
|
|
|
|
if(sig->revkey) {
|
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pk->revkey=
|
|
|
|
|
m_realloc(pk->revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key)*
|
|
|
|
|
(pk->numrevkeys+sig->numrevkeys));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0;i<sig->numrevkeys;i++)
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys++],
|
|
|
|
|
sig->revkey[i],
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct revocation_key));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if(sig->flags.expired)
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
signode = k;
|
2003-01-03 22:41:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( sig->version > sigversion )
|
|
|
|
|
sigversion = sig->version;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Remove dupes from the revocation keys */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(pk->revkey)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int i,j,x,changed=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
for(j=i+1;j<pk->numrevkeys;j++)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(memcmp(&pk->revkey[i],&pk->revkey[j],
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct revocation_key))==0)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* remove j */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(x=j;x<pk->numrevkeys-1;x++)
|
|
|
|
|
pk->revkey[x]=pk->revkey[x+1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pk->numrevkeys--;
|
|
|
|
|
j--;
|
|
|
|
|
changed=1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(changed)
|
|
|
|
|
pk->revkey=m_realloc(pk->revkey,
|
|
|
|
|
pk->numrevkeys*sizeof(struct revocation_key));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if ( signode )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* some information from a direct key signature take precedence
|
|
|
|
|
* over the same information given in UID sigs.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *p;
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if ( p )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* mark that key as valid: one direct key signature should
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* render a key as valid */
|
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid = 1;
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* pass 1.5: look for key revocation signatures that were not made
|
|
|
|
|
by the key (i.e. did a revocation key issue a revocation for
|
|
|
|
|
us?). Only bother to do this if there is a revocation key in
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
the first place and we're not revoked already. */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(!*r_revoked && pk->revkey)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(IS_KEY_REV(sig) &&
|
|
|
|
|
(sig->keyid[0]!=kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1]))
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
int rc=check_revocation_keys(pk,sig);
|
|
|
|
|
if(rc==0)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-01-22 02:08:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*r_revoked=2;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sig_to_revoke_info(sig,rinfo);
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* don't continue checking since we can't be any
|
|
|
|
|
more revoked than this */
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
|
|
|
|
|
pk->maybe_revoked=1;
|
2002-09-13 14:59:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* A failure here means the sig did not verify, was
|
|
|
|
|
not issued by a revocation key, or a revocation
|
|
|
|
|
key loop was broken. If a revocation key isn't
|
|
|
|
|
findable, however, the key might be revoked and
|
|
|
|
|
we don't know it. */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-12-30 01:46:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: In the future handle subkey and cert
|
|
|
|
|
revocations? PGP doesn't, but it's in 2440. */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* second pass: look at the self-signature of all user IDs */
|
|
|
|
|
signode = uidnode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature in one user ID */
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( uidnode && signode )
|
2002-12-28 00:46:51 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
|
2002-12-28 00:46:51 +01:00
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid=1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uidnode = k;
|
|
|
|
|
signode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
|
|
|
|
|
; /* signature did not verify */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if ( (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
|
|
|
|
|
&& sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* by a newer signature. An attacker can't use this
|
|
|
|
|
* because a key should be revoced with a key revocation.
|
|
|
|
|
* The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
|
|
|
|
|
* one time an email address may become invalid but later
|
|
|
|
|
* the same email address may become valid again (hired,
|
|
|
|
|
* fired, hired again).
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-02-10 23:42:34 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(sig->flags.expired)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired=1;
|
|
|
|
|
signode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired=0;
|
|
|
|
|
signode = k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->expiredate=sig->expiredate;
|
|
|
|
|
if( sig->version > sigversion )
|
|
|
|
|
sigversion = sig->version;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( uidnode && signode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the key isn't valid yet, and we have
|
|
|
|
|
--allow-non-selfsigned-uid set, then force it valid. */
|
|
|
|
|
if(!pk->is_valid && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(opt.verbose)
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_info(_("Invalid key %s made valid by"
|
|
|
|
|
" --allow-non-selfsigned-uid\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The key STILL isn't valid, so try and find an ultimately
|
|
|
|
|
trusted signature. */
|
|
|
|
|
if(!pk->is_valid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k=k->next)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode = k;
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1])
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *ultimate_pk;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ultimate_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*ultimate_pk));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-01 10:38:24 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* We don't want to use the full get_pubkey to
|
|
|
|
|
avoid infinite recursion in certain cases.
|
|
|
|
|
There is no reason to check that an ultimately
|
|
|
|
|
trusted key is still valid - if it has been
|
|
|
|
|
revoked or the user should also renmove the
|
|
|
|
|
ultimate trust flag. */
|
2002-12-29 16:58:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(get_pubkey_fast(ultimate_pk,sig->keyid)==0
|
|
|
|
|
&& check_key_signature2(keyblock,k,ultimate_pk,
|
2003-07-22 01:19:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==0
|
2002-12-29 16:58:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
&& get_ownertrust(ultimate_pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid=1;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003-01-03 22:41:53 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* Record the highest selfsig version so we know if this is a v3
|
|
|
|
|
key through and through, or a v3 key with a v4 selfsig
|
|
|
|
|
somewhere. This is useful in a few places to know if the key
|
|
|
|
|
must be treated as PGP2-style or OpenPGP-style. Note that a
|
|
|
|
|
selfsig revocation with a higher version number will also raise
|
|
|
|
|
this value. This is okay since such a revocation must be
|
|
|
|
|
issued by the user (i.e. it cannot be issued by someone else to
|
|
|
|
|
modify the key behavior.) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk->selfsigversion=sigversion;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now that we had a look at all user IDs we can now get some information
|
|
|
|
|
* from those user IDs.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !key_usage ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the latest user ID with key flags set */
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = 0; /* helper to find the latest user ID */
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
k = k->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( uid->help_key_usage && uid->created > uiddate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage = uid->help_key_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = uid->created;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
|
|
|
|
|
int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage &= x;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !key_expire_seen ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Note, that this may be a different one from the above because
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* some user IDs may have no expiration date set */
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
k = k->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( uid->help_key_expire && uid->created > uiddate ) {
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire = uid->help_key_expire;
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = uid->created;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Currently only v3 keys have a maximum expiration date, but I'll
|
|
|
|
|
bet v5 keys get this feature again. */
|
|
|
|
|
if(key_expire==0 || (pk->max_expiredate && key_expire>pk->max_expiredate))
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire=pk->max_expiredate;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
|
|
|
|
|
pk->expiredate = key_expire;
|
2002-08-23 22:59:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields but
|
|
|
|
|
* this needs changes at other places too. */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* and now find the real primary user ID and delete all others */
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode = uidnode2 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
|
|
|
|
|
!k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (uid->is_primary)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(uid->created > uiddate)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate = uid->created;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode = k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if(uid->created==uiddate && uidnode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* The dates are equal, so we need to do a
|
|
|
|
|
different (and arbitrary) comparison. This
|
|
|
|
|
should rarely, if ever, happen. It's good to
|
|
|
|
|
try and guarantee that two different GnuPG
|
|
|
|
|
users with two different keyrings at least pick
|
|
|
|
|
the same primary. */
|
|
|
|
|
if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode=k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(uid->created > uiddate2)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uiddate2 = uid->created;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode2 = k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if(uid->created==uiddate2 && uidnode2)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode2=k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ( uidnode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
k = k->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
|
|
|
|
|
!k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k != uidnode )
|
|
|
|
|
uid->is_primary = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if( uidnode2 ) {
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* none is flagged primary - use the latest user ID we have,
|
|
|
|
|
and disambiguate with the arbitrary packet comparison. */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* None of our uids were self-signed, so pick the one that
|
|
|
|
|
sorts first to be the primary. This is the best we can do
|
|
|
|
|
here since there are no self sigs to date the uids. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode = NULL;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
k = k->next )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if(k->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|
|
|
|
|
&& !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename
is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the
keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we
already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't
need to hit the trustdb more than once.
* getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled
on it. (key_byname): Use it here.
* packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New
"pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available,
and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it
handy and it might be useful later.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key.
Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for
setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all
at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are
at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but
deterministic.
* exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message.
* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for
revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for
consistency with --show-photos.
* main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump
attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures.
* g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp,
--pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options.
* revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to
repeat question. This is bug 153.
* keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if(!uidnode)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode=k;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(cmp_user_ids(k->pkt->pkt.user_id,
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode=k;
|
|
|
|
|
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0; /* just to be
|
|
|
|
|
safe */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL, *subpk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *sig;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 mainkid[2];
|
|
|
|
|
u32 sigdate = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE signode;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int key_usage = 0;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 keytimestamp = 0;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 key_expire = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
const byte *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( subnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
|
|
|
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
|
|
|
mainpk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( mainpk->version < 4 )
|
|
|
|
|
return; /* (actually this should never happen) */
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( mainpk, mainkid );
|
|
|
|
|
subpk = subnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keytimestamp = subpk->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
subpk->is_valid = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->main_keyid[0] = mainpk->main_keyid[0];
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->main_keyid[1] = mainpk->main_keyid[1];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the latest key binding self-signature. */
|
|
|
|
|
signode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=subnode->next; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
|
|
|
|
k = k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
|
|
|
|
|
sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sig->keyid[0] == mainkid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==mainkid[1] ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
|
|
|
|
|
; /* signature did not verify */
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) ) {
|
2002-08-22 19:47:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Note that this means that the date on a
|
|
|
|
|
revocation sig does not matter - even if the
|
|
|
|
|
binding sig is dated after the revocation sig,
|
|
|
|
|
the subkey is still marked as revoked. This
|
|
|
|
|
seems ok, as it is just as easy to make new
|
|
|
|
|
subkeys rather than re-sign old ones as the
|
|
|
|
|
problem is in the distribution. Plus, PGP (7)
|
|
|
|
|
does this the same way. */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
subpk->is_revoked = 1;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sig_to_revoke_info(sig,&subpk->revoked);
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* although we could stop now, we continue to
|
|
|
|
|
* figure out other information like the old expiration
|
|
|
|
|
* time */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if(sig->flags.expired)
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
|
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
|
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
|
|
|
|
signode = k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-03-05 14:34:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/* no valid key binding */
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !signode )
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
2004-04-15 02:30:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
sig->flags.chosen_selfsig=1; /* so we know which selfsig we chose later */
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
key_usage=parse_key_usage(sig);
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !key_usage )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
|
2004-11-29 22:21:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
key_usage &= x;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( p )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
key_expire = 0;
|
2000-10-04 13:16:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
subpk->expiredate = key_expire;
|
2004-03-05 14:34:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* algo doesn't exist */
|
|
|
|
|
if(check_pubkey_algo(subpk->pubkey_algo))
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->is_valid = 1;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-04-23 05:25:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#ifndef DO_BACKSIGS
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pretend the backsig is present and accounted for. */
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->backsig=2;
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
/* Find the first 0x19 embedded signature on our self-sig. */
|
|
|
|
|
if(subpk->backsig==0)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int seq=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,
|
|
|
|
|
SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,&n,&seq,NULL)))
|
|
|
|
|
if(n>3 && ((p[0]==3 && p[2]==0x19) || (p[0]==4 && p[1]==0x19)))
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(p==NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
seq=0;
|
|
|
|
|
/* It is safe to have this in the unhashed area since the
|
|
|
|
|
0x19 is located here for convenience, not security. */
|
|
|
|
|
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,
|
|
|
|
|
&n,&seq,NULL)))
|
|
|
|
|
if(n>3 && ((p[0]==3 && p[2]==0x19) || (p[0]==4 && p[1]==0x19)))
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(p)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_signature *backsig=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_signature));
|
|
|
|
|
IOBUF backsig_buf=iobuf_temp_with_content(p,n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(parse_signature(backsig_buf,PKT_SIGNATURE,n,backsig)==0)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if(check_backsig(mainpk,subpk,backsig)==0)
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->backsig=2;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
subpk->backsig=1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iobuf_close(backsig_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
free_seckey_enc(backsig);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Merge information from the self-signatures with the key, so that
|
|
|
|
|
* we can later use them more easy.
|
|
|
|
|
* The function works by first applying the self signatures to the
|
|
|
|
|
* primary key and the to each subkey.
|
|
|
|
|
* Here are the rules we use to decide which inormation from which
|
|
|
|
|
* self-signature is used:
|
|
|
|
|
* We check all self signatures or validity and ignore all invalid signatures.
|
|
|
|
|
* All signatures are then ordered by their creation date ....
|
|
|
|
|
* For the primary key:
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME the docs
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int revoked;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
struct revoke_info rinfo;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
prefitem_t *prefs;
|
|
|
|
|
int mdc_feature;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
log_error ("expected public key but found secret key "
|
|
|
|
|
"- must stop\n");
|
|
|
|
|
/* we better exit here becuase a public key is expected at
|
|
|
|
|
other places too. FIXME: Figure this out earlier and
|
|
|
|
|
don't get to here at all */
|
|
|
|
|
g10_exit (1);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
BUG ();
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs_main ( keyblock, &revoked, &rinfo );
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* now merge in the data from each of the subkeys */
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs_subkey ( keyblock, k );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-11-13 14:23:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
main_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( revoked || main_pk->has_expired || !main_pk->is_valid ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* if the primary key is revoked, expired, or invalid we
|
|
|
|
|
* better set the appropriate flags on that key and all
|
|
|
|
|
* subkeys */
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if(!main_pk->is_valid)
|
|
|
|
|
pk->is_valid = 0;
|
2004-01-22 02:08:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(revoked && !pk->is_revoked)
|
2004-02-11 05:32:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
pk->is_revoked = revoked;
|
2004-12-30 04:26:57 +01:00
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&pk->revoked,&rinfo,sizeof(rinfo));
|
2004-02-11 05:32:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-11-13 14:23:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if(main_pk->has_expired)
|
|
|
|
|
pk->has_expired = main_pk->has_expired;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* set the preference list of all keys to those of the primary real
|
|
|
|
|
* user ID. Note: we use these preferences when we don't know by
|
|
|
|
|
* which user ID the key has been selected.
|
|
|
|
|
* fixme: we should keep atoms of commonly used preferences or
|
|
|
|
|
* use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of
|
|
|
|
|
* all preferences.
|
|
|
|
|
* Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
prefs = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
mdc_feature = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
for (k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|
|
|
|
|
&& !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
|
|
|
|
|
&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) {
|
|
|
|
|
prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
|
|
|
|
|
mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->mdc_feature;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pk->prefs)
|
|
|
|
|
m_free (pk->prefs);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->mdc_feature = mdc_feature;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Merge the secret keys from secblock into the pubblock thereby
|
|
|
|
|
* replacing the public (sub)keys with their secret counterparts Hmmm:
|
|
|
|
|
* It might be better to get away from the concept of entire secret
|
|
|
|
|
* keys at all and have a way to store just the real secret parts
|
|
|
|
|
* from the key.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
merge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE pub;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (pub=pubblock; pub; pub = pub->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk = secblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( pub == pubblock ); /* only in the first node */
|
|
|
|
|
/* there is nothing to compare in this case, so just replace
|
|
|
|
|
* some information */
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
|
|
|
|
|
free_public_key ( pk );
|
|
|
|
|
pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
|
|
|
|
|
pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE sec;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this is more complicated: it may happen that the sequence
|
|
|
|
|
* of the subkeys dosn't match, so we have to find the
|
|
|
|
|
* appropriate secret key */
|
|
|
|
|
for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
|
|
|
|
|
free_public_key ( pk );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !sec )
|
|
|
|
|
BUG(); /* already checked in premerge */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This function checks that for every public subkey a corresponding
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* secret subkey is available and deletes the public subkey otherwise.
|
|
|
|
|
* We need this function because we can't delete it later when we
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* actually merge the secret parts into the pubring.
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* The function also plays some games with the node flags.
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
premerge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE last, pub;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (pub=pubblock,last=NULL; pub; last = pub, pub = pub->next ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pub->flag &= ~3; /* reset bits 0 and 1 */
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE sec;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* The secret parts are not available so
|
|
|
|
|
we can't use that key for signing etc.
|
|
|
|
|
Fix the pubkey usage */
|
2003-09-30 10:00:08 +02:00
|
|
|
|
pk->pubkey_usage &= ~(PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG
|
|
|
|
|
|PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
/* transfer flag bits 0 and 1 to the pubblock */
|
|
|
|
|
pub->flag |= (sec->flag &3);
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !sec ) {
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE next, ll;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2003-05-26 15:21:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_info (_("no secret subkey"
|
|
|
|
|
" for public subkey %s - ignoring\n"),
|
|
|
|
|
keystr_from_pk (pk));
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* we have to remove the subkey in this case */
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( last );
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the next subkey */
|
|
|
|
|
for (next=pub->next,ll=pub;
|
2004-09-14 04:00:39 +02:00
|
|
|
|
next && next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
|
2000-10-06 14:28:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ll = next, next = next->next )
|
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
/* make new link */
|
|
|
|
|
last->next = next;
|
|
|
|
|
/* release this public subkey with all sigs */
|
|
|
|
|
ll->next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode( pub );
|
|
|
|
|
/* let the loop continue */
|
|
|
|
|
pub = last;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* We need to copy the found bits (0 and 1) from the secret key to
|
|
|
|
|
the public key. This has already been done for the subkeys but
|
|
|
|
|
got lost on the primary key - fix it here *. */
|
|
|
|
|
pubblock->flag |= (secblock->flag & 3);
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* See see whether the key fits
|
|
|
|
|
* our requirements and in case we do not
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* request the primary key, we should select
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* a suitable subkey.
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: Check against PGP 7 whether we still need a kludge
|
|
|
|
|
* to favor type 16 keys over type 20 keys when type 20
|
|
|
|
|
* has not been explitely requested.
|
|
|
|
|
* Returns: True when a suitable key has been found.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* We have to distinguish four cases: FIXME!
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* 1. No usage and no primary key requested
|
|
|
|
|
* Examples for this case are that we have a keyID to be used
|
|
|
|
|
* for decrytion or verification.
|
|
|
|
|
* 2. No usage but primary key requested
|
|
|
|
|
* This is the case for all functions which work on an
|
|
|
|
|
* entire keyblock, e.g. for editing or listing
|
|
|
|
|
* 3. Usage and primary key requested
|
|
|
|
|
* FXME
|
|
|
|
|
* 4. Usage but no primary key requested
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME
|
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: Tell what is going to happen here and something about the rationale
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Note: We don't use this function if no specific usage is requested;
|
|
|
|
|
* This way the getkey functions can be used for plain key listings.
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* CTX ist the keyblock we are investigating, if FOUNDK is not NULL this
|
|
|
|
|
* is the key we actually found by looking at the keyid or a fingerprint and
|
|
|
|
|
* may eitehr point to the primary or one of the subkeys.
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock = ctx->keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE foundk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;
|
* armor.c, g10.c, kbnode.c, misc.c, pkclist.c, sign.c, build-packet.c,
getkey.c, keydb.c, openfile.c, plaintext.c, status.c, gpgv.c, keygen.c,
options.h, sig-check.c, tdbio.h, encode.c, mainproc.c, parse-packet.c,
signal.c, textfilter.c: Edit all preprocessor instructions to remove
whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by C89, but there are some
compilers out there that don't like it.
2003-05-24 23:50:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
#define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
unsigned int req_usage = ( ctx->req_usage & USAGE_MASK );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Request the primary if we're certifying another key, and also
|
|
|
|
|
if signing data while --pgp6 or --pgp7 is on since pgp 6 and 7
|
2002-12-04 00:31:48 +01:00
|
|
|
|
do not understand signatures made by a signing subkey. PGP 8
|
|
|
|
|
does. */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int req_prim = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) ||
|
* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c
(do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c
(dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old
sig cache subpacket. This wasn't completely harmless as it caused
subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export.
* options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c,
encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of
PGP-ness are massively complex. This is step one in simplifying them. No
functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level.
* sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference
warning.
* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message
from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key.
* main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string,
compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file,
clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New
functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one
place.
* options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification. Use a single
enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.)
* g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys,
and refresh-keys.
* options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen
against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules.
* keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp
mode.
* sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of
0.
2003-05-03 06:07:45 +02:00
|
|
|
|
((PGP6 || PGP7) && (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG));
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 latest_date;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE latest_key;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
assert( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->found_key = NULL;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->exact) {
|
|
|
|
|
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( (k->flag & 1) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
assert ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
|
|
|
|
|
foundk = k;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
|
|
|
|
|
if ( (k->flag & 2) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
|
|
|
|
|
foundu = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( DBG_CACHE )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
|
|
|
|
|
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
|
|
|
|
|
foundk? "one":"all", req_usage);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (!req_usage) {
|
|
|
|
|
latest_key = foundk? foundk:keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!req_usage) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = foundk->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pk->user_id)
|
|
|
|
|
free_user_id (pk->user_id);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->found_key = foundk;
|
|
|
|
|
cache_user_id( keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* found */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
latest_date = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
latest_key = NULL;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* do not look at subkeys if a certification key is requested */
|
|
|
|
|
if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_prim) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE nextk;
|
|
|
|
|
/* either start a loop or check just this one subkey */
|
|
|
|
|
for (k=foundk?foundk:keyblock; k; k = nextk ) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
|
|
|
|
nextk = k->next;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( foundk )
|
|
|
|
|
nextk = NULL; /* what a hack */
|
|
|
|
|
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tchecking subkey %08lX\n",
|
|
|
|
|
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL));
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tsubkey not valid\n");
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ( pk->has_expired ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tsubkey has expired\n");
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tusage does not match: want=%x have=%x\n",
|
|
|
|
|
req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tsubkey looks fine\n");
|
|
|
|
|
if ( pk->timestamp > latest_date ) {
|
|
|
|
|
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
latest_key = k;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-11-10 13:59:59 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* Okay now try the primary key unless we want an exact
|
|
|
|
|
* key ID match on a subkey */
|
|
|
|
|
if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_prim) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_prim )
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
|
|
|
|
|
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tprimary key not valid\n");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else if ( pk->has_expired ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tprimary key has expired\n");
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tprimary key usage does not match: "
|
|
|
|
|
"want=%x have=%x\n",
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else { /* okay */
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tprimary key may be used\n");
|
|
|
|
|
latest_key = keyblock;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( !latest_key ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
|
|
|
|
log_debug("\tno suitable key found - giving up\n");
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
found:
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CACHE)
|
2000-10-04 13:16:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_debug( "\tusing key %08lX\n",
|
|
|
|
|
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (latest_key) {
|
|
|
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pk->user_id)
|
|
|
|
|
free_user_id (pk->user_id);
|
|
|
|
|
pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
ctx->found_key = latest_key;
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if (latest_key != keyblock && opt.verbose)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
char *tempkeystr=
|
|
|
|
|
m_strdup(keystr_from_pk(latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key));
|
2004-12-20 06:19:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_info(_("using subkey %s instead of primary key %s\n"),
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
tempkeystr, keystr_from_pk(keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key));
|
|
|
|
|
m_free(tempkeystr);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
cache_user_id( keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* found */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode )
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
KBNODE secblock = NULL; /* helper */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int no_suitable_key = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctx->kr_handle, ctx->items, ctx->nitems))) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are searching for the first key we have to make sure
|
|
|
|
|
that the next interation does not no an implicit reset.
|
|
|
|
|
This can be triggered by an empty key ring. */
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->nitems && ctx->items->mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST)
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->items->mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (ctx->kr_handle, &ctx->keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
|
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
|
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
goto skip;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( secmode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the correspondig public key and use this
|
|
|
|
|
* this one for the selection process */
|
|
|
|
|
u32 aki[2];
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE k = ctx->keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
|
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_sk (k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki);
|
|
|
|
|
k = get_pubkeyblock (aki);
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( !k )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.quiet)
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
log_info(_("key %s: secret key without public key"
|
|
|
|
|
" - skipped\n"), keystr(aki));
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
goto skip;
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
secblock = ctx->keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keyblock = k;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
premerge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock, secblock );
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
|
|
|
|
|
* merge_selfsigs. For secret keys, premerge did tranfer the
|
|
|
|
|
* keys to the keyblock */
|
|
|
|
|
merge_selfsigs ( ctx->keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
if ( finish_lookup (ctx) ) {
|
|
|
|
|
no_suitable_key = 0;
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( secmode ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
merge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock,
|
|
|
|
|
secblock);
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (secblock);
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
secblock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
goto found;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
no_suitable_key = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
skip:
|
|
|
|
|
/* release resources and continue search */
|
|
|
|
|
if ( secmode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode( secblock );
|
|
|
|
|
secblock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
found:
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if( rc && rc != -1 )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
log_error("keydb_search failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
|
1998-09-28 21:25:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( !rc ) {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*ret_keyblock = ctx->keyblock; /* return the keyblock */
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if (rc == -1 && no_suitable_key)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = secmode ? G10ERR_UNU_SECKEY : G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
|
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
|
else if( rc == -1 )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
rc = secmode ? G10ERR_NO_SECKEY : G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if ( secmode ) {
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode( secblock );
|
|
|
|
|
secblock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
ctx->last_rc = rc;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* FIXME: Replace by the generic function
|
|
|
|
|
* It does not work as it is right now - it is used at
|
|
|
|
|
* 2 places: a) to get the key for an anonyous recipient
|
|
|
|
|
* b) to get the ultimately trusted keys.
|
|
|
|
|
* The a) usage might have some problems.
|
1999-01-24 18:16:40 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-11-06 17:58:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* set with_subkeys true to include subkeys
|
|
|
|
|
* set with_spm true to include secret-parts-missing keys
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
1998-08-05 18:51:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* Enumerate all primary secret keys. Caller must use these procedure:
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
|
|
|
|
|
* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* and provide space for the secret key (pass a buffer for sk)
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
|
|
|
|
|
* to indicate EOF.
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
* 4) Always call this function a last time with SK set to NULL,
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
* so that can free it's context.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
2002-11-06 17:58:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk,
|
|
|
|
|
int with_subkeys, int with_spm )
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int rc=0;
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
struct {
|
|
|
|
|
int eof;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
int first;
|
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
KBNODE node;
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
} *c = *context;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( !c ) { /* make a new context */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*context = c;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
c->hd = keydb_new (1);
|
|
|
|
|
c->first = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
c->keyblock = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
c->node = NULL;
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
|
|
|
|
if( !sk ) { /* free the context */
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (c->hd);
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
m_free( c );
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*context = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if( c->eof )
|
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the next secret key from the current keyblock */
|
|
|
|
|
for (; c->node; c->node = c->node->next) {
|
2002-11-06 17:58:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
if ((c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|| (with_subkeys
|
2002-11-06 17:58:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
&& c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
|
|
|
|
|
&& !(c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode==1001
|
|
|
|
|
&& !with_spm)) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
copy_secret_key (sk, c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
|
|
|
|
|
c->node = c->node->next;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* found */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
c->keyblock = c->node = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = c->first? keydb_search_first (c->hd) : keydb_search_next (c->hd);
|
|
|
|
|
c->first = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
|
keydb_release (c->hd); c->hd = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
c->eof = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
return -1; /* eof */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (c->hd, &c->keyblock);
|
|
|
|
|
c->node = c->keyblock;
|
|
|
|
|
} while (!rc);
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
return rc; /* error */
|
1998-01-13 20:04:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*********************************************
|
|
|
|
|
*********** user ID printing helpers *******
|
|
|
|
|
*********************************************/
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
|
|
|
* Return a string with a printable representation of the user_id.
|
|
|
|
|
* this string must be freed by m_free.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
char*
|
|
|
|
|
get_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
user_id_db_t r;
|
|
|
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
int pass=0;
|
|
|
|
|
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
|
|
|
|
|
do
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t a;
|
|
|
|
|
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
p = m_alloc( keystrlen() + 1 + r->len + 1 );
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(p, "%s %.*s", keystr(keyid), r->len, r->name );
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
|
2004-03-16 23:47:45 +01:00
|
|
|
|
p = m_alloc( keystrlen() + 5 );
|
|
|
|
|
sprintf(p, "%s [?]", keystr(keyid));
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
1997-11-18 15:06:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
char*
|
2004-08-23 19:55:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_user_id_string_native ( u32 *keyid )
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-08-23 19:55:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
char *p = get_user_id_string( keyid );
|
|
|
|
|
char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, strlen(p), 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
m_free(p);
|
|
|
|
|
return p2;
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-10 20:20:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
char*
|
|
|
|
|
get_long_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
user_id_db_t r;
|
|
|
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
int pass=0;
|
|
|
|
|
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t a;
|
|
|
|
|
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = m_alloc( r->len + 20 );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX %.*s",
|
|
|
|
|
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
|
|
|
|
|
r->len, r->name );
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-10 20:20:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = m_alloc( 25 );
|
1998-12-10 20:20:47 +01:00
|
|
|
|
sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1] );
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1997-12-01 11:33:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
char*
|
|
|
|
|
get_user_id( u32 *keyid, size_t *rn )
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
user_id_db_t r;
|
|
|
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
int pass=0;
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
|
1997-12-01 11:33:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
do {
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
keyid_list_t a;
|
|
|
|
|
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
|
|
|
|
|
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = m_alloc( r->len );
|
2000-09-18 16:35:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, r->name, r->len );
|
|
|
|
|
*rn = r->len;
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1997-12-01 11:33:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
|
* main.h: Create S2K_DIGEST_ALGO macro so we do not need to always set
opt.s2k_digest_algo. This helps fix a problem with PGP 2.x encrypted
symmetric messages. Change all callers (encode.c, g10.c, keyedit.c,
keygen.c, passphrase.c, sign.c).
* armor.c, cardglue.c, getkey.c, import.c, keygen.c: Be consistent in some
more quoted strings. Always use 'user ID', not 'user id', "quotes" for
user IDs, etc.
2004-09-24 22:34:38 +02:00
|
|
|
|
p = m_strdup( _("[User ID not found]") );
|
2000-07-14 19:34:53 +02:00
|
|
|
|
*rn = strlen(p);
|
1997-12-01 11:33:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
char*
|
2004-08-23 19:55:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
get_user_id_native( u32 *keyid )
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-08-23 19:55:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
size_t rn;
|
|
|
|
|
char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &rn );
|
|
|
|
|
char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, rn, 0 );
|
|
|
|
|
m_free(p);
|
|
|
|
|
return p2;
|
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
KEYDB_HANDLE
|
|
|
|
|
get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return ctx->kr_handle;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|