security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-01-21 14:47:03 +01:00
Code Activity

* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main), main.h, sig-check.c

Browse Source 
(check_key_signature2): Pass the ultimately trusted pk directly to
check_key_signature2 to avoid going through the key selection mechanism.
This prevents a deadly embrace when two keys without selfsigs each sign
the other.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2002-12-29 15:58:44 +00:00
parent 55eda4b4f8
commit 0bb73ee428
4 changed files with 29 additions and 13 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

8
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
2002-12-29 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main), main.h, sig-check.c
(check_key_signature2): Pass the ultimately trusted pk directly to
check_key_signature2 to avoid going through the key selection
mechanism. This prevents a deadly embrace when two keys without
selfsigs each sign the other.
2002-12-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* keyserver.c (keyserver_refresh): Don't print the "refreshing..."

9
g10/getkey.c
View File

@ -1571,6 +1571,8 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode )
{
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
u32 dummy;
int dum2;
if(sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1])
{
@ -1584,9 +1586,10 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
trusted key is still valid - if it has been
revoked or the user should also renmove the
ultimate trust flag. */
if(get_pubkey_fast(ultimate_pk,sig->keyid)==0 &&
check_key_signature(keyblock,k,NULL)==0 &&
get_ownertrust(ultimate_pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
if(get_pubkey_fast(ultimate_pk,sig->keyid)==0
&& check_key_signature2(keyblock,k,ultimate_pk,
NULL,&dummy,&dum2)==0
&& get_ownertrust(ultimate_pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
{
free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
pk->is_valid=1;

2
g10/main.h
View File

@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, STRLIST locusr);
/*-- sig-check.c --*/
int check_revocation_keys (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig);
int check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig );
int check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node,
int check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
int *is_selfsig, u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired );
/*-- delkey.c --*/

23
g10/sig-check.c
View File

@ -475,12 +475,14 @@ check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
{
u32 dummy;
int dum2;
return check_key_signature2(root, node, is_selfsig, &dummy, &dum2 );
return check_key_signature2(root, node, NULL, is_selfsig, &dummy, &dum2 );
}
/* If check_pk is set, then use it to check the signature in node
rather than getting it from root or the keydb. */
int
check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired )
check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, PKT_public_key *check_pk,
int *is_selfsig, u32 *r_expiredate, int *r_expired )
{
MD_HANDLE md;
PKT_public_key *pk;
@ -595,14 +597,17 @@ check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
md = md_open( algo, 0 );
hash_public_key( md, pk );
hash_uid_node( unode, md, sig );
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) {
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
{
if( is_selfsig )
*is_selfsig = 1;
*is_selfsig = 1;
rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired );
}
else {
rc = signature_check2( sig, md, r_expiredate, r_expired );
}
}
else if (check_pk)
rc=do_check(check_pk,sig,md,r_expired);
else
rc = signature_check2( sig, md, r_expiredate, r_expired );
cache_sig_result ( sig, rc );
md_close(md);
}