gnupg/agent/protect-tool.c

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/* protect-tool.c - A tool to test the secret key protection
* Copyright (C) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
2007-07-04 21:49:40 +02:00
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
#include <locale.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_CODESET
#include <langinfo.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
#include <fcntl.h> /* for setmode() */
#endif
#define INCLUDED_BY_MAIN_MODULE 1
#include "agent.h"
#include "../common/i18n.h"
#include "../common/get-passphrase.h"
#include "../common/sysutils.h"
#include "../common/init.h"
enum cmd_and_opt_values
{
aNull = 0,
oVerbose = 'v',
oArmor = 'a',
oPassphrase = 'P',
oProtect = 'p',
oUnprotect = 'u',
oNoVerbose = 500,
oShadow,
oShowShadowInfo,
oShowKeygrip,
oS2Kcalibration,
oCanonical,
oStore,
oForce,
oHaveCert,
oNoFailOnExist,
oHomedir,
oPrompt,
oStatusMsg,
oDebugUseOCB,
oAgentProgram
};
struct rsa_secret_key_s
{
gcry_mpi_t n; /* public modulus */
gcry_mpi_t e; /* public exponent */
gcry_mpi_t d; /* exponent */
gcry_mpi_t p; /* prime p. */
gcry_mpi_t q; /* prime q. */
gcry_mpi_t u; /* inverse of p mod q. */
};
static int opt_armor;
static int opt_canonical;
static int opt_store;
static int opt_force;
static int opt_no_fail_on_exist;
static int opt_have_cert;
static const char *opt_passphrase;
static char *opt_prompt;
static int opt_status_msg;
static const char *opt_agent_program;
static char *get_passphrase (int promptno);
static void release_passphrase (char *pw);
static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
ARGPARSE_group (300, N_("@Commands:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_c (oProtect, "protect", "protect a private key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oUnprotect, "unprotect", "unprotect a private key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShadow, "shadow", "create a shadow entry for a public key"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShowShadowInfo, "show-shadow-info", "return the shadow info"),
ARGPARSE_c (oShowKeygrip, "show-keygrip", "show the \"keygrip\""),
ARGPARSE_c (oS2Kcalibration, "s2k-calibration", "@"),
ARGPARSE_group (301, N_("@\nOptions:\n ")),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oVerbose, "verbose", "verbose"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oArmor, "armor", "write output in advanced format"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oCanonical, "canonical", "write output in canonical format"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPassphrase, "passphrase", "|STRING|use passphrase STRING"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oHaveCert, "have-cert",
"certificate to export provided on STDIN"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oStore, "store",
"store the created key in the appropriate place"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oForce, "force",
"force overwriting"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoFailOnExist, "no-fail-on-exist", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oPrompt, "prompt",
"|ESCSTRING|use ESCSTRING as prompt in pinentry"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oStatusMsg, "enable-status-msg", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_s (oAgentProgram, "agent-program", "@"),
ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugUseOCB, "debug-use-ocb", "@"), /* For hacking only. */
ARGPARSE_end ()
};
static const char *
my_strusage (int level)
{
const char *p;
switch (level)
{
case 9: p = "GPL-3.0-or-later"; break;
case 11: p = "gpg-protect-tool (" GNUPG_NAME ")";
break;
case 13: p = VERSION; break;
case 14: p = GNUPG_DEF_COPYRIGHT_LINE; break;
case 17: p = PRINTABLE_OS_NAME; break;
case 19: p = _("Please report bugs to <@EMAIL@>.\n"); break;
case 1:
case 40: p = _("Usage: gpg-protect-tool [options] (-h for help)\n");
break;
case 41: p = _("Syntax: gpg-protect-tool [options] [args]\n"
"Secret key maintenance tool\n");
break;
default: p = NULL;
}
return p;
}
/* static void */
/* print_mpi (const char *text, gcry_mpi_t a) */
/* { */
/* char *buf; */
/* void *bufaddr = &buf; */
/* int rc; */
/* rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, bufaddr, NULL, a); */
/* if (rc) */
/* log_info ("%s: [error printing number: %s]\n", text, gpg_strerror (rc)); */
/* else */
/* { */
/* log_info ("%s: %s\n", text, buf); */
/* gcry_free (buf); */
/* } */
/* } */
static unsigned char *
make_canonical (const char *fname, const char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
size_t erroff, len;
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
unsigned char *result;
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, buf, buflen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("invalid S-Expression in '%s' (off=%u): %s\n",
fname, (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
return NULL;
}
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
log_assert (len);
result = xmalloc (len);
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, result, len);
log_assert (len);
gcry_sexp_release (sexp);
return result;
}
static char *
make_advanced (const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
size_t erroff, len;
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
char *result;
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&sexp, &erroff, (const char*)buf, buflen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("invalid canonical S-Expression (off=%u): %s\n",
(unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
return NULL;
}
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, NULL, 0);
log_assert (len);
result = xmalloc (len);
len = gcry_sexp_sprint (sexp, GCRYSEXP_FMT_ADVANCED, result, len);
log_assert (len);
gcry_sexp_release (sexp);
return result;
}
static char *
read_file (const char *fname, size_t *r_length)
{
estream_t fp;
char *buf;
size_t buflen;
if (!strcmp (fname, "-"))
{
size_t nread, bufsize = 0;
fp = es_stdin;
es_set_binary (fp);
buf = NULL;
buflen = 0;
#define NCHUNK 8192
do
{
bufsize += NCHUNK;
if (!buf)
buf = xmalloc (bufsize);
else
buf = xrealloc (buf, bufsize);
nread = es_fread (buf+buflen, 1, NCHUNK, fp);
if (nread < NCHUNK && es_ferror (fp))
{
log_error ("error reading '[stdin]': %s\n", strerror (errno));
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
buflen += nread;
}
while (nread == NCHUNK);
#undef NCHUNK
}
else
{
struct stat st;
fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
log_error ("can't open '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
return NULL;
}
if (fstat (es_fileno (fp), &st))
{
log_error ("can't stat '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
es_fclose (fp);
return NULL;
}
buflen = st.st_size;
buf = xmalloc (buflen+1);
if (es_fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1)
{
log_error ("error reading '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
es_fclose (fp);
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
es_fclose (fp);
}
*r_length = buflen;
return buf;
}
static unsigned char *
read_key (const char *fname)
{
char *buf;
size_t buflen;
unsigned char *key;
buf = read_file (fname, &buflen);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
if (buflen >= 4 && !memcmp (buf, "Key:", 4))
{
log_error ("Extended key format is not supported by this tool\n");
xfree (buf);
return NULL;
}
key = make_canonical (fname, buf, buflen);
xfree (buf);
return key;
}
static void
read_and_protect (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
char *pw;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
pw = get_passphrase (1);
rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen, 0);
release_passphrase (pw);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("protecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
read_and_unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
char *pw;
gnupg_isotime_t protected_at;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
err = agent_unprotect (ctrl, key, (pw=get_passphrase (1)),
protected_at, &result, &resultlen);
release_passphrase (pw);
xfree (key);
if (err)
{
if (opt_status_msg)
log_info ("[PROTECT-TOOL:] bad-passphrase\n");
log_error ("unprotecting the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return;
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
if (*protected_at)
log_info ("key protection done at %.4s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%s\n",
protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6,
protected_at+9, protected_at+11, protected_at+13);
else
log_info ("key protection done at [unknown]\n");
}
err = fixup_when_ecc_private_key (result, &resultlen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("malformed key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
return;
}
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
read_and_shadow (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *result;
size_t resultlen;
unsigned char dummy_info[] = "(8:313233342:43)";
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
rc = agent_shadow_key (key, dummy_info, &result);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("shadowing the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
resultlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (result, 0, NULL,NULL);
log_assert (resultlen);
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (result, resultlen);
xfree (result);
if (!p)
return;
result = (unsigned char*)p;
resultlen = strlen (p);
}
fwrite (result, resultlen, 1, stdout);
xfree (result);
}
static void
show_shadow_info (const char *fname)
{
int rc;
unsigned char *key;
const unsigned char *info;
size_t infolen;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
rc = agent_get_shadow_info (key, &info);
xfree (key);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return;
}
infolen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (info, 0, NULL,NULL);
log_assert (infolen);
if (opt_armor)
{
char *p = make_advanced (info, infolen);
if (!p)
return;
fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout);
xfree (p);
}
else
fwrite (info, infolen, 1, stdout);
}
static void
show_file (const char *fname)
{
unsigned char *key;
size_t keylen;
char *p;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
keylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, 0, NULL,NULL);
log_assert (keylen);
if (opt_canonical)
{
fwrite (key, keylen, 1, stdout);
}
else
{
p = make_advanced (key, keylen);
if (p)
{
fwrite (p, strlen (p), 1, stdout);
xfree (p);
}
}
xfree (key);
}
static void
show_keygrip (const char *fname)
{
unsigned char *key;
gcry_sexp_t private;
unsigned char grip[20];
int i;
key = read_key (fname);
if (!key)
return;
if (gcry_sexp_new (&private, key, 0, 0))
{
log_error ("gcry_sexp_new failed\n");
return;
}
xfree (key);
if (!gcry_pk_get_keygrip (private, grip))
{
log_error ("can't calculate keygrip\n");
return;
}
gcry_sexp_release (private);
for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
printf ("%02X", grip[i]);
putchar ('\n');
}
int
main (int argc, char **argv )
{
gpgrt_argparse_t pargs;
int cmd = 0;
const char *fname;
ctrl_t ctrl;
early_system_init ();
gpgrt_set_strusage (my_strusage);
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN);
log_set_prefix ("gpg-protect-tool", GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX);
/* Make sure that our subsystems are ready. */
i18n_init ();
init_common_subsystems (&argc, &argv);
setup_libgcrypt_logging ();
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0);
pargs.argc = &argc;
pargs.argv = &argv;
pargs.flags= ARGPARSE_FLAG_KEEP;
while (gpgrt_argparse (NULL, &pargs, opts))
{
switch (pargs.r_opt)
{
case oVerbose: opt.verbose++; break;
case oArmor: opt_armor=1; break;
case oCanonical: opt_canonical=1; break;
case oHomedir: gnupg_set_homedir (pargs.r.ret_str); break;
case oAgentProgram: opt_agent_program = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oProtect: cmd = oProtect; break;
case oUnprotect: cmd = oUnprotect; break;
case oShadow: cmd = oShadow; break;
case oShowShadowInfo: cmd = oShowShadowInfo; break;
case oShowKeygrip: cmd = oShowKeygrip; break;
case oS2Kcalibration: cmd = oS2Kcalibration; break;
case oPassphrase: opt_passphrase = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oStore: opt_store = 1; break;
case oForce: opt_force = 1; break;
case oNoFailOnExist: opt_no_fail_on_exist = 1; break;
case oHaveCert: opt_have_cert = 1; break;
case oPrompt: opt_prompt = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
case oStatusMsg: opt_status_msg = 1; break;
case oDebugUseOCB: /* dummy */; break;
default: pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break;
}
}
gpgrt_argparse (NULL, &pargs, NULL); /* Release internal state. */
if (log_get_errorcount (0))
exit (2);
fname = "-";
if (argc == 1)
fname = *argv;
else if (argc > 1)
gpgrt_usage (1);
/* Allocate an CTRL object. An empty object should be sufficient. */
ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
if (!ctrl)
{
log_error ("error allocating connection control data: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
agent_exit (1);
}
/* Set the information which can't be taken from envvars. */
gnupg_prepare_get_passphrase (GPG_ERR_SOURCE_DEFAULT,
opt.verbose,
opt_agent_program,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (opt_prompt)
opt_prompt = percent_plus_unescape (opt_prompt, 0);
if (cmd == oProtect)
read_and_protect (fname);
else if (cmd == oUnprotect)
read_and_unprotect (ctrl, fname);
else if (cmd == oShadow)
read_and_shadow (fname);
else if (cmd == oShowShadowInfo)
show_shadow_info (fname);
else if (cmd == oShowKeygrip)
show_keygrip (fname);
else if (cmd == oS2Kcalibration)
{
if (!opt.verbose)
opt.verbose++; /* We need to see something. */
get_standard_s2k_count ();
}
else
show_file (fname);
xfree (ctrl);
agent_exit (0);
return 8; /*NOTREACHED*/
}
void
agent_exit (int rc)
{
rc = rc? rc : log_get_errorcount(0)? 2 : 0;
exit (rc);
}
/* Return the passphrase string and ask the agent if it has not been
set from the command line PROMPTNO select the prompt to display:
0 = default
1 = taken from the option --prompt
2 = for unprotecting a pkcs#12 object
3 = for protecting a new pkcs#12 object
4 = for protecting an imported pkcs#12 in our system
*/
static char *
get_passphrase (int promptno)
{
char *pw;
int err;
const char *desc;
char *orig_codeset;
int repeat = 0;
if (opt_passphrase)
return xstrdup (opt_passphrase);
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (promptno == 1 && opt_prompt)
{
desc = opt_prompt;
}
else if (promptno == 2)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to unprotect the "
"PKCS#12 object.");
}
else if (promptno == 3)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the "
"new PKCS#12 object.");
repeat = 1;
}
else if (promptno == 4)
{
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase to protect the "
"imported object within the GnuPG system.");
repeat = 1;
}
else
desc = _("Please enter the passphrase or the PIN\n"
"needed to complete this operation.");
i18n_switchback (orig_codeset);
err = gnupg_get_passphrase (NULL, NULL, _("Passphrase:"), desc,
repeat, repeat, 1, &pw);
if (err)
{
2010-10-13 17:57:08 +02:00
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
log_info (_("cancelled\n"));
else
log_error (_("error while asking for the passphrase: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
agent_exit (0);
}
log_assert (pw);
return pw;
}
static void
release_passphrase (char *pw)
{
if (pw)
{
wipememory (pw, strlen (pw));
xfree (pw);
}
}
Implement unattended OpenPGP secret key import. * agent/command.c (cmd_import_key): Add option --unattended. * agent/cvt-openpgp.c (convert_transfer_key): New. (do_unprotect): Factor some code out to ... (prepare_unprotect): new function. (convert_from_openpgp): Factor all code out to ... (convert_from_openpgp_main): this. Add arg 'passphrase'. Implement openpgp-native protection modes. (convert_from_openpgp_native): New. * agent/t-protect.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): New dummy fucntion * agent/protect-tool.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): Ditto. * agent/protect.c (agent_unprotect): Add arg CTRL. Adjust all callers. Support openpgp-native protection. * g10/call-agent.c (agent_import_key): Add arg 'unattended'. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Use unattended in batch mode. -- With the gpg-agent taking care of the secret keys, the user needs to migrate existing keys from secring.gpg to the agent. This and also the standard import of secret keys required the user to unprotect the secret keys first, so that gpg-agent was able to re-protected them using its own scheme. With many secret keys this is quite some usability hurdle. In particular if a passphrase is not instantly available. To make this migration smoother, this patch implements an unattended key import/migration which delays the conversion to the gpg-agent format until the key is actually used. For example: gpg2 --batch --import mysecretkey.gpg works without any user interaction due to the use of --batch. Now if a key is used (e.g. "gpg2 -su USERID_FROM_MYSECRETKEY foo"), gpg-agent has to ask for the passphrase anyway, converts the key from the openpgp format to the internal format, signs, re-encrypts the key and tries to store it in the gpg-agent format to the disk. The next time, the internal format of the key is used. This patch has only been tested with the old demo keys, more tests with other protection formats and no protection are needed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-05-22 10:50:12 +02:00
/* Stub function. */
int
agent_key_available (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip)
{
(void)ctrl;
(void)grip;
return -1; /* Not available. */
}
char *
agent_get_cache (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
{
(void)ctrl;
(void)key;
(void)cache_mode;
return NULL;
}
Implement unattended OpenPGP secret key import. * agent/command.c (cmd_import_key): Add option --unattended. * agent/cvt-openpgp.c (convert_transfer_key): New. (do_unprotect): Factor some code out to ... (prepare_unprotect): new function. (convert_from_openpgp): Factor all code out to ... (convert_from_openpgp_main): this. Add arg 'passphrase'. Implement openpgp-native protection modes. (convert_from_openpgp_native): New. * agent/t-protect.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): New dummy fucntion * agent/protect-tool.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): Ditto. * agent/protect.c (agent_unprotect): Add arg CTRL. Adjust all callers. Support openpgp-native protection. * g10/call-agent.c (agent_import_key): Add arg 'unattended'. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Use unattended in batch mode. -- With the gpg-agent taking care of the secret keys, the user needs to migrate existing keys from secring.gpg to the agent. This and also the standard import of secret keys required the user to unprotect the secret keys first, so that gpg-agent was able to re-protected them using its own scheme. With many secret keys this is quite some usability hurdle. In particular if a passphrase is not instantly available. To make this migration smoother, this patch implements an unattended key import/migration which delays the conversion to the gpg-agent format until the key is actually used. For example: gpg2 --batch --import mysecretkey.gpg works without any user interaction due to the use of --batch. Now if a key is used (e.g. "gpg2 -su USERID_FROM_MYSECRETKEY foo"), gpg-agent has to ask for the passphrase anyway, converts the key from the openpgp format to the internal format, signs, re-encrypts the key and tries to store it in the gpg-agent format to the disk. The next time, the internal format of the key is used. This patch has only been tested with the old demo keys, more tests with other protection formats and no protection are needed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-05-22 10:50:12 +02:00
gpg_error_t
agent_askpin (ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *desc_text, const char *prompt_text,
const char *initial_errtext,
struct pin_entry_info_s *pininfo,
const char *keyinfo, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
Implement unattended OpenPGP secret key import. * agent/command.c (cmd_import_key): Add option --unattended. * agent/cvt-openpgp.c (convert_transfer_key): New. (do_unprotect): Factor some code out to ... (prepare_unprotect): new function. (convert_from_openpgp): Factor all code out to ... (convert_from_openpgp_main): this. Add arg 'passphrase'. Implement openpgp-native protection modes. (convert_from_openpgp_native): New. * agent/t-protect.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): New dummy fucntion * agent/protect-tool.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): Ditto. * agent/protect.c (agent_unprotect): Add arg CTRL. Adjust all callers. Support openpgp-native protection. * g10/call-agent.c (agent_import_key): Add arg 'unattended'. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Use unattended in batch mode. -- With the gpg-agent taking care of the secret keys, the user needs to migrate existing keys from secring.gpg to the agent. This and also the standard import of secret keys required the user to unprotect the secret keys first, so that gpg-agent was able to re-protected them using its own scheme. With many secret keys this is quite some usability hurdle. In particular if a passphrase is not instantly available. To make this migration smoother, this patch implements an unattended key import/migration which delays the conversion to the gpg-agent format until the key is actually used. For example: gpg2 --batch --import mysecretkey.gpg works without any user interaction due to the use of --batch. Now if a key is used (e.g. "gpg2 -su USERID_FROM_MYSECRETKEY foo"), gpg-agent has to ask for the passphrase anyway, converts the key from the openpgp format to the internal format, signs, re-encrypts the key and tries to store it in the gpg-agent format to the disk. The next time, the internal format of the key is used. This patch has only been tested with the old demo keys, more tests with other protection formats and no protection are needed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-05-22 10:50:12 +02:00
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned char *passphrase;
size_t size;
(void)ctrl;
(void)desc_text;
(void)prompt_text;
(void)initial_errtext;
(void)keyinfo;
(void)cache_mode;
*pininfo->pin = 0; /* Reset the PIN. */
passphrase = get_passphrase (0);
size = strlen (passphrase);
if (size >= pininfo->max_length)
{
xfree (passphrase);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
}
memcpy (&pininfo->pin, passphrase, size);
xfree (passphrase);
pininfo->pin[size] = 0;
if (pininfo->check_cb)
{
/* More checks by utilizing the optional callback. */
pininfo->cb_errtext = NULL;
err = pininfo->check_cb (pininfo);
}
else
err = 0;
return err;
}
/* Replacement for the function in findkey.c. Here we write the key
* to stdout. */
gpg_error_t
agent_write_private_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
const void *buffer, size_t length, int force,
const char *serialno, const char *keyref,
const char *dispserialno, time_t timestamp)
{
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
char *p;
(void)ctrl;
(void)force;
(void)serialno;
(void)keyref;
(void)timestamp;
(void)dispserialno;
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
p = make_advanced (buffer, length);
if (p)
{
printf ("# Begin dump of %s\n%s%s# End dump of %s\n",
hexgrip, p, (*p && p[strlen(p)-1] == '\n')? "":"\n", hexgrip);
xfree (p);
}
return 0;
Implement unattended OpenPGP secret key import. * agent/command.c (cmd_import_key): Add option --unattended. * agent/cvt-openpgp.c (convert_transfer_key): New. (do_unprotect): Factor some code out to ... (prepare_unprotect): new function. (convert_from_openpgp): Factor all code out to ... (convert_from_openpgp_main): this. Add arg 'passphrase'. Implement openpgp-native protection modes. (convert_from_openpgp_native): New. * agent/t-protect.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): New dummy fucntion * agent/protect-tool.c (convert_from_openpgp_native): Ditto. * agent/protect.c (agent_unprotect): Add arg CTRL. Adjust all callers. Support openpgp-native protection. * g10/call-agent.c (agent_import_key): Add arg 'unattended'. * g10/import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Use unattended in batch mode. -- With the gpg-agent taking care of the secret keys, the user needs to migrate existing keys from secring.gpg to the agent. This and also the standard import of secret keys required the user to unprotect the secret keys first, so that gpg-agent was able to re-protected them using its own scheme. With many secret keys this is quite some usability hurdle. In particular if a passphrase is not instantly available. To make this migration smoother, this patch implements an unattended key import/migration which delays the conversion to the gpg-agent format until the key is actually used. For example: gpg2 --batch --import mysecretkey.gpg works without any user interaction due to the use of --batch. Now if a key is used (e.g. "gpg2 -su USERID_FROM_MYSECRETKEY foo"), gpg-agent has to ask for the passphrase anyway, converts the key from the openpgp format to the internal format, signs, re-encrypts the key and tries to store it in the gpg-agent format to the disk. The next time, the internal format of the key is used. This patch has only been tested with the old demo keys, more tests with other protection formats and no protection are needed. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2013-05-22 10:50:12 +02:00
}