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agent: Make --disable-extended-key-format a dummy option.
* agent/agent.h (opt): Remove enable_extended_key_format. * agent/gpg-agent.c (enum cmd_and_opt_values): Turn oDisableExtendedKeyFormat and oEnableExtendedKeyFormat into dummy options. * agent/protect.c (do_encryption): Remove arg use_ocb and corresponding code. (agent_protect): Ditto. Change all callers. * agent/findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): Simplify due to the removal of disable-extended-key-format. (write_extended_private_key): Fold into agent_write_private_key. -- This change is related to GnuPG-bug-id: 6386 but should have no visible effect except for the removal of option --disable-extended-key-format.
This commit is contained in:
parent
56ca164684
commit
6d792ae2eb
@ -141,13 +141,6 @@ struct
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passphrase change. */
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int enable_passphrase_history;
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/* If set the extended key format is used for new keys. Note that
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* this may have the value 2 in which case
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* --disable-extended-key-format won't have any effect and thus
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* effectivley locking it. This is required to support existing
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* profiles which lock the use of --enable-extended-key-format. */
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int enable_extended_key_format;
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int running_detached; /* We are running detached from the tty. */
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/* If this global option is true, the passphrase cache is ignored
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@ -566,7 +559,7 @@ unsigned char get_standard_s2k_count_rfc4880 (void);
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unsigned long get_standard_s2k_time (void);
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int agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase,
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unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen,
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unsigned long s2k_count, int use_ocb);
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unsigned long s2k_count);
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gpg_error_t agent_unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl,
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const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase,
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gnupg_isotime_t protected_at,
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@ -3142,7 +3142,7 @@ ssh_key_to_protected_buffer (gcry_sexp_t key, const char *passphrase,
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buffer_new, buffer_new_n);
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if (*passphrase)
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err = agent_protect (buffer_new, passphrase, buffer, buffer_n, 0, -1);
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err = agent_protect (buffer_new, passphrase, buffer, buffer_n, 0);
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else
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{
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/* The key derivation function does not support zero length
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@ -1218,12 +1218,6 @@ cmd_keyattr (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
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if (ctrl->restricted)
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return leave_cmd (ctx, gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN));
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if (!opt.enable_extended_key_format)
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{
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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goto leave;
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}
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opt_delete = has_option (line, "--delete");
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line = skip_options (line);
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@ -2910,7 +2904,7 @@ cmd_import_key (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
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if (passphrase)
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{
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err = agent_protect (key, passphrase, &finalkey, &finalkeylen,
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ctrl->s2k_count, -1);
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ctrl->s2k_count);
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if (!err)
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err = agent_write_private_key (grip, finalkey, finalkeylen, force,
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NULL, NULL, opt_timestamp);
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@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp_native (ctrl_t ctrl,
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if (!agent_protect (*r_key, passphrase,
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&protectedkey, &protectedkeylen,
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ctrl->s2k_count, -1))
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ctrl->s2k_count))
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agent_write_private_key (grip, protectedkey, protectedkeylen, 1,
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NULL, NULL, 0);
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xfree (protectedkey);
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245
agent/findkey.c
245
agent/findkey.c
@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007,
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* 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2014, 2019 Werner Koch
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* Copyright (C) 2023 g10 Code GmbH
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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@ -79,19 +80,114 @@ linefeed_to_percent0A (const char *string)
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}
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/* Note: Ownership of FNAME and FP are moved to this function. */
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static gpg_error_t
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write_extended_private_key (char *fname, estream_t fp, int update, int newkey,
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const void *buf, size_t len,
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const char *serialno, const char *keyref,
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time_t timestamp)
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/* Write the S-expression formatted key (BUFFER,LENGTH) to our key
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* storage. With FORCE passed as true an existing key with the given
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* GRIP will get overwritten. If SERIALNO and KEYREF are given a
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* Token line is added to the key if the extended format is used. If
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* TIMESTAMP is not zero and the key doies not yet exists it will be
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* recorded as creation date. */
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int
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agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
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const void *buffer, size_t length, int force,
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const char *serialno, const char *keyref,
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time_t timestamp)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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char *fname;
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estream_t fp;
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char hexgrip[40+4+1];
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int update, newkey;
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nvc_t pk = NULL;
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gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
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int remove = 0;
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char *token = NULL;
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bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
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strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
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fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR,
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hexgrip, NULL);
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/* FIXME: Write to a temp file first so that write failures during
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key updates won't lead to a key loss. */
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if (!force && !gnupg_access (fname, F_OK))
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{
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log_error ("secret key file '%s' already exists\n", fname);
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xfree (fname);
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST);
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}
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fp = es_fopen (fname, force? "rb+,mode=-rw" : "wbx,mode=-rw");
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if (!fp)
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{
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gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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if (force && gpg_err_code (tmperr) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
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{
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fp = es_fopen (fname, "wbx,mode=-rw");
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if (!fp)
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tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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}
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if (!fp)
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{
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log_error ("can't create '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
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xfree (fname);
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return tmperr;
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}
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update = 0;
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newkey = 1;
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}
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else if (force)
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{
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gpg_error_t rc;
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char first;
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/* See if an existing key is in extended format. */
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if (es_fread (&first, 1, 1, fp) != 1)
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{
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rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error reading first byte from '%s': %s\n",
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fname, strerror (errno));
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xfree (fname);
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es_fclose (fp);
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return rc;
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}
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rc = es_fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
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if (rc)
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{
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log_error ("error seeking in '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
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xfree (fname);
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es_fclose (fp);
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return rc;
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}
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if (first == '(')
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{
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/* Key is still in the old format - force it into extended
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* format. We do not request an update here because an
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* existing key is not yet in extended key format and no
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* extended infos are yet available. */
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update = 0;
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newkey = 0;
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}
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else
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{
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/* Key is already in the extended format. */
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update = 1;
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newkey = 0;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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/* The key file did not exist: we assume this is a new key and
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* write the Created: entry. */
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update = 0;
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newkey = 1;
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}
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if (update)
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{
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int line;
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@ -115,10 +211,11 @@ write_extended_private_key (char *fname, estream_t fp, int update, int newkey,
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}
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es_clearerr (fp);
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err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&key, NULL, buf, len);
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/* Turn (BUFFER,LENGTH) into a gcrypt s-expression and set it into
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* our name value container. */
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err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&key, NULL, buffer, length);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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err = nvc_set_private_key (pk, key);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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@ -153,7 +250,7 @@ write_extended_private_key (char *fname, estream_t fp, int update, int newkey,
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}
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}
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/* If a timestamp has been supplied and the key is new write a
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/* If a timestamp has been supplied and the key is new, write a
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* creation timestamp. (We douple check that there is no Created
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* item yet.)*/
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if (timestamp && newkey && !nvc_lookup (pk, "Created:"))
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@ -166,7 +263,7 @@ write_extended_private_key (char *fname, estream_t fp, int update, int newkey,
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goto leave;
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}
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/* Back to start and write. */
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err = es_fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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@ -212,133 +309,6 @@ write_extended_private_key (char *fname, estream_t fp, int update, int newkey,
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return err;
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}
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/* Write an S-expression formatted key to our key storage. With FORCE
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* passed as true an existing key with the given GRIP will get
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* overwritten. If SERIALNO and KEYREF are given a Token line is
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* added to the key if the extended format is used. If TIMESTAMP is
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* not zero and the key doies not yet exists it will be recorded as
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* creation date. */
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int
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agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
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const void *buffer, size_t length, int force,
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const char *serialno, const char *keyref,
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time_t timestamp)
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{
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char *fname;
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estream_t fp;
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char hexgrip[40+4+1];
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bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
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strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
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fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR,
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hexgrip, NULL);
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/* FIXME: Write to a temp file first so that write failures during
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key updates won't lead to a key loss. */
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if (!force && !gnupg_access (fname, F_OK))
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{
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log_error ("secret key file '%s' already exists\n", fname);
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xfree (fname);
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST);
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}
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fp = es_fopen (fname, force? "rb+,mode=-rw" : "wbx,mode=-rw");
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if (!fp)
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{
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gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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if (force && gpg_err_code (tmperr) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
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{
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fp = es_fopen (fname, "wbx,mode=-rw");
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if (!fp)
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tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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}
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if (!fp)
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{
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log_error ("can't create '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
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xfree (fname);
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return tmperr;
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}
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}
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else if (force)
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{
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gpg_error_t rc;
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char first;
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/* See if an existing key is in extended format. */
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if (es_fread (&first, 1, 1, fp) != 1)
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{
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rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error reading first byte from '%s': %s\n",
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fname, strerror (errno));
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xfree (fname);
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es_fclose (fp);
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return rc;
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}
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rc = es_fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
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if (rc)
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{
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log_error ("error seeking in '%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
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xfree (fname);
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es_fclose (fp);
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return rc;
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}
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if (first != '(')
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{
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/* Key is already in the extended format. */
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return write_extended_private_key (fname, fp, 1, 0, buffer, length,
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serialno, keyref, timestamp);
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}
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if (first == '(' && opt.enable_extended_key_format)
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{
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/* Key is in the old format - but we want the extended format. */
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return write_extended_private_key (fname, fp, 0, 0, buffer, length,
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serialno, keyref, timestamp);
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}
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}
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if (opt.enable_extended_key_format)
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return write_extended_private_key (fname, fp, 0, 1, buffer, length,
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serialno, keyref, timestamp);
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if (es_fwrite (buffer, length, 1, fp) != 1)
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{
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gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error writing '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
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es_fclose (fp);
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gnupg_remove (fname);
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xfree (fname);
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return tmperr;
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}
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/* When force is given, the file might have to be truncated. */
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if (force && ftruncate (es_fileno (fp), es_ftello (fp)))
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{
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gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error truncating '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
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es_fclose (fp);
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gnupg_remove (fname);
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xfree (fname);
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return tmperr;
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}
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if (es_fclose (fp))
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{
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gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error closing '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (tmperr));
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gnupg_remove (fname);
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xfree (fname);
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return tmperr;
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}
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bump_key_eventcounter ();
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xfree (fname);
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return 0;
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}
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gpg_error_t
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agent_update_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, nvc_t pk)
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@ -393,6 +363,7 @@ agent_update_private_key (const unsigned char *grip, nvc_t pk)
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return err;
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}
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/* Callback function to try the unprotection from the passphrase query
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code. */
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static gpg_error_t
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|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ store_key (gcry_sexp_t private, const char *passphrase, int force,
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{
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unsigned char *p;
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rc = agent_protect (buf, passphrase, &p, &len, s2k_count, -1);
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rc = agent_protect (buf, passphrase, &p, &len, s2k_count);
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if (rc)
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{
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xfree (buf);
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|
@ -116,8 +116,6 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
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oCheckSymPassphrasePattern,
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oMaxPassphraseDays,
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oEnablePassphraseHistory,
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oDisableExtendedKeyFormat,
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oEnableExtendedKeyFormat,
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oStealSocket,
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oUseStandardSocket,
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oNoUseStandardSocket,
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@ -238,8 +236,6 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
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/* */ "@"
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#endif
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),
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableExtendedKeyFormat, "disable-extended-key-format", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oEnableExtendedKeyFormat, "enable-extended-key-format", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_i (oListenBacklog, "listen-backlog", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_op_u (oAutoExpandSecmem, "auto-expand-secmem", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_s (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"),
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@ -315,7 +311,8 @@ static gpgrt_opt_t opts[] = {
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoUseStandardSocket, "no-use-standard-socket", "@"),
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/* Dummy options. */
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "disable-extended-key-format", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "enable-extended-key-format", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_end () /* End of list */
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};
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@ -885,7 +882,6 @@ parse_rereadable_options (gpgrt_argparse_t *pargs, int reread)
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opt.check_sym_passphrase_pattern = NULL;
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opt.max_passphrase_days = MAX_PASSPHRASE_DAYS;
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opt.enable_passphrase_history = 0;
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opt.enable_extended_key_format = 1;
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opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 0;
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opt.allow_mark_trusted = 1;
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opt.sys_trustlist_name = NULL;
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@ -974,14 +970,6 @@ parse_rereadable_options (gpgrt_argparse_t *pargs, int reread)
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opt.enable_passphrase_history = 1;
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break;
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case oEnableExtendedKeyFormat:
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opt.enable_extended_key_format = 2;
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break;
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case oDisableExtendedKeyFormat:
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if (opt.enable_extended_key_format != 2)
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opt.enable_extended_key_format = 0;
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break;
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case oIgnoreCacheForSigning: opt.ignore_cache_for_signing = 1; break;
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case oAllowMarkTrusted: opt.allow_mark_trusted = 1; break;
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|
@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static const char *opt_passphrase;
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static char *opt_prompt;
|
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static int opt_status_msg;
|
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static const char *opt_agent_program;
|
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static int opt_debug_use_ocb;
|
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|
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static char *get_passphrase (int promptno);
|
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static void release_passphrase (char *pw);
|
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@ -343,8 +342,7 @@ read_and_protect (const char *fname)
|
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return;
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|
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pw = get_passphrase (1);
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rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen, 0,
|
||||
opt_debug_use_ocb? 1 : -1);
|
||||
rc = agent_protect (key, pw, &result, &resultlen, 0);
|
||||
release_passphrase (pw);
|
||||
xfree (key);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
@ -610,7 +608,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
|
||||
case oHaveCert: opt_have_cert = 1; break;
|
||||
case oPrompt: opt_prompt = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
|
||||
case oStatusMsg: opt_status_msg = 1; break;
|
||||
case oDebugUseOCB: opt_debug_use_ocb = 1; break;
|
||||
case oDebugUseOCB: /* dummy */; break;
|
||||
|
||||
default: pargs.err = ARGPARSE_PRINT_ERROR; break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
136
agent/protect.c
136
agent/protect.c
@ -379,12 +379,11 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
const char *passphrase,
|
||||
const char *timestamp_exp, size_t timestamp_exp_len,
|
||||
unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen,
|
||||
unsigned long s2k_count, int use_ocb)
|
||||
unsigned long s2k_count)
|
||||
{
|
||||
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
||||
const char *modestr;
|
||||
unsigned char hashvalue[20];
|
||||
int blklen, enclen, outlen;
|
||||
int enclen, outlen;
|
||||
unsigned char *iv = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned int ivsize; /* Size of the buffer allocated for IV. */
|
||||
const unsigned char *s2ksalt; /* Points into IV. */
|
||||
@ -398,44 +397,26 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
*resultlen = 0;
|
||||
*result = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
modestr = (use_ocb? "openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes"
|
||||
/* */: "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc");
|
||||
modestr = "openpgp-s2k3-ocb-aes";
|
||||
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, PROT_CIPHER,
|
||||
use_ocb? GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_OCB :
|
||||
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
|
||||
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_OCB,
|
||||
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
/* We need to work on a copy of the data because this makes it
|
||||
* easier to add the trailer and the padding and more important we
|
||||
* have to prefix the text with 2 parenthesis. In CBC mode we
|
||||
* have to allocate enough space for:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ((<parameter_list>)(4:hash4:sha120:<hashvalue>)) + padding
|
||||
*
|
||||
* we always append a full block of random bytes as padding but
|
||||
* encrypt only what is needed for a full blocksize. In OCB mode we
|
||||
* have to prefix the text with 2 parenthesis. Due to OCB mode we
|
||||
* have to allocate enough space for just:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ((<parameter_list>))
|
||||
*/
|
||||
blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (PROT_CIPHER);
|
||||
if (use_ocb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* (( )) */
|
||||
outlen = 2 + protlen + 2 ;
|
||||
enclen = outlen + 16 /* taglen */;
|
||||
outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (enclen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* (( )( 4:hash 4:sha1 20:<hash> )) <padding> */
|
||||
outlen = 2 + protlen + 2 + 6 + 6 + 23 + 2 + blklen;
|
||||
enclen = outlen/blklen * blklen;
|
||||
outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (outlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* (( )) */
|
||||
outlen = 2 + protlen + 2 ;
|
||||
enclen = outlen + 16 /* taglen */;
|
||||
outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (enclen);
|
||||
if (!outbuf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rc = out_of_core ();
|
||||
@ -445,10 +426,10 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
/* Allocate a buffer for the nonce and the salt. */
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Allocate random bytes to be used as IV, padding and s2k salt
|
||||
* or in OCB mode for a nonce and the s2k salt. The IV/nonce is
|
||||
* set later because for OCB we need to set the key first. */
|
||||
ivsize = (use_ocb? 12 : (blklen*2)) + 8;
|
||||
/* Allocate random bytes to be used as nonce and s2k salt. The
|
||||
* nonce is set later because for OCB we need to set the key
|
||||
* first. */
|
||||
ivsize = 12 + 8;
|
||||
iv = xtrymalloc (ivsize);
|
||||
if (!iv)
|
||||
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||||
@ -484,40 +465,17 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
goto leave;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set the IV/nonce. */
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, use_ocb? 12 : blklen);
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, 12);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
goto leave;
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_ocb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* In OCB Mode we use only the public key parameters as AAD. */
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, hashbegin, protbegin - hashbegin);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, timestamp_exp, timestamp_exp_len);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate
|
||||
(hd, protbegin+protlen, hashlen - (protbegin+protlen - hashbegin));
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Hash the entire expression for CBC mode. Because
|
||||
* TIMESTAMP_EXP won't get protected, we can't simply hash a
|
||||
* continuous buffer but need to call md_write several times. */
|
||||
gcry_md_hd_t md;
|
||||
|
||||
rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0 );
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
gcry_md_write (md, hashbegin, protbegin - hashbegin);
|
||||
gcry_md_write (md, protbegin, protlen);
|
||||
gcry_md_write (md, timestamp_exp, timestamp_exp_len);
|
||||
gcry_md_write (md, protbegin+protlen,
|
||||
hashlen - (protbegin+protlen - hashbegin));
|
||||
memcpy (hashvalue, gcry_md_read (md, GCRY_MD_SHA1), 20);
|
||||
gcry_md_close (md);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* In OCB Mode we use only the public key parameters as AAD. */
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, hashbegin, protbegin - hashbegin);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate (hd, timestamp_exp, timestamp_exp_len);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_authenticate
|
||||
(hd, protbegin+protlen, hashlen - (protbegin+protlen - hashbegin));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Encrypt. */
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
@ -527,36 +485,15 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
*p++ = '(';
|
||||
memcpy (p, protbegin, protlen);
|
||||
p += protlen;
|
||||
if (use_ocb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
memcpy (p, ")(4:hash4:sha120:", 17);
|
||||
p += 17;
|
||||
memcpy (p, hashvalue, 20);
|
||||
p += 20;
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); /* Add padding. */
|
||||
p += blklen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
*p++ = ')';
|
||||
log_assert ( p - outbuf == outlen);
|
||||
if (use_ocb)
|
||||
gcry_cipher_final (hd);
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, outlen, NULL, 0);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
gcry_cipher_final (hd);
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, outlen, NULL, 0);
|
||||
if (!rc)
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_assert (outlen + 16 == enclen);
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_gettag (hd, outbuf + outlen, 16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, enclen, NULL, 0);
|
||||
log_assert (outlen + 16 == enclen);
|
||||
rc = gcry_cipher_gettag (hd, outbuf + outlen, 16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -584,7 +521,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
(int)strlen (modestr), modestr,
|
||||
&saltpos,
|
||||
(unsigned int)strlen (countbuf), countbuf,
|
||||
use_ocb? 12 : blklen, &ivpos, use_ocb? 12 : blklen, "",
|
||||
12, &ivpos, 12, "",
|
||||
enclen, &encpos, enclen, "");
|
||||
if (!p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -598,7 +535,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
*resultlen = strlen (p);
|
||||
*result = (unsigned char*)p;
|
||||
memcpy (p+saltpos, s2ksalt, 8);
|
||||
memcpy (p+ivpos, iv, use_ocb? 12 : blklen);
|
||||
memcpy (p+ivpos, iv, 12);
|
||||
memcpy (p+encpos, outbuf, enclen);
|
||||
xfree (iv);
|
||||
xfree (outbuf);
|
||||
@ -614,13 +551,11 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *hashbegin, size_t hashlen,
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in PLAINKEY. We assume
|
||||
a valid S-Exp here. With USE_UCB set to -1 the default scheme is
|
||||
used (ie. either CBC or OCB), set to 0 the old CBC mode is used,
|
||||
and set to 1 OCB is used. */
|
||||
* a valid S-Exp here. */
|
||||
int
|
||||
agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase,
|
||||
unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen,
|
||||
unsigned long s2k_count, int use_ocb)
|
||||
unsigned long s2k_count)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
const char *parmlist;
|
||||
@ -637,9 +572,6 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase,
|
||||
unsigned char *p;
|
||||
int have_curve = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_ocb == -1)
|
||||
use_ocb = !!opt.enable_extended_key_format;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Create an S-expression with the protected-at timestamp. */
|
||||
memcpy (timestamp_exp, "(12:protected-at15:", 19);
|
||||
gnupg_get_isotime (timestamp_exp+19);
|
||||
@ -743,7 +675,7 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase,
|
||||
rc = do_encryption (hash_begin, hash_end - hash_begin + 1,
|
||||
prot_begin, prot_end - prot_begin + 1,
|
||||
passphrase, timestamp_exp, sizeof (timestamp_exp),
|
||||
&protected, &protectedlen, s2k_count, use_ocb);
|
||||
&protected, &protectedlen, s2k_count);
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ test_agent_protect (void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = agent_protect ((const unsigned char*)specs[i].key,
|
||||
specs[i].passphrase,
|
||||
&specs[i].result, &specs[i].resultlen, 0, -1);
|
||||
&specs[i].result, &specs[i].resultlen, 0);
|
||||
if (gpg_err_code (ret) != specs[i].ret_expected)
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf ("agent_protect(%d) returned '%i/%s'; expected '%i/%s'\n",
|
||||
|
@ -615,15 +615,11 @@ remote machine.
|
||||
@itemx --disable-extended-key-format
|
||||
@opindex enable-extended-key-format
|
||||
@opindex disable-extended-key-format
|
||||
Since version 2.3 keys are created in the extended private key format.
|
||||
Changing the passphrase of a key will also convert the key to that new
|
||||
format. This new key format is supported since GnuPG version 2.1.12
|
||||
and thus there should be no need to disable it. The disable option
|
||||
allows to revert to the old behavior for new keys; be aware that keys
|
||||
are never migrated back to the old format. However if the enable
|
||||
option has been used the disable option won't have an effect. The
|
||||
advantage of the extended private key format is that it is text based
|
||||
and can carry additional meta data.
|
||||
These options are obsolete and have no effect. The extended key format
|
||||
is used for years now and has been supported since 2.1.12. Existing
|
||||
keys in the old format are migrated to the new format as soon as they
|
||||
are touched.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@anchor{option --enable-ssh-support}
|
||||
@item --enable-ssh-support
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user