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Document the archives handling implementation's details

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jvoisin 2019-05-16 20:59:15 +02:00
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doc/implementation_notes.md
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@ -12,11 +12,16 @@ images in a PDF or an office document.
Revisions handling
------------------
Revisions are handled according to the principle of least astonishment: they are entirely removed.
Revisions are handled according to the principle of least astonishment: they
are entirely removed.
- Either the users aren't aware of the revisions, are thus they should be deleted. For example journalists that are editing a document to erase mentions sources mentions.
- Either the users aren't aware of the revisions, are thus they should be
deleted. For example journalists that are editing a document to erase
mentions sources mentions.
- Or they are aware of it, and will likely not expect MAT2 to be able to keep the revisions, that are basically traces about how, when and who edited the document.
- Or they are aware of it, and will likely not expect MAT2 to be able to keep
the revisions, that are basically traces about how, when and who edited the
document.
Race conditions
@ -37,8 +42,19 @@ against them
Archives handling
-----------------
MAT2 doesn't support archives yet, because we haven't found an usable way to ask the user
what to do when a non-supported files are encountered.
By default, when cleaning a non-support file format in an archive,
mat2 will abort with a detailed error message.
While strongly discouraged, it's possible to override this behaviour to force
the exclusion, or inclusion of unknown files into the cleaned archive.
While Python's [zipfile](https://docs.python.org/3/library/zipfile.html) module
provides *safe* way to extract members of a zip archive, the
[tarfile](https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html) one doesn't,
meaning that it's up to mat2 to implement safety checks. Currently,
it defends against path-traversal, both relative and absolute,
symlink-related attacks, setuid/setgid attacks, duplicate members, block and
char devices, … but there might still be dragons lurking there.
PDF handling
------------