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gnupg/g10/ecdh.c

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/* ecdh.c - ECDH public key operations used in public key glue code
* Copyright (C) 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "../common/util.h"
#include "pkglue.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "options.h"
/* A table with the default KEK parameters used by GnuPG. */
static const struct
{
unsigned int qbits;
int openpgp_hash_id; /* KEK digest algorithm. */
int openpgp_cipher_id; /* KEK cipher algorithm. */
} kek_params_table[] =
/* Note: Must be sorted by ascending values for QBITS. */
{
{ 256, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, CIPHER_ALGO_AES },
{ 384, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA384, CIPHER_ALGO_AES192 },
/* Note: 528 is 521 rounded to the 8 bit boundary */
{ 528, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA512, CIPHER_ALGO_AES256 }
};
/* Return KEK parameters as an opaque MPI The caller must free the
returned value. Returns NULL and sets ERRNO on error. */
gcry_mpi_t
pk_ecdh_default_params (unsigned int qbits)
{
byte *kek_params;
int i;
kek_params = xtrymalloc (4);
if (!kek_params)
return NULL;
kek_params[0] = 3; /* Number of bytes to follow. */
kek_params[1] = 1; /* Version for KDF+AESWRAP. */
/* Search for matching KEK parameter. Defaults to the strongest
possible choices. Performance is not an issue here, only
interoperability. */
for (i=0; i < DIM (kek_params_table); i++)
{
if (kek_params_table[i].qbits >= qbits
|| i+1 == DIM (kek_params_table))
{
kek_params[2] = kek_params_table[i].openpgp_hash_id;
kek_params[3] = kek_params_table[i].openpgp_cipher_id;
break;
}
}
log_assert (i < DIM (kek_params_table));
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (kek_params, sizeof(kek_params), "ECDH KEK params are");
return gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, kek_params, 4 * 8);
}
/* Extract x-component from the point (SHARED,NSHARED) and strore it
* in a new buffer at R_SECRET_X. POINT_NBYTES is the size to
* represent an EC point which is determined by the public key.
* SECRET_X_SIZE is the size of x component to represent an integer
* which is determined by the curve. */
static gpg_error_t
extract_secret_x (byte **r_secret_x,
const char *shared, size_t nshared,
size_t point_nbytes, size_t secret_x_size)
{
byte *secret_x;
*r_secret_x = NULL;
/* Extract X from the result. It must be in the format of:
04 || X || Y
40 || X
41 || X
Since it may come with the prefix, the size of point is larger
than or equals to the size of an integer X. We also better check
that the provided shared point is not larger than the size needed
to represent the point. */
if (point_nbytes < secret_x_size)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
if (point_nbytes < nshared)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
/* Extract x component of the shared point: this is the actual
shared secret. */
secret_x = xtrymalloc_secure (point_nbytes);
if (!secret_x)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
memcpy (secret_x, shared, nshared);
/* Wrangle the provided point unless only the x-component w/o any
* prefix was provided. */
if (nshared != secret_x_size)
{
/* Remove the prefix. */
if ((point_nbytes & 1))
memmove (secret_x, secret_x+1, secret_x_size);
/* Clear the rest of data. */
if (point_nbytes - secret_x_size)
memset (secret_x+secret_x_size, 0, point_nbytes-secret_x_size);
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (secret_x, secret_x_size, "ECDH shared secret X is:");
*r_secret_x = secret_x;
return 0;
}
/* Encrypts/decrypts DATA using a key derived from the ECC shared
point (SHARED,NSHARED) using the FIPS SP 800-56A compliant method
key_derivation+key_wrapping. If IS_ENCRYPT is true the function
encrypts; if false, it decrypts. PKEY is the public key and PK_FP
the fingerprint of this public key. On success the result is
stored at R_RESULT; on failure NULL is stored at R_RESULT and an
error code returned. */
gpg_error_t
pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt,
const char *shared, size_t nshared,
const byte pk_fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],
gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
gcry_mpi_t *r_result)
{
gpg_error_t err;
byte *secret_x;
int secret_x_size;
unsigned int nbits;
const unsigned char *kek_params;
size_t kek_params_size;
int kdf_hash_algo;
int kdf_encr_algo;
size_t kek_size;
unsigned char message[256];
size_t message_size;
*r_result = NULL;
if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (pkey[2], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
kek_params = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pkey[2], &nbits);
kek_params_size = (nbits+7)/8;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (kek_params, kek_params_size, "ecdh KDF params:");
/* Expect 4 bytes 03 01 hash_alg symm_alg. */
if (kek_params_size != 4 || kek_params[0] != 3 || kek_params[1] != 1)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
kdf_hash_algo = kek_params[2];
kdf_encr_algo = kek_params[3];
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_debug ("ecdh KDF algorithms %s+%s with aeswrap\n",
openpgp_md_algo_name (kdf_hash_algo),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (kdf_encr_algo));
if (kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA256
&& kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA384
&& kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA512)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
if (kdf_encr_algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
&& kdf_encr_algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
&& kdf_encr_algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
kek_size = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (kdf_encr_algo);
if (kek_size > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (kdf_hash_algo))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
nbits = pubkey_nbits (PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH, pkey);
if (!nbits)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
/* Expected size of the x component */
secret_x_size = (nbits+7)/8;
if (kek_size > secret_x_size)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
err = extract_secret_x (&secret_x, shared, nshared,
(mpi_get_nbits (pkey[1] /* public point */)+7)/8,
secret_x_size);
if (err)
return err;
/*** We have now the shared secret bytes in secret_x. ***/
/* At this point we are done with PK encryption and the rest of the
* function uses symmetric key encryption techniques to protect the
* input DATA. The following two sections will simply replace
* current secret_x with a value derived from it. This will become
* a KEK.
*/
/* Build kdf_params. */
{
IOBUF obuf;
obuf = iobuf_temp();
/* variable-length field 1, curve name OID */
err = gpg_mpi_write_nohdr (obuf, pkey[0]);
/* fixed-length field 2 */
iobuf_put (obuf, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH);
/* variable-length field 3, KDF params */
err = (err ? err : gpg_mpi_write_nohdr (obuf, pkey[2]));
/* fixed-length field 4 */
iobuf_write (obuf, "Anonymous Sender ", 20);
/* fixed-length field 5, recipient fp */
iobuf_write (obuf, pk_fp, 20);
message_size = iobuf_temp_to_buffer (obuf, message, sizeof message);
iobuf_close (obuf);
if (err)
{
xfree (secret_x);
return err;
}
if(DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (message, message_size, "ecdh KDF message params are:");
}
/* Derive a KEK (key wrapping key) using MESSAGE and SECRET_X. */
{
gcry_md_hd_t h;
int old_size;
err = gcry_md_open (&h, kdf_hash_algo, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("gcry_md_open failed for kdf_hash_algo %d: %s",
kdf_hash_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (secret_x);
return err;
}
gcry_md_write(h, "\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4); /* counter = 1 */
gcry_md_write(h, secret_x, secret_x_size); /* x of the point X */
gcry_md_write(h, message, message_size); /* KDF parameters */
gcry_md_final (h);
log_assert( gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (kdf_hash_algo) >= 32 );
memcpy (secret_x, gcry_md_read (h, kdf_hash_algo),
gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (kdf_hash_algo));
gcry_md_close (h);
old_size = secret_x_size;
log_assert( old_size >= gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen( kdf_encr_algo ) );
secret_x_size = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen( kdf_encr_algo );
log_assert( secret_x_size <= gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (kdf_hash_algo) );
/* We could have allocated more, so clean the tail before returning. */
memset (secret_x+secret_x_size, 0, old_size - secret_x_size);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (secret_x, secret_x_size, "ecdh KEK is:");
}
/* And, finally, aeswrap with key secret_x. */
{
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
size_t nbytes;
byte *data_buf;
int data_buf_size;
gcry_mpi_t result;
err = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, kdf_encr_algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed to initialize AESWRAP: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (secret_x);
return err;
}
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, secret_x, secret_x_size);
xfree (secret_x);
secret_x = NULL;
if (err)
{
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
log_error ("ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_setkey: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
data_buf_size = (gcry_mpi_get_nbits(data)+7)/8;
if ((data_buf_size & 7) != (is_encrypt ? 0 : 1))
{
log_error ("can't use a shared secret of %d bytes for ecdh\n",
data_buf_size);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
}
data_buf = xtrymalloc_secure( 1 + 2*data_buf_size + 8);
if (!data_buf)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
return err;
}
if (is_encrypt)
{
byte *in = data_buf+1+data_buf_size+8;
/* Write data MPI into the end of data_buf. data_buf is size
aeswrap data. */
err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, in,
data_buf_size, &nbytes, data/*in*/);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed to export DEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
xfree (data_buf);
return err;
}
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (in, data_buf_size, "ecdh encrypting :");
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, data_buf+1, data_buf_size+8,
in, data_buf_size);
memset (in, 0, data_buf_size);
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_encrypt: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (data_buf);
return err;
}
data_buf[0] = data_buf_size+8;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (data_buf+1, data_buf[0], "ecdh encrypted to:");
result = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data_buf, 8 * (1+data_buf[0]));
if (!result)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
xfree (data_buf);
log_error ("ecdh failed to create an MPI: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
*r_result = result;
}
else
{
byte *in;
const void *p;
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (data, &nbits);
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
if (!p || nbytes > data_buf_size || !nbytes)
{
xfree (data_buf);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
}
memcpy (data_buf, p, nbytes);
if (data_buf[0] != nbytes-1)
{
log_error ("ecdh inconsistent size\n");
xfree (data_buf);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
}
in = data_buf+data_buf_size;
data_buf_size = data_buf[0];
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (data_buf+1, data_buf_size, "ecdh decrypting :");
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, in, data_buf_size, data_buf+1,
data_buf_size);
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed in gcry_cipher_decrypt: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
xfree (data_buf);
return err;
}
data_buf_size -= 8;
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_printhex (in, data_buf_size, "ecdh decrypted to :");
/* Padding is removed later. */
/* if (in[data_buf_size-1] > 8 ) */
/* { */
/* log_error ("ecdh failed at decryption: invalid padding." */
/* " 0x%02x > 8\n", in[data_buf_size-1] ); */
/* return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY); */
/* } */
err = gcry_mpi_scan (&result, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, in, data_buf_size, NULL);
xfree (data_buf);
if (err)
{
log_error ("ecdh failed to create a plain text MPI: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
*r_result = result;
}
}
return err;
}
static gcry_mpi_t
gen_k (unsigned nbits)
{
gcry_mpi_t k;
k = gcry_mpi_snew (nbits);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
log_debug ("choosing a random k of %u bits\n", nbits);
gcry_mpi_randomize (k, nbits-1, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
{
unsigned char *buffer;
if (gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, &buffer, NULL, k))
BUG ();
log_debug ("ephemeral scalar MPI #0: %s\n", buffer);
gcry_free (buffer);
}
return k;
}
/* Generate an ephemeral key for the public ECDH key in PKEY. On
success the generated key is stored at R_K; on failure NULL is
stored at R_K and an error code returned. */
gpg_error_t
pk_ecdh_generate_ephemeral_key (gcry_mpi_t *pkey, gcry_mpi_t *r_k)
{
unsigned int nbits;
gcry_mpi_t k;
*r_k = NULL;
nbits = pubkey_nbits (PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH, pkey);
if (!nbits)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
k = gen_k (nbits);
if (!k)
BUG ();
*r_k = k;
return 0;
}
/* Perform ECDH decryption. */
int
pk_ecdh_decrypt (gcry_mpi_t *result, const byte sk_fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],
gcry_mpi_t data,
const char *shared, size_t nshared,
gcry_mpi_t *skey)
{
if (!data)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
return pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (0 /*=decryption*/,
shared, nshared,
sk_fp, data/*encr data as an MPI*/,
skey, result);
}
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