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gnupg/g10/getkey.c
Werner Koch ab430c4b24 * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Removed some variables 
declaration due to shadowing warnings.
* build-packet.c (build_attribute_subpkt): s/index/idx/ to avoid
compiler warnig due to index(3).
* getkey.c (get_ctx_handle): Use KEYDB_HANDLE as return value.
* keylist.c (list_one): Made resname const.
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow "addphoto" only when --openpgp is
not used.
* options.skel: Changed one example photo viewer to qiv.
2001-12-22 13:04:24 +00:00

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/* getkey.c - Get a key from the database
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES 200
#define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES 200
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES < 2
#error We need the cache for key creation
#endif
struct getkey_ctx_s {
int exact;
KBNODE keyblock;
KBPOS kbpos;
KBNODE found_key; /* pointer into some keyblock */
int last_rc;
int req_usage;
int req_algo;
KEYDB_HANDLE kr_handle;
int not_allocated;
int nitems;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC items[1];
};
#if 0
static struct {
int any;
int okay_count;
int nokey_count;
int error_count;
} lkup_stats[21];
#endif
typedef struct keyid_list {
struct keyid_list *next;
u32 keyid[2];
} *keyid_list_t;
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
typedef struct pk_cache_entry {
struct pk_cache_entry *next;
u32 keyid[2];
PKT_public_key *pk;
} *pk_cache_entry_t;
static pk_cache_entry_t pk_cache;
static int pk_cache_entries; /* number of entries in pk cache */
static int pk_cache_disabled;
#endif
#if MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES < 5
#error we really need the userid cache
#endif
typedef struct user_id_db {
struct user_id_db *next;
keyid_list_t keyids;
int len;
char name[1];
} *user_id_db_t;
static user_id_db_t user_id_db;
static int uid_cache_entries; /* number of entries in uid cache */
static void merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock );
static int lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode );
#if 0
static void
print_stats()
{
int i;
for(i=0; i < DIM(lkup_stats); i++ ) {
if( lkup_stats[i].any )
fprintf(stderr,
"lookup stats: mode=%-2d ok=%-6d nokey=%-6d err=%-6d\n",
i,
lkup_stats[i].okay_count,
lkup_stats[i].nokey_count,
lkup_stats[i].error_count );
}
}
#endif
void
cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk )
{
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
pk_cache_entry_t ce;
u32 keyid[2];
if( pk_cache_disabled )
return;
if( is_ELGAMAL(pk->pubkey_algo)
|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) ) {
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
}
else
return; /* don't know how to get the keyid */
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
if( DBG_CACHE )
log_debug("cache_public_key: already in cache\n");
return;
}
if( pk_cache_entries >= MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
pk_cache_disabled=1;
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("too many entries in pk cache - disabled\n"));
return;
}
pk_cache_entries++;
ce = m_alloc( sizeof *ce );
ce->next = pk_cache;
pk_cache = ce;
ce->pk = copy_public_key( NULL, pk );
ce->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
ce->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
#endif
}
/*
* Return the user ID from the given keyblock.
* We use the primary uid flag which has been set by the merge_selfsigs
* function. The returned value is only valid as long as then given
* keyblock is not changed
*/
static const char *
get_primary_uid ( KBNODE keyblock, size_t *uidlen )
{
KBNODE k;
const char *s;
for (k=keyblock; k; k=k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
*uidlen = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
return k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name;
}
}
/* fixme: returning translatable constants instead of a user ID is
* not good because they are probably not utf-8 encoded. */
s = _("[User id not found]");
*uidlen = strlen (s);
return s;
}
static void
release_keyid_list ( keyid_list_t k )
{
while ( k ) {
keyid_list_t k2 = k->next;
m_free (k);
k = k2;
}
}
/****************
* Store the association of keyid and userid
* Feed only public keys to this function.
*/
static void
cache_user_id( KBNODE keyblock )
{
user_id_db_t r;
const char *uid;
size_t uidlen;
keyid_list_t keyids = NULL;
KBNODE k;
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
keyid_list_t a = m_alloc_clear ( sizeof *a );
/* Hmmm: For a long list of keyids it might be an advantage
* to append the keys */
keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, a->keyid );
/* first check for duplicates */
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
keyid_list_t b = r->keyids;
for ( b = r->keyids; b; b = b->next ) {
if( b->keyid[0] == a->keyid[0]
&& b->keyid[1] == a->keyid[1] ) {
if( DBG_CACHE )
log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
release_keyid_list ( keyids );
m_free ( a );
return;
}
}
}
/* now put it into the cache */
a->next = keyids;
keyids = a;
}
}
if ( !keyids )
BUG (); /* No key no fun */
uid = get_primary_uid ( keyblock, &uidlen );
if( uid_cache_entries >= MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
r = user_id_db;
user_id_db = r->next;
release_keyid_list ( r->keyids );
m_free(r);
uid_cache_entries--;
}
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r + uidlen-1 );
r->keyids = keyids;
r->len = uidlen;
memcpy(r->name, uid, r->len);
r->next = user_id_db;
user_id_db = r;
uid_cache_entries++;
}
void
getkey_disable_caches()
{
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
{
pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce2 ) {
ce2 = ce->next;
free_public_key( ce->pk );
m_free( ce );
}
pk_cache_disabled=1;
pk_cache_entries = 0;
pk_cache = NULL;
}
#endif
/* fixme: disable user id cache ? */
}
static void
pk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
copy_public_key ( pk, a->pkt->pkt.public_key );
}
static void
sk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx,
PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
copy_secret_key( sk, a->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
}
/****************
* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk
* can be called with PK set to NULL to just read it into some
* internal structures.
*/
int
get_pubkey( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
{
int internal = 0;
int rc = 0;
#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
{ /* Try to get it from the cache */
pk_cache_entry_t ce;
for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next ) {
if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
if( pk )
copy_public_key( pk, ce->pk );
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif
/* more init stuff */
if( !pk ) {
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
internal++;
}
/* do a lookup */
{ struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
KBNODE kb = NULL;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
ctx.req_algo = pk->req_algo;
ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
if ( !rc ) {
pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
}
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
release_kbnode ( kb );
}
if( !rc )
goto leave;
rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
leave:
if( !rc )
cache_public_key( pk );
if( internal )
free_public_key(pk);
return rc;
}
KBNODE
get_pubkeyblock( u32 *keyid )
{
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
/* no need to set exact here because we want the entire block */
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
rc = lookup( &ctx, &keyblock, 0 );
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
return rc ? NULL : keyblock;
}
/****************
* Get a secret key and store it into sk
*/
int
get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
{
int rc;
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
KBNODE kb = NULL;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
ctx.req_algo = sk->req_algo;
ctx.req_usage = sk->req_usage;
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
if ( !rc ) {
sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
}
get_seckey_end( &ctx );
release_kbnode ( kb );
if( !rc ) {
/* check the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
* unlock the secret key
*/
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Check whether the secret key is available. This is just a fast
* check and does not tell us whether the secret key is valid. It
* merely tells other whether there is some secret key.
* Returns: 0 := key is available
* G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe
*/
int
seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
{
int rc;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
if ( rc == -1 )
rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
keydb_release (hd);
return rc;
}
static int
hextobyte( const byte *s )
{
int c;
if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' )
c = 16 * (*s - '0');
else if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' )
c = 16 * (10 + *s - 'A');
else if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' )
c = 16 * (10 + *s - 'a');
else
return -1;
s++;
if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' )
c += *s - '0';
else if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' )
c += 10 + *s - 'A';
else if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' )
c += 10 + *s - 'a';
else
return -1;
return c;
}
/****************
* Return the type of the user id:
*
* Please use the constants KEYDB_SERCH_MODE_xxx
* 0 = Invalid user ID
* 1 = exact match
* 2 = match a substring
* 3 = match an email address
* 4 = match a substring of an email address
* 5 = match an email address, but compare from end
* 6 = word match mode
* 10 = it is a short KEYID (don't care about keyid[0])
* 11 = it is a long KEYID
* 12 = it is a trustdb index (keyid is looked up)
* 16 = it is a 16 byte fingerprint
* 20 = it is a 20 byte fingerprint
* 21 = Unified fingerprint :fpr:pk_algo:
* (We don't use pk_algo yet)
*
* Rules used:
* - If the username starts with 8,9,16 or 17 hex-digits (the first one
* must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a keyid; depending
* on the length a short or complete one.
* - If the username starts with 32,33,40 or 41 hex-digits (the first one
* must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a fingerprint.
* - If the username starts with a left angle, we assume it is a complete
* email address and look only at this part.
* - If the username starts with a colon we assume it is a unified
* key specfification.
* - If the username starts with a '.', we assume it is the ending
* part of an email address
* - If the username starts with an '@', we assume it is a part of an
* email address
* - If the userid start with an '=' an exact compare is done.
* - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
* done (This is the default).
* - If the userid starts with a '+' we will compare individual words
* and a match requires that all the words are in the userid.
* Words are delimited by white space or "()<>[]{}.@-+_,;/&!"
* (note that you can't search for these characters). Compare
* is not case sensitive.
*/
static int
classify_user_id2( const char *name,
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc,
int *force_exact )
{
const char *s;
int hexprefix = 0;
int hexlength;
int mode = 0;
/* clear the structure so that the mode field is set to zero unless
* we set it to the correct value right at the end of this function */
memset (desc, 0, sizeof *desc);
*force_exact = 0;
/* skip leading spaces. Fixme: what is with trailing spaces? */
for(s = name; *s && isspace(*s); s++ )
;
switch (*s) {
case 0: /* empty string is an error */
return 0;
case '.': /* an email address, compare from end */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND;
s++;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '<': /* an email address */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '@': /* part of an email address */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB;
s++;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '=': /* exact compare */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT;
s++;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '*': /* case insensitive substring search */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;
s++;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '+': /* compare individual words */
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS;
s++;
desc->u.name = s;
break;
case '#': /* local user id */
return 0; /* This is now obsolete and van't not be used anymore*/
case ':': /*Unified fingerprint */
{
const char *se, *si;
int i;
se = strchr( ++s,':');
if ( !se )
return 0;
for (i=0,si=s; si < se; si++, i++ ) {
if ( !strchr("01234567890abcdefABCDEF", *si ) )
return 0; /* invalid digit */
}
if (i != 32 && i != 40)
return 0; /* invalid length of fpr*/
for (i=0,si=s; si < se; i++, si +=2)
desc->u.fpr[i] = hextobyte(si);
for ( ; i < 20; i++)
desc->u.fpr[i]= 0;
s = se + 1;
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
}
break;
default:
if (s[0] == '0' && s[1] == 'x') {
hexprefix = 1;
s += 2;
}
hexlength = strspn(s, "0123456789abcdefABCDEF");
if (hexlength >= 8 && s[hexlength] =='!') {
*force_exact = 1;
hexlength++; /* just for the following check */
}
/* check if a hexadecimal number is terminated by EOS or blank */
if (hexlength && s[hexlength] && !isspace(s[hexlength])) {
if (hexprefix) /* a "0x" prefix without correct */
return 0; /* termination is an error */
else /* The first chars looked like */
hexlength = 0; /* a hex number, but really were not. */
}
if (*force_exact)
hexlength--;
if (hexlength == 8
|| (!hexprefix && hexlength == 9 && *s == '0')){
/* short keyid */
if (hexlength == 9)
s++;
desc->u.kid[0] = 0;
desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s, NULL, 16 );
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID;
}
else if (hexlength == 16
|| (!hexprefix && hexlength == 17 && *s == '0')) {
/* complete keyid */
char buf[9];
if (hexlength == 17)
s++;
mem2str(buf, s, 9 );
desc->u.kid[0] = strtoul( buf, NULL, 16 );
desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s+8, NULL, 16 );
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
}
else if (hexlength == 32 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 33
&& *s == '0')) {
/* md5 fingerprint */
int i;
if (hexlength == 33)
s++;
memset(desc->u.fpr+16, 0, 4);
for (i=0; i < 16; i++, s+=2) {
int c = hextobyte(s);
if (c == -1)
return 0;
desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
}
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16;
}
else if (hexlength == 40 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 41
&& *s == '0')) {
/* sha1/rmd160 fingerprint */
int i;
if (hexlength == 41)
s++;
for (i=0; i < 20; i++, s+=2) {
int c = hextobyte(s);
if (c == -1)
return 0;
desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
}
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
}
else {
if (hexprefix) /* This was a hex number with a prefix */
return 0; /* and a wrong length */
*force_exact = 0;
desc->u.name = s;
mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR; /* default mode */
}
}
desc->mode = mode;
return mode;
}
int
classify_user_id (const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc)
{
int dummy;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC dummy_desc;
if (!desc)
desc = &dummy_desc;
return classify_user_id2 (name, desc, &dummy);
}
/****************
* Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the
* first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id.
* if pk/sk has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return
* a pubkey with that algo.
* The caller should provide storage for either the pk or the sk.
* If ret_kb is not NULL the function will return the keyblock there.
*/
static int
key_byname( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, STRLIST namelist,
PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int secmode,
KBNODE *ret_kb, KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd )
{
int rc = 0;
int n;
STRLIST r;
GETKEY_CTX ctx;
KBNODE help_kb = NULL;
int exact;
if( retctx ) {/* reset the returned context in case of error */
assert (!ret_kdbhd); /* not allowed because the handle is
stored in the context */
*retctx = NULL;
}
if (ret_kdbhd)
*ret_kdbhd = NULL;
/* build the search context */
for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next )
n++;
ctx = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *ctx + (n-1)*sizeof ctx->items );
ctx->nitems = n;
for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next, n++ ) {
classify_user_id2 (r->d, &ctx->items[n], &exact);
if (exact)
ctx->exact = 1;
if (!ctx->items[n].mode) {
m_free (ctx);
return G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
}
}
ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (secmode);
if ( !ret_kb )
ret_kb = &help_kb;
if( secmode ) {
if (sk) {
ctx->req_algo = sk->req_algo;
ctx->req_usage = sk->req_usage;
}
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 1 );
if ( !rc && sk ) {
sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_kb );
}
}
else {
if (pk) {
ctx->req_algo = pk->req_algo;
ctx->req_usage = pk->req_usage;
}
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 0 );
if ( !rc && pk ) {
pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_kb );
}
}
release_kbnode ( help_kb );
if (retctx) /* caller wants the context */
*retctx = ctx;
else {
if (ret_kdbhd) {
*ret_kdbhd = ctx->kr_handle;
ctx->kr_handle = NULL;
}
get_pubkey_end (ctx);
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Find a public key from NAME and returh the keyblock or the key.
* If ret_kdb is not NULL, the KEYDB handle used to locate this keyblock is
* returned and the caller is responsible for closing it.
*/
int
get_pubkey_byname (PKT_public_key *pk,
const char *name, KBNODE *ret_keyblock,
KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd )
{
int rc;
STRLIST namelist = NULL;
add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
rc = key_byname( NULL, namelist, pk, NULL, 0, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
free_strlist( namelist );
return rc;
}
int
get_pubkey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_public_key *pk,
STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
{
return key_byname( retctx, names, pk, NULL, 0, ret_keyblock, NULL);
}
int
get_pubkey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
{
int rc;
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
if ( !rc && pk && ret_keyblock )
pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_keyblock );
return rc;
}
void
get_pubkey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
{
if( ctx ) {
memset (&ctx->kbpos, 0, sizeof ctx->kbpos);
keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);
if( !ctx->not_allocated )
m_free( ctx );
}
}
/****************
* Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
* FIXME:
* We should replace this with the _byname function. Thiscsan be done
* by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style.
*/
int
get_pubkey_byfprint( PKT_public_key *pk,
const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
{
int rc;
if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
KBNODE kb = NULL;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.exact = 1 ;
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
if (!rc && pk )
pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
release_kbnode ( kb );
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
}
else
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
return rc;
}
/****************
* Search for a key with the given fingerprint and return the
* complete keyblock which may have more than only this key.
*/
int
get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
size_t fprint_len )
{
int rc;
if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
rc = lookup( &ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
}
else
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
return rc;
}
/****************
* Get a secret key by name and store it into sk
* If NAME is NULL use the default key
*/
static int
get_seckey_byname2( GETKEY_CTX *retctx,
PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unprotect,
KBNODE *retblock )
{
STRLIST namelist = NULL;
int rc;
if( !name && opt.def_secret_key && *opt.def_secret_key ) {
add_to_strlist( &namelist, opt.def_secret_key );
rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, retblock, NULL );
}
else if( !name ) { /* use the first one as default key */
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
KBNODE kb = NULL;
assert (!retctx ); /* do we need this at all */
assert (!retblock);
memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
if (!rc && sk )
sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
release_kbnode ( kb );
get_seckey_end( &ctx );
}
else {
add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, retblock, NULL );
}
free_strlist( namelist );
if( !rc && unprotect )
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
return rc;
}
int
get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unlock )
{
return get_seckey_byname2 ( NULL, sk, name, unlock, NULL );
}
int
get_seckey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_secret_key *sk,
STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
{
return key_byname( retctx, names, NULL, sk, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL );
}
int
get_seckey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
{
int rc;
rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 1 );
if ( !rc && sk && ret_keyblock )
sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_keyblock );
return rc;
}
void
get_seckey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
{
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
}
/************************************************
************* Merging stuff ********************
************************************************/
/****************
* merge all selfsignatures with the keys.
* FIXME: replace this at least for the public key parts
* by merge_selfsigs.
* It is still used in keyedit.c and
* at 2 or 3 other places - check whether it is really needed.
* It might be needed by the key edit and import stuff because
* the keylock is changed.
*/
void
merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig;
KBNODE k;
u32 kid[2] = { 0, 0 };
u32 sigdate = 0;
if (keyblock && keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
/* divert to our new function */
merge_selfsigs (keyblock);
return;
}
/* still need the old one because the new one can't handle secret keys */
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; sk = NULL;
if( pk->version < 4 )
pk = NULL; /* not needed for old keys */
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
else if( !pk->expiredate ) { /* and subkey */
/* insert the expiration date here */
/*FIXME!!! pk->expiredate = subkeys_expiretime( k, kid );*/
}
sigdate = 0;
}
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
pk = NULL; sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( sk->version < 4 )
sk = NULL;
else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
sigdate = 0;
}
else if( (pk || sk ) && k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
&& sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
&& !(sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x28)
&& sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
/* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
* This is not used for subkey binding signature, becuase this
* is done above.
* FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
* but this is time consuming - we must provide another
* way to handle this
*/
const byte *p;
u32 ed;
p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
if( pk ) {
ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
pk->expiredate = ed;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
}
}
else {
ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
sk->expiredate = ed;
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature
* associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE:
* - wether the UID has been revoked
* - assumed creation date of the UID
* - temporary store the keyflags here
* - temporary store the key expiration time here
* - mark whether the primary user ID flag hat been set.
* - store the preferences
*/
static void
fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
{
PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
const byte *p, *sym, *hash, *zip;
size_t n, nsym, nhash, nzip;
uid->created = 0; /* not created == invalid */
if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) ) {
uid->is_revoked = 1;
return; /* has been revoked */
}
uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* this one is okay */
/* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
uid->help_key_usage = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
if ( p && n ) {
/* first octet of the keyflags */
if ( (*p & 3) )
uid->help_key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
if ( (*p & 12) )
uid->help_key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
/* Note: we do not set the CERT flag here because it can be assumed
* that thre is no real policy to set it. */
}
/* ditto or the key expiration */
uid->help_key_expire = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
if ( p ) {
uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
}
/* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
* of them to only have one in our keyblock */
uid->is_primary = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
if ( p && *p )
uid->is_primary = 1;
/* We could also query this from the unhashed area if it is not in
* the hased area and then later try to decide which is the better
* there should be no security problem with this.
* For now we only look at the hashed one.
*/
/* now build the preferences list. We try to get the preferences
* from the hashed list but if there are no such preferences, we
* try to get them from the unhashed list. There is no risk with
* that, because our implementation comes only with strong
* algorithms and it would be fruitless for an attacker to insert
* an weak algorithm. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
hash = p; nhash = p?n:0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
zip = p; nzip = p?n:0;
if (uid->prefs)
m_free (uid->prefs);
n = nsym + nhash + nzip;
if (!n)
uid->prefs = NULL;
else {
uid->prefs = m_alloc (sizeof (*uid->prefs) * (n+1));
n = 0;
for (; nsym; nsym--, n++) {
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
uid->prefs[n].value = *sym++;
}
for (; nhash; nhash--, n++) {
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
uid->prefs[n].value = *hash++;
}
for (; nzip; nzip--, n++) {
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
uid->prefs[n].value = *zip++;
}
uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE; /* end of list marker */
uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
}
/* see whether we have the MDC feature */
uid->mdc_feature = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x01))
uid->mdc_feature = 1;
}
static void
merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
KBNODE k;
u32 kid[2];
u32 sigdate = 0, uiddate=0, uiddate2;
KBNODE signode, uidnode, uidnode2;
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
unsigned int key_usage = 0;
u32 keytimestamp = 0;
u32 key_expire = 0;
int key_expire_seen = 0;
*r_revoked = 0;
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
BUG ();
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keytimestamp = pk->timestamp;
keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
pk->main_keyid[0] = kid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = kid[1];
if ( pk->version < 4 ) {
/* before v4 the key packet itself contains the expiration date
* and there was noway to change it. So we also use only the
* one from the key packet */
key_expire = pk->expiredate;
key_expire_seen = 1;
}
/* first pass: find the latest direct key self-signature.
* We assume that the newest one overrides all others
*/
signode = NULL;
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) {
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( IS_KEY_REV (sig) ){
/* key has been revoked - there is no way to override
* such a revocation, so we theoretically can stop now.
* We should not cope with expiration times for revocations
* here because we have to assume that an attacker can
* generate all kinds of signatures. However due to the
* fact that the key has been revoked it does not harm
* either and by continuing we gather some more info on
* that key.
*/
*r_revoked = 1;
}
else if ( IS_KEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
const byte *p;
p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
if ( p && (sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p)) >= curtime )
; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
else {
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
signode = k;
}
}
}
}
}
if ( signode ) {
/* some information from a direct key signature take precedence
* over the same information given in UID sigs.
*/
PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
const byte *p;
size_t n;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
if ( p && n ) {
/* first octet of the keyflags */
if ( (*p & 3) )
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
if ( (*p & 12) )
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
}
if ( pk->version > 3 ) {
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
if ( p ) {
key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
key_expire_seen = 1;
}
}
/* mark that key as valid: one direct key signature should
* render a key as valid */
pk->is_valid = 1;
}
/* second pass: look at the self-signature of all user IDs */
signode = uidnode = NULL;
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature in one user ID */
uiddate = 0; /* and over of all user IDs */
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if ( uidnode && signode )
fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
uidnode = k;
signode = NULL;
if ( sigdate > uiddate )
uiddate = sigdate;
sigdate = 0;
}
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode ) {
PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) {
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
&& sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
/* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
* by a newer signature. An attacker can't use this
* because a key should be revoced with a key revocation.
* The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
* one time an email address may become invalid but later
* the same email address may become valid again (hired,
* fired, hired again).
*/
const byte *p;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
if ( p && (sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p)) >= curtime )
; /* signature/revocation has expired - ignore it */
else {
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
signode = k;
}
}
}
}
}
if ( uidnode && signode ) {
fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
pk->is_valid = 1;
}
if ( sigdate > uiddate )
uiddate = sigdate;
/* Now that we had a look at all user IDs we can now get some information
* from those user IDs.
*/
if ( !key_usage ) {
/* find the latest user ID with key flags set */
uiddate = 0; /* helper to find the latest user ID */
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if ( uid->help_key_usage && uid->created > uiddate ) {
key_usage = uid->help_key_usage;
uiddate = uid->created;
}
}
}
}
if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
}
else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
key_usage &= x;
}
pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
if ( !key_expire_seen ) {
/* find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set
* Note, that this may be a different one from the above because
* some user IDs may have no expiration date set */
uiddate = 0;
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if ( uid->help_key_expire && uid->created > uiddate ) {
key_expire = uid->help_key_expire;
uiddate = uid->created;
}
}
}
}
pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
if ( pk->version >= 4 )
pk->expiredate = key_expire;
/* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields but
* this needs changes at other places too. */
/* and now find the real primary user ID and delete all others */
uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
uidnode = uidnode2 = NULL;
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if ( uid->is_primary && uid->created > uiddate ) {
uiddate = uid->created;
uidnode = k;
}
if ( !uid->is_primary && uid->created > uiddate2 ) {
uiddate2 = uid->created;
uidnode2 = k;
}
}
}
if ( uidnode ) {
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if ( k != uidnode )
uid->is_primary = 0;
}
}
}
else if( uidnode2 ) {
/* none is flagged primary - use the latest user ID we have */
uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 1;
}
}
static void
merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
{
PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL, *subpk = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig;
KBNODE k;
u32 mainkid[2];
u32 sigdate = 0;
KBNODE signode;
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
unsigned int key_usage = 0;
u32 keytimestamp = 0;
u32 key_expire = 0;
const byte *p;
size_t n;
if ( subnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
BUG ();
mainpk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if ( mainpk->version < 4 )
return; /* (actually this should never happen) */
keyid_from_pk( mainpk, mainkid );
subpk = subnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keytimestamp = subpk->timestamp;
subpk->is_valid = 0;
subpk->main_keyid[0] = mainpk->main_keyid[0];
subpk->main_keyid[1] = mainpk->main_keyid[1];
if ( subpk->version < 4 )
return; /* there are no v3 subkeys */
/* find the latest key binding self-signature. */
signode = NULL;
sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
for(k=subnode->next; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( sig->keyid[0] == mainkid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==mainkid[1] ) {
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) ) {
subpk->is_revoked = 1;
/* although we could stop now, we continue to
* figure out other information like the old expiration
* time */
}
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
if ( p && (sig->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p)) >= curtime )
; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
else {
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
signode = k;
}
}
}
}
}
if ( !signode ) {
return; /* no valid key binding */
}
subpk->is_valid = 1;
sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
if ( p && n ) {
/* first octet of the keyflags */
if ( (*p & 3) )
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
if ( (*p & 12) )
key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
}
if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
}
else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
key_usage &= x;
}
subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
if ( p )
key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
else
key_expire = 0;
subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
subpk->expiredate = key_expire;
}
/*
* Merge information from the self-signatures with the key, so that
* we can later use them more easy.
* The function works by first applying the self signatures to the
* primary key and the to each subkey.
* Here are the rules we use to decide which inormation from which
* self-signature is used:
* We check all self signatures or validity and ignore all invalid signatures.
* All signatures are then ordered by their creation date ....
* For the primary key:
* FIXME the docs
*/
static void
merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE k;
int revoked;
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
prefitem_t *prefs;
int mdc_feature;
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
log_error ("expected public key but found secret key "
"- must stop\n");
/* we better exit here becuase a public key is expected at
other places too. FIXME: Figure this out earlier and
don't get to here at all */
g10_exit (1);
}
BUG ();
}
merge_selfsigs_main ( keyblock, &revoked );
main_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if ( revoked ) {
/* if the primary key has been revoked we better set the revoke
* flag on that key and all subkeys */
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
pk->is_revoked = 1;
pk->main_keyid[0] = main_pk->main_keyid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = main_pk->main_keyid[1];
}
}
return;
}
/* now merge in the data from each of the subkeys */
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
merge_selfsigs_subkey ( keyblock, k );
}
}
/* set the preference list of all keys to those of the primary
* user ID. Note: we use these preferences when we don't know by
* which user ID the key has been selected.
* fixme: we should keep atoms of commonly used preferences or
* use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
* FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of
* all preferences.
* Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag.
*/
prefs = NULL;
mdc_feature = 0;
for (k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next) {
if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) {
prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->mdc_feature;
break;
}
}
for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->prefs)
m_free (pk->prefs);
pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
pk->mdc_feature = mdc_feature;
}
}
}
/*
* Merge the secret keys from secblock into the pubblock thereby
* replacing the public (sub)keys with their secret counterparts Hmmm:
* It might be better to get away from the concept of entire secret
* keys at all and have a way to store just the real secret parts
* from the key.
*/
static void
merge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
{
KBNODE pub;
assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
for (pub=pubblock; pub; pub = pub->next ) {
if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
PKT_secret_key *sk = secblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
assert ( pub == pubblock ); /* only in the first node */
/* there is nothing to compare in this case, so just replace
* some information */
copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
free_public_key ( pk );
pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
}
else if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
KBNODE sec;
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* this is more complicated: it may happen that the sequence
* of the subkeys dosn't match, so we have to find the
* appropriate secret key */
for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
free_public_key ( pk );
pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
break;
}
}
}
if ( !sec )
BUG(); /* already checked in premerge */
}
}
}
/* This function checks that for every public subkey a corresponding
* secret subkey is avalable and deletes the public subkey otherwise.
* We need this function because we can't delete it later when we
* actually merge the secret parts into the pubring.
* The function also plays some games with the node flags.
*/
static void
premerge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
{
KBNODE last, pub;
assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
for (pub=pubblock,last=NULL; pub; last = pub, pub = pub->next ) {
pub->flag &= ~3; /* reset bits 0 and 1 */
if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
KBNODE sec;
PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
if ( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
/* The secret parts are not available so
we can't use that key for signing etc.
Fix the pubkey usage */
pk->pubkey_usage &= ~PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
}
/* transfer flag bits 0 and 1 to the pubblock */
pub->flag |= (sec->flag &3);
break;
}
}
}
if ( !sec ) {
KBNODE next, ll;
log_info ( "no secret subkey "
"for public subkey %08lX - ignoring\n",
(ulong)keyid_from_pk (pk,NULL) );
/* we have to remove the subkey in this case */
assert ( last );
/* find the next subkey */
for (next=pub->next,ll=pub;
next && pub->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
ll = next, next = next->next )
;
/* make new link */
last->next = next;
/* release this public subkey with all sigs */
ll->next = NULL;
release_kbnode( pub );
/* let the loop continue */
pub = last;
}
}
}
}
/* See see whether the key fits
* our requirements and in case we do not
* request the primary key, we should select
* a suitable subkey.
* FIXME: Check against PGP 7 whether we still need a kludge
* to favor type 16 keys over type 20 keys when type 20
* has not been explitely requested.
* Returns: True when a suitable key has been found.
*
* We have to distinguish four cases: FIXME!
* 1. No usage and no primary key requested
* Examples for this case are that we have a keyID to be used
* for decrytion or verification.
* 2. No usage but primary key requested
* This is the case for all functions which work on an
* entire keyblock, e.g. for editing or listing
* 3. Usage and primary key requested
* FXME
* 4. Usage but no primary key requested
* FIXME
* FIXME: Tell what is going to happen here and something about the rationale
* Note: We don't use this function if no specific usage is requested;
* This way the getkey functions can be used for plain key listings.
*
* CTX ist the keyblock we are investigating, if FOUNDK is not NULL this
* is the key we actually found by looking at the keyid or a fingerprint and
* may eitehr point to the primary or one of the subkeys.
*/
static int
finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
{
KBNODE keyblock = ctx->keyblock;
KBNODE k;
KBNODE foundk = NULL;
PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;
#define USAGE_MASK (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
unsigned int req_usage = ( ctx->req_usage & USAGE_MASK );
int req_cert = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
u32 latest_date;
KBNODE latest_key;
u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
assert( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
ctx->found_key = NULL;
if (ctx->exact) {
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
if ( (k->flag & 1) ) {
assert ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
foundk = k;
break;
}
}
}
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
if ( (k->flag & 2) ) {
assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
foundu = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
break;
}
}
if ( DBG_CACHE )
log_debug( "finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
foundk? "one":"all", req_usage);
if (!req_usage) {
latest_key = foundk? foundk:keyblock;
goto found;
}
if (!req_usage) {
PKT_public_key *pk = foundk->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->user_id)
free_user_id (pk->user_id);
pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
ctx->found_key = foundk;
cache_user_id( keyblock );
return 1; /* found */
}
latest_date = 0;
latest_key = NULL;
/* do not look at subkeys if a certification key is requested */
if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_cert) {
KBNODE nextk;
/* either start a loop or check just this one subkey */
for (k=foundk?foundk:keyblock; k; k = nextk ) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
nextk = k->next;
if ( k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
continue;
if ( foundk )
nextk = NULL; /* what a hack */
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tchecking subkey %08lX\n",
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL));
if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tsubkey not valid\n");
continue;
}
if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
continue;
}
if ( pk->has_expired ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tsubkey has expired\n");
continue;
}
if ( pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
continue;
}
if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tusage does not match: want=%x have=%x\n",
req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
continue;
}
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tsubkey looks fine\n");
if ( pk->timestamp > latest_date ) {
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
latest_key = k;
}
}
}
/* Okay now try the primary key unless we want an exact
* key ID match on a subkey */
if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_cert) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_cert )
log_debug( "\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tprimary key not valid\n");
}
else if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
}
else if ( pk->has_expired ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tprimary key has expired\n");
}
else if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tprimary key usage does not match: "
"want=%x have=%x\n",
req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
}
else { /* okay */
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tprimary key may be used\n");
latest_key = keyblock;
latest_date = pk->timestamp;
}
}
if ( !latest_key ) {
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug("\tno suitable key found - giving up\n");
return 0;
}
found:
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug( "\tusing key %08lX\n",
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
if (latest_key) {
PKT_public_key *pk = latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (pk->user_id)
free_user_id (pk->user_id);
pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
}
ctx->found_key = latest_key;
if (latest_key != keyblock && opt.verbose) {
log_info(_("using secondary key %08lX "
"instead of primary key %08lX\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
}
cache_user_id( keyblock );
return 1; /* found */
}
static int
lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode )
{
int rc;
KBNODE secblock = NULL; /* helper */
int no_suitable_key = 0;
rc = 0;
while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctx->kr_handle, ctx->items, ctx->nitems))) {
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (ctx->kr_handle, &ctx->keyblock);
if (rc) {
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
rc = 0;
goto skip;
}
if ( secmode ) {
/* find the correspondig public key and use this
* this one for the selection process */
u32 aki[2];
KBNODE k = ctx->keyblock;
if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
BUG();
keyid_from_sk (k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki);
k = get_pubkeyblock (aki);
if( !k ) {
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info(_("key %08lX: secret key without public key "
"- skipped\n"), (ulong)aki[1] );
goto skip;
}
secblock = ctx->keyblock;
ctx->keyblock = k;
premerge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock, secblock );
}
/* warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
* merge_selfsigs. For secret keys, premerge did tranfer the
* keys to the keyblock */
merge_selfsigs ( ctx->keyblock );
if ( finish_lookup (ctx) ) {
no_suitable_key = 0;
if ( secmode ) {
merge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock,
secblock);
release_kbnode (secblock);
secblock = NULL;
}
goto found;
}
else
no_suitable_key = 1;
skip:
/* release resources and continue search */
if ( secmode ) {
release_kbnode( secblock );
secblock = NULL;
}
release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
}
found:
if( rc && rc != -1 )
log_error("keydb_search failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
if( !rc ) {
*ret_keyblock = ctx->keyblock; /* return the keyblock */
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
}
else if (rc == -1 && no_suitable_key)
rc = secmode ? G10ERR_UNU_SECKEY : G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
else if( rc == -1 )
rc = secmode ? G10ERR_NO_SECKEY : G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
if ( secmode ) {
release_kbnode( secblock );
secblock = NULL;
}
release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
ctx->keyblock = NULL;
ctx->last_rc = rc;
return rc;
}
/****************
* FIXME: Replace by the generic function
* It does not work as it is right now - it is used at
* 2 places: a) to get the key for an anonyous recipient
* b) to get the ultimately trusted keys.
* The a) usage might have some problems.
*
* Enumerate all primary secret keys. Caller must use these procedure:
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function
* and provide space for the secret key (pass a buffer for sk)
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
* to indicate EOF.
* 4) Always call this function a last time with SK set to NULL,
* so that can free it's context.
*/
int
enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk, int with_subkeys )
{
int rc=0;
struct {
int eof;
int first;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
KBNODE keyblock;
KBNODE node;
} *c = *context;
if( !c ) { /* make a new context */
c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
*context = c;
c->hd = keydb_new (1);
c->first = 1;
c->keyblock = NULL;
c->node = NULL;
}
if( !sk ) { /* free the context */
keydb_release (c->hd);
release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
m_free( c );
*context = NULL;
return 0;
}
if( c->eof )
return -1;
do {
/* get the next secret key from the current keyblock */
for (; c->node; c->node = c->node->next) {
if (c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| (with_subkeys
&& c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
copy_secret_key (sk, c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
c->node = c->node->next;
return 0; /* found */
}
}
release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
c->keyblock = c->node = NULL;
rc = c->first? keydb_search_first (c->hd) : keydb_search_next (c->hd);
c->first = 0;
if (rc) {
keydb_release (c->hd); c->hd = NULL;
c->eof = 1;
return -1; /* eof */
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (c->hd, &c->keyblock);
c->node = c->keyblock;
} while (!rc);
return rc; /* error */
}
/*********************************************
*********** user ID printing helpers *******
*********************************************/
/****************
* Return a string with a printable representation of the user_id.
* this string must be freed by m_free.
*/
char*
get_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
{
user_id_db_t r;
char *p;
int pass=0;
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
do {
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
keyid_list_t a;
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
p = m_alloc( r->len + 10 );
sprintf(p, "%08lX %.*s",
(ulong)keyid[1], r->len, r->name );
return p;
}
}
}
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
p = m_alloc( 15 );
sprintf(p, "%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[1] );
return p;
}
char*
get_user_id_string_native( u32 *keyid )
{
char *p = get_user_id_string( keyid );
char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, strlen(p), 0 );
m_free(p);
return p2;
}
char*
get_long_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
{
user_id_db_t r;
char *p;
int pass=0;
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
do {
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
keyid_list_t a;
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
p = m_alloc( r->len + 20 );
sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX %.*s",
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
r->len, r->name );
return p;
}
}
}
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
p = m_alloc( 25 );
sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1] );
return p;
}
char*
get_user_id( u32 *keyid, size_t *rn )
{
user_id_db_t r;
char *p;
int pass=0;
/* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
do {
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
keyid_list_t a;
for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
p = m_alloc( r->len );
memcpy(p, r->name, r->len );
*rn = r->len;
return p;
}
}
}
} while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
p = m_strdup( _("[User id not found]") );
*rn = strlen(p);
return p;
}
KEYDB_HANDLE
get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx)
{
return ctx->kr_handle;
}
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