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gnupg/g10/mainproc.c
David Shaw 68aa60e79c * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use two different preferred keyserver 
displays - one if the key is not present (to tell the user where to get
the key), the other if it is present (to tell the user where the key can
be refreshed).

* packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set flag if a preferred
keyserver is present.

* keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Show keyserver url in listings with
list-option show-keyserver-url.
2003-08-26 03:56:47 +00:00

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/* mainproc.c - handle packets
* Copyright (C) 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "photoid.h"
struct kidlist_item {
struct kidlist_item *next;
u32 kid[2];
int pubkey_algo;
int reason;
};
/****************
* Structure to hold the context
*/
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
struct mainproc_context {
struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* may be useful in the future */
PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
PKT_secret_key *last_seckey;
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */
int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */
STRLIST signed_data;
const char *sigfilename;
DEK *dek;
int last_was_session_key;
KBNODE list; /* the current list of packets */
int have_data;
IOBUF iobuf; /* used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */
ulong local_id; /* ditto */
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* list of encryption packets */
struct {
int op;
int stop_now;
} pipemode;
};
static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
static void
release_list( CTX c )
{
if( !c->list )
return;
proc_tree(c, c->list );
release_kbnode( c->list );
while( c->pkenc_list ) {
struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
m_free( c->pkenc_list );
c->pkenc_list = tmp;
}
c->pkenc_list = NULL;
c->list = NULL;
c->have_data = 0;
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
c->pipemode.op = 0;
c->pipemode.stop_now = 0;
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
static int
add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
KBNODE node;
if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */
/* We can only append another onepass packet if the list
* does contain only onepass packets */
for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
node = node->next )
;
if( node ) {
/* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and
* allow this packet to start a new verification thing */
release_list( c );
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
}
else
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
}
else /* insert the first one */
c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt );
return 1;
}
static int
add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
/* New clear text signature.
* Process the last one and reset everything */
release_list(c);
}
else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
/* Pipemode control packet */
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 )
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
/* start the whole thing */
assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */
assert ( !c->pipemode.op );
c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1];
}
else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) {
/* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */
assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
}
else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) {
assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
release_list (c);
/* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
}
else
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
}
if( c->list ) /* add another packet */
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
else /* insert the first one */
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
return 1;
}
static int
add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("orphaned user ID\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
KBNODE node;
if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
* of prepending the signature to the data is
* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
node = new_kbnode( pkt );
c->list = node;
return 1;
}
else if( !c->list )
return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
else if( !c->list->pkt )
BUG(); /* so nicht */
/* add a new signature node id at the end */
node = new_kbnode( pkt );
add_kbnode( c->list, node );
return 1;
}
static void
symkey_decrypt_sesskey( DEK *dek, byte *sesskey, size_t slen )
{
CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
int n;
if ( slen < 17 || slen > 33 ) {
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
(int)slen);
return;
}
hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
cipher_decrypt( hd, sesskey, sesskey, slen );
cipher_close( hd );
/* check first byte (the cipher algo) */
if ( sesskey[0] > 10 ) {
log_error ( _("invalid symkey algorithm detected (%d)\n"),
sesskey[0] );
return;
}
n = cipher_get_keylen (sesskey[0]) / 8;
if (n > DIM(dek->key))
BUG ();
/* now we replace the dek components with the real session key
to decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( sesskey[0] ) / 8;
dek->algo = sesskey[0];
memcpy( dek->key, sesskey + 1, dek->keylen );
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
if (!enc)
log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
else {
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s;
s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
if( s )
log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
else
log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
if ( opt.list_only )
goto leave;
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
if ( c->dek && enc->seskeylen )
symkey_decrypt_sesskey( c->dek, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen );
}
leave:
free_packet(pkt);
}
static void
proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
int result = 0;
/* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */
c->last_was_session_key = 1;
enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
/*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
* function to check it. */
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("public key is %08lX\n"), (ulong)enc->keyid[1] );
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[50];
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
}
if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it */
c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
if ( result ) {
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
|| opt.try_all_secrets
|| !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else {
c->dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
/* error: delete the DEK */
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
}
}
else
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
}
else
result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
if( result == -1 )
;
else {
if( !result ) {
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
if ( opt.show_session_key ) {
int i;
char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf );
write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
}
}
/* store it for later display */
{
struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x );
x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
x->reason = result;
x->next = c->pkenc_list;
c->pkenc_list = x;
}
}
free_packet(pkt);
}
/****************
* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
* not decrypt.
*/
static void
print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
{
for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
const char *algstr;
if ( failed && !list->reason )
continue;
if ( !failed && list->reason )
continue;
algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo );
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
if( !algstr )
algstr = "[?]";
pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) {
size_t n;
char *p;
log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %08lX, created %s\n"),
nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, (ulong)list->kid[1],
strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
fputs(" \"", log_stream() );
p = get_user_id( list->kid, &n );
print_utf8_string2 ( log_stream(), p, n, '"' );
m_free(p);
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
}
else {
log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %08lX\n"),
algstr, (ulong) list->kid[1] );
}
free_public_key( pk );
if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[20];
sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
(ulong)list->kid[1] );
write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
}
}
else if (list->reason)
log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(list->reason));
}
}
static void
proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
int result = 0;
if (!opt.quiet) {
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
}
write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
/*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
int algo;
STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
/* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) {
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if (!algo)
algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
idea_cipher_warn(1);
log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
}
else {
algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) {
/* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
s2kbuf.mode = 0;
s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
s2k = &s2kbuf;
}
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
}
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if( !result )
result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
if( result == -1 )
;
else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
}
else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
}
else {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
}
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
}
static void
proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc;
KBNODE n;
if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
else if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0);
/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
* and no armoring - Not yet tested
* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
*/
any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0;
for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) {
md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo
== DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
only_md5 = 1;
else
only_md5 = 0;
any = 1;
}
if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
only_md5 = 0;
}
else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
/* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
if ( datalen < 2 )
log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
* documents */
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data );
any = 1;
break; /* no pass signature pakets are expected */
}
}
if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) {
/* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
}
if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
/* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only
* catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored
* pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
* in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch.
*/
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
}
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 );
else {
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
/* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
* check the signature */
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
}
}
if( rc )
log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
*/
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
else
c->list = n;
}
static int
proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
{
return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data,
((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
}
static int
proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
{
return proc_encryption_packets( info, a );
}
static void
proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
int rc;
/*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
if( c->sigs_only )
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c );
else if( c->encrypt_only )
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c );
else
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
if( rc )
log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
}
/****************
* check the signature
* Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
*/
static int
do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
{
PKT_signature *sig;
MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
int algo, rc;
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
if( is_selfsig )
*is_selfsig = 0;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
algo = sig->digest_algo;
if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
return rc;
if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
if( c->mfx.md )
md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
else /* detached signature */
md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
/* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
* in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
if( c->mfx.md ) {
md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
if( c->mfx.md2 )
md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
}
else { /* detached signature */
log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
md2 = md_open( 0, 0 );
}
}
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x18
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
log_info(_("standalone revocation - "
"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
}
else {
log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
sig->sig_class);
return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
}
else
return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
md_close(md);
md_close(md2);
return rc;
}
static void
print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !pkt )
BUG();
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) {
printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
return;
}
if( opt.with_colons )
{
if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
printf("%u %lu",
pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
}
else
print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
}
/****************
* List the certificate in a user friendly way
*/
static void
list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
int any=0;
int mainkey;
if( !node )
;
else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) )
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( opt.with_colons ) {
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if( mainkey ) {
c->local_id = pk->local_id;
c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
}
printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
if( c->trustletter )
putchar( c->trustletter );
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( c->local_id )
printf("%lu", c->local_id );
putchar(':');
if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
putchar(':');
if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
putchar('\n'); any=1;
if( opt.fingerprint )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
}
}
else
printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
mainkey? "pub":"sub",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL ),
datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
if( mainkey ) {
/* and now list all userids with their signatures */
for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
if( !any ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
puts("[revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
printf("%s:::::::::",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
else
printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
}
print_userid( node->pkt );
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
if( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
}
any=1;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
}
}
else if( pk->expiredate ) { /* of subkey */
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) );
}
if( !any )
putchar('\n');
if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
}
else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( opt.with_colons ) {
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
}
else
printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_sk( sk, NULL ),
datestr_from_sk( sk ) );
if( mainkey ) {
/* and now list all userids with their signatures */
for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
if( !any ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
puts("[revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
printf("%s:::::::::",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
else
printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
}
print_userid( node->pkt );
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
any=1;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
}
}
if( !any )
putchar('\n');
if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int is_selfsig = 0;
int rc2=0;
size_t n;
char *p;
int sigrc = ' ';
if( !opt.list_sigs )
return;
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
fputs("rev", stdout);
else
fputs("sig", stdout);
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
fflush(stdout);
switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else { /* check whether this is a self signature */
u32 keyid[2];
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid );
else
keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid );
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
is_selfsig = 1;
}
}
if( opt.with_colons ) {
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
printf(":");
if(sig->trust_regexp)
print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
printf(":");
}
else
printf("%c %08lX %s ",
sigrc, (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if( is_selfsig ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout);
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
}
else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
m_free(p);
}
if( opt.with_colons )
printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
putchar('\n');
}
else
log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
}
int
proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
int rc;
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
c->anchor = anchor;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
{
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->sigs_only = 1;
c->signed_data = signedfiles;
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->encrypt_only = 1;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
{
PACKET *pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
int rc=0;
int any_data=0;
int newpkt;
c->iobuf = a;
init_packet(pkt);
while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
any_data = 1;
if( rc ) {
free_packet(pkt);
/* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packet. */
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
break;
continue;
}
newpkt = -1;
if( opt.list_packets ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if( c->sigs_only ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if( c->encrypt_only ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
release_list( c );
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
newpkt = 1;
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
break;
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
* when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
* an extra layer.
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
*/
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
if( newpkt == -1 )
;
else if( newpkt ) {
pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
}
else
free_packet(pkt);
if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
/* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to
* break the loop here */
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
if( any_data )
rc = 0;
else if( rc == -1 )
write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
leave:
release_list( c );
m_free(c->dek);
free_packet( pkt );
m_free( pkt );
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
return rc;
}
static int
check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr, *tstr;
int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
if( opt.skip_verify ) {
log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
return 0;
}
/* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures:
* PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet
* sequence: sig+data, OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG
* sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig.
* Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with
* different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might
* not be possible to get it right: let's say we have:
* data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last
* data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then
* data+sig.
* To protect against this we check that all signatures follow
* without any intermediate packets. Note, that we won't get this
* error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because
* we reset the list every time
*
* FIXME: Now that we have these marker packets, we should create a
* real grammar and check against this.
*/
{
KBNODE n;
int n_sig=0;
for (n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
n_sig++;
}
if (n_sig > 1) { /* more than one signature - check sequence */
int tmp, onepass;
for (tmp=onepass=0,n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
onepass++;
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
onepass++; /* handle the same way as a onepass */
}
else if ( (tmp && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) ) {
log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
return 0;
}
else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
tmp = 1;
else if (!tmp && !onepass
&& n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
/* plaintext before signatures but no one-pass packets*/
log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
return 0;
}
}
}
}
tstr = asctimestamp(sig->timestamp);
astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo );
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
{
log_info(_("Signature made %.*s\n"),(int)strlen(tstr), tstr);
log_info(_(" using %s key %08lX%08lX\n"),
astr? astr: "?",(ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
}
else
log_info(_("Signature made %.*s using %s key ID %08lX\n"),
(int)strlen(tstr), tstr, astr? astr: "?",
(ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver_scheme && opt.keyserver_options.auto_key_retrieve) {
if( keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid )==0 )
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
}
/* If the key still isn't found, try to inform the user where it
can be found. */
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
{
const byte *p;
int seq=0;
size_t n;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
{
/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm
not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
print_string( log_stream(), p, n, 0 );
putc( '\n', log_stream() );
}
}
if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
KBNODE un, keyblock;
int count=0, statno;
char keyid_str[50];
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
if(rc)
statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
else if(sig->flags.expired)
statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
else if(is_expkey)
statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
else if(is_revkey)
statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
else
statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
/* find and print the primary user ID */
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
int valid;
if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
continue;
}
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
continue;
if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
continue;
/* We want the textual user ID here */
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
assert(pk);
/* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
line. */
valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
-1 );
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY)
fprintf(log_stream(),"\" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
else
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
count++;
}
if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual
userid */
/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
break;
}
/* Try for any userid at all */
if(!un) {
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
}
}
if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
-1 );
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un) {
fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() );
putc(' ', log_stream() );
}
print_utf8_string( log_stream(),
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3 );
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
}
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
if ( count && !rc ) {
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
continue;
/* Only skip textual primaries */
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
{
dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
}
log_info( _(" aka \""));
print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY)
fprintf(log_stream(),"\" [%s]\n",
trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
un->pkt->
pkt.user_id)));
else
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
}
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
if( !rc )
{
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY)
show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
else
show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER)
show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
else
show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATION)
show_notation(sig,0,1);
else
show_notation(sig,0,2);
}
if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
/* print a status response with the fingerprint */
PKT_public_key *vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
size_t i, n;
bufp = buf;
fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
p = array;
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to
match! */
sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
(ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class);
bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
if (!vpk->is_primary) {
u32 akid[2];
akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
free_public_key (vpk);
vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
/* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
memset (array, 0, n);
}
else
fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
}
p = array;
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
}
free_public_key( vpk );
}
if( !rc )
rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
if(sig->flags.expired)
{
log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
}
else if(sig->expiredate)
log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
if(opt.verbose)
log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo));
if( rc )
g10_errors_seen = 1;
if( opt.batch && rc )
g10_exit(1);
}
else {
char buf[50];
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
buf[16] = 0;
write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
}
if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Process the tree which starts at node
*/
static void
proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
KBNODE n1;
int rc;
if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
return;
/* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
while ( node
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
node = node->next;
}
if (!node)
return;
c->local_id = 0;
c->trustletter = ' ';
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
list_node( c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
list_node( c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
/* check all signatures */
if( !c->have_data ) {
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
/* prepare to create all requested message digests */
c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
/* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
}
/* ask for file and hash it */
if( c->sigs_only ) {
rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL,
c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
}
else {
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
/* clear text signed message */
if( !c->have_data ) {
log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
return;
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int multiple_ok=1;
n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
if(n1)
{
byte class=sig->sig_class;
byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
{
/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
to run a different hash context for each), but if
they are all the same, make an exception. */
if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
|| n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
{
multiple_ok=0;
log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
break;
}
}
}
if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
sig->sig_class);
else if( !c->have_data ) {
/* detached signature */
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
;
else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
}
else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
&& sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
/* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached
* signature has been created in textmode */
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
}
#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
/* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
* It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
* this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
* but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
* then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly
* hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
*/
/* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
#endif
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
if( c->sigs_only ) {
rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
}
else {
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */
else if (!opt.quiet)
log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
if(multiple_ok)
for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
else
check_sig_and_print( c, node );
}
else {
dump_kbnode (c->list);
log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
dump_kbnode (node);
}
}
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