security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2024-11-11 21:48:50 +01:00
Code Activity
d851bdf579
gnupg/sm/keylist.c
Werner Koch f96ad015d8 * gpgsm.c: New option --with-ephemeral-keys. 
* keylist.c (list_internal_keys): Set it here.
(list_cert_raw): And indicate those keys.  Changed all our callers
to pass the new arg HD through.
2004-08-06 16:14:10 +00:00

1275 lines
35 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

This file contains invisible Unicode characters

This file contains invisible Unicode characters that are indistinguishable to humans but may be processed differently by a computer. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

/* keylist.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
* 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "gpgsm.h"
#include <gcrypt.h>
#include <ksba.h>
#include "keydb.h"
#include "../kbx/keybox.h" /* for KEYBOX_FLAG_* */
#include "i18n.h"
struct list_external_parm_s {
ctrl_t ctrl;
FILE *fp;
int print_header;
int with_colons;
int with_chain;
int raw_mode;
};
/* This table is to map Extended Key Usage OIDs to human readable
names. */
struct {
const char *oid;
const char *name;
} key_purpose_map[] = {
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1", "serverAuth" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2", "clientAuth" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3", "codeSigning" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4", "emailProtection" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.5", "ipsecEndSystem" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.6", "ipsecTunnel" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.7", "ipsecUser" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8", "timeStamping" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9", "ocspSigning" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.10", "dvcs" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.11", "sbgpCertAAServerAuth" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.13", "eapOverPPP" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.14", "wlanSSID" },
{ NULL, NULL }
};
/* A table mapping OIDs to a descriptive string. */
static struct {
char *oid;
char *name;
unsigned int flag;
} oidtranstbl[] = {
/* Algorithms. */
{ "1.2.840.10040.4.1", "dsa" },
{ "1.2.840.10040.4.3", "dsaWithSha1" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", "rsaEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.2", "md2WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.3", "md4WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.4", "md5WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.5", "sha1WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.7", "rsaOAEP" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.8", "rsaOAEP-MGF" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.9", "rsaOAEP-pSpecified" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.10", "rsaPSS" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.11", "sha256WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.12", "sha384WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.2.840.113549.1.1.13", "sha512WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.3.14.3.2.26", "sha1" },
{ "1.3.14.3.2.29", "sha-1WithRSAEncryption" },
{ "1.3.36.3.3.1.2", "rsaSignatureWithripemd160" },
/* Telesec extensions. */
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.0", "certExtensionLiabilityLimitationExt" },
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.1", "telesecCertIdExt" },
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.2", "telesecPolicyIdentifier" },
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.3", "telesecPolicyQualifierID" },
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.4", "telesecCRLFilteredExt" },
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.5", "telesecCRLFilterExt"},
{ "0.2.262.1.10.12.6", "telesecNamingAuthorityExt" },
/* PKIX private extensions. */
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", "authorityInfoAccess" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.2", "biometricInfo" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3", "qcStatements" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.4", "acAuditIdentity" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.5", "acTargeting" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.6", "acAaControls" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7", "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8", "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.9", "sbgp-routerIdentifier" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.10", "acProxying" },
{ "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11", "subjectInfoAccess" },
/* X.509 id-ce */
{ "2.5.29.14", "subjectKeyIdentifier"},
{ "2.5.29.15", "keyUsage", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.16", "privateKeyUsagePeriod" },
{ "2.5.29.17", "subjectAltName", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.18", "issuerAltName", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.19", "basicConstraints", 1},
{ "2.5.29.20", "cRLNumber" },
{ "2.5.29.21", "cRLReason" },
{ "2.5.29.22", "expirationDate" },
{ "2.5.29.23", "instructionCode" },
{ "2.5.29.24", "invalidityDate" },
{ "2.5.29.27", "deltaCRLIndicator" },
{ "2.5.29.28", "issuingDistributionPoint" },
{ "2.5.29.29", "certificateIssuer" },
{ "2.5.29.30", "nameConstraints" },
{ "2.5.29.31", "cRLDistributionPoints", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.32", "certificatePolicies", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.32.0", "anyPolicy" },
{ "2.5.29.33", "policyMappings" },
{ "2.5.29.35", "authorityKeyIdentifier", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.36", "policyConstraints" },
{ "2.5.29.37", "extKeyUsage", 1 },
{ "2.5.29.46", "freshestCRL" },
{ "2.5.29.54", "inhibitAnyPolicy" },
/* Netscape certificate extensions. */
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.1", "netscape-cert-type" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.2", "netscape-base-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.3", "netscape-revocation-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.4", "netscape-ca-revocation-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.7", "netscape-cert-renewal-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.8", "netscape-ca-policy-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.9", "netscape-homePage-url" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.10", "netscape-entitylogo" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.11", "netscape-userPicture" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.12", "netscape-ssl-server-name" },
{ "2.16.840.1.113730.1.13", "netscape-comment" },
{ NULL }
};
/* Return the description for OID; if no description is available
NULL is returned. */
static const char *
get_oid_desc (const char *oid, unsigned int *flag)
{
int i;
if (oid)
for (i=0; oidtranstbl[i].oid; i++)
if (!strcmp (oidtranstbl[i].oid, oid))
{
if (flag)
*flag = oidtranstbl[i].flag;
return oidtranstbl[i].name;
}
if (flag)
*flag = 0;
return NULL;
}
static void
print_key_data (ksba_cert_t cert, FILE *fp)
{
#if 0
int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
int i;
for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
{
fprintf (fp, "pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
}
#endif
}
static void
print_capabilities (ksba_cert_t cert, FILE *fp)
{
gpg_error_t err;
unsigned int use;
err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &use);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
putc ('e', fp);
putc ('s', fp);
putc ('c', fp);
putc ('E', fp);
putc ('S', fp);
putc ('C', fp);
return;
}
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error getting key usage information: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
return;
}
if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT)))
putc ('e', fp);
if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION)))
putc ('s', fp);
if ((use & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
putc ('c', fp);
if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT)))
putc ('E', fp);
if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION)))
putc ('S', fp);
if ((use & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
putc ('C', fp);
}
static void
print_time (gnupg_isotime_t t, FILE *fp)
{
if (!t || !*t)
;
else
fputs (t, fp);
}
/* return an allocated string with the email address extracted from a
DN */
static char *
email_kludge (const char *name)
{
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf;
int n;
if (strncmp (name, "1.2.840.113549.1.9.1=#", 22))
return NULL;
/* This looks pretty much like an email address in the subject's DN
we use this to add an additional user ID entry. This way,
openSSL generated keys get a nicer and usable listing */
name += 22;
for (n=0, p=name; hexdigitp (p) && hexdigitp (p+1); p +=2, n++)
;
if (*p != '#' || !n)
return NULL;
buf = xtrymalloc (n+3);
if (!buf)
return NULL; /* oops, out of core */
*buf = '<';
for (n=1, p=name; *p != '#'; p +=2, n++)
buf[n] = xtoi_2 (p);
buf[n++] = '>';
buf[n] = 0;
return buf;
}
/* List one certificate in colon mode */
static void
list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity,
FILE *fp, int have_secret)
{
int rc;
int idx;
char truststring[2];
char *p;
ksba_sexp_t sexp;
char *fpr;
ksba_isotime_t t;
gpg_error_t valerr;
int algo;
unsigned int nbits;
const char *chain_id;
char *chain_id_buffer = NULL;
int is_root = 0;
if (ctrl->with_validation)
valerr = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, NULL, 1, NULL, 0);
else
valerr = 0;
/* We need to get the fingerprint and the chaining ID in advance. */
fpr = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
{
ksba_cert_t next;
rc = gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (cert, &next);
if (!rc) /* We known the issuer's certificate. */
{
p = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (next, GCRY_MD_SHA1);
chain_id_buffer = p;
chain_id = chain_id_buffer;
ksba_cert_release (next);
}
else if (rc == -1) /* We have reached the root certificate. */
{
chain_id = fpr;
is_root = 1;
}
else
chain_id = NULL;
}
fputs (have_secret? "crs:":"crt:", fp);
truststring[0] = 0;
truststring[1] = 0;
if ((validity & VALIDITY_REVOKED)
|| gpg_err_code (valerr) == GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)
*truststring = 'r';
else if (gpg_err_code (valerr) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED)
*truststring = 'e';
else if (valerr)
*truststring = 'i';
else
{
/* Lets also check whether the certificate under question
expired. This is merely a hack until we found a proper way
to store the expiration flag in the keybox. */
ksba_isotime_t current_time, not_after;
gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
if (!opt.ignore_expiration
&& !ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, not_after)
&& *not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
*truststring = 'e';
}
/* Is we have no truststring yet (i.e. the certificate might be
good) and this is a root certificate, we ask the agent whether
this is a trusted root certificate. */
if (!*truststring && is_root)
{
rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert);
if (!rc)
*truststring = 'u'; /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
*truststring = 'n'; /* No, we do not trust this one. */
/* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */
}
if (*truststring)
fputs (truststring, fp);
algo = gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits);
fprintf (fp, ":%u:%d:%s:", nbits, algo, fpr+24);
/* We assume --fixed-list-mode for gpgsm */
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
print_time (t, fp);
putc (':', fp);
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
print_time ( t, fp);
putc (':', fp);
/* Field 8, serial number: */
if ((sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert)))
{
int len;
const unsigned char *s = sexp;
if (*s == '(')
{
s++;
for (len=0; *s && *s != ':' && digitp (s); s++)
len = len*10 + atoi_1 (s);
if (*s == ':')
for (s++; len; len--, s++)
fprintf (fp,"%02X", *s);
}
xfree (sexp);
}
putc (':', fp);
/* Field 9, ownertrust - not used here */
putc (':', fp);
/* field 10, old user ID - we use it here for the issuer DN */
if ((p = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert,0)))
{
print_sanitized_string (fp, p, ':');
xfree (p);
}
putc (':', fp);
/* Field 11, signature class - not used */
putc (':', fp);
/* Field 12, capabilities: */
print_capabilities (cert, fp);
putc (':', fp);
putc ('\n', fp);
/* FPR record */
fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::%s:::", fpr);
/* Print chaining ID (field 13)*/
if (chain_id)
fputs (chain_id, fp);
putc (':', fp);
putc ('\n', fp);
xfree (fpr); fpr = NULL; chain_id = NULL;
xfree (chain_id_buffer); chain_id_buffer = NULL;
if (opt.with_key_data)
{
if ( (p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert)))
{
fprintf (fp, "grp:::::::::%s:\n", p);
xfree (p);
}
print_key_data (cert, fp);
}
for (idx=0; (p = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert,idx)); idx++)
{
fprintf (fp, "uid:%s::::::::", truststring);
print_sanitized_string (fp, p, ':');
putc (':', fp);
putc (':', fp);
putc ('\n', fp);
if (!idx)
{
/* It would be better to get the faked email address from
the keydb. But as long as we don't have a way to pass
the meta data back, we just check it the same way as the
code used to create the keybox meta data does */
char *pp = email_kludge (p);
if (pp)
{
fprintf (fp, "uid:%s::::::::", truststring);
print_sanitized_string (fp, pp, ':');
putc (':', fp);
putc (':', fp);
putc ('\n', fp);
xfree (pp);
}
}
xfree (p);
}
}
static void
print_name_raw (FILE *fp, const char *string)
{
if (!string)
fputs ("[error]", fp);
else
print_sanitized_string (fp, string, 0);
}
static void
print_names_raw (FILE *fp, int indent, ksba_name_t name)
{
int idx;
const char *s;
int indent_all;
if ((indent_all = (indent < 0)))
indent = - indent;
if (!name)
{
fputs ("none\n", fp);
return;
}
for (idx=0; (s = ksba_name_enum (name, idx)); idx++)
{
char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, idx);
printf ("%*s%s\n", idx||indent_all?indent:0, "", p?p:s);
xfree (p);
}
}
/* List one certificate in raw mode useful to have a closer look at
the certificate. This one does no beautification and only minimal
output sanitation. It is mainly useful for debugging. */
static void
list_cert_raw (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
ksba_cert_t cert, FILE *fp, int have_secret,
int with_validation)
{
gpg_error_t err;
size_t off, len;
ksba_sexp_t sexp;
char *dn;
ksba_isotime_t t;
int idx, i;
int is_ca, chainlen;
unsigned int kusage;
char *string, *p, *pend;
const char *oid, *s;
ksba_name_t name, name2;
unsigned int reason;
sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
fputs ("Serial number: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
ksba_free (sexp);
putc ('\n', fp);
dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
fputs (" Issuer: ", fp);
print_name_raw (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, idx)); idx++)
{
fputs (" aka: ", fp);
print_name_raw (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
fputs (" Subject: ", fp);
print_name_raw (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, idx)); idx++)
{
fputs (" aka: ", fp);
print_name_raw (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, 0);
fprintf (fp, " sha1_fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
xfree (dn);
dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_MD5);
fprintf (fp, " md5_fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
xfree (dn);
dn = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
fprintf (fp, " keygrip: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
xfree (dn);
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
fputs (" notBefore: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
putc ('\n', fp);
fputs (" notAfter: ", fp);
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
putc ('\n', fp);
oid = ksba_cert_get_digest_algo (cert);
s = get_oid_desc (oid, NULL);
fprintf (fp, " hashAlgo: %s%s%s%s\n", oid, s?" (":"",s?s:"",s?")":"");
{
const char *algoname;
unsigned int nbits;
algoname = gcry_pk_algo_name (gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits));
fprintf (fp, " keyType: %u bit %s\n", nbits, algoname? algoname:"?");
}
/* authorityKeyIdentifier */
fputs (" authKeyId: ", fp);
err = ksba_cert_get_auth_key_id (cert, NULL, &name, &sexp);
if (!err || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA || !name)
fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
else
{
gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
ksba_free (sexp);
putc ('\n', fp);
print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
ksba_name_release (name);
}
}
else
fputs ("[?]\n", fp);
fputs (" keyUsage:", fp);
err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &kusage);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
if (err)
fprintf (fp, " [error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
fputs (" digitalSignature", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION))
fputs (" nonRepudiation", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
fputs (" keyEncipherment", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT))
fputs (" dataEncipherment", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT))
fputs (" keyAgreement", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
fputs (" certSign", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))
fputs (" crlSign", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_ENCIPHER_ONLY))
fputs (" encipherOnly", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DECIPHER_ONLY))
fputs (" decipherOnly", fp);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
else
fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
fputs (" extKeyUsage: ", fp);
err = ksba_cert_get_ext_key_usages (cert, &string);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
p = string;
while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
{
*pend++ = 0;
for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
break;
fputs (key_purpose_map[i].oid?key_purpose_map[i].name:p, fp);
p = pend;
if (*p != 'C')
fputs (" (suggested)", fp);
if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
{
p++;
fputs ("\n ", fp);
}
}
xfree (string);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
else
fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
fputs (" policies: ", fp);
err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &string);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
p = string;
while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
{
*pend++ = 0;
for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
break;
fputs (p, fp);
p = pend;
if (*p == 'C')
fputs (" (critical)", fp);
if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
{
p++;
fputs ("\n ", fp);
}
}
xfree (string);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
else
fputs ("[none]\n", fp);
fputs (" chainLength: ", fp);
err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &is_ca, &chainlen);
if (err || is_ca)
{
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else if (chainlen == -1)
fputs ("unlimited", fp);
else
fprintf (fp, "%d", chainlen);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
else
fputs ("not a CA\n", fp);
/* CRL distribution point */
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_crl_dist_point (cert, idx, &name, &name2,
&reason)) ;idx++)
{
fputs (" crlDP: ", fp);
print_names_raw (fp, 15, name);
if (reason)
{
fputs (" reason: ", fp);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED))
fputs (" unused", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_KEY_COMPROMISE))
fputs (" keyCompromise", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CA_COMPROMISE))
fputs (" caCompromise", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED))
fputs (" affiliationChanged", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED))
fputs (" superseded", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION))
fputs (" cessationOfOperation", stdout);
if ( (reason & KSBA_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD))
fputs (" certificateHold", stdout);
putchar ('\n');
}
fputs (" issuer: ", fp);
print_names_raw (fp, 23, name2);
ksba_name_release (name);
ksba_name_release (name2);
}
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
fputs (" crlDP: [error]\n", fp);
else if (!idx)
fputs (" crlDP: [none]\n", fp);
/* authorityInfoAccess. */
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx, &string,
&name)); idx++)
{
fputs (" authInfo: ", fp);
s = get_oid_desc (string, NULL);
fprintf (fp, "%s%s%s%s\n", string, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"");
print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
ksba_name_release (name);
ksba_free (string);
}
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
fputs (" authInfo: [error]\n", fp);
else if (!idx)
fputs (" authInfo: [none]\n", fp);
/* subjectInfoAccess. */
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_subject_info_access (cert, idx, &string,
&name)); idx++)
{
fputs (" subjectInfo: ", fp);
s = get_oid_desc (string, NULL);
fprintf (fp, "%s%s%s%s\n", string, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"");
print_names_raw (fp, -15, name);
ksba_name_release (name);
ksba_free (string);
}
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
fputs (" subjInfo: [error]\n", fp);
else if (!idx)
fputs (" subjInfo: [none]\n", fp);
for (idx=0; !(err=ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
&oid, &i, &off, &len));idx++)
{
unsigned int flag;
s = get_oid_desc (oid, &flag);
if (!(flag & 1))
fprintf (fp, " %s: %s%s%s%s [%d octets]\n",
i? "critExtn":" extn",
oid, s?" (":"", s?s:"", s?")":"", (int)len);
}
if (with_validation)
{
err = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, NULL, 1, fp, 0);
if (!err)
fprintf (fp, " [certificate is good]\n");
else
fprintf (fp, " [certificate is bad: %s]\n", gpg_strerror (err));
}
if (opt.with_ephemeral_keys && hd)
{
unsigned int blobflags;
err = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0, &blobflags);
if (err)
fprintf (fp, " [error getting keyflags: %s]\n", gpg_strerror (err));
else if ((blobflags & 2))
fprintf (fp, " [stored as ephemeral]\n");
}
}
/* List one certificate in standard mode */
static void
list_cert_std (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, FILE *fp, int have_secret,
int with_validation)
{
gpg_error_t err;
ksba_sexp_t sexp;
char *dn;
ksba_isotime_t t;
int idx, i;
int is_ca, chainlen;
unsigned int kusage;
char *string, *p, *pend;
sexp = ksba_cert_get_serial (cert);
fputs ("Serial number: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_serial (fp, sexp);
ksba_free (sexp);
putc ('\n', fp);
dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, 0);
fputs (" Issuer: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_name (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_issuer (cert, idx)); idx++)
{
fputs (" aka: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_name (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
fputs (" Subject: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_name (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
for (idx=1; (dn = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, idx)); idx++)
{
fputs (" aka: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_name (fp, dn);
ksba_free (dn);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 0, t);
fputs (" validity: ", fp);
gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
fputs (" through ", fp);
ksba_cert_get_validity (cert, 1, t);
gpgsm_print_time (fp, t);
putc ('\n', fp);
{
const char *algoname;
unsigned int nbits;
algoname = gcry_pk_algo_name (gpgsm_get_key_algo_info (cert, &nbits));
fprintf (fp, " key type: %u bit %s\n", nbits, algoname? algoname:"?");
}
err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &kusage);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
fputs (" key usage:", fp);
if (err)
fprintf (fp, " [error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
fputs (" digitalSignature", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION))
fputs (" nonRepudiation", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
fputs (" keyEncipherment", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT))
fputs (" dataEncipherment", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT))
fputs (" keyAgreement", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
fputs (" certSign", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))
fputs (" crlSign", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_ENCIPHER_ONLY))
fputs (" encipherOnly", fp);
if ( (kusage & KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DECIPHER_ONLY))
fputs (" decipherOnly", fp);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
err = ksba_cert_get_ext_key_usages (cert, &string);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
fputs ("ext key usage: ", fp);
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
p = string;
while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
{
*pend++ = 0;
for (i=0; key_purpose_map[i].oid; i++)
if ( !strcmp (key_purpose_map[i].oid, p) )
break;
fputs (key_purpose_map[i].oid?key_purpose_map[i].name:p, fp);
p = pend;
if (*p != 'C')
fputs (" (suggested)", fp);
if ((p = strchr (p, '\n')))
{
p++;
fputs (", ", fp);
}
}
xfree (string);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
err = ksba_cert_get_cert_policies (cert, &string);
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
{
fputs (" policies: ", fp);
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else
{
for (p=string; *p; p++)
{
if (*p == '\n')
*p = ',';
}
print_sanitized_string (fp, string, 0);
xfree (string);
}
putc ('\n', fp);
}
err = ksba_cert_is_ca (cert, &is_ca, &chainlen);
if (err || is_ca)
{
fputs (" chain length: ", fp);
if (err)
fprintf (fp, "[error: %s]", gpg_strerror (err));
else if (chainlen == -1)
fputs ("unlimited", fp);
else
fprintf (fp, "%d", chainlen);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
if (opt.with_md5_fingerprint)
{
dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, GCRY_MD_MD5);
fprintf (fp, " md5 fpr: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
xfree (dn);
}
dn = gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (cert, 0);
fprintf (fp, " fingerprint: %s\n", dn?dn:"error");
xfree (dn);
if (with_validation)
{
err = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, NULL, 1, fp, 0);
if (!err)
fprintf (fp, " [certificate is good]\n");
else
fprintf (fp, " [certificate is bad: %s]\n", gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
/* Same as standard mode mode list all certifying certs too. */
static void
list_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
ksba_cert_t cert, int raw_mode,
FILE *fp, int with_validation)
{
ksba_cert_t next = NULL;
if (raw_mode)
list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, cert, fp, 0, with_validation);
else
list_cert_std (ctrl, cert, fp, 0, with_validation);
ksba_cert_ref (cert);
while (!gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (cert, &next))
{
ksba_cert_release (cert);
fputs ("Certified by\n", fp);
if (raw_mode)
list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, next, fp, 0, with_validation);
else
list_cert_std (ctrl, next, fp, 0, with_validation);
cert = next;
}
ksba_cert_release (cert);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
/* List all internal keys or just the keys given as NAMES. MODE is a
bit vector to specify what keys are to be included; see
gpgsm_list_keys (below) for details. If RAW_MODE is true, the raw
output mode will be used intead of the standard beautified one.
*/
static gpg_error_t
list_internal_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, STRLIST names, FILE *fp,
unsigned int mode, int raw_mode)
{
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
STRLIST sl;
int ndesc;
ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
gpg_error_t rc = 0;
const char *lastresname, *resname;
int have_secret;
hd = keydb_new (0);
if (!hd)
{
log_error ("keydb_new failed\n");
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave;
}
if (!names)
ndesc = 1;
else
{
for (sl=names, ndesc=0; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
;
}
desc = xtrycalloc (ndesc, sizeof *desc);
if (!ndesc)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
log_error ("out of core\n");
goto leave;
}
if (!names)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
else
{
for (ndesc=0, sl=names; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
rc = keydb_classify_name (sl->d, desc+ndesc);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("key `%s' not found: %s\n",
sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
rc = 0;
}
else
ndesc++;
}
}
if (opt.with_ephemeral_keys)
keydb_set_ephemeral (hd, 1);
/* It would be nice to see which of the given users did actually
match one in the keyring. To implement this we need to have a
found flag for each entry in desc and to set this we must check
all those entries after a match to mark all matched one -
currently we stop at the first match. To do this we need an
extra flag to enable this feature so */
lastresname = NULL;
while (!(rc = keydb_search (hd, desc, ndesc)))
{
unsigned int validity;
if (!names)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
rc = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0, &validity);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_flags failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_cert (hd, &cert);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("keydb_get_cert failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
if (lastresname != resname )
{
int i;
if (ctrl->no_server)
{
fprintf (fp, "%s\n", resname );
for (i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putc ('\n', fp);
lastresname = resname;
}
}
have_secret = 0;
if (mode)
{
char *p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
if (p)
{
rc = gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl, p);
if (!rc)
have_secret = 1;
else if ( gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
goto leave;
rc = 0;
xfree (p);
}
}
if (!mode
|| ((mode & 1) && !have_secret)
|| ((mode & 2) && have_secret) )
{
if (ctrl->with_colons)
list_cert_colon (ctrl, cert, validity, fp, have_secret);
else if (ctrl->with_chain)
list_cert_chain (ctrl, hd, cert,
raw_mode, fp, ctrl->with_validation);
else
{
if (raw_mode)
list_cert_raw (ctrl, hd, cert, fp, have_secret,
ctrl->with_validation);
else
list_cert_std (ctrl, cert, fp, have_secret,
ctrl->with_validation);
putc ('\n', fp);
}
}
ksba_cert_release (cert);
cert = NULL;
}
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EOF || rc == -1 )
rc = 0;
if (rc)
log_error ("keydb_search failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
leave:
ksba_cert_release (cert);
xfree (desc);
keydb_release (hd);
return rc;
}
static void
list_external_cb (void *cb_value, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
struct list_external_parm_s *parm = cb_value;
if (keydb_store_cert (cert, 1, NULL))
log_error ("error storing certificate as ephemeral\n");
if (parm->print_header)
{
const char *resname = "[external keys]";
int i;
fprintf (parm->fp, "%s\n", resname );
for (i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putc ('\n', parm->fp);
parm->print_header = 0;
}
if (parm->with_colons)
list_cert_colon (parm->ctrl, cert, 0, parm->fp, 0);
else if (parm->with_chain)
list_cert_chain (parm->ctrl, NULL, cert, parm->raw_mode, parm->fp, 0);
else
{
if (parm->raw_mode)
list_cert_raw (parm->ctrl, NULL, cert, parm->fp, 0, 0);
else
list_cert_std (parm->ctrl, cert, parm->fp, 0, 0);
putc ('\n', parm->fp);
}
}
/* List external keys similar to internal one. Note: mode does not
make sense here because it would be unwise to list external secret
keys */
static gpg_error_t
list_external_keys (CTRL ctrl, STRLIST names, FILE *fp, int raw_mode)
{
int rc;
struct list_external_parm_s parm;
parm.fp = fp;
parm.ctrl = ctrl,
parm.print_header = ctrl->no_server;
parm.with_colons = ctrl->with_colons;
parm.with_chain = ctrl->with_chain;
parm.raw_mode = raw_mode;
rc = gpgsm_dirmngr_lookup (ctrl, names, list_external_cb, &parm);
if (rc)
log_error ("listing external keys failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
/* List all keys or just the key given as NAMES.
MODE controls the operation mode:
Bit 0-2:
0 = list all public keys but don't flag secret ones
1 = list only public keys
2 = list only secret keys
3 = list secret and public keys
Bit 6: list internal keys
Bit 7: list external keys
Bit 8: Do a raw format dump.
*/
gpg_error_t
gpgsm_list_keys (CTRL ctrl, STRLIST names, FILE *fp, unsigned int mode)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
if ((mode & (1<<6)))
err = list_internal_keys (ctrl, names, fp, (mode & 3), (mode&256));
if (!err && (mode & (1<<7)))
err = list_external_keys (ctrl, names, fp, (mode&256));
return err;
}
View Git Blame Copy Permalink