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5281ecbe3a
* dirmngr/ocsp.c (do_ocsp_request): Remove arg md. Add args r_sigval, r_produced_at, and r_md. Get the hash algo from the signature and create the context here. (check_signature): Allow any hash algo. Print a diagnostic if the signature does not verify. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 3966 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
890 lines
27 KiB
C
890 lines
27 KiB
C
/* ocsp.c - OCSP management
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* Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
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*
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* This file is part of DirMngr.
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*
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* DirMngr is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* DirMngr is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "dirmngr.h"
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#include "misc.h"
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#include "http.h"
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#include "validate.h"
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#include "certcache.h"
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#include "ocsp.h"
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/* The maximum size we allow as a response from an OCSP reponder. */
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#define MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE 65536
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static const char oidstr_ocsp[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1";
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/* Telesec attribute used to implement a positive confirmation.
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CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
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HashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
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certificateHash OCTET STRING }
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*/
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/* static const char oidstr_certHash[] = "1.3.36.8.3.13"; */
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/* Read from FP and return a newly allocated buffer in R_BUFFER with the
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entire data read from FP. */
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static gpg_error_t
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read_response (estream_t fp, unsigned char **r_buffer, size_t *r_buflen)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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unsigned char *buffer;
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size_t bufsize, nbytes;
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*r_buffer = NULL;
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*r_buflen = 0;
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bufsize = 4096;
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buffer = xtrymalloc (bufsize);
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if (!buffer)
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return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
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nbytes = 0;
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for (;;)
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{
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unsigned char *tmp;
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size_t nread = 0;
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assert (nbytes < bufsize);
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nread = es_fread (buffer+nbytes, 1, bufsize-nbytes, fp);
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if (nread < bufsize-nbytes && es_ferror (fp))
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
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log_error (_("error reading from responder: %s\n"),
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strerror (errno));
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xfree (buffer);
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return err;
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}
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if ( !(nread == bufsize-nbytes && !es_feof (fp)))
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{ /* Response successfully received. */
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nbytes += nread;
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*r_buffer = buffer;
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*r_buflen = nbytes;
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return 0;
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}
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nbytes += nread;
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/* Need to enlarge the buffer. */
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if (bufsize >= MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE)
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{
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log_error (_("response from server too large; limit is %d bytes\n"),
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MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE);
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xfree (buffer);
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
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}
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bufsize += 4096;
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tmp = xtryrealloc (buffer, bufsize);
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if (!tmp)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
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xfree (buffer);
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return err;
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}
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buffer = tmp;
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}
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}
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/* Construct an OCSP request, send it to the configured OCSP responder
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and parse the response. On success the OCSP context may be used to
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further process the response. The signature value and the
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production date are returned at R_SIGVAL and R_PRODUCED_AT; they
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may be NULL or an empty string if not available. A new hash
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context is returned at R_MD. */
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static gpg_error_t
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do_ocsp_request (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_ocsp_t ocsp,
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const char *url, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_cert_t issuer_cert,
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ksba_sexp_t *r_sigval, ksba_isotime_t r_produced_at,
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gcry_md_hd_t *r_md)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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unsigned char *request, *response;
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size_t requestlen, responselen;
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http_t http;
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ksba_ocsp_response_status_t response_status;
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const char *t;
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int redirects_left = 2;
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char *free_this = NULL;
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(void)ctrl;
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*r_sigval = NULL;
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*r_produced_at = 0;
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*r_md = NULL;
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if (dirmngr_use_tor ())
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{
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/* For now we do not allow OCSP via Tor due to possible privacy
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concerns. Needs further research. */
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log_error (_("OCSP request not possible due to Tor mode\n"));
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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}
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if (opt.disable_http)
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{
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log_error (_("OCSP request not possible due to disabled HTTP\n"));
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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}
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err = ksba_ocsp_add_target (ocsp, cert, issuer_cert);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error setting OCSP target: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
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return err;
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}
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{
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size_t n;
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unsigned char nonce[32];
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n = ksba_ocsp_set_nonce (ocsp, NULL, 0);
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if (n > sizeof nonce)
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n = sizeof nonce;
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gcry_create_nonce (nonce, n);
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ksba_ocsp_set_nonce (ocsp, nonce, n);
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}
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err = ksba_ocsp_build_request (ocsp, &request, &requestlen);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error building OCSP request: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
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return err;
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}
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once_more:
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err = http_open (&http, HTTP_REQ_POST, url, NULL, NULL,
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((opt.honor_http_proxy? HTTP_FLAG_TRY_PROXY:0)
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| (dirmngr_use_tor ()? HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR:0)
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| (opt.disable_ipv4? HTTP_FLAG_IGNORE_IPv4 : 0)
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| (opt.disable_ipv6? HTTP_FLAG_IGNORE_IPv6 : 0)),
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ctrl->http_proxy, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error connecting to '%s': %s\n"), url, gpg_strerror (err));
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xfree (free_this);
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return err;
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}
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es_fprintf (http_get_write_ptr (http),
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"Content-Type: application/ocsp-request\r\n"
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"Content-Length: %lu\r\n",
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(unsigned long)requestlen );
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http_start_data (http);
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if (es_fwrite (request, requestlen, 1, http_get_write_ptr (http)) != 1)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
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log_error ("error sending request to '%s': %s\n", url, strerror (errno));
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http_close (http, 0);
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xfree (request);
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xfree (free_this);
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return err;
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}
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xfree (request);
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request = NULL;
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err = http_wait_response (http);
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if (err || http_get_status_code (http) != 200)
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{
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if (err)
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log_error (_("error reading HTTP response for '%s': %s\n"),
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url, gpg_strerror (err));
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else
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{
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switch (http_get_status_code (http))
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{
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case 301:
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case 302:
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{
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const char *s = http_get_header (http, "Location");
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log_info (_("URL '%s' redirected to '%s' (%u)\n"),
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url, s?s:"[none]", http_get_status_code (http));
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if (s && *s && redirects_left-- )
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{
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xfree (free_this); url = NULL;
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free_this = xtrystrdup (s);
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if (!free_this)
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err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
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else
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{
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url = free_this;
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http_close (http, 0);
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goto once_more;
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}
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}
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else
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
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log_error (_("too many redirections\n"));
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}
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break;
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case 413: /* Payload too large */
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
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break;
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default:
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log_error (_("error accessing '%s': http status %u\n"),
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url, http_get_status_code (http));
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
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break;
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}
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}
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http_close (http, 0);
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xfree (free_this);
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return err;
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}
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err = read_response (http_get_read_ptr (http), &response, &responselen);
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http_close (http, 0);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error reading HTTP response for '%s': %s\n"),
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url, gpg_strerror (err));
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xfree (free_this);
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return err;
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}
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/* log_printhex (response, responselen, "ocsp response"); */
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err = ksba_ocsp_parse_response (ocsp, response, responselen,
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&response_status);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error parsing OCSP response for '%s': %s\n"),
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url, gpg_strerror (err));
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xfree (response);
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xfree (free_this);
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return err;
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}
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switch (response_status)
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{
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SUCCESS: t = "success"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_MALFORMED: t = "malformed"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_INTERNAL: t = "internal error"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_TRYLATER: t = "try later"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SIGREQUIRED: t = "must sign request"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_UNAUTHORIZED: t = "unauthorized"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_REPLAYED: t = "replay detected"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_OTHER: t = "other (unknown)"; break;
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case KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_NONE: t = "no status"; break;
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default: t = "[unknown status]"; break;
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}
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if (response_status == KSBA_OCSP_RSPSTATUS_SUCCESS)
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{
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int hash_algo;
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if (opt.verbose)
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log_info (_("OCSP responder at '%s' status: %s\n"), url, t);
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/* Get the signature value now because we can all this fucntion
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* only once. */
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*r_sigval = ksba_ocsp_get_sig_val (ocsp, r_produced_at);
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hash_algo = hash_algo_from_sigval (*r_sigval);
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if (!hash_algo)
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{
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if (opt.verbose)
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log_info ("ocsp: using SHA-256 as fallback hash algo.\n");
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hash_algo = GCRY_MD_SHA256;
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}
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err = gcry_md_open (r_md, hash_algo, 0);
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("failed to establish a hashing context for OCSP: %s\n"),
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gpg_strerror (err));
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goto leave;
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}
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if (DBG_HASHING)
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gcry_md_debug (*r_md, "ocsp");
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err = ksba_ocsp_hash_response (ocsp, response, responselen,
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HASH_FNC, *r_md);
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if (err)
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log_error (_("hashing the OCSP response for '%s' failed: %s\n"),
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url, gpg_strerror (err));
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}
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else
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{
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log_error (_("OCSP responder at '%s' status: %s\n"), url, t);
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
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}
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leave:
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xfree (response);
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xfree (free_this);
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if (err)
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{
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xfree (*r_sigval);
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*r_sigval = NULL;
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*r_produced_at = 0;
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gcry_md_close (*r_md);
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*r_md = NULL;
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}
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return err;
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}
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/* Validate that CERT is indeed valid to sign an OCSP response. If
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SIGNER_FPR_LIST is not NULL we simply check that CERT matches one
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of the fingerprints in this list. */
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static gpg_error_t
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validate_responder_cert (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
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fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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char *fpr;
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if (signer_fpr_list)
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{
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fpr = get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert);
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for (; signer_fpr_list && strcmp (signer_fpr_list->hexfpr, fpr);
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signer_fpr_list = signer_fpr_list->next)
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;
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if (signer_fpr_list)
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err = 0;
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else
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{
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log_error (_("not signed by a default OCSP signer's certificate"));
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_CA_CERT);
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}
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xfree (fpr);
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}
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else
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{
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/* We avoid duplicating the entire certificate validation code
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from gpgsm here. Because we have no way calling back to the
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client and letting it compute the validity, we use the ugly
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hack of telling the client that the response will only be
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valid if the certificate given in this status message is
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valid.
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Note, that in theory we could simply ask the client via an
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inquire to validate a certificate but this might involve
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calling DirMngr again recursivly - we can't do that as of now
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(neither DirMngr nor gpgsm have the ability for concurrent
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access to DirMngr. */
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/* FIXME: We should cache this certificate locally, so that the next
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call to dirmngr won't need to look it up - if this works at
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all. */
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fpr = get_fingerprint_hexstring (cert);
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dirmngr_status (ctrl, "ONLY_VALID_IF_CERT_VALID", fpr, NULL);
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xfree (fpr);
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err = 0;
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}
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return err;
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}
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|
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/* Helper for check_signature. */
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static int
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check_signature_core (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, gcry_sexp_t s_sig,
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gcry_sexp_t s_hash, fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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ksba_sexp_t pubkey;
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gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL;
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pubkey = ksba_cert_get_public_key (cert);
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if (!pubkey)
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
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else
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err = canon_sexp_to_gcry (pubkey, &s_pkey);
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xfree (pubkey);
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if (!err)
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err = gcry_pk_verify (s_sig, s_hash, s_pkey);
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if (!err)
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err = validate_responder_cert (ctrl, cert, signer_fpr_list);
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if (!err)
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{
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gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
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return 0; /* Successfully verified the signature. */
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}
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/* We simply ignore all errors. */
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gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
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return err;
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}
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|
|
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/* Check the signature of an OCSP repsonse. OCSP is the context,
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S_SIG the signature value and MD the handle of the hash we used for
|
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the response. This function automagically finds the correct public
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key. If SIGNER_FPR_LIST is not NULL, the default OCSP reponder has been
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used and thus the certificate is one of those identified by
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the fingerprints. */
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static gpg_error_t
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check_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
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ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, gcry_sexp_t s_sig, gcry_md_hd_t md,
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fingerprint_list_t signer_fpr_list)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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int algo, cert_idx;
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gcry_sexp_t s_hash;
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ksba_cert_t cert;
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const char *s;
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|
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/* Create a suitable S-expression with the hash value of our response. */
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gcry_md_final (md);
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algo = gcry_md_get_algo (md);
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s = gcry_md_algo_name (algo);
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if (algo && s && strlen (s) < 16)
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{
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|
char hashalgostr[16+1];
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; s[i]; i++)
|
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hashalgostr[i] = ascii_tolower (s[i]);
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hashalgostr[i] = 0;
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err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_hash, NULL, "(data(flags pkcs1)(hash %s %b))",
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hashalgostr,
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(int)gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo),
|
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gcry_md_read (md, algo));
|
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}
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else
|
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
|
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if (err)
|
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{
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log_error (_("creating S-expression failed: %s\n"), gcry_strerror (err));
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return err;
|
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}
|
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|
|
/* Get rid of old OCSP specific certificate references. */
|
|
release_ctrl_ocsp_certs (ctrl);
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|
|
|
if (signer_fpr_list && !signer_fpr_list->next)
|
|
{
|
|
/* There is exactly one signer fingerprint given. Thus we use
|
|
the default OCSP responder's certificate and instantly know
|
|
the certificate to use. */
|
|
cert = get_cert_byhexfpr (signer_fpr_list->hexfpr);
|
|
if (!cert)
|
|
cert = get_cert_local (ctrl, signer_fpr_list->hexfpr);
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
{
|
|
err = check_signature_core (ctrl, cert, s_sig, s_hash,
|
|
signer_fpr_list);
|
|
ksba_cert_release (cert);
|
|
cert = NULL;
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_sexp_release (s_hash);
|
|
return 0; /* Successfully verified the signature. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
char *name;
|
|
ksba_sexp_t keyid;
|
|
|
|
/* Put all certificates included in the response into the cache
|
|
and setup a list of those certificate which will later be
|
|
preferred used when locating certificates. */
|
|
for (cert_idx=0; (cert = ksba_ocsp_get_cert (ocsp, cert_idx));
|
|
cert_idx++)
|
|
{
|
|
cert_ref_t cref;
|
|
|
|
/* dump_cert ("from ocsp response", cert); */
|
|
cref = xtrymalloc (sizeof *cref);
|
|
if (!cref)
|
|
log_error (_("allocating list item failed: %s\n"),
|
|
gcry_strerror (err));
|
|
else if (!cache_cert_silent (cert, &cref->fpr))
|
|
{
|
|
cref->next = ctrl->ocsp_certs;
|
|
ctrl->ocsp_certs = cref;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
xfree (cref);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the certificate by means of the responder ID. */
|
|
err = ksba_ocsp_get_responder_id (ocsp, &name, &keyid);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("error getting responder ID: %s\n"),
|
|
gcry_strerror (err));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
cert = find_cert_bysubject (ctrl, name, keyid);
|
|
if (!cert)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("responder certificate ");
|
|
if (name)
|
|
log_printf ("'/%s' ", name);
|
|
if (keyid)
|
|
{
|
|
log_printf ("{");
|
|
dump_serial (keyid);
|
|
log_printf ("} ");
|
|
}
|
|
log_printf ("not found\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
{
|
|
err = check_signature_core (ctrl, cert, s_sig, s_hash,
|
|
signer_fpr_list);
|
|
ksba_cert_release (cert);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
{
|
|
ksba_free (name);
|
|
ksba_free (keyid);
|
|
gcry_sexp_release (s_hash);
|
|
return 0; /* Successfully verified the signature. */
|
|
}
|
|
log_error ("responder certificate ");
|
|
if (name)
|
|
log_printf ("'/%s' ", name);
|
|
if (keyid)
|
|
{
|
|
log_printf ("{");
|
|
dump_serial (keyid);
|
|
log_printf ("} ");
|
|
}
|
|
log_printf ("did not verify: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
}
|
|
ksba_free (name);
|
|
ksba_free (keyid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcry_sexp_release (s_hash);
|
|
log_error (_("no suitable certificate found to verify the OCSP response\n"));
|
|
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether the certificate either given by fingerprint CERT_FPR
|
|
or directly through the CERT object is valid by running an OCSP
|
|
transaction. With FORCE_DEFAULT_RESPONDER set only the configured
|
|
default responder is used. */
|
|
gpg_error_t
|
|
ocsp_isvalid (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *cert_fpr,
|
|
int force_default_responder)
|
|
{
|
|
gpg_error_t err;
|
|
ksba_ocsp_t ocsp = NULL;
|
|
ksba_cert_t issuer_cert = NULL;
|
|
ksba_sexp_t sigval = NULL;
|
|
gcry_sexp_t s_sig = NULL;
|
|
ksba_isotime_t current_time;
|
|
ksba_isotime_t this_update, next_update, revocation_time, produced_at;
|
|
ksba_isotime_t tmp_time;
|
|
ksba_status_t status;
|
|
ksba_crl_reason_t reason;
|
|
char *url_buffer = NULL;
|
|
const char *url;
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
|
|
int i, idx;
|
|
char *oid;
|
|
ksba_name_t name;
|
|
fingerprint_list_t default_signer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the certificate. */
|
|
if (cert)
|
|
{
|
|
ksba_cert_ref (cert);
|
|
|
|
err = find_issuing_cert (ctrl, cert, &issuer_cert);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("issuer certificate not found: %s\n"),
|
|
gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
cert = get_cert_local (ctrl, cert_fpr);
|
|
if (!cert)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("caller did not return the target certificate\n"));
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
issuer_cert = get_issuing_cert_local (ctrl, NULL);
|
|
if (!issuer_cert)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("caller did not return the issuing certificate\n"));
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create an OCSP instance. */
|
|
err = ksba_ocsp_new (&ocsp);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("failed to allocate OCSP context: %s\n"),
|
|
gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out the OCSP responder to use.
|
|
1. Try to get the reponder from the certificate.
|
|
We do only take http and https style URIs into account.
|
|
2. If this fails use the default responder, if any.
|
|
*/
|
|
url = NULL;
|
|
for (idx=0; !url && !opt.ignore_ocsp_service_url && !force_default_responder
|
|
&& !(err=ksba_cert_get_authority_info_access (cert, idx,
|
|
&oid, &name)); idx++)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( !strcmp (oid, oidstr_ocsp) )
|
|
{
|
|
for (i=0; !url && ksba_name_enum (name, i); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
char *p = ksba_name_get_uri (name, i);
|
|
if (p && (!ascii_strncasecmp (p, "http:", 5)
|
|
|| !ascii_strncasecmp (p, "https:", 6)))
|
|
url = url_buffer = p;
|
|
else
|
|
xfree (p);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ksba_name_release (name);
|
|
ksba_free (oid);
|
|
}
|
|
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("can't get authorityInfoAccess: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!url)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opt.ocsp_responder || !*opt.ocsp_responder)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("no default OCSP responder defined\n"));
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!opt.ocsp_signer)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("no default OCSP signer defined\n"));
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CONFIGURATION);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
url = opt.ocsp_responder;
|
|
default_signer = opt.ocsp_signer;
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
log_info (_("using default OCSP responder '%s'\n"), url);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
log_info (_("using OCSP responder '%s'\n"), url);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ask the OCSP responder. */
|
|
err = do_ocsp_request (ctrl, ocsp, url, cert, issuer_cert,
|
|
&sigval, produced_at, &md);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* It is sometimes useful to know the responder ID. */
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
{
|
|
char *resp_name;
|
|
ksba_sexp_t resp_keyid;
|
|
|
|
err = ksba_ocsp_get_responder_id (ocsp, &resp_name, &resp_keyid);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
log_info (_("error getting responder ID: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
log_info ("responder id: ");
|
|
if (resp_name)
|
|
log_printf ("'/%s' ", resp_name);
|
|
if (resp_keyid)
|
|
{
|
|
log_printf ("{");
|
|
dump_serial (resp_keyid);
|
|
log_printf ("} ");
|
|
}
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
ksba_free (resp_name);
|
|
ksba_free (resp_keyid);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We got a useful answer, check that the answer has a valid signature. */
|
|
if (!sigval || !*produced_at || !md)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
if ( (err = canon_sexp_to_gcry (sigval, &s_sig)) )
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
xfree (sigval);
|
|
sigval = NULL;
|
|
err = check_signature (ctrl, ocsp, s_sig, md, default_signer);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* We only support one certificate per request. Check that the
|
|
answer matches the right certificate. */
|
|
err = ksba_ocsp_get_status (ocsp, cert,
|
|
&status, this_update, next_update,
|
|
revocation_time, &reason);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("error getting OCSP status for target certificate: %s\n"),
|
|
gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In case the certificate has been revoked, we better invalidate
|
|
our cached validation status. */
|
|
if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t validated_at = 0; /* That is: No cached validation available. */
|
|
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "validated_at",
|
|
&validated_at, sizeof (validated_at));
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("set_user_data(validated_at) failed: %s\n",
|
|
gpg_strerror (err));
|
|
err = 0; /* The certificate is anyway revoked, and that is a
|
|
more important message than the failure of our
|
|
cache. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("certificate status is: %s (this=%s next=%s)\n"),
|
|
status == KSBA_STATUS_GOOD? _("good"):
|
|
status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED? _("revoked"):
|
|
status == KSBA_STATUS_UNKNOWN? _("unknown"):
|
|
status == KSBA_STATUS_NONE? _("none"): "?",
|
|
this_update, next_update);
|
|
if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
|
|
log_info (_("certificate has been revoked at: %s due to: %s\n"),
|
|
revocation_time,
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_UNSPECIFIED? "unspecified":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_KEY_COMPROMISE? "key compromise":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CA_COMPROMISE? "CA compromise":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED?
|
|
"affiliation changed":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_SUPERSEDED? "superseded":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATION?
|
|
"cessation of operation":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD?
|
|
"certificate on hold":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL?
|
|
"removed from CRL":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_PRIVILEGE_WITHDRAWN?
|
|
"privilege withdrawn":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_AA_COMPROMISE? "AA compromise":
|
|
reason == KSBA_CRLREASON_OTHER? "other":"?");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (status == KSBA_STATUS_REVOKED)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED);
|
|
else if (status == KSBA_STATUS_UNKNOWN)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
|
|
else if (status != KSBA_STATUS_GOOD)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Allow for some clock skew. */
|
|
gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
|
|
add_seconds_to_isotime (current_time, opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp (this_update, current_time) > 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("OCSP responder returned a status in the future\n"));
|
|
log_info ("used now: %s this_update: %s\n", current_time, this_update);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that THIS_UPDATE is not too far back in the past. */
|
|
gnupg_copy_time (tmp_time, this_update);
|
|
add_seconds_to_isotime (tmp_time,
|
|
opt.ocsp_max_period+opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
|
|
if (!*tmp_time || strcmp (tmp_time, current_time) < 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("OCSP responder returned a non-current status\n"));
|
|
log_info ("used now: %s this_update: %s\n",
|
|
current_time, this_update);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we are not beyound NEXT_UPDATE (plus some extra time). */
|
|
if (*next_update)
|
|
{
|
|
gnupg_copy_time (tmp_time, next_update);
|
|
add_seconds_to_isotime (tmp_time,
|
|
opt.ocsp_current_period+opt.ocsp_max_clock_skew);
|
|
if (!*tmp_time && strcmp (tmp_time, current_time) < 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("OCSP responder returned an too old status\n"));
|
|
log_info ("used now: %s next_update: %s\n",
|
|
current_time, next_update);
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TIME_CONFLICT);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
gcry_md_close (md);
|
|
gcry_sexp_release (s_sig);
|
|
xfree (sigval);
|
|
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
|
|
ksba_cert_release (cert);
|
|
ksba_ocsp_release (ocsp);
|
|
xfree (url_buffer);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Release the list of OCSP certificates hold in the CTRL object. */
|
|
void
|
|
release_ctrl_ocsp_certs (ctrl_t ctrl)
|
|
{
|
|
while (ctrl->ocsp_certs)
|
|
{
|
|
cert_ref_t tmp = ctrl->ocsp_certs->next;
|
|
xfree (ctrl->ocsp_certs);
|
|
ctrl->ocsp_certs = tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|