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gnupg/g10/mainproc.c
David Shaw bf079613b7 * pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Use the same translated string for 
showing the user ID as mainproc.c:print_pkenc_list.

* mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Allow translating the quotes around the
user ID.

* card-util.c, g10.c, photoid.c, trustdb.c: The last of the \"%s\" -> `%s'
quoting for things that aren't user IDs.

* keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): If there is no keyserver host, print the
whole URI since it is self-contained.
2004-10-11 21:08:37 +00:00

1882 lines
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/* mainproc.c - handle packets
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
* 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "photoid.h"
struct kidlist_item {
struct kidlist_item *next;
u32 kid[2];
int pubkey_algo;
int reason;
};
/****************
* Structure to hold the context
*/
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
struct mainproc_context {
struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* may be useful in the future */
PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
PKT_secret_key *last_seckey;
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */
int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */
STRLIST signed_data;
const char *sigfilename;
DEK *dek;
int last_was_session_key;
KBNODE list; /* the current list of packets */
int have_data;
IOBUF iobuf; /* used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */
ulong symkeys;
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* list of encryption packets */
struct {
int op;
int stop_now;
} pipemode;
};
static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
static void
release_list( CTX c )
{
if( !c->list )
return;
proc_tree(c, c->list );
release_kbnode( c->list );
while( c->pkenc_list ) {
struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
m_free( c->pkenc_list );
c->pkenc_list = tmp;
}
c->pkenc_list = NULL;
c->list = NULL;
c->have_data = 0;
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
c->pipemode.op = 0;
c->pipemode.stop_now = 0;
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
static int
add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
KBNODE node;
if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */
/* We can only append another onepass packet if the list
* does contain only onepass packets */
for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
node = node->next )
;
if( node ) {
/* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and
* allow this packet to start a new verification thing */
release_list( c );
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
}
else
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
}
else /* insert the first one */
c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt );
return 1;
}
static int
add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
/* New clear text signature.
* Process the last one and reset everything */
release_list(c);
}
else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
/* Pipemode control packet */
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 )
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
/* start the whole thing */
assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */
assert ( !c->pipemode.op );
c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1];
}
else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) {
/* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */
assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
}
else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) {
assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
release_list (c);
/* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
}
else
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
}
if( c->list ) /* add another packet */
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
else /* insert the first one */
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
return 1;
}
static int
add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("orphaned user ID\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
static int
add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
KBNODE node;
if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
* of prepending the signature to the data is
* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
node = new_kbnode( pkt );
c->list = node;
return 1;
}
else if( !c->list )
return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
else if( !c->list->pkt )
BUG(); /* so nicht */
/* add a new signature node id at the end */
node = new_kbnode( pkt );
add_kbnode( c->list, node );
return 1;
}
static int
symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
{
CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
unsigned int n;
if ( slen < 17 || slen > 33 ) {
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
(int)slen);
return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
}
hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen );
cipher_close( hd );
/* check first byte (the cipher algo) */
if(check_cipher_algo(seskey[0]))
{
/* There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad
passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have. */
log_error(_("bad passphrase or unknown cipher algorithm (%d)\n"),
seskey[0]);
if(seskey[0]==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
idea_cipher_warn(0);
return G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
}
n = cipher_get_keylen (seskey[0]) / 8;
if (n > DIM(dek->key))
BUG ();
/* now we replace the dek components with the real session key
to decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( seskey[0] ) / 8;
dek->algo = seskey[0];
memcpy( dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen );
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
return 0;
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
if (!enc)
log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
else if(!c->dek)
{
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
if(s)
{
if(!opt.quiet)
{
if(enc->seskeylen)
log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
else
log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
}
}
else
log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo))
{
log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
s=NULL;
}
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
if(!s || opt.list_only)
goto leave;
if(opt.override_session_key)
{
c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
{
m_free(c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else
{
c->dek=passphrase_to_dek(NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL);
if(c->dek)
{
/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
key comes before a public key in the message - if
the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
come later. */
if(enc->seskeylen)
{
if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
enc->seskeylen))
{
m_free(c->dek);
c->dek=NULL;
}
}
else
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
}
}
leave:
c->symkeys++;
free_packet(pkt);
}
static void
proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
int result = 0;
/* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */
c->last_was_session_key = 1;
enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
/*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
* function to check it. */
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) );
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[50];
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
}
if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it */
c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
if ( result ) {
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
|| opt.try_all_secrets
|| !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else {
c->dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
/* error: delete the DEK */
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
}
}
else
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
}
else
result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
if( result == -1 )
;
else
{
/* store it for later display */
struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x );
x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
x->reason = result;
x->next = c->pkenc_list;
c->pkenc_list = x;
if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
}
free_packet(pkt);
}
/****************
* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
* not decrypt.
*/
static void
print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
{
for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
const char *algstr;
if ( failed && !list->reason )
continue;
if ( !failed && list->reason )
continue;
algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo );
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
if( !algstr )
algstr = "[?]";
pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) )
{
char *p;
log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
fprintf(log_stream(),_(" \"%s\"\n"),p);
m_free(p);
}
else
log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
algstr,keystr(list->kid));
free_public_key( pk );
if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[20];
sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
(ulong)list->kid[1] );
write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
}
}
else if (list->reason)
log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(list->reason));
}
}
static void
proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
int result = 0;
if (!opt.quiet)
{
if(c->symkeys>1)
log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys);
else if(c->symkeys==1)
log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
}
write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
/*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
int algo;
STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
if(opt.override_session_key)
{
c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
if(result)
{
m_free(c->dek);
c->dek = NULL;
}
}
else
{
/* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
{
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if (!algo)
algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
idea_cipher_warn(1);
log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
}
else
{
algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
{
/* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
s2kbuf.mode = 0;
s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
s2k = &s2kbuf;
}
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
}
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if( !result )
result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
if( result == -1 )
;
else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
if(opt.show_session_key)
{
int i;
char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf );
write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
}
}
else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
}
else {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
}
m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
}
static void
proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc;
KBNODE n;
if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
else if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0);
/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
* and no armoring - Not yet tested
* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
*/
any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0;
for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) {
md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo
== DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
only_md5 = 1;
else
only_md5 = 0;
any = 1;
}
if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
only_md5 = 0;
}
else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
/* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
if ( datalen < 2 )
log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
* documents */
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data );
any = 1;
break; /* no pass signature pakets are expected */
}
}
if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) {
/* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
}
if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
/* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only
* catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored
* pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
* in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch.
*/
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
}
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 );
else {
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
/* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
* check the signature */
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
}
}
if( rc )
log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
*/
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
else
c->list = n;
}
static int
proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
{
return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data,
((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
}
static int
proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
{
return proc_encryption_packets( info, a );
}
static void
proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
int rc;
/*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
if( c->sigs_only )
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c );
else if( c->encrypt_only )
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c );
else
rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
if( rc )
log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
}
/****************
* check the signature
* Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
*/
static int
do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
{
PKT_signature *sig;
MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
int algo, rc;
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
if( is_selfsig )
*is_selfsig = 0;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
algo = sig->digest_algo;
if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
return rc;
if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
if( c->mfx.md )
md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
else /* detached signature */
md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
/* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
* in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
if( c->mfx.md ) {
md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
if( c->mfx.md2 )
md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
}
else { /* detached signature */
log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
md2 = md_open( 0, 0 );
}
}
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
|| sig->sig_class == 0x18
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
log_info(_("standalone revocation - "
"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
}
else {
log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
sig->sig_class);
return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
}
}
else
return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
md_close(md);
md_close(md2);
return rc;
}
static void
print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !pkt )
BUG();
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) {
printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
return;
}
if( opt.with_colons )
{
if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
printf("%u %lu",
pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
}
else
print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
}
/****************
* List the certificate in a user friendly way
*/
static void
list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
int any=0;
int mainkey;
if( !node )
;
else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) )
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( opt.with_colons )
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if( mainkey )
c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
if( c->trustletter )
putchar( c->trustletter );
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
putchar(':');
if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
putchar('\n'); any=1;
if( opt.fingerprint )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
}
}
else
printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s%s",
mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ),
datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":"");
if( mainkey ) {
/* and now list all userids with their signatures */
for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
if( !any ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
puts("[revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
printf("%s:::::::::",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
else
printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
}
print_userid( node->pkt );
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
if( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
}
any=1;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
}
}
else
{
/* of subkey */
if( pk->is_revoked )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
printf("]");
}
else if( pk->expiredate )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
printf("]");
}
}
if( !any )
putchar('\n');
if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
}
else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( opt.with_colons )
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
}
else
printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk ));
if( mainkey ) {
/* and now list all userids with their signatures */
for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
if( !any ) {
if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
puts("[revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
printf("%s:::::::::",
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
else
printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
}
print_userid( node->pkt );
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
any=1;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
any = 1;
}
list_node(c, node );
}
}
}
if( !any )
putchar('\n');
if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int is_selfsig = 0;
int rc2=0;
size_t n;
char *p;
int sigrc = ' ';
if( !opt.verbose )
return;
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
fputs("rev", stdout);
else
fputs("sig", stdout);
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
fflush(stdout);
switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
else { /* check whether this is a self signature */
u32 keyid[2];
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid );
else
keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid );
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
is_selfsig = 1;
}
}
if( opt.with_colons ) {
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
printf(":");
if(sig->trust_regexp)
print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
printf(":");
}
else
printf("%c %s %s ",
sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if( is_selfsig ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout);
if( opt.with_colons )
putchar(':');
}
else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
m_free(p);
}
if( opt.with_colons )
printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
putchar('\n');
}
else
log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
}
int
proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
int rc;
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
c->anchor = anchor;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
{
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->sigs_only = 1;
c->signed_data = signedfiles;
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->encrypt_only = 1;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
m_free( c );
return rc;
}
int
do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
{
PACKET *pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
int rc=0;
int any_data=0;
int newpkt;
c->iobuf = a;
init_packet(pkt);
while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
any_data = 1;
if( rc ) {
free_packet(pkt);
/* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packet. */
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
break;
continue;
}
newpkt = -1;
if( opt.list_packets ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if( c->sigs_only ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else if( c->encrypt_only ) {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_USER_ID:
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
else {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
release_list( c );
c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
newpkt = 1;
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
break;
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
* when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
* an extra layer.
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
*/
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
if( newpkt == -1 )
;
else if( newpkt ) {
pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
}
else
free_packet(pkt);
if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
/* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to
* break the loop here */
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
if( any_data )
rc = 0;
else if( rc == -1 )
write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
leave:
release_list( c );
m_free(c->dek);
free_packet( pkt );
m_free( pkt );
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
return rc;
}
static int
check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr;
int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
if( opt.skip_verify ) {
log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
return 0;
}
/* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures:
* PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet
* sequence: sig+data, OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG
* sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig.
* Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with
* different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might
* not be possible to get it right: let's say we have:
* data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last
* data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then
* data+sig.
* To protect against this we check that all signatures follow
* without any intermediate packets. Note, that we won't get this
* error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because
* we reset the list every time
*
* FIXME: Now that we have these marker packets, we should create a
* real grammar and check against this.
*/
{
KBNODE n;
int n_sig=0;
for (n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
n_sig++;
}
if (n_sig > 1) { /* more than one signature - check sequence */
int tmp, onepass;
for (tmp=onepass=0,n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
onepass++;
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
onepass++; /* handle the same way as a onepass */
}
else if ( (tmp && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) ) {
log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
return 0;
}
else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
tmp = 1;
else if (!tmp && !onepass
&& n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
/* plaintext before signatures but no one-pass packets*/
log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
return 0;
}
}
}
}
astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo );
if(keystrlen()>8)
{
log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
log_info(_(" using %s key %s\n"),
astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
}
else
log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
keystr(sig->keyid));
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
/* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
{
const byte *p;
int seq=0;
size_t n;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
{
/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm
not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n );
putc( '\n', log_stream() );
if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
{
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
if(spec)
{
int res;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if(!res)
rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
free_keyserver_spec(spec);
if(!rc)
break;
}
}
}
}
/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, this is a
second try. */
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
{
int res;
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
if(!res)
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
}
if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
KBNODE un, keyblock;
int count=0, statno;
char keyid_str[50];
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
if(rc)
statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
else if(sig->flags.expired)
statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
else if(is_expkey)
statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
else if(is_revkey)
statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
else
statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
/* find and print the primary user ID */
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
char *p;
int valid;
if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
continue;
}
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
continue;
if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
continue;
/* We want the textual primary user ID here */
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
assert(pk);
/* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
line. */
valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
-1 );
p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
if(rc)
log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
else if(sig->flags.expired)
log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
else
log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
m_free(p);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY)
fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
else
fputs("\n", log_stream() );
count++;
}
if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual
userid */
char *p;
/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
break;
}
/* Try for any userid at all */
if(!un) {
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
}
}
if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
-1 );
if(un)
p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
else
p=m_strdup("[?]");
if(rc)
log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
else if(sig->flags.expired)
log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
else
log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
{
putc(' ', log_stream() );
fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() );
}
fputs("\n", log_stream() );
}
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
if ( count && !rc ) {
char *p;
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
|| un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
&& !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
continue;
/* Only skip textual primaries */
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
continue;
if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
{
dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
}
p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
log_info(_(" aka \"%s\""),p);
m_free(p);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY)
{
const char *valid;
if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
valid=_("revoked");
else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
valid=_("expired");
else
valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
un->pkt->
pkt.user_id));
fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",valid);
}
else
fputs("\n", log_stream() );
}
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
if( !rc )
{
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)
show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
else
show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)
show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
else
show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS)
show_notation(sig,0,1,
((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
else
show_notation(sig,0,2,0);
}
if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
/* print a status response with the fingerprint */
PKT_public_key *vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
size_t i, n;
bufp = buf;
fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
p = array;
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to
match! */
sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
(ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class);
bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
if (!vpk->is_primary) {
u32 akid[2];
akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
free_public_key (vpk);
vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
/* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
memset (array, 0, n);
}
else
fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
}
p = array;
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
}
free_public_key( vpk );
}
if( !rc )
rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
if(sig->flags.expired)
{
log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
}
else if(sig->expiredate)
log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
if(opt.verbose)
log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo));
if( rc )
g10_errors_seen = 1;
if( opt.batch && rc )
g10_exit(1);
}
else {
char buf[50];
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
buf[16] = 0;
write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
}
if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Process the tree which starts at node
*/
static void
proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
KBNODE n1;
int rc;
if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
return;
/* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
while ( node
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
node = node->next;
}
if (!node)
return;
c->trustletter = ' ';
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
list_node( c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( node );
list_node( c, node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
/* check all signatures */
if( !c->have_data ) {
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
/* prepare to create all requested message digests */
c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
/* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
}
/* ask for file and hash it */
if( c->sigs_only ) {
rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL,
c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
}
else {
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
/* clear text signed message */
if( !c->have_data ) {
log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
return;
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int multiple_ok=1;
n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
if(n1)
{
byte class=sig->sig_class;
byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
{
/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
to run a different hash context for each), but if
they are all the same, make an exception. */
if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
|| n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
{
multiple_ok=0;
log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
break;
}
}
}
if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
sig->sig_class);
else if( !c->have_data ) {
/* detached signature */
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
;
else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
}
else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
&& sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
/* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached
* signature has been created in textmode */
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
}
#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
/* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
* It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
* this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
* but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
* then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly
* hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
*/
/* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
#endif
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
if( c->sigs_only ) {
rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
}
else {
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
}
else if ( c->signed_data ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */
else if (!opt.quiet)
log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
if(multiple_ok)
for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
else
check_sig_and_print( c, node );
}
else {
dump_kbnode (c->list);
log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
dump_kbnode (node);
}
}
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