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![Werner Koch](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
* g10/gpg.c (parse_list_options): Add "sort-sigs". (main): Make it the default. * g10/options.h (LIST_SORT_SIGS): New. * g10/keylist.c (cmp_signodes): New. (list_keyblock_print): Sort signatures and factor signature printing code out to ... (list_signature_print): new. -- In particular together with --full-timestamps this makes it easier to see the history of key signatures and their revocations. The self-signatures are also printed first. To disable this --list-options no-sort-sigs can be used. Also don't print the annoying "no recocation reason specified" message. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
615 lines
20 KiB
C
615 lines
20 KiB
C
/* key-clean.c - Functions to clean a keyblock
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008, 2010-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2014, 2016-2018 Werner Koch
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "gpg.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "../common/util.h"
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#include "../common/host2net.h"
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#include "../common/i18n.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "key-clean.h"
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/*
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* Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
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* To do this, we first remove all signatures which are not valid and
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* from the remaining we look for the latest one. If this is not a
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* certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
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* node flag bit 8. Revocations are marked with flag 11, and sigs
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* from unavailable keys are marked with flag 12. Note that flag bits
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* 9 and 10 are used for internal purposes.
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*/
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void
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mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
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u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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PKT_signature *sig;
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/* First check all signatures. */
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for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
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{
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int rc;
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node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break; /* ready */
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if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
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continue;
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sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (main_kid
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&& sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
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continue; /* ignore self-signatures if we pass in a main_kid */
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if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
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continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
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if(sig->sig_class>=0x11 && sig->sig_class<=0x13 &&
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sig->sig_class-0x10<opt.min_cert_level)
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continue; /* treat anything under our min_cert_level as an
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invalid signature */
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if (klist && !is_in_klist (klist, sig))
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continue; /* no need to check it then */
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if ((rc=check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL)))
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{
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/* we ignore anything that won't verify, but tag the
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no_pubkey case */
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if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
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node->flag |= 1<<12;
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continue;
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}
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node->flag |= 1<<9;
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}
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/* Reset the remaining flags. */
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for (; node; node = node->next)
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node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
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/* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
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* bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
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* processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures, and bit
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* 11 will be set for usable revocations. */
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/* For each cert figure out the latest valid one. */
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for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
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{
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KBNODE n, signode;
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u32 kid[2];
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u32 sigdate;
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break;
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if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
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continue; /* not a node to look at */
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if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
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continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
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node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
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sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
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signode = node;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
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/* Now find the latest and greatest signature */
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for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
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{
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if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break;
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if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
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continue;
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if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
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continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
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sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
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continue;
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n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
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/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
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then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
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older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
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as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
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automatically fine. */
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if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
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(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
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continue;
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/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
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then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
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n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
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nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
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automatically fine. */
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if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
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((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
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{
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signode = n;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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continue;
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}
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/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
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remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
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revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
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If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
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packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
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their original order. */
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if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
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{
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signode = n;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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}
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}
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sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
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{ /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked.
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* Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
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* We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
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* certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
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* want that after the expiration of his certificate the
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* system falls back to an older certification which has a
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* different expiration time */
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const byte *p;
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u32 expire;
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p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig, 1, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
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expire = p? sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p) : 0;
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if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
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{
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signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
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if (next_expire && expire && expire < *next_expire)
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*next_expire = expire;
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}
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}
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else
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signode->flag |= (1<<11);
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}
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}
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static int
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clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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int noisy, int self_only)
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{
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int deleted = 0;
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kbnode_t node;
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u32 keyid[2];
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
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/* Passing in a 0 for current time here means that we'll never weed
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out an expired sig. This is correct behavior since we want to
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keep the most recent expired sig in a series. */
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mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
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/* What we want to do here is remove signatures that are not
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considered as part of the trust calculations. Thus, all invalid
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signatures are out, as are any signatures that aren't the last of
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a series of uid sigs or revocations It breaks down like this:
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coming out of mark_usable_uid_certs, if a sig is unflagged, it is
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not even a candidate. If a sig has flag 9 or 10, that means it
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was selected as a candidate and vetted. If a sig has flag 8 it
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is a usable signature. If a sig has flag 11 it is a usable
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revocation. If a sig has flag 12 it was issued by an unavailable
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key. "Usable" here means the most recent valid
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signature/revocation in a series from a particular signer.
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Delete everything that isn't a usable uid sig (which might be
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expired), a usable revocation, or a sig from an unavailable
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key. */
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for (node=uidnode->next;
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node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
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node=node->next)
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{
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int keep;
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keep = self_only? (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
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&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1]) : 1;
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/* Keep usable uid sigs ... */
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if ((node->flag & (1<<8)) && keep)
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continue;
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/* ... and usable revocations... */
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if ((node->flag & (1<<11)) && keep)
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continue;
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/* ... and sigs from unavailable keys. */
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/* disabled for now since more people seem to want sigs from
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unavailable keys removed altogether. */
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/*
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if(node->flag & (1<<12))
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continue;
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*/
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/* Everything else we delete */
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/* At this point, if 12 is set, the signing key was unavailable.
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If 9 or 10 is set, it's superseded. Otherwise, it's
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invalid. */
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if (noisy)
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log_info ("removing signature from key %s on user ID \"%s\": %s\n",
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keystr (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid),
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uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
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node->flag&(1<<12)? "key unavailable":
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node->flag&(1<<9)? "signature superseded"
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/* */ :"invalid signature" );
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delete_kbnode (node);
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deleted++;
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}
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return deleted;
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}
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/* This is substantially easier than clean_sigs_from_uid since we just
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have to establish if the uid has a valid self-sig, is not revoked,
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and is not expired. Note that this does not take into account
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whether the uid has a trust path to it - just whether the keyholder
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themselves has certified the uid. Returns true if the uid was
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compacted. To "compact" a user ID, we simply remove ALL signatures
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except the self-sig that caused the user ID to be remove-worthy.
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We don't actually remove the user ID packet itself since it might
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be resurrected in a later merge. Note that this function requires
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that the caller has already done a merge_keys_and_selfsig().
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TODO: change the import code to allow importing a uid with only a
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revocation if the uid already exists on the keyring. */
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static int
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clean_uid_from_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode, int noisy)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
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int deleted = 0;
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
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/* Skip valid user IDs, compacted user IDs, and non-self-signed user
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IDs if --allow-non-selfsigned-uid is set. */
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if (uid->created
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|| uid->flags.compacted
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|| (!uid->flags.expired && !uid->flags.revoked && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid))
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return 0;
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for (node=uidnode->next;
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node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
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node=node->next)
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{
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if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
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{
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delete_kbnode (node);
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deleted = 1;
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uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted = 1;
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}
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}
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if (noisy)
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{
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const char *reason;
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char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
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if (uid->flags.revoked)
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reason = _("revoked");
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else if (uid->flags.expired)
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reason = _("expired");
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else
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reason = _("invalid");
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log_info ("compacting user ID \"%s\" on key %s: %s\n",
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user, keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key),
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reason);
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xfree (user);
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}
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return deleted;
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}
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/* Needs to be called after a merge_keys_and_selfsig() */
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void
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clean_one_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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int noisy, int self_only, int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
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{
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int dummy = 0;
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
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if (!uids_cleaned)
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uids_cleaned = &dummy;
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if (!sigs_cleaned)
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sigs_cleaned = &dummy;
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/* Do clean_uid_from_key first since if it fires off, we don't have
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to bother with the other. */
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*uids_cleaned += clean_uid_from_key (keyblock, uidnode, noisy);
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if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted)
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*sigs_cleaned += clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode,
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noisy, self_only);
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}
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/* NB: This function marks the deleted nodes only and the caller is
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* responsible to skip or remove them. Needs to be called after a
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* merge_keys_and_selfsig(). */
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void
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clean_all_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
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int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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for (node = keyblock->next;
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node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
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node = node->next)
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{
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
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clean_one_uid (ctrl, keyblock, node, noisy, self_only,
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uids_cleaned, sigs_cleaned);
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}
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/* Remove bogus subkey binding signatures: The only signatures
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* allowed are of class 0x18 and 0x28. */
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log_assert (!node || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY));
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}
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/* Helper for clean_all_subkeys. */
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static int
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clean_one_subkey (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t subkeynode, int noisy, int clean_level)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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PKT_public_key *pk = subkeynode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
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unsigned int use = pk->pubkey_usage;
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int do_clean = 0;
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(void)ctrl;
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(void)noisy;
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log_assert (subkeynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| subkeynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
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if (DBG_LOOKUP)
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log_debug ("\tchecking subkey %08lX [%c%c%c%c%c]\n",
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(ulong) keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL),
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(use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)? 'e':'-',
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(use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)? 's':'-',
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(use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)? 'c':'-',
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(use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)? 'a':'-',
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(use & PUBKEY_USAGE_UNKNOWN)? '?':'-');
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if (!pk->flags.valid)
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{
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if (DBG_LOOKUP)
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log_debug ("\tsubkey not valid\n");
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if (clean_level == KEY_CLEAN_INVALID)
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do_clean = 1;
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}
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if (pk->has_expired)
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{
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if (DBG_LOOKUP)
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log_debug ("\tsubkey has expired\n");
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if (clean_level == KEY_CLEAN_ALL)
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do_clean = 1;
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else if (clean_level == KEY_CLEAN_AUTHENCR
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&& (use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC | PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH))
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&& !(use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT)))
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do_clean = 1;
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else if (clean_level == KEY_CLEAN_ENCR
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&& (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
|
|
&& !(use & (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG | PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT
|
|
| PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH)))
|
|
do_clean = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pk->flags.revoked)
|
|
{
|
|
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
|
|
log_debug ("\tsubkey has been revoked (keeping)\n");
|
|
/* Avoid any cleaning because revocations are important. */
|
|
do_clean = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!do_clean)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
|
|
log_debug ("\t=> removing this subkey\n");
|
|
|
|
delete_kbnode (subkeynode);
|
|
for (node = subkeynode->next;
|
|
node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
|
|
node = node->next)
|
|
delete_kbnode (node);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Helper for clean_all_subkeys. Here duplicate signatures from a
|
|
* subkey are removed. This should in general not happen because
|
|
* import takes care of that. However, sometimes other tools are used
|
|
* to manage a keyring or key has been imported a long time ago. */
|
|
static int
|
|
clean_one_subkey_dupsigs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t subkeynode)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t node;
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = subkeynode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
int any_choosen = 0;
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
(void)ctrl;
|
|
|
|
log_assert (subkeynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| subkeynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
|
|
log_debug ("\tchecking subkey %08lX for dupsigs\n",
|
|
(ulong) keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL));
|
|
|
|
/* First check that the chosen flag has been set. Note that we
|
|
* only look at plain signatures so to keep all revocation
|
|
* signatures which may carry important information. */
|
|
for (node = subkeynode->next;
|
|
node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
|
|
node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!is_deleted_kbnode (node)
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
|
&& IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
|
|
{
|
|
any_choosen = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!any_choosen)
|
|
return 0; /* Ooops no chosen flag set - we can't decide. */
|
|
|
|
for (node = subkeynode->next;
|
|
node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
|
|
node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!is_deleted_kbnode (node)
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
|
&& IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
|
|
&& !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
|
|
{
|
|
delete_kbnode (node);
|
|
count++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This function only marks the deleted nodes and the caller is
|
|
* responsible to skip or remove them. Needs to be called after a
|
|
* merge_keys_and_selfsig. CLEAN_LEVEL is one of the KEY_CLEAN_*
|
|
* values. */
|
|
void
|
|
clean_all_subkeys (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int clean_level,
|
|
int *subkeys_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t first_subkey, node;
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_LOOKUP)
|
|
log_debug ("clean_all_subkeys: checking key %08lX\n",
|
|
(ulong) keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL));
|
|
|
|
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next)
|
|
if (!is_deleted_kbnode (node)
|
|
&& (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
|
|
break;
|
|
first_subkey = node;
|
|
|
|
/* Remove bogus subkey binding signatures: The only signatures
|
|
* allowed are of class 0x18 and 0x28. */
|
|
for (node = first_subkey; node; node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
|
&& !(IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
|
|
|| IS_SUBKEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature)))
|
|
{
|
|
delete_kbnode (node);
|
|
if (sigs_cleaned)
|
|
++*sigs_cleaned;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do the selected cleaning. */
|
|
if (clean_level > KEY_CLEAN_NONE)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Clean enitre subkeys. */
|
|
for (node = first_subkey; node; node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
if (clean_one_subkey (ctrl, node, noisy, clean_level))
|
|
{
|
|
if (subkeys_cleaned)
|
|
++*subkeys_cleaned;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clean duplicate signatures from a subkey. */
|
|
for (node = first_subkey; node; node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
n = clean_one_subkey_dupsigs (ctrl, node);
|
|
if (sigs_cleaned)
|
|
*sigs_cleaned += n;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|