gnupg/agent/protect.c

/* protect.c - Un/Protect a secret key
 * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
 *               2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 *
 * This file is part of GnuPG.
 *
 * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 * (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
 */

#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>

#include "agent.h"

#include "sexp-parse.h"

#define PROT_CIPHER        GCRY_CIPHER_AES
#define PROT_CIPHER_STRING "aes"
#define PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN (128/8)


/* A table containing the information needed to create a protected
   private key */
static struct {
  const char *algo;
  const char *parmlist;
  int prot_from, prot_to;
} protect_info[] = {
  { "rsa",  "nedpqu", 2, 5 },
  { "dsa",  "pqgyx", 4, 4 },
  { "elg",  "pgyx", 3, 3 },
  { NULL }
};


static int
hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo,
                 int s2kmode,
                 const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount,
                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);



/* Calculate the MIC for a private key S-Exp. SHA1HASH should pint to
   a 20 byte buffer.  This function is suitable for any algorithms. */
static int 
calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash)
{
  const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end;
  const unsigned char *s;
  size_t n;

  s = plainkey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); 
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
  hash_begin = s;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */

  while (*s == '(')
    {
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s += n;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s += n;
      if ( *s != ')' )
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s++;
    }
  if (*s != ')')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  s++;
  hash_end = s;

  gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, sha1hash,
                       hash_begin, hash_end - hash_begin);

  return 0;
}



/* Encrypt the parameter block starting at PROTBEGIN with length
   PROTLEN using the utf8 encoded key PASSPHRASE and return the entire
   encrypted block in RESULT or ereturn with an error code.  SHA1HASH
   is the 20 byte SHA-1 hash required for the integrity code.

   The parameter block is expected to be an incomplete S-Expression of
   the form (example in advanced format):

     (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#)
     (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#)
     (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#)
     (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) 

   the returned block is the S-Expression:

    (protected mode (parms) encrypted_octet_string)

*/
static int
do_encryption (const char *protbegin, size_t protlen, 
               const char *passphrase,  const unsigned char *sha1hash,
               unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
{
  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
  const char *modestr = "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc";
  int blklen, enclen, outlen;
  char *iv = NULL;
  int rc;
  char *outbuf = NULL;
  char *p;
  int saltpos, ivpos, encpos;

  rc = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, PROT_CIPHER, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
                         GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
  if (rc)
    return rc;


  /* We need to work on a copy of the data because this makes it
     easier to add the trailer and the padding and more important we
     have to prefix the text with 2 parenthesis, so we have to
     allocate enough space for:

     ((<parameter_list>)(4:hash4:sha120:<hashvalue>)) + padding

     We always append a full block of random bytes as padding but
     encrypt only what is needed for a full blocksize */
  blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (PROT_CIPHER);
  outlen = 2 + protlen + 2 + 6 + 6 + 23 + 2 + blklen;
  enclen = outlen/blklen * blklen;
  outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (outlen);
  if (!outbuf)
    rc = out_of_core ();
  if (!rc)
    {
      /* Allocate random bytes to be used as IV, padding and s2k salt. */
      iv = xtrymalloc (blklen*2+8);
      if (!iv)
        rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
      gcry_create_nonce (iv, blklen*2+8);
      rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, blklen);
    }
  if (!rc)
    {
      unsigned char *key;
      size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN;
      
      key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen);
      if (!key)
        rc = out_of_core ();
      else
        {
          rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1,
                                3, iv+2*blklen, 96, key, keylen);
          if (!rc)
            rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen);
          xfree (key);
        }
    }
  if (!rc)
    {
      p = outbuf;
      *p++ = '(';
      *p++ = '(';
      memcpy (p, protbegin, protlen);
      p += protlen;
      memcpy (p, ")(4:hash4:sha120:", 17);
      p += 17;
      memcpy (p, sha1hash, 20);
      p += 20;
      *p++ = ')';
      *p++ = ')';
      memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); 
      p += blklen;
      assert ( p - outbuf == outlen);
      rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, enclen, NULL, 0);
    }
  gcry_cipher_close (hd);
  if (rc)
    {
      xfree (iv);
      xfree (outbuf);
      return rc;
    }

  /* Now allocate the buffer we want to return.  This is

     (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc
       ((sha1 salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv)
       encrypted_octet_string)
       
     in canoncical format of course.  We use asprintf and %n modifier
     and spaces as palceholders.  */
  asprintf (&p,
            "(9:protected%d:%s((4:sha18:%n_8bytes_2:96)%d:%n%*s)%d:%n%*s)",
            (int)strlen (modestr), modestr,
            &saltpos, 
            blklen, &ivpos, blklen, "",
            enclen, &encpos, enclen, "");
  if (p)
    { /* asprintf does not use our malloc system */
      char *psave = p;
      p = xtrymalloc (strlen (psave)+1);
      if (p)
        strcpy (p, psave);
      free (psave);
    }
  if (!p)
    {
      gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core ();
      xfree (iv);
      xfree (outbuf);
      return tmperr;
    }
  *resultlen = strlen (p);
  *result = p;
  memcpy (p+saltpos, iv+2*blklen, 8);
  memcpy (p+ivpos, iv, blklen);
  memcpy (p+encpos, outbuf, enclen);
  xfree (iv);
  xfree (outbuf);
  return 0;
}



/* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in plainkey.  We assume
   a valid S-Exp here. */
int 
agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase,
               unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
{
  int rc;
  const unsigned char *s;
  const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end;
  const unsigned char *prot_begin, *prot_end, *real_end;
  size_t n;
  int c, infidx, i;
  unsigned char hashvalue[20];
  unsigned char *protected;
  size_t protectedlen;
  int depth = 0;
  unsigned char *p;

  s = plainkey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  depth++;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); 
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
  depth++;
  hash_begin = s;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 

  for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo
              && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++)
    ;
  if (!protect_info[infidx].algo)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); 

  prot_begin = prot_end = NULL;
  for (i=0; (c=protect_info[infidx].parmlist[i]); i++)
    {
      if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_from)
        prot_begin = s;
      if (*s != '(')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
      depth++;
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      if (n != 1 || c != *s)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s += n;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s +=n; /* skip value */
      if (*s != ')')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      depth--;
      if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_to)
        prot_end = s;
      s++;
    }
  if (*s != ')' || !prot_begin || !prot_end )
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  depth--;
  hash_end = s;
  s++;
  /* skip to the end of the S-exp */
  assert (depth == 1);
  rc = sskip (&s, &depth);
  if (rc)
    return rc;
  assert (!depth);
  real_end = s-1;

  gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hashvalue,
                       hash_begin, hash_end - hash_begin + 1);

  rc = do_encryption (prot_begin, prot_end - prot_begin + 1,
                      passphrase,  hashvalue,
                      &protected, &protectedlen);
  if (rc)
    return rc;

  /* Now create the protected version of the key.  Note that the 10
     extra bytes are for for the inserted "protected-" string (the
     beginning of the plaintext reads: "((11:private-key(" ). */
  *resultlen = (10
                + (prot_begin-plainkey)
                + protectedlen
                + (real_end-prot_end));
  *result = p = xtrymalloc (*resultlen);
  if (!p)
    {
      gpg_error_t tmperr = out_of_core ();
      xfree (protected);
      return tmperr;
    }
  memcpy (p, "(21:protected-", 14);
  p += 14;
  memcpy (p, plainkey+4, prot_begin - plainkey - 4);
  p += prot_begin - plainkey - 4;
  memcpy (p, protected, protectedlen);
  p += protectedlen;
  memcpy (p, prot_end+1, real_end - prot_end);
  p += real_end - prot_end;
  assert ( p - *result == *resultlen);
  xfree (protected);
  return 0;
}


/* Do the actual decryption and check the return list for consistency.  */
static int
do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, 
               const char *passphrase, 
               const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount,
               const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
               unsigned char **result)
{
  int rc = 0;
  int blklen;
  gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
  unsigned char *outbuf;
  size_t reallen;

  blklen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (PROT_CIPHER);
  if (protectedlen < 4 || (protectedlen%blklen))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);

  rc = gcry_cipher_open (&hd, PROT_CIPHER, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC,
                         GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE);
  if (rc)
    return rc;

  outbuf = gcry_malloc_secure (protectedlen);
  if (!outbuf)
    rc = out_of_core ();
  if (!rc)
    rc = gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, iv, ivlen);
  if (!rc)
    {
      unsigned char *key;
      size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN;
      
      key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen);
      if (!key)
        rc = out_of_core ();
      else
        {
          rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1,
                                3, s2ksalt, s2kcount, key, keylen);
          if (!rc)
            rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen);
          xfree (key);
        }
    }
  if (!rc)
    rc = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, outbuf, protectedlen,
                              protected, protectedlen);
  gcry_cipher_close (hd);
  if (rc)
    {
      xfree (outbuf);
      return rc;
    }
  /* Do a quick check first. */
  if (*outbuf != '(' && outbuf[1] != '(')
    {
      xfree (outbuf);
      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
    }
  /* Check that we have a consistent S-Exp. */
  reallen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (outbuf, protectedlen, NULL, NULL);
  if (!reallen || (reallen + blklen < protectedlen) )
    {
      xfree (outbuf);
      return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
    }
  *result = outbuf;
  return 0;
}


/* Merge the parameter list contained in CLEARTEXT with the original
   protect lists PROTECTEDKEY by replacing the list at REPLACEPOS.
   Return the new list in RESULT and the MIC value in the 20 byte
   buffer SHA1HASH. */
static int
merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey,
             size_t replacepos, 
             const unsigned char *cleartext,
             unsigned char *sha1hash,
             unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
{
  size_t n, newlistlen;
  unsigned char *newlist, *p;
  const unsigned char *s;
  const unsigned char *startpos, *endpos;
  int i, rc;
  
  if (replacepos < 26)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);

  /* Estimate the required size of the resulting list.  We have a large
     safety margin of >20 bytes (MIC hash from CLEARTEXT and the
     removed "protected-" */
  newlistlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (protectedkey, 0, NULL, NULL);
  if (!newlistlen)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
  n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (cleartext, 0, NULL, NULL);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
  newlistlen += n;
  newlist = gcry_malloc_secure (newlistlen);
  if (!newlist)
    return out_of_core ();

  /* Copy the initial segment */
  strcpy (newlist, "(11:private-key");
  p = newlist + 15;
  memcpy (p, protectedkey+15+10, replacepos-15-10);
  p += replacepos-15-10;

  /* copy the cleartext */
  s = cleartext;
  if (*s != '(' && s[1] != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);  /*we already checked this */
  s += 2;
  startpos = s;
  while ( *s == '(' )
    {
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        goto invalid_sexp;
      s += n;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        goto invalid_sexp;
      s += n;
      if ( *s != ')' )
        goto invalid_sexp;
      s++;
    }
  if ( *s != ')' )
    goto invalid_sexp;
  endpos = s;
  s++;
  /* short intermezzo: Get the MIC */
  if (*s != '(')
    goto invalid_sexp;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "hash"))
    goto invalid_sexp;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1"))
    goto invalid_sexp; 
  n = snext (&s);
  if (n != 20)
    goto invalid_sexp;
  memcpy (sha1hash, s, 20);
  s += n;
  if (*s != ')')
    goto invalid_sexp;
  /* end intermezzo */

  /* append the parameter list */
  memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos);
  p += endpos - startpos;
  
  /* skip overt the protected list element in the original list */
  s = protectedkey + replacepos;
  assert (*s == '(');
  s++;
  i = 1;
  rc = sskip (&s, &i);
  if (rc)
    goto failure;
  startpos = s;
  i = 2; /* we are inside this level */
  rc = sskip (&s, &i);
  if (rc)
    goto failure;
  assert (s[-1] == ')');
  endpos = s; /* one behind the end of the list */

  /* append the rest */
  memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos);
  p += endpos - startpos;

  /* ready */
  *result = newlist;
  *resultlen = newlistlen;
  return 0;

 failure:
  wipememory (newlist, newlistlen);
  xfree (newlist);
  return rc;

 invalid_sexp:
  wipememory (newlist, newlistlen);
  xfree (newlist);
  return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
}



/* Unprotect the key encoded in canonical format.  We assume a valid
   S-Exp here. */
int 
agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase,
                 unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen)
{
  int rc;
  const unsigned char *s;
  size_t n;
  int infidx, i;
  unsigned char sha1hash[20], sha1hash2[20];
  const unsigned char *s2ksalt;
  unsigned long s2kcount;
  const unsigned char *iv;
  const unsigned char *prot_begin;
  unsigned char *cleartext;
  unsigned char *final;
  size_t finallen;

  s = protectedkey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); 
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 

  for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo
              && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++)
    ;
  if (!protect_info[infidx].algo)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); 

  /* Now find the list with the protected information.  Here is an
     example for such a list:
     (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc 
        ((sha1 <salt> <count>) <Initialization_Vector>)
        <encrypted_data>)
   */
  for (;;)
    {
      if (*s != '(')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
      prot_begin = s;
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      if (smatch (&s, n, "protected"))
        break;
      s += n;
      i = 1;
      rc = sskip (&s, &i);
      if (rc)
        return rc;
    }
  /* found */
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION);
  if (*s != '(' || s[1] != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  s += 2;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION);
  n = snext (&s);
  if (n != 8)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);
  s2ksalt = s;
  s += n;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);
  /* We expect a list close as next, so we can simply use strtoul()
     here.  We might want to check that we only have digits - but this
     is nothing we should worry about */
  if (s[n] != ')' )
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  s2kcount = strtoul (s, NULL, 10);
  if (!s2kcount)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);
  s += n;
  s++; /* skip list end */

  n = snext (&s);
  if (n != 16) /* Wrong blocksize for IV (we support only aes-128). */
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);
  iv = s;
  s += n;
  if (*s != ')' )
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  
  rc = do_decryption (s, n,
                      passphrase, s2ksalt, s2kcount,
                      iv, 16,
                      &cleartext);
  if (rc)
    return rc;

  rc = merge_lists (protectedkey, prot_begin-protectedkey, cleartext,
                    sha1hash, &final, &finallen);
  /* Albeit cleartext has been allocated in secure memory and thus
     xfree will wipe it out, we do an extra wipe just in case
     somethings goes badly wrong. */
  wipememory (cleartext, prot_begin-protectedkey);
  xfree (cleartext);
  if (rc)
    return rc;

  rc = calculate_mic (final, sha1hash2);
  if (!rc && memcmp (sha1hash, sha1hash2, 20))
    rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CORRUPTED_PROTECTION);
  if (rc)
    {
      wipememory (final, finallen);
      xfree (final);
      return rc;
    }

  *result = final;
  *resultlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (final, 0, NULL, NULL);
  return 0;
}

/* Check the type of the private key, this is one of the constants:
   PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN if we can't figure out the type (this is the
   value 0), PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR for an unprotected private key.
   PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED for an protected private key or
   PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED for a sub key where the secret parts are stored
   elsewhere. */
int
agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey)
{
  const unsigned char *s;
  size_t n;

  s = privatekey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN;
  if (smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key"))
    return PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED;
  if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key"))
    return PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED;
  if (smatch (&s, n, "private-key"))
    return PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR;
  return PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN;
}



/* Transform a passphrase into a suitable key of length KEYLEN and
   store this key in the caller provided buffer KEY.  The caller must
   provide an HASHALGO, a valid S2KMODE (see rfc-2440) and depending on
   that mode an S2KSALT of 8 random bytes and an S2KCOUNT (a suitable
   value is 96).
  
   Returns an error code on failure.  */
static int
hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo,
                 int s2kmode,
                 const unsigned char *s2ksalt,
                 unsigned long s2kcount,
                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
  int rc;
  gcry_md_hd_t md;
  int pass, i;
  int used = 0;
  int pwlen = strlen (passphrase);

  if ( (s2kmode != 0 && s2kmode != 1 && s2kmode != 3)
      || !hashalgo || !keylen || !key || !passphrase)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
  if ((s2kmode == 1 ||s2kmode == 3) && !s2ksalt)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
  
  rc = gcry_md_open (&md, hashalgo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE);
  if (rc)
    return rc;

  for (pass=0; used < keylen; pass++)
    {
      if (pass)
        {
          gcry_md_reset (md);
          for (i=0; i < pass; i++) /* preset the hash context */
            gcry_md_putc (md, 0);
	}

      if (s2kmode == 1 || s2kmode == 3)
        {
          int len2 = pwlen + 8;
          unsigned long count = len2;

          if (s2kmode == 3)
            {
              count = (16ul + (s2kcount & 15)) << ((s2kcount >> 4) + 6);
              if (count < len2)
                count = len2;
            }

          while (count > len2)
            {
              gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8);
              gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen);
              count -= len2;
            }
          if (count < 8)
            gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, count);
          else 
            {
              gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8);
              count -= 8;
              gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, count);
            }
        }
      else
        gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen);
      
      gcry_md_final (md);
      i = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hashalgo);
      if (i > keylen - used)
        i = keylen - used;
      memcpy  (key+used, gcry_md_read (md, hashalgo), i);
      used += i;
    }
  gcry_md_close(md);
  return 0;
}



/* Create a shadow key from a public key.  We use the shadow protocol
  "ti-v1" and insert the S-expressionn SHADOW_INFO.  The resulting
  S-expression is returned in an allocated buffer RESULT will point
  to. The input parameters are expected to be valid canonilized
  S-expressions */
int 
agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey,
                  const unsigned char *shadow_info,
                  unsigned char **result)
{
  const unsigned char *s;
  const unsigned char *point;
  size_t n;
  int depth = 0;
  unsigned char *p;
  size_t pubkey_len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (pubkey, 0, NULL,NULL);
  size_t shadow_info_len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (shadow_info, 0, NULL,NULL);

  if (!pubkey_len || !shadow_info_len)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
  s = pubkey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  depth++;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "public-key"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); 
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
  depth++;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s); 
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */

  while (*s != ')')
    {
      if (*s != '(')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
      depth++;
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n) 
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s += n;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s +=n; /* skip value */
      if (*s != ')')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      depth--;
      s++;
    }
  point = s; /* insert right before the point */
  depth--;
  s++;
  assert (depth == 1);

  /* calculate required length by taking in account: the "shadowed-"
     prefix, the "shadowed", "t1-v1" as well as some parenthesis */
  n = 12 + pubkey_len + 1 + 3+8 + 2+5 + shadow_info_len + 1;
  *result = p = xtrymalloc (n);
  if (!p)
      return out_of_core ();
  p = stpcpy (p, "(20:shadowed-private-key");
  /* (10:public-key ...)*/
  memcpy (p, pubkey+14, point - (pubkey+14));
  p += point - (pubkey+14);
  p = stpcpy (p, "(8:shadowed5:t1-v1");
  memcpy (p, shadow_info, shadow_info_len);
  p += shadow_info_len;
  *p++ = ')';
  memcpy (p, point, pubkey_len - (point - pubkey));
  p += pubkey_len - (point - pubkey);

  return 0;
}

/* Parse a canonical encoded shadowed key and return a pointer to the
   inner list with the shadow_info */
int 
agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey,
                       unsigned char const **shadow_info)
{
  const unsigned char *s;
  size_t n;
  int depth = 0;

  s = shadowkey;
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
  depth++;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (!smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key"))
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); 
  if (*s != '(')
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
  depth++;
  s++;
  n = snext (&s); 
  if (!n)
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */

  for (;;)
    {
      if (*s == ')')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP);
      if (*s != '(')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
      depth++;
      s++;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n) 
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed"))
        break;
      s += n;
      n = snext (&s);
      if (!n)
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      s +=n; /* skip value */
      if (*s != ')')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
      depth--;
      s++;
    }
  /* Found the shadowed list, S points to the protocol */
  n = snext (&s);
  if (!n) 
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); 
  if (smatch (&s, n, "t1-v1"))
    {
      if (*s != '(')
        return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP);
      *shadow_info = s;
    }
  else
    return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
  return 0;
}