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eff62d82bf
sm/ * call-dirmngr.c (inq_certificate): Add new inquire SENDCERT_SKI. * certlist.c (gpgsm_find_cert): Add new arg KEYID and implement this filter. Changed all callers. * certchain.c (find_up_search_by_keyid): New helper. (find_up): Also try using the AKI.keyIdentifier. (find_up_external): Ditto.
485 lines
14 KiB
C
485 lines
14 KiB
C
/* certlist.c - build list of certificates
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* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "gpgsm.h"
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#include <gcrypt.h>
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#include <ksba.h>
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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static const char oid_kp_serverAuth[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1";
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static const char oid_kp_clientAuth[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2";
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static const char oid_kp_codeSigning[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3";
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static const char oid_kp_emailProtection[]= "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4";
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static const char oid_kp_timeStamping[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8";
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static const char oid_kp_ocspSigning[] = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9";
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/* Return 0 if the cert is usable for encryption. A MODE of 0 checks
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for signing a MODE of 1 checks for encryption, a MODE of 2 checks
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for verification and a MODE of 3 for decryption (just for
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debugging). MODE 4 is for certificate signing, MODE for COSP
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response signing. */
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static int
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cert_usage_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int mode)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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unsigned int use;
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char *extkeyusages;
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int have_ocsp_signing = 0;
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err = ksba_cert_get_ext_key_usages (cert, &extkeyusages);
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if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
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err = 0; /* no policy given */
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if (!err)
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{
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unsigned int extusemask = ~0; /* Allow all. */
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if (extkeyusages)
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{
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char *p, *pend;
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int any_critical = 0;
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extusemask = 0;
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p = extkeyusages;
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while (p && (pend=strchr (p, ':')))
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{
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*pend++ = 0;
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/* Only care about critical flagged usages. */
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if ( *pend == 'C' )
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{
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any_critical = 1;
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if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_serverAuth))
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extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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else if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_clientAuth))
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extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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else if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_codeSigning))
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extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE);
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else if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_emailProtection))
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extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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else if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_timeStamping))
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extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
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| KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION);
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}
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/* This is a hack to cope with OCSP. Note that we do
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not yet fully comply with the requirements and that
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the entire CRL/OCSP checking thing should undergo a
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thorough review and probably redesign. */
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if ( !strcmp (p, oid_kp_ocspSigning))
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have_ocsp_signing = 1;
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if ((p = strchr (pend, '\n')))
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p++;
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}
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xfree (extkeyusages);
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extkeyusages = NULL;
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if (!any_critical)
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extusemask = ~0; /* Reset to the don't care mask. */
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}
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err = ksba_cert_get_key_usage (cert, &use);
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if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
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{
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err = 0;
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if (opt.verbose && mode < 2)
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log_info (_("no key usage specified - assuming all usages\n"));
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use = ~0;
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}
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/* Apply extKeyUsage. */
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use &= extusemask;
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}
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if (err)
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{
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log_error (_("error getting key usage information: %s\n"),
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gpg_strerror (err));
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xfree (extkeyusages);
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return err;
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}
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if (mode == 4)
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{
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if ((use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN)))
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return 0;
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log_info (_("certificate should have not "
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"been used for certification\n"));
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE);
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}
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if (mode == 5)
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{
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if (use != ~0
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&& (have_ocsp_signing
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|| (use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN
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|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))))
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return 0;
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log_info (_("certificate should have not "
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"been used for OCSP response signing\n"));
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE);
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}
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if ((use & ((mode&1)?
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(KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT):
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(KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION)))
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)
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return 0;
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log_info (mode==3? _("certificate should have not been used for encryption\n"):
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mode==2? _("certificate should have not been used for signing\n"):
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mode==1? _("certificate is not usable for encryption\n"):
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_("certificate is not usable for signing\n"));
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE);
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}
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/* Return 0 if the cert is usable for signing */
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 0);
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}
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/* Return 0 if the cert is usable for encryption */
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 1);
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}
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 2);
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}
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_decrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 3);
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}
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 4);
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}
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int
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gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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return cert_usage_p (cert, 5);
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}
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static int
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same_subject_issuer (const char *subject, const char *issuer, ksba_cert_t cert)
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{
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char *subject2 = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
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char *issuer2 = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
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int tmp;
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tmp = (subject && subject2
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&& !strcmp (subject, subject2)
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&& issuer && issuer2
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&& !strcmp (issuer, issuer2));
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xfree (subject2);
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xfree (issuer2);
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return tmp;
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}
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/* Return true if CERT is already contained in CERTLIST. */
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static int
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is_cert_in_certlist (ksba_cert_t cert, certlist_t certlist)
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{
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const unsigned char *img_a, *img_b;
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size_t len_a, len_b;
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img_a = ksba_cert_get_image (cert, &len_a);
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if (img_a)
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{
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for ( ; certlist; certlist = certlist->next)
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{
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img_b = ksba_cert_get_image (certlist->cert, &len_b);
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if (img_b && len_a == len_b && !memcmp (img_a, img_b, len_a))
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return 1; /* Already contained. */
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Add CERT to the list of certificates at CERTADDR but avoid
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duplicates. */
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int
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gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
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certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to)
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{
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if (!is_cert_in_certlist (cert, *listaddr))
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{
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certlist_t cl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *cl);
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if (!cl)
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return OUT_OF_CORE (errno);
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cl->cert = cert;
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ksba_cert_ref (cert);
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cl->next = *listaddr;
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cl->is_encrypt_to = is_encrypt_to;
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*listaddr = cl;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Add a certificate to a list of certificate and make sure that it is
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a valid certificate. With SECRET set to true a secret key must be
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available for the certificate. IS_ENCRYPT_TO sets the corresponding
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flag in the new create LISTADDR item. */
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int
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gpgsm_add_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *name, int secret,
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CERTLIST *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to)
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{
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int rc;
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KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
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KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
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ksba_cert_t cert = NULL;
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rc = keydb_classify_name (name, &desc);
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if (!rc)
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{
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kh = keydb_new (0);
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if (!kh)
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
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else
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{
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int wrong_usage = 0;
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char *subject = NULL;
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char *issuer = NULL;
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get_next:
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rc = keydb_search (kh, &desc, 1);
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if (!rc)
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rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert);
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if (!rc)
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{
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rc = secret? gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (cert)
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: gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (cert);
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if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE)
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{
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/* There might be another certificate with the
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correct usage, so we try again */
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if (!wrong_usage)
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{ /* save the first match */
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wrong_usage = rc;
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subject = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
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issuer = ksba_cert_get_subject (cert, 0);
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ksba_cert_release (cert);
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cert = NULL;
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goto get_next;
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}
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else if (same_subject_issuer (subject, issuer, cert))
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{
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wrong_usage = rc;
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ksba_cert_release (cert);
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cert = NULL;
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goto get_next;
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}
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else
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wrong_usage = rc;
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}
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}
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/* We want the error code from the first match in this case. */
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if (rc && wrong_usage)
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rc = wrong_usage;
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if (!rc)
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{
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next_ambigious:
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rc = keydb_search (kh, &desc, 1);
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if (rc == -1)
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rc = 0;
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else if (!rc)
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{
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ksba_cert_t cert2 = NULL;
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/* We have to ignore ambigious names as long as
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there only fault is a bad key usage */
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if (!keydb_get_cert (kh, &cert2))
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{
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int tmp = (same_subject_issuer (subject, issuer, cert2)
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&& ((gpg_err_code (
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secret? gpgsm_cert_use_sign_p (cert2)
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: gpgsm_cert_use_encrypt_p (cert2)
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)
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) == GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE));
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ksba_cert_release (cert2);
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if (tmp)
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goto next_ambigious;
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}
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
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}
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}
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xfree (subject);
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xfree (issuer);
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if (!rc && !is_cert_in_certlist (cert, *listaddr))
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{
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if (!rc && secret)
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{
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char *p;
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
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p = gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (cert);
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if (p)
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{
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if (!gpgsm_agent_havekey (ctrl, p))
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rc = 0;
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xfree (p);
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}
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}
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if (!rc)
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rc = gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
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if (!rc)
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{
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CERTLIST cl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *cl);
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if (!cl)
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rc = OUT_OF_CORE (errno);
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else
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{
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cl->cert = cert; cert = NULL;
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cl->next = *listaddr;
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cl->is_encrypt_to = is_encrypt_to;
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*listaddr = cl;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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keydb_release (kh);
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ksba_cert_release (cert);
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return rc == -1? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY): rc;
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}
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void
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gpgsm_release_certlist (CERTLIST list)
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{
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while (list)
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{
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CERTLIST cl = list->next;
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ksba_cert_release (list->cert);
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xfree (list);
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list = cl;
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}
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}
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/* Like gpgsm_add_to_certlist, but look only for one certificate. No
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chain validation is done. If KEYID is not NULL it is take as an
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additional filter value which must match the
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subjectKeyIdentifier. */
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int
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gpgsm_find_cert (const char *name, ksba_sexp_t keyid, ksba_cert_t *r_cert)
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{
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int rc;
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KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
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KEYDB_HANDLE kh = NULL;
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*r_cert = NULL;
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rc = keydb_classify_name (name, &desc);
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if (!rc)
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{
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kh = keydb_new (0);
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if (!kh)
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
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else
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{
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nextone:
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rc = keydb_search (kh, &desc, 1);
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if (!rc)
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{
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rc = keydb_get_cert (kh, r_cert);
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if (!rc && keyid)
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{
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ksba_sexp_t subj;
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rc = ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (*r_cert, NULL, &subj);
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if (!rc)
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{
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if (cmp_simple_canon_sexp (keyid, subj))
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{
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xfree (subj);
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goto nextone;
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}
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xfree (subj);
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/* Okay: Here we know that the certificate's
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subjectKeyIdentifier matches the requested
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one. */
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}
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else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_DATA)
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goto nextone;
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}
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}
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/* If we don't have the KEYID filter we need to check for
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ambigious search results. Note, that it is somehwat
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reasonable to assume that a specification of a KEYID
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won't lead to ambiguous names. */
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if (!rc && !keyid)
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{
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rc = keydb_search (kh, &desc, 1);
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if (rc == -1)
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rc = 0;
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else
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{
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if (!rc)
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
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ksba_cert_release (*r_cert);
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*r_cert = NULL;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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keydb_release (kh);
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return rc == -1? gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY): rc;
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}
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