mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
synced 2024-11-10 21:38:50 +01:00
405 lines
11 KiB
C
405 lines
11 KiB
C
/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
|
*
|
|
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
*
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
|
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <config.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <gcrypt.h>
|
|
#include "util.h"
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
|
#include "keydb.h"
|
|
#include "main.h"
|
|
#include "options.h"
|
|
#include "i18n.h"
|
|
#include "status.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
* Emulate our old PK interface here - sometime in the future we might
|
|
* change the internal design to directly fit to libgcrypt.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
pk_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
|
|
{
|
|
GCRY_SEXP s_skey;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/* make a sexp from skey */
|
|
if( algo == GCRY_PK_DSA ) {
|
|
rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
|
|
"(private-key(dsa(p%m)(q%m)(g%m)(y%m)(x%m)))",
|
|
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4] );
|
|
}
|
|
else if( algo == GCRY_PK_ELG || algo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E ) {
|
|
rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
|
|
"(private-key(elg(p%m)(g%m)(y%m)(x%m)))",
|
|
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3] );
|
|
}
|
|
else if( algo == GCRY_PK_RSA ) {
|
|
rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
|
|
"(private-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)(d%m)(p%m)(q%m)(u%m)))",
|
|
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4], skey[5] );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return GPGERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
|
|
|
|
if ( rc )
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
|
|
rc = gcry_pk_testkey( s_skey );
|
|
gcry_sexp_release( s_skey );
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
|
|
{
|
|
u16 csum=0;
|
|
int i, res;
|
|
unsigned nbytes;
|
|
|
|
if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
|
|
DEK *dek = NULL;
|
|
u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
|
|
PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
|
|
|
|
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
|
|
log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
|
|
return GPGERR_GENERAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if( sk->protect.algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE )
|
|
BUG();
|
|
if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
|
|
log_info(_("protection algorithm %d is not supported\n"),
|
|
sk->protect.algo );
|
|
return GPGERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
|
|
}
|
|
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
|
|
keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
|
|
if( !sk->is_primary ) {
|
|
keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
|
|
keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
|
|
}
|
|
dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
|
|
&sk->protect.s2k, 0 );
|
|
/* Hmmm: Do we use sync mode here even for Twofish? */
|
|
if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
|
|
| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
|
|
0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ) )
|
|
) {
|
|
BUG();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
|
|
log_fatal("set key failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
|
|
gcry_free(dek);
|
|
save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
|
|
if( gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ))
|
|
log_fatal("set IV failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
|
|
csum = 0;
|
|
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
|
|
size_t ndata;
|
|
unsigned int ndatabits;
|
|
byte *p, *data;
|
|
u16 csumc = 0;
|
|
|
|
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
|
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
|
|
ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
|
|
if ( ndata > 1 )
|
|
csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
|
|
data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
|
|
gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
|
|
mpi_release( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
|
|
p = data;
|
|
if( ndata < 2 ) {
|
|
log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
|
|
sk->csum = 0;
|
|
csum = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
|
|
sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
|
|
if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
|
|
/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
|
|
sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
|
|
* because the length may have an arbitrary value */
|
|
if( sk->csum == csum ) {
|
|
for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
|
nbytes = ndata;
|
|
assert( gcry_is_secure( p ) );
|
|
res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
|
|
p, &nbytes);
|
|
if( res )
|
|
log_bug("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: rc=%d\n", res);
|
|
|
|
ndata -= nbytes;
|
|
p += nbytes;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
gcry_free(data);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
|
size_t ndata;
|
|
unsigned int ndatabits;
|
|
byte *p, *data;
|
|
|
|
assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
|
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
|
|
ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
|
|
data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
|
|
gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
|
|
gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
|
|
mpi_release( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
|
|
|
|
res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
|
|
data, &ndata );
|
|
if( res )
|
|
log_bug("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: rc=%d\n", res);
|
|
|
|
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
gcry_free( data );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
gcry_cipher_close( cipher_hd );
|
|
/* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
|
|
if( csum != sk->csum ) {
|
|
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
|
|
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
|
|
free_secret_key( save_sk );
|
|
return GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
|
|
}
|
|
/* the checksum may be correct in some cases,
|
|
* so we also check the key itself */
|
|
res = pk_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
|
|
if( res ) {
|
|
copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
|
|
passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
|
|
free_secret_key( save_sk );
|
|
return GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
|
|
}
|
|
free_secret_key( save_sk );
|
|
sk->is_protected = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
|
|
csum = 0;
|
|
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
|
assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
|
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
}
|
|
if( csum != sk->csum )
|
|
return GPGERR_CHECKSUM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
* Check the secret key
|
|
* Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if( n < 1 )
|
|
n = opt.batch? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i < n && rc == GPGERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
|
|
if( i )
|
|
log_info(_("Invalid passphrase; please try again ...\n"));
|
|
rc = do_check( sk );
|
|
if( rc == GPGERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
|
|
u32 kid[2];
|
|
char buf[50];
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
|
|
sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
|
|
write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
|
|
}
|
|
if( have_static_passphrase() )
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( !rc )
|
|
write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
* check whether the secret key is protected.
|
|
* Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk )
|
|
{
|
|
return sk->is_protected? sk->protect.algo : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/****************
|
|
* Protect the secret key with the passphrase from DEK
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
|
|
{
|
|
int i,j, rc = 0;
|
|
byte *buffer;
|
|
unsigned nbytes;
|
|
u16 csum;
|
|
|
|
if( !dek )
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
|
|
rc = GPGERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
|
|
else {
|
|
print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
|
|
if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
|
|
GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
|
|
| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
|
|
0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ))
|
|
) {
|
|
BUG();
|
|
}
|
|
rc = gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
|
|
if( rc == GCRYERR_WEAK_KEY ) {
|
|
log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
|
|
" - please change passphrase again.\n"));
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else if( rc )
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
/* set the IV length */
|
|
{ int blocksize = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen( sk->protect.algo );
|
|
if( blocksize != 8 && blocksize != 16 )
|
|
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %d\n", blocksize );
|
|
sk->protect.ivlen = blocksize;
|
|
assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
|
|
}
|
|
gcry_randomize(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen,
|
|
GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
|
|
gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: replace set/get buffer */
|
|
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
|
|
byte *bufarr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
|
|
unsigned narr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
|
|
unsigned nbits[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
|
|
int ndata=0;
|
|
byte *p, *data;
|
|
|
|
for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
|
|
assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
|
|
|
if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, (void**)bufarr+j,
|
|
narr+j, sk->skey[i]))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
nbits[j] = gcry_mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
ndata += narr[j] + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
for( ; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
|
|
bufarr[j] = NULL;
|
|
ndata += 2; /* for checksum */
|
|
|
|
data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
|
|
p = data;
|
|
for(j=0; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
|
|
p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
|
|
p[1] = nbits[j];
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
|
|
p += narr[j];
|
|
gcry_free(bufarr[j]);
|
|
}
|
|
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
|
|
sk->csum = csum;
|
|
*p++ = csum >> 8;
|
|
*p++ = csum;
|
|
assert( p == data+ndata );
|
|
gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, NULL, 0 );
|
|
for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
|
mpi_release( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
sk->skey[i] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata*8 );
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* NOTE: we always recalculate the checksum because there
|
|
* are some test releases which calculated it wrong */
|
|
/* FIXME: Replace this code -- Hmmm: why */
|
|
csum = 0;
|
|
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
|
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
|
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
|
|
if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
|
|
&buffer, &nbytes, sk->skey[i] ) )
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
|
|
assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
|
gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, nbytes, NULL, 0 );
|
|
gcry_mpi_release( sk->skey[i] );
|
|
if( gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
|
|
buffer,&nbytes ) )
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
gcry_free( buffer );
|
|
}
|
|
sk->csum = csum;
|
|
}
|
|
sk->is_protected = 1;
|
|
gcry_cipher_close( cipher_hd );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|