mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
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55ba204bfa
Pass PINENTRY_USER_DATA and XAUTHORITY to Pinentry. Improved support for the quality bar. Minor internal restructuring. Translation fixes.
757 lines
22 KiB
C
757 lines
22 KiB
C
/* export.c
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
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* 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "gpg.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "status.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "trustdb.h"
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/* An object to keep track of subkeys. */
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struct subkey_list_s
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{
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struct subkey_list_s *next;
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u32 kid[2];
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};
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typedef struct subkey_list_s *subkey_list_t;
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static int do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options );
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static int do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret,
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KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options,
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int *any );
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static int build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent);
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int
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parse_export_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
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{
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struct parse_options export_opts[]=
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{
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{"export-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
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N_("export signatures that are marked as local-only")},
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{"export-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,
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N_("export attribute user IDs (generally photo IDs)")},
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{"export-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,
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N_("export revocation keys marked as \"sensitive\"")},
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{"export-reset-subkey-passwd",EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD,NULL,
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N_("remove the passphrase from exported subkeys")},
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{"export-clean",EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
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N_("remove unusable parts from key during export")},
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{"export-minimal",EXPORT_MINIMAL|EXPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
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N_("remove as much as possible from key during export")},
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{"export-sexp-format",EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT, NULL,
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N_("export keys in an S-expression based format")},
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/* Aliases for backward compatibility */
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{"include-local-sigs",EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
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{"include-attributes",EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES,NULL,NULL},
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{"include-sensitive-revkeys",EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS,NULL,NULL},
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/* dummy */
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{"export-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
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{"export-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
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{"export-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
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{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
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/* add tags for include revoked and disabled? */
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};
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return parse_options(str,options,export_opts,noisy);
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}
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/****************
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* Export the public keys (to standard out or --output).
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* Depending on opt.armor the output is armored.
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* options are defined in main.h.
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* If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported. */
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int
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export_pubkeys( strlist_t users, unsigned int options )
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{
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return do_export( users, 0, options );
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}
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/****************
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* Export to an already opened stream; return -1 if no keys have
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* been exported
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*/
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int
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export_pubkeys_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users,
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KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options )
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{
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int any, rc;
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rc = do_export_stream( out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any );
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if( !rc && !any )
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rc = -1;
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return rc;
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}
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int
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export_seckeys( strlist_t users )
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{
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/* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */
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unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT);
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return do_export( users, 1, options );
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}
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int
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export_secsubkeys( strlist_t users )
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{
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/* Use only relevant options for the secret key. */
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unsigned int options = (opt.export_options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT);
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return do_export( users, 2, options );
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}
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static int
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do_export( strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options )
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{
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IOBUF out = NULL;
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int any, rc;
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armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
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compress_filter_context_t zfx;
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memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
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rc = open_outfile( NULL, 0, &out );
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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if (!(options & EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
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{
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if ( opt.armor )
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{
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afx = new_armor_context ();
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afx->what = secret? 5 : 1;
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push_armor_filter (afx, out);
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}
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if ( opt.compress_keys )
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push_compress_filter (out,&zfx,default_compress_algo());
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}
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rc = do_export_stream ( out, users, secret, NULL, options, &any );
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if ( rc || !any )
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iobuf_cancel (out);
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else
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iobuf_close (out);
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release_armor_context (afx);
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return rc;
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}
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/* Release an entire subkey list. */
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static void
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release_subkey_list (subkey_list_t list)
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{
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while (list)
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{
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subkey_list_t tmp = list->next;;
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xfree (list);
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list = tmp;
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}
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}
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/* Returns true if NODE is a subkey and contained in LIST. */
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static int
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subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list_t list, KBNODE node)
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{
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
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{
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u32 kid[2];
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
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keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
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else
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keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
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for (; list; list = list->next)
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if (list->kid[0] == kid[0] && list->kid[1] == kid[1])
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Allocate a new subkey list item from NODE. */
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static subkey_list_t
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new_subkey_list_item (KBNODE node)
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{
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subkey_list_t list = xcalloc (1, sizeof *list);
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
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keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, list->kid);
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else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, list->kid);
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return list;
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}
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/* Helper function to check whether the subkey at NODE actually
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matches the description at DESC. The function returns true if the
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key under question has been specified by an exact specification
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(keyID or fingerprint) and does match the one at NODE. It is
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assumed that the packet at NODE is either a public or secret
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subkey. */
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static int
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exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node)
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{
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u32 kid[2];
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byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
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size_t fprlen;
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int result = 0;
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switch(desc->mode)
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{
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
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keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
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else
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keyid_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, kid);
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break;
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
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fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr,&fprlen);
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else
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fingerprint_from_sk (node->pkt->pkt.secret_key, fpr,&fprlen);
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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switch(desc->mode)
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{
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
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if (desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
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result = 1;
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break;
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
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if (desc->u.kid[0] == kid[0] && desc->u.kid[1] == kid[1])
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result = 1;
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break;
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
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if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 16))
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result = 1;
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break;
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
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case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
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if (!memcmp (desc->u.fpr, fpr, 20))
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result = 1;
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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return result;
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}
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/* If keyblock_out is non-NULL, AND the exit code is zero, then it
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contains a pointer to the first keyblock found and exported. No
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other keyblocks are exported. The caller must free it. */
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static int
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do_export_stream( IOBUF out, strlist_t users, int secret,
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KBNODE *keyblock_out, unsigned int options, int *any )
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{
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int rc = 0;
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PACKET pkt;
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KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
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KBNODE kbctx, node;
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size_t ndesc, descindex;
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KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc = NULL;
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subkey_list_t subkey_list = NULL; /* Track alreay processed subkeys. */
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KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd;
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strlist_t sl;
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int indent = 0;
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*any = 0;
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init_packet( &pkt );
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kdbhd = keydb_new (secret);
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if (!users) {
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ndesc = 1;
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desc = xcalloc ( ndesc, sizeof *desc );
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desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
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}
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else {
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for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
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;
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desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
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for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next) {
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if (classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc))
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ndesc++;
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else
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log_error (_("key \"%s\" not found: %s\n"),
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sl->d, g10_errstr (G10ERR_INV_USER_ID));
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}
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/* It would be nice to see which of the given users did
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actually match one in the keyring. To implement this we
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need to have a found flag for each entry in desc and to set
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this we must check all those entries after a match to mark
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all matched one - currently we stop at the first match. To
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do this we need an extra flag to enable this feature so */
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}
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#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
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if (secret) {
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log_error (_("exporting secret keys not allowed\n"));
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rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
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goto leave;
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}
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#endif
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while (!(rc = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex))) {
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int sha1_warned=0,skip_until_subkey=0;
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u32 sk_keyid[2];
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if (!users)
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desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
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/* Read the keyblock. */
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rc = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock );
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if( rc ) {
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log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
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goto leave;
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}
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if((node=find_kbnode(keyblock,PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
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{
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PKT_secret_key *sk=node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
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keyid_from_sk(sk,sk_keyid);
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/* We can't apply GNU mode 1001 on an unprotected key. */
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if( secret == 2 && !sk->is_protected )
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{
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log_info(_("key %s: not protected - skipped\n"),
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keystr(sk_keyid));
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continue;
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}
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/* No v3 keys with GNU mode 1001. */
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if( secret == 2 && sk->version == 3 )
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{
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log_info(_("key %s: PGP 2.x style key - skipped\n"),
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keystr(sk_keyid));
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continue;
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}
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/* It does not make sense to export a key with a primary
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key on card using a non-key stub. We simply skip those
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keys when used with --export-secret-subkeys. */
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if (secret == 2 && sk->is_protected
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&& sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
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{
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log_info(_("key %s: key material on-card - skipped\n"),
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keystr(sk_keyid));
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continue;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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/* It's a public key export, so do the cleaning if
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requested. Note that both export-clean and
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export-minimal only apply to UID sigs (0x10, 0x11,
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0x12, and 0x13). A designated revocation is never
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stripped, even with export-minimal set. */
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if(options&EXPORT_CLEAN)
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clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&EXPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
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}
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/* And write it. */
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for( kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0 )); ) {
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if( skip_until_subkey )
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{
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if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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skip_until_subkey=0;
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else
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continue;
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}
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/* We used to use comment packets, but not any longer. In
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case we still have comments on a key, strip them here
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before we call build_packet(). */
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if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT )
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continue;
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/* Make sure that ring_trust packets never get exported. */
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
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continue;
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/* If exact is set, then we only export what was requested
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(plus the primary key, if the user didn't specifically
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request it). */
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if(desc[descindex].exact
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&& (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
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{
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if (!exact_subkey_match_p (desc+descindex, node))
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{
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/* Before skipping this subkey, check whether any
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other description wants an exact match on a
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subkey and include that subkey into the output
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too. Need to add this subkey to a list so that
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it won't get processed a second time.
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So the first step here is to check that list and
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skip in any case if the key is in that list.
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We need this whole mess because the import
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function is not able to merge secret keys and
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thus it is useless to output them as two
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separate keys and have import merge them. */
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if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))
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skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */
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else
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{
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size_t j;
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for (j=0; j < ndesc; j++)
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if (j != descindex && desc[j].exact
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&& exact_subkey_match_p (desc+j, node))
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break;
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if (!(j < ndesc))
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skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */
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}
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}
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if(skip_until_subkey)
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continue;
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/* Mark this one as processed. */
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{
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subkey_list_t tmp = new_subkey_list_item (node);
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tmp->next = subkey_list;
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subkey_list = tmp;
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}
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}
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if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
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{
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/* do not export packets which are marked as not
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exportable */
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if(!(options&EXPORT_LOCAL_SIGS)
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&& !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable)
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continue; /* not exportable */
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/* Do not export packets with a "sensitive" revocation
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key unless the user wants us to. Note that we do
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export these when issuing the actual revocation
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(see revoke.c). */
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if(!(options&EXPORT_SENSITIVE_REVKEYS)
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&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
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{
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int i;
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for(i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++)
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if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40)
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break;
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if(i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys)
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continue;
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}
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}
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/* Don't export attribs? */
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if( !(options&EXPORT_ATTRIBUTES) &&
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node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
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node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) {
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/* Skip until we get to something that is not an attrib
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or a signature on an attrib */
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while(kbctx->next && kbctx->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) {
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kbctx=kbctx->next;
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}
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continue;
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}
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if( secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
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{
|
|
/* We don't want to export the secret parts of the
|
|
* primary key, this is done by using GNU protection mode 1001
|
|
*/
|
|
int save_mode = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode;
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = 1001;
|
|
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
|
|
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
|
|
else
|
|
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode = save_mode;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (secret == 2 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
|
|
&& (opt.export_options&EXPORT_RESET_SUBKEY_PASSWD))
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the subkey is protected reset the passphrase to
|
|
export an unprotected subkey. This feature is
|
|
useful in cases of a subkey copied to an unattended
|
|
machine where a passphrase is not required. */
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk_save, *sk;
|
|
|
|
sk_save = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
|
sk = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk_save);
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
|
|
|
|
log_info (_("about to export an unprotected subkey\n"));
|
|
switch (is_secret_key_protected (sk))
|
|
{
|
|
case -1:
|
|
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
|
|
; /* No secret parts. */
|
|
else if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002 )
|
|
; /* Card key stub. */
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
{
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
|
|
free_secret_key (sk);
|
|
log_error (_("failed to unprotect the subkey: %s\n"),
|
|
g10_errstr (rc));
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
|
|
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
|
|
else
|
|
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
|
|
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk_save;
|
|
free_secret_key (sk);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Warn the user if the secret key or any of the secret
|
|
subkeys are protected with SHA1 and we have
|
|
simple_sk_checksum set. */
|
|
if(!sha1_warned && opt.simple_sk_checksum &&
|
|
(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY ||
|
|
node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) &&
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.sha1chk)
|
|
{
|
|
/* I hope this warning doesn't confuse people. */
|
|
log_info(_("WARNING: secret key %s does not have a "
|
|
"simple SK checksum\n"),keystr(sk_keyid));
|
|
|
|
sha1_warned=1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
|
|
rc = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
|
|
else
|
|
rc = build_packet (out, node->pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( rc ) {
|
|
log_error("build_packet(%d) failed: %s\n",
|
|
node->pkt->pkttype, g10_errstr(rc) );
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; indent; indent--)
|
|
iobuf_put (out, ')');
|
|
iobuf_put (out, '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
++*any;
|
|
if(keyblock_out)
|
|
{
|
|
*keyblock_out=keyblock;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT) && indent)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; indent; indent--)
|
|
iobuf_put (out, ')');
|
|
iobuf_put (out, '\n');
|
|
}
|
|
if( rc == -1 )
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
release_subkey_list (subkey_list);
|
|
xfree(desc);
|
|
keydb_release (kdbhd);
|
|
if(rc || keyblock_out==NULL)
|
|
release_kbnode( keyblock );
|
|
if( !*any )
|
|
log_info(_("WARNING: nothing exported\n"));
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
write_sexp_line (iobuf_t out, int *indent, const char *text)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < *indent; i++)
|
|
iobuf_put (out, ' ');
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, text);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (iobuf_t out, int *indent, const char *name, gcry_mpi_t a)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
unsigned char *buffer;
|
|
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(");
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, name);
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, " #");
|
|
|
|
rc = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, &buffer, NULL, a);
|
|
assert (!rc);
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, buffer);
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, "#)");
|
|
gcry_free (buffer);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
build_sexp_seckey (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_secret_key *sk = pkt->pkt.secret_key;
|
|
char tmpbuf[100];
|
|
|
|
if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
|
|
{
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, "(openpgp-key\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
iobuf_writestr (out, " (subkey\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
}
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(private-key\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
if (is_RSA (sk->pubkey_algo) && !sk->is_protected)
|
|
{
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(rsa\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "n", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "e", sk->skey[1]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "d", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "q", sk->skey[4]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "u", sk->skey[5]);
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
(*indent)--;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && !sk->is_protected)
|
|
{
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(dsa\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "q", sk->skey[1]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "g", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "y", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "x", sk->skey[4]);
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
(*indent)--;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (is_ELGAMAL (sk->pubkey_algo) && !sk->is_protected)
|
|
{
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(elg\n");
|
|
(*indent)++;
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "p", sk->skey[0]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "g", sk->skey[2]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "y", sk->skey[3]); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
write_sexp_keyparm (out, indent, "x", sk->skey[4]);
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
(*indent)--;
|
|
}
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, "(attrib\n"); (*indent)++;
|
|
sprintf (tmpbuf, "(created \"%lu\"", (unsigned long)sk->timestamp);
|
|
write_sexp_line (out, indent, tmpbuf);
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close created */
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close attrib */
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'); (*indent)--; /* close private-key */
|
|
if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
|
|
iobuf_put (out,')'), (*indent)--; /* close subkey */
|
|
iobuf_put (out,'\n');
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For some packet types we write them in a S-expression format. This
|
|
is still EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change. */
|
|
static int
|
|
build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
switch (pkt->pkttype)
|
|
{
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
|
|
rc = build_sexp_seckey (out, pkt, indent);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|