mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
synced 2024-11-08 21:18:51 +01:00
32ec480024
* common/openpgp-oid.c (oidtable): Support KEM for bp256 and bp384. * g10/pkglue.c (do_encrypt_kem): Ditto. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 6815 Note, this needs the very latest Libgcrypt to work properly
565 lines
16 KiB
C
565 lines
16 KiB
C
/* pubkey-enc.c - Process a public key encoded packet.
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2009,
|
|
* 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
|
*
|
|
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
*
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <config.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "gpg.h"
|
|
#include "../common/util.h"
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
|
#include "keydb.h"
|
|
#include "trustdb.h"
|
|
#include "../common/status.h"
|
|
#include "options.h"
|
|
#include "main.h"
|
|
#include "../common/i18n.h"
|
|
#include "pkglue.h"
|
|
#include "call-agent.h"
|
|
#include "../common/host2net.h"
|
|
#include "../common/compliance.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
static gpg_error_t get_it (ctrl_t ctrl, struct pubkey_enc_list *k,
|
|
DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the given algo is mentioned in one of the valid user-ids. */
|
|
static int
|
|
is_algo_in_prefs (kbnode_t keyblock, preftype_t type, int algo)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t k;
|
|
|
|
for (k = keyblock; k; k = k->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
|
prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
|
|
|
|
if (uid->created && prefs && !uid->flags.revoked && !uid->flags.expired)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; prefs->type; prefs++)
|
|
if (prefs->type == type && prefs->value == algo)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the session key from a pubkey enc packet and return it in DEK,
|
|
* which should have been allocated in secure memory by the caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
gpg_error_t
|
|
get_session_key (ctrl_t ctrl, struct pubkey_enc_list *list, DEK *dek)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_public_key *sk = NULL;
|
|
gpg_error_t err;
|
|
void *enum_context = NULL;
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
int search_for_secret_keys = 1;
|
|
struct pubkey_enc_list *k;
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CLOCK)
|
|
log_clock ("get_session_key enter");
|
|
|
|
while (search_for_secret_keys)
|
|
{
|
|
sk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sk);
|
|
err = enum_secret_keys (ctrl, &enum_context, sk);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* Check compliance. */
|
|
if (! gnupg_pk_is_allowed (opt.compliance, PK_USE_DECRYPTION,
|
|
sk->pubkey_algo, 0,
|
|
sk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (sk), NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("key %s is not suitable for decryption"
|
|
" in %s mode\n"),
|
|
keystr_from_pk (sk),
|
|
gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: The list needs to be sorted so that we try the keys in
|
|
* an appropriate order. For example:
|
|
* - On-disk keys w/o protection
|
|
* - On-disk keys with a cached passphrase
|
|
* - On-card keys of an active card
|
|
* - On-disk keys with protection
|
|
* - On-card keys from cards which are not plugged it. Here a
|
|
* cancel-all button should stop asking for other cards.
|
|
* Without any anonymous keys the sorting can be skipped.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (k = list; k; k = k->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
|
|
|| k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
|
|
|| k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_KYBER
|
|
|| k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
|
|
|| k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
|
|
|| k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (openpgp_pk_test_algo2 (k->pubkey_algo, PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (sk->pubkey_algo != k->pubkey_algo)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk (sk, keyid);
|
|
|
|
if (!k->keyid[0] && !k->keyid[1])
|
|
{
|
|
if (opt.skip_hidden_recipients)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.quiet)
|
|
log_info (_("anonymous recipient; trying secret key %s ...\n"),
|
|
keystr (keyid));
|
|
}
|
|
else if (opt.try_all_secrets
|
|
|| (k->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && k->keyid[1] == keyid[1]))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opt.quiet && !(sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
|
|
log_info (_("used key is not marked for encryption use.\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
err = get_it (ctrl, k, dek, sk, keyid);
|
|
k->result = err;
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opt.quiet && !k->keyid[0] && !k->keyid[1])
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("okay, we are the anonymous recipient.\n"));
|
|
if (!(sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC))
|
|
log_info (_("used key is not marked for encryption use.\n")
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
search_for_secret_keys = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
|
|
{
|
|
search_for_secret_keys = 0;
|
|
break; /* Don't try any more secret keys. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
enum_secret_keys (ctrl, &enum_context, NULL); /* free context */
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
|
|
|
|
/* Return the last specific error, if any. */
|
|
for (k = list; k; k = k->next)
|
|
if (k->result != -1)
|
|
err = k->result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CLOCK)
|
|
log_clock ("get_session_key leave");
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static gpg_error_t
|
|
get_it (ctrl_t ctrl,
|
|
struct pubkey_enc_list *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
|
|
{
|
|
gpg_error_t err;
|
|
byte *frame = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int frameidx;
|
|
size_t nframe;
|
|
u16 csum, csum2;
|
|
int padding;
|
|
gcry_sexp_t s_data;
|
|
char *desc;
|
|
char *keygrip;
|
|
byte fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CLOCK)
|
|
log_clock ("decryption start");
|
|
|
|
/* Get the keygrip. */
|
|
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (sk, &keygrip);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* Convert the data to an S-expression. */
|
|
if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
|
|
|| sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
|
|
else
|
|
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(elg(a%m)(b%m)))",
|
|
enc->data[0], enc->data[1]);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
|
|
|| sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!enc->data[0])
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
|
|
else
|
|
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(rsa(a%m)))",
|
|
enc->data[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
|
|
else
|
|
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(ecdh(s%m)(e%m)))",
|
|
enc->data[1], enc->data[0]);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_KYBER)
|
|
{
|
|
char fixedinfo[1+MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
|
|
int fixedlen;
|
|
|
|
if ((opt.compat_flags & COMPAT_T7014_OLD))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Temporary use for tests with original test vectors. */
|
|
fixedinfo[0] = 0x69;
|
|
fixedlen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
fixedinfo[0] = enc->seskey_algo;
|
|
v5_fingerprint_from_pk (sk, fixedinfo+1, NULL);
|
|
fixedlen = 33;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1] || !enc->data[2])
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
|
|
else
|
|
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL,
|
|
"(enc-val(pqc(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(c%d)(fixed-info%b)))",
|
|
enc->data[0], enc->data[1], enc->data[2],
|
|
enc->seskey_algo, fixedlen, fixedinfo);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
|
|
fingerprint_from_pk (sk, fp, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt. */
|
|
desc = gpg_format_keydesc (ctrl, sk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_NORMAL, 1);
|
|
|
|
err = agent_pkdecrypt (NULL, keygrip,
|
|
desc, sk->keyid, sk->main_keyid, sk->pubkey_algo,
|
|
s_data, &frame, &nframe, &padding);
|
|
xfree (desc);
|
|
gcry_sexp_release (s_data);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* Now get the DEK (data encryption key) from the frame
|
|
*
|
|
* Old versions encode the DEK in this format (msb is left):
|
|
*
|
|
* 0 1 DEK(16 bytes) CSUM(2 bytes) 0 RND(n bytes) 2
|
|
*
|
|
* Later versions encode the DEK like this:
|
|
*
|
|
* 0 2 RND(n bytes) 0 A DEK(k bytes) CSUM(2 bytes)
|
|
*
|
|
* (mpi_get_buffer already removed the leading zero).
|
|
*
|
|
* RND are non-zero randow bytes.
|
|
* A is the cipher algorithm
|
|
* DEK is the encryption key (session key) with length k
|
|
* CSUM
|
|
*/
|
|
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
|
|
log_printhex (frame, nframe, "DEK frame:");
|
|
frameidx = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_KYBER)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We expect a 32 byte session key. We should not see this
|
|
* error here because due to the KEM mode the agent_pkdecrypt
|
|
* should have already failed. */
|
|
if (nframe != 32)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
dek->keylen = nframe;
|
|
dek->algo = enc->seskey_algo;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_mpi_t decoded;
|
|
|
|
/* At the beginning the frame are the bytes of shared point MPI. */
|
|
err = pk_ecdh_decrypt (&decoded, fp, enc->data[1]/*encr data as an MPI*/,
|
|
frame, nframe, sk->pkey);
|
|
if(err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
xfree (frame);
|
|
err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &frame, &nframe, decoded);
|
|
mpi_release (decoded);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* Now the frame are the bytes decrypted but padded session key. */
|
|
if (!nframe || nframe <= 8
|
|
|| frame[nframe-1] > nframe)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
nframe -= frame[nframe-1]; /* Remove padding. */
|
|
if (4 > nframe)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dek->keylen = nframe - 3;
|
|
dek->algo = frame[0];
|
|
frameidx = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (padding)
|
|
{
|
|
if (7 > nframe)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Actually the leading zero is required but due to
|
|
* the way we encode the output in libgcrypt as an MPI we
|
|
* are not able to encode that leading zero. However, when
|
|
* using a Smartcard we are doing it the right way and
|
|
* therefore we have to skip the zero. This should be fixed
|
|
* in gpg-agent of course. */
|
|
frameidx = 0;
|
|
if (!frame[frameidx])
|
|
frameidx++;
|
|
|
|
if (frame[frameidx] == 1 && frame[nframe - 1] == 2)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("old encoding of the DEK is not supported\n"));
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
if (frame[frameidx] != 2) /* Something went wrong. */
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Skip the random bytes. */
|
|
for (frameidx++; frameidx < nframe && frame[frameidx]; frameidx++)
|
|
;
|
|
frameidx++; /* Skip the zero byte. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (frameidx + 4 > nframe)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dek->keylen = nframe - (frameidx + 1) - 2;
|
|
dek->algo = frame[frameidx++];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether we support the ago. */
|
|
err = openpgp_cipher_test_algo (dek->algo);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opt.quiet && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("cipher algorithm %d%s is unknown or disabled\n"),
|
|
dek->algo,
|
|
dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA ? " (IDEA)" : "");
|
|
}
|
|
dek->algo = 0;
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
if (dek->keylen != openpgp_cipher_get_algo_keylen (dek->algo))
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the key to DEK and compare the checksum if needed. */
|
|
/* We use the frameidx as flag for the need of a checksum. */
|
|
memcpy (dek->key, frame + frameidx, dek->keylen);
|
|
if (frameidx)
|
|
{
|
|
csum = buf16_to_u16 (frame+nframe-2);
|
|
for (csum2 = 0, frameidx = 0; frameidx < dek->keylen; frameidx++)
|
|
csum2 += dek->key[frameidx];
|
|
if (csum != csum2)
|
|
{
|
|
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_CLOCK)
|
|
log_clock ("decryption ready");
|
|
if (DBG_CRYPTO)
|
|
log_printhex (dek->key, dek->keylen, "DEK is:");
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the algo is in the preferences and whether it has
|
|
* expired. Also print a status line with the key's fingerprint. */
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
|
|
PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
|
|
KBNODE pkb = get_pubkeyblock (ctrl, keyid);
|
|
|
|
if (!pkb)
|
|
{
|
|
err = -1;
|
|
log_error ("oops: public key not found for preference check\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pkb->pkt->pkt.public_key->selfsigversion > 3
|
|
&& dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
|
|
&& !opt.quiet
|
|
&& !is_algo_in_prefs (pkb, PREFTYPE_SYM, dek->algo))
|
|
log_info (_("WARNING: cipher algorithm %s not found in recipient"
|
|
" preferences\n"), openpgp_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo));
|
|
|
|
/* if (!err && 25519 && openpgp_oidbuf_is_ed25519 (curve, len)) */
|
|
/* log_info ("Note: legacy OID was used for cv25519\n"); */
|
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t k;
|
|
int first = 1;
|
|
|
|
for (k = pkb; k; k = k->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 aki[2];
|
|
|
|
if (first)
|
|
{
|
|
first = 0;
|
|
mainpk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk (k->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
|
|
if (aki[0] == keyid[0] && aki[1] == keyid[1])
|
|
{
|
|
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pk)
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate <= make_timestamp ())
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("Note: secret key %s expired at %s\n"),
|
|
keystr (keyid), asctimestamp (pk->expiredate));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pk && pk->flags.revoked)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("Note: key has been revoked"));
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
show_revocation_reason (ctrl, pk, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_status_enabled () && pk && mainpk)
|
|
{
|
|
char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
|
|
char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
|
|
|
|
hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
|
|
hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
|
|
|
|
/* Note that we do not want to create a trustdb just for
|
|
* getting the ownertrust: If there is no trustdb there can't
|
|
* be ulitmately trusted key anyway and thus the ownertrust
|
|
* value is irrelevant. */
|
|
write_status_printf (STATUS_DECRYPTION_KEY, "%s %s %c",
|
|
pkhex, mainpkhex,
|
|
get_ownertrust_info (ctrl, mainpk, 1));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
release_kbnode (pkb);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
xfree (frame);
|
|
xfree (keygrip);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the session key from the given string.
|
|
* String is supposed to be formatted as this:
|
|
* <algo-id>:<even-number-of-hex-digits>
|
|
*/
|
|
gpg_error_t
|
|
get_override_session_key (DEK *dek, const char *string)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *s;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!string)
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
dek->algo = atoi (string);
|
|
if (dek->algo < 1)
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
if (!(s = strchr (string, ':')))
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
s++;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < DIM (dek->key) && *s; i++, s += 2)
|
|
{
|
|
int c = hextobyte (s);
|
|
if (c == -1)
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
dek->key[i] = c;
|
|
}
|
|
if (*s)
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
dek->keylen = i;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|