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d03d0add12
* agent/command.c (KEYTOCARD_TIMESTAMP_FORMAT): Remove and use format string direct. (cmd_keytocard): Change timestamp to an u64 and use the new u64 parser functions. Use split_fields. Add ecdh parameter stuff. Take the default timestamp from the keyfile. * agent/findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Add arg timestamp and set it. Adjust all callers. -- This is backport from 2.4 but only the agent part. We consider it more relibale if we also pass the ECDH parameters along in 2.2. Adding the timestamp stuff should not harm either. Because we now have the u64 time string parser, we use them here. See-commit:c03ba92576See-commit:c795be79c1This patch is somewhat related to: GnuPG-bug-id: 6378, 5538
1700 lines
46 KiB
C
1700 lines
46 KiB
C
/* findkey.c - Locate the secret key
|
||
* Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007,
|
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* 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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||
* Copyright (C) 2014, 2019 Werner Koch
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* Copyright (C) 2023 g10 Code GmbH
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||
*
|
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
||
*
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||
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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||
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
||
* (at your option) any later version.
|
||
*
|
||
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||
*
|
||
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
||
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
#include <config.h>
|
||
#include <errno.h>
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||
#include <stdio.h>
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||
#include <stdlib.h>
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||
#include <string.h>
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||
#include <ctype.h>
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||
#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <npth.h> /* (we use pth_sleep) */
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#include "agent.h"
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#include "../common/i18n.h"
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#include "../common/ssh-utils.h"
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#include "../common/name-value.h"
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||
#ifndef O_BINARY
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#define O_BINARY 0
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#endif
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||
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||
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static gpg_error_t read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip,
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||
gcry_sexp_t *result, nvc_t *r_keymeta);
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||
static gpg_error_t is_shadowed_key (gcry_sexp_t s_skey);
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||
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||
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||
/* Helper to pass data to the check callback of the unprotect function. */
|
||
struct try_unprotect_arg_s
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{
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||
ctrl_t ctrl;
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||
const unsigned char *protected_key;
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unsigned char *unprotected_key;
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int change_required; /* Set by the callback to indicate that the
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user should change the passphrase. */
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};
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||
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/* Return the file name for the 20 byte keygrip GRIP. With FOR_NEW
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* create a file name for later renaming to the actual name. Return
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* NULL on error. */
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static char *
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fname_from_keygrip (const unsigned char *grip, int for_new)
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{
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char hexgrip[40+4+4+1];
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||
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bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
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strcpy (hexgrip+40, for_new? ".key.tmp" : ".key");
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||
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return make_filename_try (gnupg_homedir (), GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR,
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hexgrip, NULL);
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}
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||
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||
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/* Write the S-expression formatted key (BUFFER,LENGTH) to our key
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* storage. With FORCE passed as true an existing key with the given
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* GRIP will be overwritten. If SERIALNO and KEYREF are given a Token
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* line is added to the key if the extended format is used. If
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* TIMESTAMP is not zero and the key doies not yet exists it will be
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* recorded as creation date. */
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int
|
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agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
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const void *buffer, size_t length, int force,
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const char *serialno, const char *keyref,
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const char *dispserialno,
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time_t timestamp)
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{
|
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gpg_error_t err;
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char *oldfname = NULL;
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||
char *fname = NULL;
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estream_t fp;
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int newkey = 0;
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nvc_t pk = NULL;
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gcry_sexp_t key = NULL;
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int is_regular;
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int remove = 0;
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||
char *token0 = NULL;
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||
char *token = NULL;
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char *dispserialno_buffer = NULL;
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char **tokenfields = NULL;
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int blocksigs = 0;
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||
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oldfname = fname_from_keygrip (grip, 0);
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if (!oldfname)
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return out_of_core ();
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||
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err = read_key_file (grip, &key, &pk);
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if (err)
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{
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if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
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newkey = 1;
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else
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||
{
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||
log_error ("can't open '%s': %s\n", oldfname, gpg_strerror (err));
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goto leave;
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||
}
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}
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||
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if (!pk)
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{
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||
/* Key is still in the old format or does not exist - create a
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* new container. */
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||
pk = nvc_new_private_key ();
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if (!pk)
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||
{
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||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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||
goto leave;
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}
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}
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||
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||
/* Check whether we already have a regular key. */
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is_regular = (key && gpg_err_code (is_shadowed_key (key)) != GPG_ERR_TRUE);
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/* Turn (BUFFER,LENGTH) into a gcrypt s-expression and set it into
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* our name value container. */
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gcry_sexp_release (key);
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err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&key, NULL, buffer, length);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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err = nvc_set_private_key (pk, key);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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||
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/* Check that we do not update a regular key with a shadow key. */
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if (is_regular && gpg_err_code (is_shadowed_key (key)) == GPG_ERR_TRUE)
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{
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log_info ("updating regular key file '%s'"
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" by a shadow key inhibited\n", oldfname);
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err = 0; /* Simply ignore the error. */
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goto leave;
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}
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/* Check that we update a regular key only in force mode. */
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if (is_regular && !force)
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{
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log_error ("secret key file '%s' already exists\n", oldfname);
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EEXIST);
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goto leave;
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}
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/* If requested write a Token line. */
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if (serialno && keyref)
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{
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nve_t item;
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const char *s;
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size_t token0len;
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||
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if (dispserialno)
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{
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/* Escape the DISPSERIALNO. */
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dispserialno_buffer = percent_plus_escape (dispserialno);
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if (!dispserialno_buffer)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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goto leave;
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}
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dispserialno = dispserialno_buffer;
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}
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token0 = strconcat (serialno, " ", keyref, NULL);
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if (token0)
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token = strconcat (token0, " - ", dispserialno? dispserialno:"-", NULL);
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if (!token0 || !token)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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goto leave;
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}
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token0len = strlen (token0);
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for (item = nvc_lookup (pk, "Token:");
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item;
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item = nve_next_value (item, "Token:"))
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if ((s = nve_value (item)) && !strncmp (s, token0, token0len))
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break;
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if (!item)
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{
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/* No token or no token with that value exists. Add a new
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* one so that keys which have been stored on several cards
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* are well supported. */
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err = nvc_add (pk, "Token:", token);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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}
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else
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{
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/* Token exists: Update the display s/n. It may have
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* changed due to changes in a newer software version. */
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if (s && (tokenfields = strtokenize (s, " \t\n"))
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&& tokenfields[0] && tokenfields[1] && tokenfields[2]
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&& tokenfields[3]
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&& !strcmp (tokenfields[3], dispserialno))
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; /* No need to update Token entry. */
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else
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{
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err = nve_set (item, token);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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}
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}
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}
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/* If a timestamp has been supplied and the key is new, write a
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* creation timestamp. (We douple check that there is no Created
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* item yet.)*/
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if (timestamp && newkey && !nvc_lookup (pk, "Created:"))
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{
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gnupg_isotime_t timebuf;
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epoch2isotime (timebuf, timestamp);
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err = nvc_add (pk, "Created:", timebuf);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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}
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/* Create a temporary file for writing. */
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fname = fname_from_keygrip (grip, 1);
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fp = fname ? es_fopen (fname, "wbx,mode=-rw") : NULL;
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if (!fp)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("can't create '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
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goto leave;
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}
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err = nvc_write (pk, fp);
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if (!err && es_fflush (fp))
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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if (err)
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{
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log_error ("error writing '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
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remove = 1;
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goto leave;
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}
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if (es_fclose (fp))
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error closing '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
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remove = 1;
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goto leave;
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}
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fp = NULL;
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err = gnupg_rename_file (fname, oldfname, &blocksigs);
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if (err)
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{
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err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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log_error ("error renaming '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
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remove = 1;
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goto leave;
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}
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bump_key_eventcounter ();
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leave:
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if (blocksigs)
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gnupg_unblock_all_signals ();
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es_fclose (fp);
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if (remove && fname)
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gnupg_remove (fname);
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xfree (fname);
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xfree (oldfname);
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xfree (token);
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xfree (token0);
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xfree (dispserialno_buffer);
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xfree (tokenfields);
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gcry_sexp_release (key);
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nvc_release (pk);
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return err;
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}
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/* Callback function to try the unprotection from the passphrase query
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code. */
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static gpg_error_t
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try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
|
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{
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struct try_unprotect_arg_s *arg = pi->check_cb_arg;
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ctrl_t ctrl = arg->ctrl;
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size_t dummy;
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gpg_error_t err;
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gnupg_isotime_t now, protected_at, tmptime;
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char *desc = NULL;
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log_assert (!arg->unprotected_key);
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arg->change_required = 0;
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err = agent_unprotect (ctrl, arg->protected_key, pi->pin, protected_at,
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&arg->unprotected_key, &dummy);
|
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if (err)
|
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return err;
|
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if (!opt.max_passphrase_days || ctrl->in_passwd)
|
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return 0; /* No regular passphrase change required. */
|
||
|
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if (!*protected_at)
|
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{
|
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/* No protection date known - must force passphrase change. */
|
||
desc = xtrystrdup (L_("Note: This passphrase has never been changed.%0A"
|
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"Please change it now."));
|
||
if (!desc)
|
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return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
}
|
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else
|
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{
|
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gnupg_get_isotime (now);
|
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gnupg_copy_time (tmptime, protected_at);
|
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err = add_days_to_isotime (tmptime, opt.max_passphrase_days);
|
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if (err)
|
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return err;
|
||
if (strcmp (now, tmptime) > 0 )
|
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{
|
||
/* Passphrase "expired". */
|
||
desc = xtryasprintf
|
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(L_("This passphrase has not been changed%%0A"
|
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"since %.4s-%.2s-%.2s. Please change it now."),
|
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protected_at, protected_at+4, protected_at+6);
|
||
if (!desc)
|
||
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (desc)
|
||
{
|
||
/* Change required. */
|
||
if (opt.enforce_passphrase_constraints)
|
||
{
|
||
err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc,
|
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L_("Change passphrase"), NULL, 0);
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
arg->change_required = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc,
|
||
L_("Change passphrase"),
|
||
L_("I'll change it later"), 0);
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
arg->change_required = 1;
|
||
else if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|
||
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
|
||
err = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (desc);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Modify a Key description, replacing certain special format
|
||
characters. List of currently supported replacements:
|
||
|
||
%% - Replaced by a single %
|
||
%c - Replaced by the content of COMMENT.
|
||
%C - Same as %c but put into parentheses.
|
||
%F - Replaced by an ssh style fingerprint computed from KEY.
|
||
|
||
The functions returns 0 on success or an error code. On success a
|
||
newly allocated string is stored at the address of RESULT.
|
||
*/
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_modify_description (const char *in, const char *comment,
|
||
const gcry_sexp_t key, char **result)
|
||
{
|
||
size_t comment_length;
|
||
size_t in_len;
|
||
size_t out_len;
|
||
char *out;
|
||
size_t i;
|
||
int special, pass;
|
||
char *ssh_fpr = NULL;
|
||
char *p;
|
||
|
||
*result = NULL;
|
||
|
||
if (!comment)
|
||
comment = "";
|
||
|
||
comment_length = strlen (comment);
|
||
in_len = strlen (in);
|
||
|
||
/* First pass calculates the length, second pass does the actual
|
||
copying. */
|
||
/* FIXME: This can be simplified by using es_fopenmem. */
|
||
out = NULL;
|
||
out_len = 0;
|
||
for (pass=0; pass < 2; pass++)
|
||
{
|
||
special = 0;
|
||
for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++)
|
||
{
|
||
if (special)
|
||
{
|
||
special = 0;
|
||
switch (in[i])
|
||
{
|
||
case '%':
|
||
if (out)
|
||
*out++ = '%';
|
||
else
|
||
out_len++;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case 'c': /* Comment. */
|
||
if (out)
|
||
{
|
||
memcpy (out, comment, comment_length);
|
||
out += comment_length;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
out_len += comment_length;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case 'C': /* Comment. */
|
||
if (!comment_length)
|
||
;
|
||
else if (out)
|
||
{
|
||
*out++ = '(';
|
||
memcpy (out, comment, comment_length);
|
||
out += comment_length;
|
||
*out++ = ')';
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
out_len += comment_length + 2;
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case 'F': /* SSH style fingerprint. */
|
||
if (!ssh_fpr && key)
|
||
ssh_get_fingerprint_string (key, opt.ssh_fingerprint_digest,
|
||
&ssh_fpr);
|
||
if (ssh_fpr)
|
||
{
|
||
if (out)
|
||
out = stpcpy (out, ssh_fpr);
|
||
else
|
||
out_len += strlen (ssh_fpr);
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
default: /* Invalid special sequences are kept as they are. */
|
||
if (out)
|
||
{
|
||
*out++ = '%';
|
||
*out++ = in[i];
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
out_len+=2;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else if (in[i] == '%')
|
||
special = 1;
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
if (out)
|
||
*out++ = in[i];
|
||
else
|
||
out_len++;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!pass)
|
||
{
|
||
*result = out = xtrymalloc (out_len + 1);
|
||
if (!out)
|
||
{
|
||
xfree (ssh_fpr);
|
||
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*out = 0;
|
||
log_assert (*result + out_len == out);
|
||
xfree (ssh_fpr);
|
||
|
||
/* The ssh prompt may sometimes end in
|
||
* "...%0A ()"
|
||
* The empty parentheses doesn't look very good. We use this hack
|
||
* here to remove them as well as the indentation spaces. */
|
||
p = *result;
|
||
i = strlen (p);
|
||
if (i > 2 && !strcmp (p + i - 2, "()"))
|
||
{
|
||
p += i - 2;
|
||
*p-- = 0;
|
||
while (p > *result && spacep (p))
|
||
*p-- = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Unprotect the canconical encoded S-expression key in KEYBUF. GRIP
|
||
should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the
|
||
caching mechanism. DESC_TEXT may be set to override the default
|
||
description used for the pinentry. If LOOKUP_TTL is given this
|
||
function is used to lookup the default ttl. If R_PASSPHRASE is not
|
||
NULL, the function succeeded and the key was protected the used
|
||
passphrase (entered or from the cache) is stored there; if not NULL
|
||
will be stored. The caller needs to free the returned
|
||
passphrase. */
|
||
static gpg_error_t
|
||
unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
|
||
unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl,
|
||
char **r_passphrase)
|
||
{
|
||
struct pin_entry_info_s *pi;
|
||
struct try_unprotect_arg_s arg;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
unsigned char *result;
|
||
size_t resultlen;
|
||
char hexgrip[40+1];
|
||
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
*r_passphrase = NULL;
|
||
|
||
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
|
||
|
||
/* Initially try to get it using a cache nonce. */
|
||
if (cache_nonce)
|
||
{
|
||
char *pw;
|
||
|
||
pw = agent_get_cache (ctrl, cache_nonce, CACHE_MODE_NONCE);
|
||
if (pw)
|
||
{
|
||
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, *keybuf, pw, NULL, &result, &resultlen);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
*r_passphrase = pw;
|
||
else
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
xfree (*keybuf);
|
||
*keybuf = result;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* First try to get it from the cache - if there is none or we can't
|
||
unprotect it, we fall back to ask the user */
|
||
if (cache_mode != CACHE_MODE_IGNORE)
|
||
{
|
||
char *pw;
|
||
|
||
retry:
|
||
pw = agent_get_cache (ctrl, hexgrip, cache_mode);
|
||
if (pw)
|
||
{
|
||
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, *keybuf, pw, NULL, &result, &resultlen);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_NORMAL)
|
||
agent_store_cache_hit (hexgrip);
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
*r_passphrase = pw;
|
||
else
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
xfree (*keybuf);
|
||
*keybuf = result;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
}
|
||
else if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_NORMAL)
|
||
{
|
||
/* The standard use of GPG keys is to have a signing and an
|
||
encryption subkey. Commonly both use the same
|
||
passphrase. We try to help the user to enter the
|
||
passphrase only once by silently trying the last
|
||
correctly entered passphrase. Checking one additional
|
||
passphrase should be acceptable; despite the S2K
|
||
introduced delays. The assumed workflow is:
|
||
|
||
1. Read encrypted message in a MUA and thus enter a
|
||
passphrase for the encryption subkey.
|
||
|
||
2. Reply to that mail with an encrypted and signed
|
||
mail, thus entering the passphrase for the signing
|
||
subkey.
|
||
|
||
We can often avoid the passphrase entry in the second
|
||
step. We do this only in normal mode, so not to
|
||
interfere with unrelated cache entries. */
|
||
pw = agent_get_cache (ctrl, NULL, cache_mode);
|
||
if (pw)
|
||
{
|
||
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, *keybuf, pw, NULL,
|
||
&result, &resultlen);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
*r_passphrase = pw;
|
||
else
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
xfree (*keybuf);
|
||
*keybuf = result;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (pw);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* If the pinentry is currently in use, we wait up to 60 seconds
|
||
for it to close and check the cache again. This solves a common
|
||
situation where several requests for unprotecting a key have
|
||
been made but the user is still entering the passphrase for
|
||
the first request. Because all requests to agent_askpin are
|
||
serialized they would then pop up one after the other to
|
||
request the passphrase - despite that the user has already
|
||
entered it and is then available in the cache. This
|
||
implementation is not race free but in the worst case the
|
||
user has to enter the passphrase only once more. */
|
||
if (pinentry_active_p (ctrl, 0))
|
||
{
|
||
/* Active - wait */
|
||
if (!pinentry_active_p (ctrl, 60))
|
||
{
|
||
/* We need to give the other thread a chance to actually put
|
||
it into the cache. */
|
||
npth_sleep (1);
|
||
goto retry;
|
||
}
|
||
/* Timeout - better call pinentry now the plain way. */
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1);
|
||
if (!pi)
|
||
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
pi->max_length = MAX_PASSPHRASE_LEN + 1;
|
||
pi->min_digits = 0; /* we want a real passphrase */
|
||
pi->max_digits = 16;
|
||
pi->max_tries = 3;
|
||
pi->check_cb = try_unprotect_cb;
|
||
arg.ctrl = ctrl;
|
||
arg.protected_key = *keybuf;
|
||
arg.unprotected_key = NULL;
|
||
arg.change_required = 0;
|
||
pi->check_cb_arg = &arg;
|
||
|
||
rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, desc_text, NULL, NULL, pi, hexgrip, cache_mode);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if ((pi->status & PINENTRY_STATUS_PASSWORD_FROM_CACHE))
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("Clearing pinentry cache which caused error %s\n",
|
||
gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
|
||
agent_clear_passphrase (ctrl, hexgrip, cache_mode);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
log_assert (arg.unprotected_key);
|
||
if (arg.change_required)
|
||
{
|
||
/* The callback told as that the user should change their
|
||
passphrase. Present the dialog to do. */
|
||
size_t canlen, erroff;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
|
||
log_assert (arg.unprotected_key);
|
||
canlen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (arg.unprotected_key, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
||
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff,
|
||
(char*)arg.unprotected_key, canlen);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
wipememory (arg.unprotected_key, canlen);
|
||
xfree (arg.unprotected_key);
|
||
xfree (pi);
|
||
return rc;
|
||
}
|
||
rc = agent_protect_and_store (ctrl, s_skey, NULL);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("changing the passphrase failed: %s\n",
|
||
gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
wipememory (arg.unprotected_key, canlen);
|
||
xfree (arg.unprotected_key);
|
||
xfree (pi);
|
||
return rc;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
/* Passphrase is fine. */
|
||
agent_put_cache (ctrl, hexgrip, cache_mode, pi->pin,
|
||
lookup_ttl? lookup_ttl (hexgrip) : 0);
|
||
agent_store_cache_hit (hexgrip);
|
||
if (r_passphrase && *pi->pin)
|
||
*r_passphrase = xtrystrdup (pi->pin);
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (*keybuf);
|
||
*keybuf = arg.unprotected_key;
|
||
}
|
||
xfree (pi);
|
||
return rc;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Read the key identified by GRIP from the private key directory and
|
||
* return it as an gcrypt S-expression object in RESULT. If R_KEYMETA
|
||
* is not NULL, the meta data items are stored there. However the
|
||
* "Key:" item is removed. Returns an error code and stores NULL at
|
||
* RESULT. */
|
||
static gpg_error_t
|
||
read_key_file (const unsigned char *grip, gcry_sexp_t *result, nvc_t *r_keymeta)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
char *fname;
|
||
estream_t fp = NULL;
|
||
struct stat st;
|
||
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
||
size_t buflen, erroff;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
char first;
|
||
|
||
*result = NULL;
|
||
if (r_keymeta)
|
||
*r_keymeta = NULL;
|
||
|
||
fname = fname_from_keygrip (grip, 0);
|
||
if (!fname)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
fp = es_fopen (fname, "rb");
|
||
if (!fp)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
|
||
log_error ("can't open '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (es_fread (&first, 1, 1, fp) != 1)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
log_error ("error reading first byte from '%s': %s\n",
|
||
fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (es_fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET))
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
log_error ("error seeking in '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (first != '(')
|
||
{
|
||
/* Key is in extended format. */
|
||
nvc_t pk;
|
||
int line;
|
||
|
||
err = nvc_parse_private_key (&pk, &line, fp);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("error parsing '%s' line %d: %s\n",
|
||
fname, line, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
err = nvc_get_private_key (pk, result);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("error getting private key from '%s': %s\n",
|
||
fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
else
|
||
nvc_delete_named (pk, "Key:");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!err && r_keymeta)
|
||
*r_keymeta = pk;
|
||
else
|
||
nvc_release (pk);
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (fstat (es_fileno (fp), &st))
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
log_error ("can't stat '%s': %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
buflen = st.st_size;
|
||
buf = xtrymalloc (buflen+1);
|
||
if (!buf)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
log_error ("error allocating %zu bytes for '%s': %s\n",
|
||
buflen, fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (es_fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
log_error ("error reading %zu bytes from '%s': %s\n",
|
||
buflen, fname, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Convert the file into a gcrypt S-expression object. */
|
||
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, (char*)buf, buflen);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
*result = s_skey;
|
||
|
||
leave:
|
||
es_fclose (fp);
|
||
xfree (fname);
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Remove the key identified by GRIP from the private key directory. */
|
||
static gpg_error_t
|
||
remove_key_file (const unsigned char *grip)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err = 0;
|
||
char *fname;
|
||
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
|
||
|
||
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
|
||
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
|
||
fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR,
|
||
hexgrip, NULL);
|
||
if (gnupg_remove (fname))
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
xfree (fname);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp in RESULT after locating it using
|
||
the GRIP. If the operation shall be diverted to a token, an
|
||
allocated S-expression with the shadow_info part from the file is
|
||
stored at SHADOW_INFO; if not NULL will be stored at SHADOW_INFO.
|
||
CACHE_MODE defines now the cache shall be used. DESC_TEXT may be
|
||
set to present a custom description for the pinentry. LOOKUP_TTL
|
||
is an optional function to convey a TTL to the cache manager; we do
|
||
not simply pass the TTL value because the value is only needed if
|
||
an unprotect action was needed and looking up the TTL may have some
|
||
overhead (e.g. scanning the sshcontrol file). If a CACHE_NONCE is
|
||
given that cache item is first tried to get a passphrase. If
|
||
R_PASSPHRASE is not NULL, the function succeeded and the key was
|
||
protected the used passphrase (entered or from the cache) is stored
|
||
there; if not NULL will be stored. The caller needs to free the
|
||
returned passphrase. */
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
|
||
const char *desc_text,
|
||
const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info,
|
||
cache_mode_t cache_mode, lookup_ttl_t lookup_ttl,
|
||
gcry_sexp_t *result, char **r_passphrase,
|
||
uint64_t *r_timestamp)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
size_t len, buflen, erroff;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
nvc_t keymeta = NULL;
|
||
|
||
*result = NULL;
|
||
if (shadow_info)
|
||
*shadow_info = NULL;
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
*r_passphrase = NULL;
|
||
if (r_timestamp)
|
||
*r_timestamp = (uint64_t)(-1);
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey, &keymeta);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* For use with the protection functions we also need the key as an
|
||
canonical encoded S-expression in a buffer. Create this buffer
|
||
now. */
|
||
err = make_canon_sexp (s_skey, &buf, &len);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
nvc_release (keymeta);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (r_timestamp && keymeta)
|
||
{
|
||
const char *created = nvc_get_string (keymeta, "Created:");
|
||
|
||
if (created)
|
||
*r_timestamp = isotime2epoch_u64 (created);
|
||
}
|
||
nvc_release (keymeta);
|
||
|
||
switch (agent_private_key_type (buf))
|
||
{
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
|
||
break; /* no unprotection needed */
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_OPENPGP_NONE:
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char *buf_new;
|
||
size_t buf_newlen;
|
||
|
||
err = agent_unprotect (ctrl, buf, "", NULL, &buf_new, &buf_newlen);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("failed to convert unprotected openpgp key: %s\n",
|
||
gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
buf = buf_new;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
|
||
{
|
||
char *desc_text_final;
|
||
char *comment = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/* Note, that we will take the comment as a C string for
|
||
display purposes; i.e. all stuff beyond a Nul character is
|
||
ignored. */
|
||
{
|
||
gcry_sexp_t comment_sexp;
|
||
|
||
comment_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "comment", 0);
|
||
if (comment_sexp)
|
||
comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (comment_sexp, 1);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
desc_text_final = NULL;
|
||
if (desc_text)
|
||
err = agent_modify_description (desc_text, comment, s_skey,
|
||
&desc_text_final);
|
||
gcry_free (comment);
|
||
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
{
|
||
err = unprotect (ctrl, cache_nonce, desc_text_final, &buf, grip,
|
||
cache_mode, lookup_ttl, r_passphrase);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
|
||
gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
xfree (desc_text_final);
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED:
|
||
if (shadow_info)
|
||
{
|
||
const unsigned char *s;
|
||
size_t n;
|
||
|
||
err = agent_get_shadow_info (buf, &s);
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
{
|
||
n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (s, 0, NULL,NULL);
|
||
log_assert (n);
|
||
*shadow_info = xtrymalloc (n);
|
||
if (!*shadow_info)
|
||
err = out_of_core ();
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
memcpy (*shadow_info, s, n);
|
||
err = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY);
|
||
break;
|
||
default:
|
||
log_error ("invalid private key format\n");
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
s_skey = NULL;
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
{
|
||
xfree (*r_passphrase);
|
||
*r_passphrase = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
buflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (buf, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
||
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, (char*)buf, buflen);
|
||
wipememory (buf, buflen);
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
if (r_passphrase)
|
||
{
|
||
xfree (*r_passphrase);
|
||
*r_passphrase = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*result = s_skey;
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the string name from the S-expression S_KEY as well as a
|
||
string describing the names of the parameters. ALGONAMESIZE and
|
||
ELEMSSIZE give the allocated size of the provided buffers. The
|
||
buffers may be NULL if not required. If R_LIST is not NULL the top
|
||
level list will be stored there; the caller needs to release it in
|
||
this case. */
|
||
static gpg_error_t
|
||
key_parms_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t s_key, gcry_sexp_t *r_list,
|
||
char *r_algoname, size_t algonamesize,
|
||
char *r_elems, size_t elemssize)
|
||
{
|
||
gcry_sexp_t list, l2;
|
||
const char *name, *algoname, *elems;
|
||
size_t n;
|
||
|
||
if (r_list)
|
||
*r_list = NULL;
|
||
|
||
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "shadowed-private-key", 0 );
|
||
if (!list)
|
||
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "protected-private-key", 0 );
|
||
if (!list)
|
||
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_key, "private-key", 0 );
|
||
if (!list)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("invalid private key format\n");
|
||
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
list = l2;
|
||
name = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 0, &n);
|
||
if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "rsa", 3))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "rsa";
|
||
elems = "ne";
|
||
}
|
||
else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "dsa", 3))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "dsa";
|
||
elems = "pqgy";
|
||
}
|
||
else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "ecc", 3))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "ecc";
|
||
elems = "pabgnq";
|
||
}
|
||
else if (n==5 && !memcmp (name, "ecdsa", 5))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "ecdsa";
|
||
elems = "pabgnq";
|
||
}
|
||
else if (n==4 && !memcmp (name, "ecdh", 4))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "ecdh";
|
||
elems = "pabgnq";
|
||
}
|
||
else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "elg", 3))
|
||
{
|
||
algoname = "elg";
|
||
elems = "pgy";
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("unknown private key algorithm\n");
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (r_algoname)
|
||
{
|
||
if (strlen (algoname) >= algonamesize)
|
||
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUFFER_TOO_SHORT);
|
||
strcpy (r_algoname, algoname);
|
||
}
|
||
if (r_elems)
|
||
{
|
||
if (strlen (elems) >= elemssize)
|
||
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUFFER_TOO_SHORT);
|
||
strcpy (r_elems, elems);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (r_list)
|
||
*r_list = list;
|
||
else
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return true if KEYPARMS holds an EdDSA key. */
|
||
static int
|
||
is_eddsa (gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
|
||
{
|
||
int result = 0;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t list;
|
||
const char *s;
|
||
size_t n;
|
||
int i;
|
||
|
||
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (keyparms, "flags", 0);
|
||
for (i = list ? gcry_sexp_length (list)-1 : 0; i > 0; i--)
|
||
{
|
||
s = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, i, &n);
|
||
if (!s)
|
||
continue; /* Not a data element. */
|
||
|
||
if (n == 5 && !memcmp (s, "eddsa", 5))
|
||
{
|
||
result = 1;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
return result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the public key algorithm number if S_KEY is a DSA style key.
|
||
If it is not a DSA style key, return 0. */
|
||
int
|
||
agent_is_dsa_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key)
|
||
{
|
||
int result;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t list;
|
||
char algoname[6];
|
||
|
||
if (!s_key)
|
||
return 0;
|
||
|
||
if (key_parms_from_sexp (s_key, &list, algoname, sizeof algoname, NULL, 0))
|
||
return 0; /* Error - assume it is not an DSA key. */
|
||
|
||
if (!strcmp (algoname, "dsa"))
|
||
result = GCRY_PK_DSA;
|
||
else if (!strcmp (algoname, "ecc"))
|
||
{
|
||
if (is_eddsa (list))
|
||
result = 0;
|
||
else
|
||
result = GCRY_PK_ECDSA;
|
||
}
|
||
else if (!strcmp (algoname, "ecdsa"))
|
||
result = GCRY_PK_ECDSA;
|
||
else
|
||
result = 0;
|
||
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
return result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return true if S_KEY is an EdDSA key as used with curve Ed25519. */
|
||
int
|
||
agent_is_eddsa_key (gcry_sexp_t s_key)
|
||
{
|
||
int result;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t list;
|
||
char algoname[6];
|
||
|
||
if (!s_key)
|
||
return 0;
|
||
|
||
if (key_parms_from_sexp (s_key, &list, algoname, sizeof algoname, NULL, 0))
|
||
return 0; /* Error - assume it is not an EdDSA key. */
|
||
|
||
if (!strcmp (algoname, "ecc") && is_eddsa (list))
|
||
result = 1;
|
||
else if (!strcmp (algoname, "eddsa")) /* backward compatibility. */
|
||
result = 1;
|
||
else
|
||
result = 0;
|
||
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (list);
|
||
return result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* This function returns GPG_ERR_TRUE if S_SKEY represents a shadowed
|
||
* key. 0 is return for other key types. Any other error may occur
|
||
* if S_SKEY is not valid. */
|
||
static gpg_error_t
|
||
is_shadowed_key (gcry_sexp_t s_skey)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
size_t buflen;
|
||
|
||
err = make_canon_sexp (s_skey, &buf, &buflen);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
return err;
|
||
|
||
if (agent_private_key_type (buf) == PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED)
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TRUE);
|
||
|
||
wipememory (buf, buflen);
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the key for the keygrip GRIP. The result is stored at
|
||
RESULT. This function extracts the key from the private key
|
||
database and returns it as an S-expression object as it is. On
|
||
failure an error code is returned and NULL stored at RESULT. */
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_raw_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
gcry_sexp_t *result)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
|
||
(void)ctrl;
|
||
|
||
*result = NULL;
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey, NULL);
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
*result = s_skey;
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_keymeta_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
nvc_t *r_keymeta)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
|
||
(void)ctrl;
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey, r_keymeta);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the public key for the keygrip GRIP. The result is stored
|
||
at RESULT. This function extracts the public key from the private
|
||
key database. On failure an error code is returned and NULL stored
|
||
at RESULT. */
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_public_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
|
||
const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
gcry_sexp_t *result)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
int i, idx;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
|
||
const char *algoname, *elems;
|
||
int npkey;
|
||
gcry_mpi_t array[10];
|
||
gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t flags = NULL;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t uri_sexp, comment_sexp;
|
||
const char *uri, *comment;
|
||
size_t uri_length, comment_length;
|
||
int uri_intlen, comment_intlen;
|
||
char *format, *p;
|
||
void *args[2+7+2+2+1]; /* Size is 2 + max. # of elements + 2 for uri + 2
|
||
for comment + end-of-list. */
|
||
int argidx;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t list = NULL;
|
||
const char *s;
|
||
|
||
(void)ctrl;
|
||
|
||
*result = NULL;
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey, NULL);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
return err;
|
||
|
||
for (i=0; i < DIM (array); i++)
|
||
array[i] = NULL;
|
||
|
||
err = extract_private_key (s_skey, 0, &algoname, &npkey, NULL, &elems,
|
||
array, DIM (array), &curve, &flags);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
uri = NULL;
|
||
uri_length = 0;
|
||
uri_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "uri", 0);
|
||
if (uri_sexp)
|
||
uri = gcry_sexp_nth_data (uri_sexp, 1, &uri_length);
|
||
|
||
comment = NULL;
|
||
comment_length = 0;
|
||
comment_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "comment", 0);
|
||
if (comment_sexp)
|
||
comment = gcry_sexp_nth_data (comment_sexp, 1, &comment_length);
|
||
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
s_skey = NULL;
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* FIXME: The following thing is pretty ugly code; we should
|
||
investigate how to make it cleaner. Probably code to handle
|
||
canonical S-expressions in a memory buffer is better suited for
|
||
such a task. After all that is what we do in protect.c. Need
|
||
to find common patterns and write a straightformward API to use
|
||
them. */
|
||
log_assert (sizeof (size_t) <= sizeof (void*));
|
||
|
||
format = xtrymalloc (15+4+7*npkey+10+15+1+1);
|
||
if (!format)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
for (i=0; array[i]; i++)
|
||
gcry_mpi_release (array[i]);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (curve);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (flags);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (uri_sexp);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
argidx = 0;
|
||
p = stpcpy (stpcpy (format, "(public-key("), algoname);
|
||
p = stpcpy (p, "%S%S"); /* curve name and flags. */
|
||
args[argidx++] = &curve;
|
||
args[argidx++] = &flags;
|
||
for (idx=0, s=elems; idx < npkey; idx++)
|
||
{
|
||
*p++ = '(';
|
||
*p++ = *s++;
|
||
p = stpcpy (p, " %m)");
|
||
log_assert (argidx < DIM (args));
|
||
args[argidx++] = &array[idx];
|
||
}
|
||
*p++ = ')';
|
||
if (uri)
|
||
{
|
||
p = stpcpy (p, "(uri %b)");
|
||
log_assert (argidx+1 < DIM (args));
|
||
uri_intlen = (int)uri_length;
|
||
args[argidx++] = (void *)&uri_intlen;
|
||
args[argidx++] = (void *)&uri;
|
||
}
|
||
if (comment)
|
||
{
|
||
p = stpcpy (p, "(comment %b)");
|
||
log_assert (argidx+1 < DIM (args));
|
||
comment_intlen = (int)comment_length;
|
||
args[argidx++] = (void *)&comment_intlen;
|
||
args[argidx++] = (void*)&comment;
|
||
}
|
||
*p++ = ')';
|
||
*p = 0;
|
||
log_assert (argidx < DIM (args));
|
||
args[argidx] = NULL;
|
||
|
||
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&list, NULL, format, args);
|
||
xfree (format);
|
||
for (i=0; array[i]; i++)
|
||
gcry_mpi_release (array[i]);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (curve);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (flags);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (uri_sexp);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp);
|
||
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
*result = list;
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Check whether the secret key identified by GRIP is available.
|
||
Returns 0 is the key is available. */
|
||
int
|
||
agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip)
|
||
{
|
||
int result;
|
||
char *fname;
|
||
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
|
||
|
||
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
|
||
strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
|
||
|
||
fname = make_filename (gnupg_homedir (), GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR,
|
||
hexgrip, NULL);
|
||
result = !gnupg_access (fname, R_OK)? 0 : -1;
|
||
xfree (fname);
|
||
return result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Return the information about the secret key specified by the binary
|
||
keygrip GRIP. If the key is a shadowed one the shadow information
|
||
will be stored at the address R_SHADOW_INFO as an allocated
|
||
S-expression. */
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_key_info_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
int *r_keytype, unsigned char **r_shadow_info)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
size_t len;
|
||
int keytype;
|
||
|
||
(void)ctrl;
|
||
|
||
if (r_keytype)
|
||
*r_keytype = PRIVATE_KEY_UNKNOWN;
|
||
if (r_shadow_info)
|
||
*r_shadow_info = NULL;
|
||
|
||
{
|
||
gcry_sexp_t sexp;
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &sexp, NULL);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
|
||
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
|
||
else
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
err = make_canon_sexp (sexp, &buf, &len);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (sexp);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keytype = agent_private_key_type (buf);
|
||
switch (keytype)
|
||
{
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_OPENPGP_NONE:
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
|
||
/* If we ever require it we could retrieve the comment fields
|
||
from such a key. */
|
||
break;
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED:
|
||
if (r_shadow_info)
|
||
{
|
||
const unsigned char *s;
|
||
size_t n;
|
||
|
||
err = agent_get_shadow_info (buf, &s);
|
||
if (!err)
|
||
{
|
||
n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (s, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
||
log_assert (n);
|
||
*r_shadow_info = xtrymalloc (n);
|
||
if (!*r_shadow_info)
|
||
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
else
|
||
memcpy (*r_shadow_info, s, n);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
break;
|
||
default:
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!err && r_keytype)
|
||
*r_keytype = keytype;
|
||
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Delete the key with GRIP from the disk after having asked for
|
||
* confirmation using DESC_TEXT. If FORCE is set the function won't
|
||
* require a confirmation via Pinentry or warns if the key is also
|
||
* used by ssh. If ONLY_STUBS is set only stub keys (references to
|
||
* smartcards) will be affected.
|
||
*
|
||
* Common error codes are:
|
||
* GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY
|
||
* GPG_ERR_KEY_ON_CARD
|
||
* GPG_ERR_NOT_CONFIRMED
|
||
* GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN - Not a stub key and ONLY_STUBS requested.
|
||
*/
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_delete_key (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
|
||
const unsigned char *grip, int force, int only_stubs)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
|
||
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
||
size_t len;
|
||
char *desc_text_final = NULL;
|
||
char *comment = NULL;
|
||
ssh_control_file_t cf = NULL;
|
||
char hexgrip[40+4+1];
|
||
char *default_desc = NULL;
|
||
int key_type;
|
||
|
||
err = read_key_file (grip, &s_skey, NULL);
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
|
||
err = make_canon_sexp (s_skey, &buf, &len);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
|
||
key_type = agent_private_key_type (buf);
|
||
if (only_stubs && key_type != PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED)
|
||
{
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_FORBIDDEN);
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch (key_type)
|
||
{
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_OPENPGP_NONE:
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
|
||
bin2hex (grip, 20, hexgrip);
|
||
if (!force)
|
||
{
|
||
if (!desc_text)
|
||
{
|
||
default_desc = xtryasprintf
|
||
(L_("Do you really want to delete the key identified by keygrip%%0A"
|
||
" %s%%0A %%C%%0A?"), hexgrip);
|
||
desc_text = default_desc;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Note, that we will take the comment as a C string for
|
||
display purposes; i.e. all stuff beyond a Nul character is
|
||
ignored. */
|
||
{
|
||
gcry_sexp_t comment_sexp;
|
||
|
||
comment_sexp = gcry_sexp_find_token (s_skey, "comment", 0);
|
||
if (comment_sexp)
|
||
comment = gcry_sexp_nth_string (comment_sexp, 1);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (comment_sexp);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (desc_text)
|
||
err = agent_modify_description (desc_text, comment, s_skey,
|
||
&desc_text_final);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
|
||
err = agent_get_confirmation (ctrl, desc_text_final,
|
||
L_("Delete key"), L_("No"), 0);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
|
||
cf = ssh_open_control_file ();
|
||
if (cf)
|
||
{
|
||
if (!ssh_search_control_file (cf, hexgrip, NULL, NULL, NULL))
|
||
{
|
||
err = agent_get_confirmation
|
||
(ctrl,
|
||
L_("Warning: This key is also listed for use with SSH!\n"
|
||
"Deleting the key might remove your ability to "
|
||
"access remote machines."),
|
||
L_("Delete key"), L_("No"), 0);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
err = remove_key_file (grip);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED:
|
||
err = remove_key_file (grip);
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
log_error ("invalid private key format\n");
|
||
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
leave:
|
||
ssh_close_control_file (cf);
|
||
gcry_free (comment);
|
||
xfree (desc_text_final);
|
||
xfree (default_desc);
|
||
xfree (buf);
|
||
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Write an S-expression formatted shadow key to our key storage.
|
||
* Shadow key is created by an S-expression public key in PKBUF and
|
||
* card's SERIALNO and the IDSTRING. With FORCE passed as true an
|
||
* existing key with the given GRIP will get overwritten. If
|
||
* DISPSERIALNO is not NULL the human readable s/n will also be
|
||
* recorded in the key file. */
|
||
gpg_error_t
|
||
agent_write_shadow_key (const unsigned char *grip,
|
||
const char *serialno, const char *keyid,
|
||
const unsigned char *pkbuf, int force,
|
||
const char *dispserialno)
|
||
{
|
||
gpg_error_t err;
|
||
unsigned char *shadow_info;
|
||
unsigned char *shdkey;
|
||
size_t len;
|
||
|
||
/* Just in case some caller did not parse the stuff correctly, skip
|
||
* leading spaces. */
|
||
while (spacep (serialno))
|
||
serialno++;
|
||
while (spacep (keyid))
|
||
keyid++;
|
||
|
||
shadow_info = make_shadow_info (serialno, keyid);
|
||
if (!shadow_info)
|
||
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
||
|
||
err = agent_shadow_key (pkbuf, shadow_info, &shdkey);
|
||
xfree (shadow_info);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("shadowing the key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
len = gcry_sexp_canon_len (shdkey, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
||
err = agent_write_private_key (grip, shdkey, len, force,
|
||
serialno, keyid, dispserialno, 0);
|
||
xfree (shdkey);
|
||
if (err)
|
||
log_error ("error writing key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
|
||
|
||
return err;
|
||
}
|