mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
synced 2024-12-22 10:19:57 +01:00
09117e769a
* g10/call-dirmngr.c (gpg_dirmngr_ks_list): Make R_KEYSERVER optional. * g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_any_configured): New. (keyserver_put): Remove arg keyserver because this will always receive opt.keyserver which is anyway used when connecting dirmngr. Do not check opt.keyserver. (keyserver_import_cert): Replace opt.keyserver by keyserver_any_configured. * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Ditto. * g10/import.c (revocation_present): Ditto. * g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_byname): Ditto. * g10/gpgv.c (keyserver_any_configured): Add stub. * g10/test-stubs.c (keyserver_any_configured): Add stub. -- The keyserver should be configured in dirmngr.conf and thus we can't use opt.keyserver in gpg to decide whether a keyserver has been configured. GnuPG-bug-id: 2147 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
2384 lines
71 KiB
C
2384 lines
71 KiB
C
/* mainproc.c - handle packets
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
|
|
*
|
|
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
|
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
* (at your option) any later version.
|
|
*
|
|
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
*
|
|
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <config.h>
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
#include <time.h>
|
|
|
|
#include "gpg.h"
|
|
#include "util.h"
|
|
#include "packet.h"
|
|
#include "iobuf.h"
|
|
#include "options.h"
|
|
#include "keydb.h"
|
|
#include "filter.h"
|
|
#include "main.h"
|
|
#include "status.h"
|
|
#include "i18n.h"
|
|
#include "trustdb.h"
|
|
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
|
|
#include "photoid.h"
|
|
#include "mbox-util.h"
|
|
#include "call-dirmngr.h"
|
|
|
|
/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
|
|
value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
|
|
#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
|
|
struct kidlist_item
|
|
{
|
|
struct kidlist_item *next;
|
|
u32 kid[2];
|
|
int pubkey_algo;
|
|
int reason;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Object to hold the processing context.
|
|
*/
|
|
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
|
|
struct mainproc_context
|
|
{
|
|
ctrl_t ctrl;
|
|
struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
|
|
PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
|
|
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
|
|
md_filter_context_t mfx;
|
|
int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
|
|
int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
|
|
|
|
/* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
|
|
detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
|
|
file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
|
|
const char *sigfilename;
|
|
|
|
/* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
|
|
signature. */
|
|
struct
|
|
{
|
|
/* A file descriptor of the the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
|
|
int data_fd;
|
|
/* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
|
|
used if DATA_FD is -1. */
|
|
strlist_t data_names;
|
|
/* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
|
|
is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
|
|
int used;
|
|
} signed_data;
|
|
|
|
DEK *dek;
|
|
int last_was_session_key;
|
|
kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
|
|
iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
|
|
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
|
|
ulong symkeys;
|
|
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
|
|
struct {
|
|
unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
|
|
has been seen. */
|
|
unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
|
|
unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
|
|
} any;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*** Local prototypes. ***/
|
|
static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
|
|
static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
|
|
static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
|
|
static int literals_seen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*** Functions. ***/
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
reset_literals_seen(void)
|
|
{
|
|
literals_seen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
release_list( CTX c )
|
|
{
|
|
if (!c->list)
|
|
return;
|
|
proc_tree (c, c->list);
|
|
release_kbnode (c->list);
|
|
while (c->pkenc_list)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
|
|
xfree (c->pkenc_list);
|
|
c->pkenc_list = tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
c->pkenc_list = NULL;
|
|
c->list = NULL;
|
|
c->any.data = 0;
|
|
c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t node;
|
|
|
|
if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
|
|
else /* Insert the first one. */
|
|
c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
|
|
{
|
|
/* New clear text signature.
|
|
* Process the last one and reset everything */
|
|
release_list(c);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
|
|
else /* Insert the first one. */
|
|
c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!c->list)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!c->list)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!c->list)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t node;
|
|
|
|
c->any.sig_seen = 1;
|
|
if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
|
|
* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
|
|
* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
|
|
* of prepending the signature to the data is
|
|
* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
|
|
* from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
|
|
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
|
|
c->list = node;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!c->list)
|
|
return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
|
|
else if (!c->list->pkt)
|
|
BUG(); /* so nicht */
|
|
|
|
/* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
|
|
node = new_kbnode (pkt);
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, node);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
|
|
|
if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
|
|
(int)slen);
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
|
|
gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
|
|
gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
|
|
|
|
/* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
|
|
decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
|
|
|
|
dek->keylen=slen-1;
|
|
dek->algo=seskey[0];
|
|
|
|
if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
|
|
memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
|
|
|
|
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
|
|
|
|
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
|
|
if (!enc)
|
|
log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
|
|
else if(!c->dek)
|
|
{
|
|
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
|
|
const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
|
|
|
|
if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opt.quiet)
|
|
{
|
|
if (enc->seskeylen)
|
|
log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
|
|
else
|
|
log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
|
|
|
|
if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
|
|
{
|
|
log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
|
|
" algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
|
|
s = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
|
|
if (!s || opt.list_only)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
if (opt.override_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
|
|
if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
|
|
{
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (c->dek)
|
|
{
|
|
c->dek->symmetric = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
|
|
comes before a public key in the message - if the
|
|
user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
|
|
chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
|
|
be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
|
|
appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
|
|
come later. */
|
|
if (enc->seskeylen)
|
|
{
|
|
if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
|
|
enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
|
|
{
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
c->symkeys++;
|
|
free_packet (pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_pubkey_enc *enc;
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 1;
|
|
enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
|
|
/*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
|
|
/* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
|
|
* function to check it. */
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
|
|
|
|
if (is_status_enabled())
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[50];
|
|
/* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
|
|
to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
|
|
problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
|
|
algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
|
|
IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
|
|
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
|
|
(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
/* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
|
|
* secure memory because it has already been passed on the
|
|
* command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
|
|
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
|
|
result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
|
|
if (result)
|
|
{
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
|
|
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
|
|
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
|
|
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
|
|
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
|
|
There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
|
|
subkey. */
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
|
|
we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
|
|
experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
|
|
if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
|
|
|| opt.try_all_secrets
|
|
|| have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
|
|
{
|
|
if(opt.list_only)
|
|
result = -1;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
|
|
if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Error: Delete the DEK. */
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
|
|
|
|
if (result == -1)
|
|
;
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Store it for later display. */
|
|
struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
|
|
x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
|
|
x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
|
|
x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
|
|
x->reason = result;
|
|
x->next = c->pkenc_list;
|
|
c->pkenc_list = x;
|
|
|
|
if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
|
|
log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_packet(pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
|
|
* not decrypt.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; list; list = list->next)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
|
const char *algstr;
|
|
|
|
if (failed && !list->reason)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!failed && list->reason)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
|
|
pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
|
|
|
|
if (!algstr)
|
|
algstr = "[?]";
|
|
pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
|
|
if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid))
|
|
{
|
|
char *p;
|
|
log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
|
|
nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
|
|
strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
|
|
p = get_user_id_native (list->kid);
|
|
log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
|
|
xfree (p);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
|
|
algstr, keystr(list->kid));
|
|
|
|
free_public_key (pk);
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
if (is_status_enabled())
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[20];
|
|
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
|
|
(ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (list->reason)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
|
|
gpg_strerror (list->reason));
|
|
write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int result = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.quiet)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->symkeys>1)
|
|
log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
|
|
else if (c->symkeys == 1)
|
|
log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
|
|
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
|
|
print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
|
|
|
|
write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
|
|
|
|
/*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
|
|
if (opt.list_only)
|
|
result = -1;
|
|
else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
int algo;
|
|
STRING2KEY s2kbuf;
|
|
STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
|
|
int canceled;
|
|
|
|
if (opt.override_session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
|
|
result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
|
|
if (result)
|
|
{
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
|
|
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
|
|
if (algo)
|
|
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
|
|
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
|
|
else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
|
|
{
|
|
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
|
|
if (!algo)
|
|
algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
|
|
log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
|
|
"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
|
|
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
|
|
if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
|
|
s2kbuf.mode = 0;
|
|
s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
|
|
s2k = &s2kbuf;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, &canceled);
|
|
if (c->dek)
|
|
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
|
|
else if (canceled)
|
|
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
|
|
else
|
|
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!c->dek)
|
|
result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
|
|
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
|
|
|
|
if (result == -1)
|
|
;
|
|
else if (!result
|
|
&& !opt.ignore_mdc_error
|
|
&& !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
|
|
&& openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) != 8
|
|
&& c->dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The message has been decrypted but has no MDC despite that a
|
|
modern cipher (blocklength != 64 bit, except for Twofish) is
|
|
used and the option to ignore MDC errors is not used: To
|
|
avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
|
|
we fail here. */
|
|
log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
|
|
if (opt.verbose > 1)
|
|
log_info ("decryption forced to fail\n");
|
|
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
|
|
&& opt.ignore_mdc_error))
|
|
{
|
|
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
|
|
if (opt.verbose > 1)
|
|
log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
|
|
if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
|
|
write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
|
|
else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
|
|
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
|
|
}
|
|
else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
|
|
log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
|
|
write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
|
|
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
|
|
&& *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
|
|
{
|
|
if (opt.debug)
|
|
log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
|
|
c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
|
|
passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
|
|
write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
|
|
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
|
|
* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xfree (c->dek);
|
|
c->dek = NULL;
|
|
free_packet (pkt);
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
|
|
write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
|
|
int any, clearsig, rc;
|
|
kbnode_t n;
|
|
|
|
literals_seen++;
|
|
|
|
if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
|
|
log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
|
|
else if (opt.verbose)
|
|
log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
|
|
|
|
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
|
|
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
/* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
|
|
* and no armoring - Not yet tested
|
|
* Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
|
|
* Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
|
|
* See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
|
|
*/
|
|
any = clearsig = 0;
|
|
for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
|
|
{
|
|
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The onepass signature case. */
|
|
if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
|
|
any = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The clearsigned message case. */
|
|
size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
|
|
const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
|
|
if (datalen < 2)
|
|
log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
|
|
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
|
|
* documents. */
|
|
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
|
|
for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
|
|
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
|
|
any = 1;
|
|
break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
|
|
expected. */
|
|
}
|
|
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
|
|
gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
|
|
any = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
|
|
according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
|
|
There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
|
|
that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
|
|
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
|
|
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
|
|
}
|
|
if (DBG_HASHING)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
|
|
if (c->mfx.md2)
|
|
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc=0;
|
|
|
|
if (literals_seen > 1)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
|
|
{
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
|
|
log_inc_errorcount ();
|
|
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
{
|
|
rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig);
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
|
|
signature. */
|
|
rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
|
|
free_packet(pkt);
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
|
|
* This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
|
|
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
|
|
if (c->list)
|
|
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
|
|
else
|
|
c->list = n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
|
|
&& ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
|
|
return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
|
|
((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
|
|
else
|
|
return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
|
|
((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
|
|
((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
|
|
{
|
|
CTX c = info;
|
|
return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
|
|
if (c->sigs_only)
|
|
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
|
|
else if( c->encrypt_only )
|
|
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
|
|
else
|
|
rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
|
|
{
|
|
CTX cc;
|
|
|
|
for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
|
|
cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
|
|
log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (rc)
|
|
log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
|
|
free_packet(pkt);
|
|
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check the signature
|
|
* Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
|
|
int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_signature *sig;
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
|
|
int algo, rc;
|
|
|
|
assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
|
|
if (is_selfsig)
|
|
*is_selfsig = 0;
|
|
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
|
|
algo = sig->digest_algo;
|
|
rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->mfx.md)
|
|
{
|
|
if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
}
|
|
else /* detached signature */
|
|
{
|
|
/* check_signature() will enable the md. */
|
|
if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
|
|
{
|
|
/* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
|
|
in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
|
|
if (c->mfx.md)
|
|
{
|
|
if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
}
|
|
else /* detached signature */
|
|
{
|
|
log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
|
|
/* check_signature() will enable the md*/
|
|
if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
|
|
BUG ();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
|
|
|| sig->sig_class == 0x18
|
|
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|
|
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|
|
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
|
|
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
|
|
"use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
|
|
return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
|
|
return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
|
|
|
|
/* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
|
|
(0x00) or text document (0x01). */
|
|
rc = check_signature2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
|
|
if (! rc)
|
|
md_good = md;
|
|
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
|
|
{
|
|
rc = check_signature2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
|
|
if (! rc)
|
|
md_good = md2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (md_good)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, 0);
|
|
sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
|
|
memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gcry_md_close (md);
|
|
gcry_md_close (md2);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!pkt)
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
{
|
|
es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
|
|
es_printf("%u %lu",
|
|
pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
|
|
pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
|
|
else
|
|
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
|
pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
|
pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* List the keyblock in a user friendly way
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
|
|
{
|
|
int mainkey;
|
|
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
if (!node)
|
|
;
|
|
else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY))
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
|
|
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
|
|
if (mainkey)
|
|
c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
|
|
0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL));
|
|
es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
|
|
if (c->trustletter)
|
|
es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
|
|
es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
|
|
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
|
|
pk->pubkey_algo,
|
|
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
|
|
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
|
|
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
|
|
if (mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode)
|
|
es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
es_printf ("%s %s/%s %s",
|
|
mainkey? "pub":"sub",
|
|
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
|
|
keystr_from_pk (pk),
|
|
datestr_from_pk (pk));
|
|
|
|
if (pk->flags.revoked)
|
|
{
|
|
es_printf (" [");
|
|
es_printf (_("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
|
|
es_printf ("]\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else if( pk->expiredate && !opt.with_colons)
|
|
{
|
|
es_printf (" [");
|
|
es_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
|
|
es_printf ("]\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
|
|
|
|
if ((mainkey && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
|
|
print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
{
|
|
if (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
|
|
es_printf ("rtv:1:%u:\n",
|
|
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mainkey)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
|
|
for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
list_node (c, node );
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
{
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
|
|
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
|
|
else
|
|
es_printf ("uid%*s",
|
|
(int)keystrlen ()+(opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
|
|
"" );
|
|
print_userid (node->pkt);
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
|
|
if (opt.with_colons
|
|
&& node->next
|
|
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
|
|
{
|
|
es_printf ("rtv:2:%u:\n",
|
|
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
|
|
node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
list_node(c, node );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
|
|
/* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
|
|
a public key one and use that here. */
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
int is_selfsig = 0;
|
|
int rc2 = 0;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
char *p;
|
|
int sigrc = ' ';
|
|
|
|
if (!opt.verbose)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
|
|
es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
|
|
else
|
|
es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
|
|
if (opt.check_sigs)
|
|
{
|
|
fflush (stdout);
|
|
rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL);
|
|
switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
|
|
{
|
|
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
|
|
case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
|
|
case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
|
|
case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
|
|
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
|
|
{
|
|
u32 keyid[2];
|
|
|
|
if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
|
|
{
|
|
keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
|
|
|
|
if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
|
|
is_selfsig = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
{
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
if (sigrc != ' ')
|
|
es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
|
|
es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
|
|
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
|
|
colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
|
|
colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
|
|
|
|
if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
|
|
es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
|
|
if (sig->trust_regexp)
|
|
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
|
|
strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
|
|
sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
|
|
if (sigrc == '%')
|
|
es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
|
|
else if (sigrc == '?')
|
|
;
|
|
else if (is_selfsig)
|
|
{
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
|
|
{
|
|
p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
|
|
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
|
|
opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
|
|
xfree (p);
|
|
}
|
|
if (opt.with_colons)
|
|
es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
|
|
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
|
|
|
|
c->ctrl = ctrl;
|
|
c->anchor = anchor;
|
|
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
|
|
xfree (c);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
|
|
strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
|
|
{
|
|
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
c->ctrl = ctrl;
|
|
c->anchor = anchor;
|
|
c->sigs_only = 1;
|
|
|
|
c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
|
|
c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
|
|
c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
|
|
|
|
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
|
|
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
|
|
|
|
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
|
|
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
|
|
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
|
|
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
|
|
with an error. */
|
|
if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
|
|
{
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
|
|
log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
|
|
rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
|
|
so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
|
|
if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
|
|
c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
xfree (c);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
|
|
void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
CTX c;
|
|
|
|
c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
|
|
if (!c)
|
|
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
|
|
|
|
c->ctrl = ctrl;
|
|
c->anchor = anchor;
|
|
c->sigs_only = 1;
|
|
|
|
c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
|
|
c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
|
|
c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
|
|
|
|
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
|
|
|
|
/* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
|
|
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
|
|
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
|
|
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
|
|
with an error. */
|
|
if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
|
|
{
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
|
|
log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
|
|
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
|
|
so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
|
|
if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
|
|
c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
xfree ( c );
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
|
|
{
|
|
CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
c->ctrl = ctrl;
|
|
c->anchor = anchor;
|
|
c->encrypt_only = 1;
|
|
rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
|
|
xfree (c);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
check_nesting (CTX c)
|
|
{
|
|
int level;
|
|
|
|
for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
|
|
level++;
|
|
|
|
if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
|
|
return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET *pkt;
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
int any_data = 0;
|
|
int newpkt;
|
|
|
|
rc = check_nesting (c);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
|
|
c->iobuf = a;
|
|
init_packet(pkt);
|
|
while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
|
|
{
|
|
any_data = 1;
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
{
|
|
free_packet (pkt);
|
|
/* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
|
|
* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
|
|
&& opt.list_packets != 2 )
|
|
break;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
newpkt = -1;
|
|
if (opt.list_packets)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (pkt->pkttype)
|
|
{
|
|
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
|
|
default: newpkt = 0; break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->sigs_only)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (pkt->pkttype)
|
|
{
|
|
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_USER_ID:
|
|
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
|
|
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
|
|
write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
|
|
rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
|
|
default: newpkt = 0; break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->encrypt_only)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (pkt->pkttype)
|
|
{
|
|
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_USER_ID:
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
|
|
rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
|
|
default: newpkt = 0; break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
switch (pkt->pkttype)
|
|
{
|
|
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
|
|
release_list (c);
|
|
c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
|
|
newpkt = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
|
|
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
|
|
newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
|
|
break;
|
|
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
|
|
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
|
|
case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
|
|
default: newpkt = 0; break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto leave;
|
|
|
|
/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
|
|
* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
|
|
* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
|
|
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
|
|
* when there is a compression packet between which adds just
|
|
* an extra layer.
|
|
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
|
|
c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
|
|
|
|
if (newpkt == -1)
|
|
;
|
|
else if (newpkt)
|
|
{
|
|
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
|
|
init_packet (pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
free_packet(pkt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
|
|
|
|
if (any_data)
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
else if (rc == -1)
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
|
|
|
|
|
|
leave:
|
|
release_list (c);
|
|
xfree(c->dek);
|
|
free_packet (pkt);
|
|
xfree (pkt);
|
|
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
|
|
of the notation data. */
|
|
static pka_info_t *
|
|
get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
|
|
struct notation *nd,*notation;
|
|
|
|
notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
|
|
|
|
for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
|
|
continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
|
|
|
|
/* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
|
|
we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
|
|
list. */
|
|
if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
|
|
{
|
|
pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
|
|
pka->valid = 0;
|
|
pka->checked = 0;
|
|
pka->uri = NULL;
|
|
strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free_notation(notation);
|
|
|
|
return pka;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
|
|
be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
|
|
out and try to get that DNS record. */
|
|
static const char *
|
|
pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
|
|
{
|
|
assert (!sig->pka_info);
|
|
sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
|
|
sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
|
|
if (sig->pka_info)
|
|
{
|
|
char *url;
|
|
unsigned char *fpr;
|
|
size_t fprlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
|
|
&fpr, &fprlen, &url))
|
|
{
|
|
if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
|
|
if (url)
|
|
{
|
|
sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
|
|
if (!*url)
|
|
xfree (url);
|
|
else
|
|
sig->pka_info->uri = url;
|
|
url = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
xfree (fpr);
|
|
xfree (url);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
|
|
PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
|
|
{
|
|
char *p;
|
|
|
|
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
|
|
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
|
|
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
if (un)
|
|
p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
|
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
p = xstrdup ("[?]");
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
|
|
else if (sig->flags.expired)
|
|
log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
|
|
else
|
|
log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
|
|
|
|
xfree (p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
const char *astr;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
int is_expkey = 0;
|
|
int is_revkey = 0;
|
|
char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
*pkstrbuf = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (opt.skip_verify)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the message composition is valid.
|
|
|
|
Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
|
|
|
|
S{1,n} -- detached signature.
|
|
S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
|
|
O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
|
|
C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
O = One-Pass Signature packet.
|
|
S = Signature packet.
|
|
P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
|
|
(Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
|
|
for a signed message but that does not work as it
|
|
introduces ambiguities.)
|
|
We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
|
|
CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
|
|
C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
|
|
|
|
We reject all other messages.
|
|
|
|
Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
|
|
each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
|
|
introduce a bug here.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t n;
|
|
int n_onepass, n_sig;
|
|
|
|
/* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
|
|
/* dump_kbnode (c->list); */
|
|
|
|
n = c->list;
|
|
assert (n);
|
|
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
|
|
"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
|
|
for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
|
|
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (!n)
|
|
; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
|
|
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
|
|
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
|
|
{
|
|
if (n->next)
|
|
goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
|
|
for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
|
|
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
|
|
n_onepass++;
|
|
if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
|
|
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
|
|
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
|
|
n_sig++;
|
|
if (!n_sig)
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
|
|
/* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
|
|
something like this:
|
|
|
|
if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
|
|
However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
|
|
can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
|
|
messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
|
|
|
|
if (n_onepass != n_sig)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
|
|
"number of signature packets\n");
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
|
|
{
|
|
/* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
|
|
n = n->next;
|
|
if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
|
|
== CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
|
|
n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
|
|
n_sig++;
|
|
if (n || !n_sig)
|
|
goto ambiguous;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ambiguous:
|
|
log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
|
|
|
|
astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
|
|
if (keystrlen () > 8)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
|
|
log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
|
|
astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
|
|
asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
|
|
keystr(sig->keyid));
|
|
|
|
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
|
|
|
|
/* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
|
|
{
|
|
const byte *p;
|
|
int seq = 0;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
|
|
while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
|
|
{
|
|
/* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
|
|
you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
|
|
"from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
|
|
even try to make two strings here :) */
|
|
log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
|
|
print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
|
|
if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
|
|
&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
|
|
{
|
|
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
|
|
|
|
spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
|
|
if (spec)
|
|
{
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
|
|
res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec);
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
|
|
if (!res)
|
|
rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
|
|
free_keyserver_spec (spec);
|
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
|
|
try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
|
|
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
|
|
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
|
|
{
|
|
const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
|
|
|
|
if (uri)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
|
|
fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
|
|
int res;
|
|
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
|
|
|
|
spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
|
|
if (spec)
|
|
{
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
|
|
res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec);
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
|
|
free_keyserver_spec (spec);
|
|
if (!res)
|
|
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
|
|
no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
|
|
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
|
|
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
|
|
&& keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
|
|
{
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
|
|
res=keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
|
|
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
|
|
if (!res)
|
|
rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t un, keyblock;
|
|
int count = 0;
|
|
int statno;
|
|
char keyid_str[50];
|
|
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
|
|
else if (sig->flags.expired)
|
|
statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
|
|
else if (is_expkey)
|
|
statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
|
|
else if(is_revkey)
|
|
statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
|
|
else
|
|
statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
|
|
|
|
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (sig->keyid);
|
|
|
|
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
|
|
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
|
|
|
|
/* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
|
|
"Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
|
|
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
|
|
{
|
|
int valid;
|
|
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
|
|
{
|
|
pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* We want the textual primary user ID here */
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
assert (pk);
|
|
|
|
/* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
|
|
user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
|
|
the signature later.) Because print_good_bad_signature
|
|
does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
|
|
before calling that function. */
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
|
|
valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
valid = 0; /* Not used. */
|
|
|
|
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
|
|
|
|
print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
|
|
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
|
|
log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
|
|
else
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
|
|
/* Get a string description of the algo for informational
|
|
output we want to print later. It is convenient to do it
|
|
here because we already have the right public key. */
|
|
pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
|
|
count++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In case we did not found a valid valid textual userid above
|
|
we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
|
|
with the "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
|
|
if (!count)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Try for an invalid textual userid */
|
|
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|
|
&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try for any userid at all */
|
|
if (!un)
|
|
{
|
|
for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
|
|
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
|
|
|
|
print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
|
|
|
|
if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
|
|
log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
|
|
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
|
|
if (count
|
|
&& !rc
|
|
&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
|
|
{
|
|
char *p;
|
|
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
|
|
{
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
|
|
|| un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
|
|
&& !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
|
|
&& !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If this user id has attribute data, print that. */
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
|
|
{
|
|
dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);
|
|
|
|
if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
|
|
show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
|
|
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
|
|
pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
|
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
|
|
log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
|
|
xfree (p);
|
|
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
|
|
{
|
|
const char *valid;
|
|
|
|
if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
|
|
valid = _("revoked");
|
|
else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
|
|
valid = _("expired");
|
|
else
|
|
/* Since this is just informational, don't
|
|
actually ask the user to update any trust
|
|
information. */
|
|
valid = (trust_value_to_string
|
|
(get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0)));
|
|
log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
log_printf ("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
release_kbnode( keyblock );
|
|
|
|
/* For good signatures print notation data. */
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
|
|
show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
|
|
else
|
|
show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
|
|
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
|
|
show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
|
|
else
|
|
show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
|
|
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
|
|
show_notation
|
|
(sig, 0, 1,
|
|
(((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
|
|
+ ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
|
|
else
|
|
show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line. */
|
|
if (!rc && is_status_enabled ())
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
|
|
|
|
if (!get_pubkey (vpk, sig->keyid))
|
|
{
|
|
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
|
|
char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
|
|
size_t i, n;
|
|
|
|
bufp = buf;
|
|
fingerprint_from_pk (vpk, array, &n);
|
|
p = array;
|
|
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
|
|
sprintf (bufp, "%02X", *p );
|
|
/* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
|
|
with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
|
|
etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to match! */
|
|
sprintf (bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
|
|
strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
|
|
(ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
|
|
sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
|
|
sig->sig_class);
|
|
bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
|
|
if (!vpk->flags.primary)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 akid[2];
|
|
|
|
akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
|
|
akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
|
|
free_public_key (vpk);
|
|
vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
|
|
if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
|
|
n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
|
|
memset (array, 0, n);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
|
|
}
|
|
p = array;
|
|
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
|
|
sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf);
|
|
}
|
|
free_public_key (vpk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
|
|
Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
|
|
how to resolve a conflict. */
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
|
|
pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
|
|
rc = check_signatures_trust (sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Print extra information about the signature. */
|
|
if (sig->flags.expired)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
|
|
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
|
|
}
|
|
else if (sig->expiredate)
|
|
log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
|
|
|
|
if (opt.verbose)
|
|
log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
|
|
sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
|
|
sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
|
|
gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
|
|
*pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"",
|
|
pkstrbuf);
|
|
|
|
/* Print final warnings. */
|
|
if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
|
|
deprecated command
|
|
gpg --verify FILE.sig
|
|
was used instead of
|
|
gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
|
|
to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
|
|
data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
|
|
|
|
The problem is that the first form would also verify a
|
|
standard signature. This behavior could be used to
|
|
create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
|
|
standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
|
|
(for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
|
|
sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
|
|
Using the first form the verify command would correctly
|
|
verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
|
|
kbnode_t n;
|
|
char *dfile;
|
|
|
|
dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
|
|
if (dfile)
|
|
{
|
|
for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
|
|
if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (n)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
|
|
is not a detached signature. */
|
|
log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
|
|
"file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
|
|
}
|
|
xfree (dfile);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
g10_errors_seen = 1;
|
|
if (opt.batch && rc)
|
|
g10_exit (1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[50];
|
|
|
|
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
|
|
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
|
|
sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
|
|
sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc);
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_ERRSIG, buf);
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
buf[16] = 0;
|
|
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf);
|
|
}
|
|
if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
|
|
log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the tree which starts at node
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
|
|
{
|
|
kbnode_t n1;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
|
|
they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
|
|
addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
|
|
while (node
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
|
|
{
|
|
node = node->next;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!node)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
c->trustletter = ' ';
|
|
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
|
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
|
|
{
|
|
merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
|
|
list_node (c, node);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
|
|
{
|
|
merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
|
|
list_node (c, node);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check all signatures. */
|
|
if (!c->any.data)
|
|
{
|
|
int use_textmode = 0;
|
|
|
|
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
|
|
/* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
|
|
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto hash_err;
|
|
|
|
/* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
|
|
one-pass packet? */
|
|
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
|
|
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
|
|
|
|
if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
|
|
use_textmode = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Ask for file and hash it. */
|
|
if (c->sigs_only)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
|
|
rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
|
|
c->signed_data.data_fd,
|
|
use_textmode);
|
|
else
|
|
rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
|
|
c->signed_data.data_names,
|
|
c->sigfilename,
|
|
use_textmode);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
|
|
iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
|
|
use_textmode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hash_err:
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->signed_data.used)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
|
|
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
|
|
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Clear text signed message. */
|
|
if (!c->any.data)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->signed_data.used)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
|
|
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
|
{
|
|
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
|
int multiple_ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
|
|
if (n1)
|
|
{
|
|
byte class = sig->sig_class;
|
|
byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
|
|
|
|
for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
|
|
{
|
|
/* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
|
|
different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
|
|
to run a different hash context for each), but if
|
|
they are all the same, make an exception. */
|
|
if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
|
|
|| n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash)
|
|
{
|
|
multiple_ok = 0;
|
|
log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
|
|
"Only the first will be checked.\n"));
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!c->any.data)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Detached signature */
|
|
free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
|
|
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto detached_hash_err;
|
|
|
|
if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
|
|
; /* Strict RFC mode. */
|
|
else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
|
|
&& sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|
|
&& sig->sig_class == 0x01)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
|
|
* signature has been created in textmode. */
|
|
rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
goto detached_hash_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
|
|
* 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
|
|
* signatures; this would let the first signature check
|
|
* (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
|
|
* extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
|
|
* This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
|
|
* some cases (and break others).
|
|
* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (DBG_HASHING)
|
|
{
|
|
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
|
|
if (c->mfx.md2)
|
|
gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (c->sigs_only)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
|
|
rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
|
|
c->signed_data.data_fd,
|
|
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
|
|
else
|
|
rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
|
|
c->signed_data.data_names,
|
|
c->sigfilename,
|
|
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
|
|
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
|
|
(sig->sig_class == 0x01));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
detached_hash_err:
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (c->signed_data.used)
|
|
{
|
|
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!opt.quiet)
|
|
log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
|
|
|
|
if (multiple_ok)
|
|
{
|
|
for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
|
|
check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
check_sig_and_print (c, node);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
dump_kbnode (c->list);
|
|
log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");
|
|
dump_kbnode (node);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|