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gnupg/g10/keyedit.c
David Shaw ff4b6613a9 * keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Fix assertion failure when using 
toggle to see a secret key.  Reported by Maxim Britov.
2003-09-03 23:24:03 +00:00

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/* keyedit.c - keyedit stuff
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
* 2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "photoid.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
static void show_prefs( PKT_user_id *uid, int verbose );
static void show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
int with_revoker, int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs );
static void show_key_and_fingerprint( KBNODE keyblock );
static int menu_adduid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock, int photo );
static void menu_deluid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_delsig( KBNODE pub_keyblock );
static void menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_addrevoker( KBNODE pub_keyblock,
KBNODE sec_keyblock, int sensitive );
static int menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_set_primary_uid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_set_preferences( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_set_keyserver_url (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_select_uid( KBNODE keyblock, int idx );
static int menu_select_key( KBNODE keyblock, int idx );
static int count_uids( KBNODE keyblock );
static int count_uids_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag );
static int count_keys_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag );
static int count_selected_uids( KBNODE keyblock );
static int real_uids_left( KBNODE keyblock );
static int count_selected_keys( KBNODE keyblock );
static int menu_revsig( KBNODE keyblock );
static int menu_revuid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock );
static int enable_disable_key( KBNODE keyblock, int disable );
static void menu_showphoto( KBNODE keyblock );
static int update_trust=0;
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
#define NODFLG_BADSIG (1<<0) /* bad signature */
#define NODFLG_NOKEY (1<<1) /* no public key */
#define NODFLG_SIGERR (1<<2) /* other sig error */
#define NODFLG_MARK_A (1<<4) /* temporary mark */
#define NODFLG_DELSIG (1<<5) /* to be deleted */
#define NODFLG_SELUID (1<<8) /* indicate the selected userid */
#define NODFLG_SELKEY (1<<9) /* indicate the selected key */
#define NODFLG_SELSIG (1<<10) /* indicate a selected signature */
struct sign_attrib {
int non_exportable,non_revocable;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason;
byte trust_depth,trust_value;
char *trust_regexp;
};
/****************
* Print information about a signature, check it and return true
* if the signature is okay. NODE must be a signature packet.
*/
static int
print_and_check_one_sig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node,
int *inv_sigs, int *no_key, int *oth_err,
int *is_selfsig, int print_without_key )
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int rc, sigrc;
int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that
issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */
switch( (rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, is_selfsig)) ) {
case 0:
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG|NODFLG_NOKEY|NODFLG_SIGERR);
sigrc = '!';
break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:
node->flag = NODFLG_BADSIG;
sigrc = '-';
if( inv_sigs )
++*inv_sigs;
break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:
node->flag = NODFLG_NOKEY;
sigrc = '?';
if( no_key )
++*no_key;
break;
default:
node->flag = NODFLG_SIGERR;
sigrc = '%';
if( oth_err )
++*oth_err;
break;
}
if( sigrc != '?' || print_without_key ) {
tty_printf("%s%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c ",
is_rev? "rev":"sig",sigrc,
(sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
(sig->trust_depth>9)?'T':
(sig->trust_depth>0)?'0'+sig->trust_depth:' ');
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
tty_printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
else
tty_printf("%08lX",(ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
tty_printf(" %s", datestr_from_sig(sig));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
tty_printf(" %s",expirestr_from_sig(sig));
tty_printf(" ");
if( sigrc == '%' )
tty_printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if( *is_selfsig ) {
tty_printf( is_rev? _("[revocation]")
: _("[self-signature]") );
}
else {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string2( p, n, 40 );
m_free(p);
}
tty_printf("\n");
if(sig->flags.policy_url && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY))
show_policy_url(sig,3,0);
if(sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATION))
show_notation(sig,3,0);
if(sig->flags.pref_ks && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER))
show_keyserver_url(sig,3,0);
}
return (sigrc == '!');
}
/****************
* Check the keysigs and set the flags to indicate errors.
* Returns true if error found.
*/
static int
check_all_keysigs( KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected )
{
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
int inv_sigs = 0;
int no_key = 0;
int oth_err = 0;
int has_selfsig = 0;
int mis_selfsig = 0;
int selected = !only_selected;
int anyuid = 0;
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if( only_selected )
selected = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
if( selected ) {
tty_printf("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
tty_printf("\n");
if( anyuid && !has_selfsig )
mis_selfsig++;
has_selfsig = 0;
anyuid = 1;
}
}
else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ( (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30 ) ) {
int selfsig;
if( print_and_check_one_sig( keyblock, node, &inv_sigs,
&no_key, &oth_err, &selfsig, 0 ) ) {
if( selfsig )
has_selfsig = 1;
}
/* Hmmm: should we update the trustdb here? */
}
}
if( !has_selfsig )
mis_selfsig++;
if( inv_sigs == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
else if( inv_sigs )
tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), inv_sigs );
if( no_key == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
else if( no_key )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"), no_key );
if( oth_err == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
else if( oth_err )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), oth_err );
if( mis_selfsig == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 user ID without valid self-signature detected\n"));
else if( mis_selfsig )
tty_printf(_("%d user IDs without valid self-signatures detected\n"),
mis_selfsig);
return inv_sigs || no_key || oth_err || mis_selfsig;
}
static int
sign_mk_attrib( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
{
struct sign_attrib *attrib = opaque;
byte buf[8];
if( attrib->non_exportable ) {
buf[0] = 0; /* not exportable */
build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE, buf, 1 );
}
if( attrib->non_revocable ) {
buf[0] = 0; /* not revocable */
build_sig_subpkt( sig, SIGSUBPKT_REVOCABLE, buf, 1 );
}
if( attrib->reason )
revocation_reason_build_cb( sig, attrib->reason );
if(attrib->trust_depth)
{
/* Not critical. If someone doesn't understand trust sigs,
this can still be a valid regular signature. */
buf[0] = attrib->trust_depth;
buf[1] = attrib->trust_value;
build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_TRUST,buf,2);
/* Critical. If someone doesn't understands regexps, this
whole sig should be invalid. Note the +1 for the length -
regexps are null terminated. */
if(attrib->trust_regexp)
build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL|SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP,
attrib->trust_regexp,
strlen(attrib->trust_regexp)+1);
}
return 0;
}
static void
trustsig_prompt(byte *trust_value,byte *trust_depth,char **regexp)
{
char *p;
*trust_value=0;
*trust_depth=0;
*regexp=NULL;
tty_printf("\n");
/* Same string as pkclist.c:do_edit_ownertrust */
tty_printf(_(
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"));
tty_printf (_(" (%d) I trust marginally\n"), 1);
tty_printf (_(" (%d) I trust fully\n"), 2);
tty_printf("\n");
while(*trust_value==0)
{
p = cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_value",_("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces(p);
cpr_kill_prompt();
/* 60 and 120 are as per RFC2440 */
if(p[0]=='1' && !p[1])
*trust_value=60;
else if(p[0]=='2' && !p[1])
*trust_value=120;
m_free(p);
}
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_(
"Please enter the depth of this trust signature.\n"
"A depth greater than 1 allows the key you are signing to make\n"
"trust signatures on your behalf.\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
while(*trust_depth==0)
{
p = cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_depth",_("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces(p);
cpr_kill_prompt();
*trust_depth=atoi(p);
m_free(p);
if(*trust_depth<1 || *trust_depth>255)
*trust_depth=0;
}
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_("Please enter a domain to restrict this signature, "
"or enter for none.\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
p=cpr_get("trustsig_prompt.trust_regexp",_("Your selection? "));
trim_spaces(p);
cpr_kill_prompt();
if(strlen(p)>0)
{
char *q=p;
int regexplen=100,ind;
*regexp=m_alloc(regexplen);
/* Now mangle the domain the user entered into a regexp. To do
this, \-escape everything that isn't alphanumeric, and attach
"<[^>]+[@.]" to the front, and ">$" to the end. */
strcpy(*regexp,"<[^>]+[@.]");
ind=strlen(*regexp);
while(*q)
{
if(!((*q>='A' && *q<='Z')
|| (*q>='a' && *q<='z') || (*q>='0' && *q<='9')))
(*regexp)[ind++]='\\';
(*regexp)[ind++]=*q;
if((regexplen-ind)<3)
{
regexplen+=100;
*regexp=m_realloc(*regexp,regexplen);
}
q++;
}
(*regexp)[ind]='\0';
strcat(*regexp,">$");
}
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\n");
}
/****************
* Loop over all locusr and and sign the uids after asking.
* If no user id is marked, all user ids will be signed;
* if some user_ids are marked those will be signed.
*/
static int
sign_uids( KBNODE keyblock, STRLIST locusr, int *ret_modified,
int local, int nonrevocable, int trust )
{
int rc = 0;
SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk=NULL;
int select_all = !count_selected_uids(keyblock);
int all_v3=1;
/* Are there any non-v3 sigs on this key already? */
if(PGP2)
for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
node->pkt->pkt.signature->version>3)
{
all_v3=0;
break;
}
/* build a list of all signators.
*
* We use the CERT flag to request the primary which must always
* be one which is capable of signing keys. I can't see a reason
* why to sign keys using a subkey. Implementation of USAGE_CERT
* is just a hack in getkey.c and does not mean that a subkey
* marked as certification capable will be used */
rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, 0, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT);
if( rc )
goto leave;
/* loop over all signators */
for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
u32 sk_keyid[2],pk_keyid[2];
size_t n;
char *p,*trust_regexp=NULL;
int force_v4=0,class=0,selfsig=0;
u32 duration=0,timestamp=0;
byte trust_depth=0,trust_value=0;
if(local || nonrevocable || trust ||
opt.cert_policy_url || opt.cert_notation_data)
force_v4=1;
/* we have to use a copy of the sk, because make_keysig_packet
* may remove the protection from sk and if we did other
* changes to the secret key, we would save the unprotected
* version */
if( sk )
free_secret_key(sk);
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk_rover->sk );
keyid_from_sk( sk, sk_keyid );
/* set mark A for all selected user ids */
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) )
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
else
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
/* reset mark for uids which are already signed */
uidnode = NULL;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
primary_pk=node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( primary_pk, pk_keyid );
/* Is this a self-sig? */
if(pk_keyid[0]==sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1]==sk_keyid[1])
{
selfsig=1;
/* Do not force a v4 sig here, otherwise it would
be difficult to remake a v3 selfsig. If this
is a v3->v4 promotion case, then we set
force_v4 later anyway. */
force_v4=0;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uidnode = (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)? node : NULL;
if(uidnode)
{
char *user=utf8_to_native(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
0);
if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
{
tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is revoked."),user);
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf("\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.revoke_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
else if(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
{
tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is expired."),user);
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf("\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.expire_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
else if(!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->created && !selfsig)
{
tty_printf(_("User ID \"%s\" is not self-signed."),
user);
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf("\n");
/* No, so remove the mark and continue */
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.nosig_okay",
_("Are you sure you "
"still want to sign "
"it? (y/N) ")))
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
else
{
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
}
}
m_free(user);
}
}
else if( uidnode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
if( sk_keyid[0] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& sk_keyid[1] == node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] ) {
char buf[50];
char *user=utf8_to_native(uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
0);
/* It's a v3 self-sig. Make it into a v4 self-sig? */
if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->version<4 && selfsig)
{
tty_printf(_("The self-signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a PGP 2.x-style signature.\n"),user);
/* Note that the regular PGP2 warning below
still applies if there are no v4 sigs on
this key at all. */
if(opt.expert)
if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.v4_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to an OpenPGP self-"
"signature? (y/N) ")))
{
force_v4=1;
node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
m_free(user);
continue;
}
}
/* Is the current signature expired? */
if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.expired)
{
tty_printf(_("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"has expired.\n"),user);
if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.replace_expired_okay",
_("Do you want to issue a "
"new signature to replace "
"the expired one? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
m_free(user);
continue;
}
}
if(!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && !local)
{
/* It's a local sig, and we want to make a
exportable sig. */
tty_printf(_("Your current signature on \"%s\"\n"
"is a local signature.\n"),user);
if(cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.local_promote_okay",
_("Do you want to promote "
"it to a full exportable "
"signature? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Mark these for later deletion. We
don't want to delete them here, just in
case the replacement signature doesn't
happen for some reason. We only delete
these after the replacement is already
in place. */
node->flag|=NODFLG_DELSIG;
m_free(user);
continue;
}
}
/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
* case we should allow to sign it again. */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
tty_printf(_(
"\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %08lX\n"),
user,(ulong)sk_keyid[1] );
else
tty_printf(_(
"\"%s\" was already signed by key %08lX\n"),
user,(ulong)sk_keyid[1] );
if(opt.expert
&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.dupe_okay",
_("Do you want to sign it "
"again anyway? (y/N) ")))
{
/* Don't delete the old sig here since this is
an --expert thing. */
m_free(user);
continue;
}
sprintf (buf, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)sk->keyid[0], (ulong)sk->keyid[1] );
write_status_text (STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED, buf);
uidnode->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A; /* remove mark */
m_free(user);
}
}
}
/* check whether any uids are left for signing */
if( !count_uids_with_flag(keyblock, NODFLG_MARK_A) ) {
tty_printf(_("Nothing to sign with key %08lX\n"),
(ulong)sk_keyid[1] );
continue;
}
/* Ask whether we really should sign these user id(s) */
tty_printf("\n");
show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0 );
tty_printf("\n");
if(primary_pk->expiredate && !selfsig)
{
u32 now=make_timestamp();
if(primary_pk->expiredate<=now)
{
tty_printf(_("This key has expired!"));
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf(" ");
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.expired_okay",
_("Are you sure you still "
"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
}
else
{
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
continue;
}
}
else
{
char *answer;
tty_printf(_("This key is due to expire on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_pk(primary_pk));
answer=cpr_get("sign_uid.expire",
_("Do you want your signature to "
"expire at the same time? (Y/n) "));
if(answer_is_yes_no_default(answer,1))
{
/* This fixes the signature timestamp we're going
to make as now. This is so the expiration date
is exactly correct, and not a few seconds off
(due to the time it takes to answer the
questions, enter the passphrase, etc). */
timestamp=now;
duration=primary_pk->expiredate-now;
force_v4=1;
}
cpr_kill_prompt();
m_free(answer);
}
}
/* Only ask for duration if we haven't already set it to match
the expiration of the pk */
if(opt.ask_cert_expire && !duration && !selfsig)
duration=ask_expire_interval(1);
if(duration)
force_v4=1;
/* Is --pgp2 on, it's a v3 key, all the sigs on the key are
currently v3 and we're about to sign it with a v4 sig? If
so, danger! */
if(PGP2 && all_v3 &&
(sk->version>3 || force_v4) && primary_pk->version<=3)
{
tty_printf(_("You may not make an OpenPGP signature on a "
"PGP 2.x key while in --pgp2 mode.\n"));
tty_printf(_("This would make the key unusable in PGP 2.x.\n"));
if(opt.expert)
{
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.v4_on_v3_okay",
_("Are you sure you still "
"want to sign it? (y/N) ")))
continue;
all_v3=0;
}
else
continue;
}
if(selfsig)
;
else
{
if(opt.batch)
class=0x10+opt.def_cert_check_level;
else
{
char *answer;
tty_printf(_("How carefully have you verified the key you are "
"about to sign actually belongs\nto the person "
"named above? If you don't know what to "
"answer, enter \"0\".\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_(" (0) I will not answer.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_check_level==0?" (default)":"");
tty_printf(_(" (1) I have not checked at all.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_check_level==1?" (default)":"");
tty_printf(_(" (2) I have done casual checking.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_check_level==2?" (default)":"");
tty_printf(_(" (3) I have done very careful checking.%s\n"),
opt.def_cert_check_level==3?" (default)":"");
tty_printf("\n");
while(class==0)
{
answer = cpr_get("sign_uid.class",_("Your selection? "
"(enter '?' for more information): "));
if(answer[0]=='\0')
class=0x10+opt.def_cert_check_level; /* Default */
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"0")==0)
class=0x10; /* Generic */
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"1")==0)
class=0x11; /* Persona */
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"2")==0)
class=0x12; /* Casual */
else if(ascii_strcasecmp(answer,"3")==0)
class=0x13; /* Positive */
else
tty_printf(_("Invalid selection.\n"));
m_free(answer);
}
}
if(trust)
trustsig_prompt(&trust_value,&trust_depth,&trust_regexp);
}
tty_printf(_("Are you really sure that you want to sign this key\n"
"with your key: \""));
p = get_user_id( sk_keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p); p = NULL;
tty_printf("\" (%08lX)\n",(ulong)sk_keyid[1]);
if(selfsig)
{
tty_printf(_("\nThis will be a self-signature.\n"));
if( local )
tty_printf(
_("\nWARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-exportable.\n"));
if( nonrevocable )
tty_printf(
_("\nWARNING: the signature will not be marked "
"as non-revocable.\n"));
}
else
{
if( local )
tty_printf(
_("\nThe signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"));
if( nonrevocable )
tty_printf(
_("\nThe signature will be marked as non-revocable.\n"));
switch(class)
{
case 0x11:
tty_printf(_("\nI have not checked this key at all.\n"));
break;
case 0x12:
tty_printf(_("\nI have checked this key casually.\n"));
break;
case 0x13:
tty_printf(_("\nI have checked this key very carefully.\n"));
break;
}
}
tty_printf("\n");
if( opt.batch && opt.answer_yes )
;
else if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("sign_uid.okay", _("Really sign? ")) )
continue;
/* now we can sign the user ids */
reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
primary_pk = NULL;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
primary_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) ) {
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
assert( primary_pk );
memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
attrib.non_exportable = local;
attrib.non_revocable = nonrevocable;
attrib.trust_depth = trust_depth;
attrib.trust_value = trust_value;
attrib.trust_regexp = trust_regexp;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
/* we force creation of a v4 signature for local
* signatures, otherwise we would not generate the
* subpacket with v3 keys and the signature becomes
* exportable */
if(selfsig)
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
sk,
0x13, 0, force_v4?4:0, 0, 0,
keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk);
else
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
sk,
class, 0, force_v4?4:0,
timestamp, duration,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
*ret_modified = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
update_trust = 1;
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
goto reloop;
}
}
/* Delete any sigs that got promoted */
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->flag & NODFLG_DELSIG)
delete_kbnode(node);
} /* end loop over signators */
leave:
release_sk_list( sk_list );
if( sk )
free_secret_key(sk);
return rc;
}
/****************
* Change the passphrase of the primary and all secondary keys.
* We use only one passphrase for all keys.
*/
static int
change_passphrase( KBNODE keyblock )
{
int rc = 0;
int changed=0;
KBNODE node;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
char *passphrase = NULL;
int no_primary_secrets = 0;
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; secret key not found anymore!\n");
goto leave;
}
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
switch( is_secret_key_protected( sk ) ) {
case -1:
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
break;
case 0:
tty_printf(_("This key is not protected.\n"));
break;
default:
if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
tty_printf(_("Secret parts of primary key are not available.\n"));
no_primary_secrets = 1;
}
else {
tty_printf(_("Key is protected.\n"));
rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
if( !rc )
passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
}
break;
}
/* unprotect all subkeys (use the supplied passphrase or ask)*/
for(node=keyblock; !rc && node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
set_next_passphrase( passphrase );
rc = check_secret_key( subsk, 0 );
if( !rc && !passphrase )
passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
}
}
if( rc )
tty_printf(_("Can't edit this key: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
else {
DEK *dek = NULL;
STRING2KEY *s2k = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
const char *errtext = NULL;
tty_printf(_("Enter the new passphrase for this secret key.\n\n") );
set_next_passphrase( NULL );
for(;;) {
s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
s2k->hash_algo = opt.s2k_digest_algo;
dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.s2k_cipher_algo,
s2k, 2, errtext, NULL);
if( !dek ) {
errtext = N_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again");
tty_printf ("%s.\n", _(errtext));
}
else if( !dek->keylen ) {
rc = 0;
tty_printf(_( "You don't want a passphrase -"
" this is probably a *bad* idea!\n\n"));
if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("change_passwd.empty.okay",
_("Do you really want to do this? ")))
{
changed++;
break;
}
}
else { /* okay */
rc = 0;
if( !no_primary_secrets ) {
sk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
sk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
rc = protect_secret_key( sk, dek );
}
for(node=keyblock; !rc && node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_secret_key *subsk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
subsk->protect.algo = dek->algo;
subsk->protect.s2k = *s2k;
rc = protect_secret_key( subsk, dek );
}
}
if( rc )
log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
else
changed++;
break;
}
}
m_free(s2k);
m_free(dek);
}
leave:
m_free( passphrase );
set_next_passphrase( NULL );
return changed && !rc;
}
/****************
* There are some keys out (due to a bug in gnupg), where the sequence
* of the packets is wrong. This function fixes that.
* Returns: true if the keyblock has been fixed.
*
* Note: This function does not work if there is more than one user ID.
*/
static int
fix_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node, last, subkey;
int fixed=0;
/* locate key signatures of class 0x10..0x13 behind sub key packets */
for( subkey=last=NULL, node = keyblock; node;
last=node, node = node->next ) {
switch( node->pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
if( !subkey )
subkey = last; /* actually it is the one before the subkey */
break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
if( subkey ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( sig->sig_class >= 0x10 && sig->sig_class <= 0x13 ) {
log_info(_(
"moving a key signature to the correct place\n"));
last->next = node->next;
node->next = subkey->next;
subkey->next = node;
node = last;
fixed=1;
}
}
break;
default: break;
}
}
return fixed;
}
/****************
* Menu driven key editor. If sign_mode is true semi-automatical signing
* will be performed. commands are ignore in this case
*
* Note: to keep track of some selection we use node->mark MARKBIT_xxxx.
*/
void
keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr, STRLIST commands,
int sign_mode )
{
enum cmdids { cmdNONE = 0,
cmdQUIT, cmdHELP, cmdFPR, cmdLIST, cmdSELUID, cmdCHECK, cmdSIGN,
cmdTSIGN, cmdLSIGN, cmdNRSIGN, cmdNRLSIGN, cmdREVSIG, cmdREVKEY,
cmdREVUID, cmdDELSIG, cmdPRIMARY, cmdDEBUG, cmdSAVE, cmdADDUID,
cmdADDPHOTO, cmdDELUID, cmdADDKEY, cmdDELKEY, cmdADDREVOKER,
cmdTOGGLE, cmdSELKEY, cmdPASSWD, cmdTRUST, cmdPREF, cmdEXPIRE,
cmdENABLEKEY, cmdDISABLEKEY, cmdSHOWPREF, cmdSETPREF, cmdUPDPREF,
cmdPREFKS, cmdINVCMD, cmdSHOWPHOTO, cmdUPDTRUST, cmdCHKTRUST,
cmdNOP };
static struct { const char *name;
enum cmdids id;
int need_sk;
int not_with_sk;
int signmode;
const char *desc;
} cmds[] = {
{ N_("quit") , cmdQUIT , 0,0,1, N_("quit this menu") },
{ N_("q") , cmdQUIT , 0,0,1, NULL },
{ N_("save") , cmdSAVE , 0,0,1, N_("save and quit") },
{ N_("help") , cmdHELP , 0,0,1, N_("show this help") },
{ "?" , cmdHELP , 0,0,1, NULL },
{ N_("fpr") , cmdFPR , 0,0,1, N_("show fingerprint") },
{ N_("list") , cmdLIST , 0,0,1, N_("list key and user IDs") },
{ N_("l") , cmdLIST , 0,0,1, NULL },
{ N_("uid") , cmdSELUID , 0,0,1, N_("select user ID N") },
{ N_("key") , cmdSELKEY , 0,0,0, N_("select secondary key N") },
{ N_("check") , cmdCHECK , 0,0,1, N_("list signatures") },
{ N_("c") , cmdCHECK , 0,0,1, NULL },
{ N_("sign") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key") },
{ N_("s") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, NULL },
{ N_("tsign") , cmdTSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("make a trust signature")},
{ N_("lsign") , cmdLSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key locally") },
{ N_("nrsign") , cmdNRSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key non-revocably") },
{ N_("nrlsign") , cmdNRLSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key locally and non-revocably") },
{ N_("debug") , cmdDEBUG , 0,0,0, NULL },
{ N_("adduid") , cmdADDUID , 1,1,0, N_("add a user ID") },
{ N_("addphoto"), cmdADDPHOTO , 1,1,0, N_("add a photo ID") },
{ N_("deluid") , cmdDELUID , 0,1,0, N_("delete user ID") },
/* delphoto is really deluid in disguise */
{ N_("delphoto"), cmdDELUID , 0,1,0, NULL },
{ N_("addkey") , cmdADDKEY , 1,1,0, N_("add a secondary key") },
{ N_("delkey") , cmdDELKEY , 0,1,0, N_("delete a secondary key") },
{ N_("addrevoker"),cmdADDREVOKER,1,1,0, N_("add a revocation key") },
{ N_("delsig") , cmdDELSIG , 0,1,0, N_("delete signatures") },
{ N_("expire") , cmdEXPIRE , 1,1,0, N_("change the expire date") },
{ N_("primary") , cmdPRIMARY , 1,1,0, N_("flag user ID as primary")},
{ N_("toggle") , cmdTOGGLE , 1,0,0, N_("toggle between secret "
"and public key listing") },
{ N_("t" ) , cmdTOGGLE , 1,0,0, NULL },
{ N_("pref") , cmdPREF , 0,1,0, N_("list preferences (expert)") },
{ N_("showpref"), cmdSHOWPREF , 0,1,0, N_("list preferences (verbose)") },
{ N_("setpref") , cmdSETPREF , 1,1,0, N_("set preference list") },
{ N_("updpref") , cmdUPDPREF , 1,1,0, N_("updated preferences") },
{ N_("keyserver"),cmdPREFKS , 1,1,0, N_("set preferred keyserver URL")},
{ N_("passwd") , cmdPASSWD , 1,1,0, N_("change the passphrase") },
{ N_("trust") , cmdTRUST , 0,1,0, N_("change the ownertrust") },
{ N_("revsig") , cmdREVSIG , 0,1,0, N_("revoke signatures") },
{ N_("revuid") , cmdREVUID , 1,1,0, N_("revoke a user ID") },
{ N_("revkey") , cmdREVKEY , 1,1,0, N_("revoke a secondary key") },
{ N_("disable") , cmdDISABLEKEY, 0,1,0, N_("disable a key") },
{ N_("enable") , cmdENABLEKEY , 0,1,0, N_("enable a key") },
{ N_("showphoto"),cmdSHOWPHOTO , 0,0,0, N_("show photo ID") },
{ NULL, cmdNONE } };
enum cmdids cmd = 0;
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE kdbhd = NULL;
KBNODE sec_keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE sec_kdbhd = NULL;
KBNODE cur_keyblock;
char *answer = NULL;
int redisplay = 1;
int modified = 0;
int sec_modified = 0;
int toggle;
int have_commands = !!commands;
if ( opt.command_fd != -1 )
;
else if( opt.batch && !have_commands ) {
log_error(_("can't do that in batchmode\n"));
goto leave;
}
if( sign_mode ) {
commands = NULL;
append_to_strlist( &commands, sign_mode == 1? "sign":
sign_mode == 2?"lsign":
sign_mode == 3?"nrsign":"nrlsign");
have_commands = 1;
}
/* get the public key */
rc = get_pubkey_byname (NULL, username, &keyblock, &kdbhd, 1);
if( rc )
goto leave;
if( fix_keyblock( keyblock ) )
modified++;
if( collapse_uids( &keyblock ) )
modified++;
reorder_keyblock(keyblock);
if( !sign_mode ) {/* see whether we have a matching secret key */
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sec_kdbhd = keydb_new (1);
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (sec_kdbhd, afp);
}
if (!rc) {
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (sec_kdbhd, &sec_keyblock);
if (rc) {
log_error (_("error reading secret keyblock `%s': %s\n"),
username, g10_errstr(rc));
}
else {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
if( fix_keyblock( sec_keyblock ) )
sec_modified++;
}
}
if (rc) {
sec_keyblock = NULL;
keydb_release (sec_kdbhd); sec_kdbhd = NULL;
rc = 0;
}
}
if( sec_keyblock ) {
tty_printf(_("Secret key is available.\n"));
}
toggle = 0;
cur_keyblock = keyblock;
for(;;) { /* main loop */
int i, arg_number, photo;
const char *arg_string = "";
char *p;
PKT_public_key *pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf("\n");
if( redisplay ) {
show_key_with_all_names( cur_keyblock, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 );
tty_printf("\n");
redisplay = 0;
}
do {
m_free(answer);
if( have_commands ) {
if( commands ) {
answer = m_strdup( commands->d );
commands = commands->next;
}
else if( opt.batch ) {
answer = m_strdup("quit");
}
else
have_commands = 0;
}
if( !have_commands ) {
answer = cpr_get_no_help("keyedit.prompt", _("Command> "));
cpr_kill_prompt();
}
trim_spaces(answer);
} while( *answer == '#' );
arg_number = 0; /* Yes, here is the init which egcc complains about */
photo = 0; /* This too */
if( !*answer )
cmd = cmdLIST;
else if( *answer == CONTROL_D )
cmd = cmdQUIT;
else if( digitp(answer ) ) {
cmd = cmdSELUID;
arg_number = atoi(answer);
}
else {
if( (p=strchr(answer,' ')) ) {
*p++ = 0;
trim_spaces(answer);
trim_spaces(p);
arg_number = atoi(p);
arg_string = p;
}
for(i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ ) {
if( !ascii_strcasecmp( answer, cmds[i].name ) )
break;
}
if( sign_mode && !cmds[i].signmode )
cmd = cmdINVCMD;
else if( cmds[i].need_sk && !sec_keyblock ) {
tty_printf(_("Need the secret key to do this.\n"));
cmd = cmdNOP;
}
else if( cmds[i].not_with_sk && sec_keyblock && toggle ) {
tty_printf(_("Please use the command \"toggle\" first.\n"));
cmd = cmdNOP;
}
else
cmd = cmds[i].id;
}
switch( cmd ) {
case cmdHELP:
for(i=0; cmds[i].name; i++ ) {
if( sign_mode && !cmds[i].signmode )
;
else if( cmds[i].need_sk && !sec_keyblock )
; /* skip if we do not have the secret key */
else if( cmds[i].desc )
tty_printf("%-10s %s\n", cmds[i].name, _(cmds[i].desc) );
}
break;
case cmdLIST:
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdFPR:
show_key_and_fingerprint( keyblock );
break;
case cmdSELUID:
if( menu_select_uid( cur_keyblock, arg_number ) )
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdSELKEY:
if( menu_select_key( cur_keyblock, arg_number ) )
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdCHECK:
/* we can only do this with the public key becuase the
* check functions can't cope with secret keys and it
* is questionable whether this would make sense at all */
check_all_keysigs( keyblock, count_selected_uids(keyblock) );
break;
case cmdSIGN: /* sign (only the public key) */
case cmdLSIGN: /* sign (only the public key) */
case cmdNRSIGN: /* sign (only the public key) */
case cmdNRLSIGN: /* sign (only the public key) */
case cmdTSIGN:
if( pk->is_revoked )
{
tty_printf(_("Key is revoked."));
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf(" ");
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.sign_revoked.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to sign it? (y/N) ")))
break;
}
else
{
tty_printf(_(" Unable to sign.\n"));
break;
}
}
if( count_uids(keyblock) > 1 && !count_selected_uids(keyblock) ) {
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.sign_all.okay",
_("Really sign all user IDs? ")) ) {
tty_printf(_("Hint: Select the user IDs to sign\n"));
break;
}
}
if( !sign_uids( keyblock, locusr, &modified,
(cmd == cmdLSIGN) || (cmd == cmdNRLSIGN),
(cmd == cmdNRSIGN) || (cmd==cmdNRLSIGN),
(cmd == cmdTSIGN))
&& sign_mode )
goto do_cmd_save;
break;
case cmdDEBUG:
dump_kbnode( cur_keyblock );
break;
case cmdTOGGLE:
toggle = !toggle;
cur_keyblock = toggle? sec_keyblock : keyblock;
redisplay = 1;
break;
case cmdADDPHOTO:
if (RFC2440 || RFC1991 || PGP2)
{
tty_printf(
_("This command is not allowed while in %s mode.\n"),
RFC2440?"OpenPGP":PGP2?"PGP2":"RFC-1991");
break;
}
photo=1;
/* fall through */
case cmdADDUID:
if( menu_adduid( keyblock, sec_keyblock, photo ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
sec_modified = modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
}
break;
case cmdDELUID: {
int n1;
if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
else if( real_uids_left(keyblock) < 1 )
tty_printf(_("You can't delete the last user ID!\n"));
else if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.remove.uid.okay",
n1 > 1? _("Really remove all selected user IDs? ")
: _("Really remove this user ID? ")
) ) {
menu_deluid( keyblock, sec_keyblock );
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
if( sec_keyblock )
sec_modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdDELSIG: {
int n1;
if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
else if( menu_delsig( keyblock ) ) {
/* no redisplay here, because it may scroll away some
* status output of delsig */
modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdADDKEY:
if( generate_subkeypair( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
sec_modified = modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
}
break;
case cmdDELKEY: {
int n1;
if( !(n1=count_selected_keys( keyblock )) )
tty_printf(_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
else if( sec_keyblock && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.remove.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1?
_("Do you really want to delete the selected keys? "):
_("Do you really want to delete this key? ")
))
;
else {
menu_delkey( keyblock, sec_keyblock );
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
if( sec_keyblock )
sec_modified = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdADDREVOKER:
{
int sensitive=0;
if(arg_string && ascii_strcasecmp(arg_string,"sensitive")==0)
sensitive=1;
if( menu_addrevoker( keyblock, sec_keyblock, sensitive ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
sec_modified = modified = 1;
merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
}
}
break;
case cmdREVUID: {
int n1;
if( !(n1=count_selected_uids(keyblock)) )
tty_printf(_("You must select at least one user ID.\n"));
else if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.revoke.uid.okay",
n1 > 1? _("Really revoke all selected user IDs? ")
: _("Really revoke this user ID? ")
) ) {
if(menu_revuid(keyblock,sec_keyblock))
{
modified=1;
redisplay=1;
}
}
}
break;
case cmdREVKEY: {
int n1;
if( !(n1=count_selected_keys( keyblock )) )
tty_printf(_("You must select at least one key.\n"));
else if( sec_keyblock && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.revoke.subkey.okay",
n1 > 1?
_("Do you really want to revoke the selected keys? "):
_("Do you really want to revoke this key? ")
))
;
else {
if( menu_revkey( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
modified = 1;
/*sec_modified = 1;*/
}
redisplay = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdEXPIRE:
if( menu_expire( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( sec_keyblock );
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
sec_modified = 1;
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdPRIMARY:
if( menu_set_primary_uid ( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdPASSWD:
if( change_passphrase( sec_keyblock ) )
sec_modified = 1;
break;
case cmdTRUST:
show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0 );
tty_printf("\n");
if( edit_ownertrust( find_kbnode( keyblock,
PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key, 1 ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
/* No real need to set update_trust here as
edit_ownertrust() calls revalidation_mark()
anyway. */
update_trust=1;
}
break;
case cmdPREF:
show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 );
break;
case cmdSHOWPREF:
show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2 );
break;
case cmdSETPREF:
keygen_set_std_prefs ( !*arg_string? "default" : arg_string, 0);
break;
case cmdUPDPREF:
{
PKT_user_id *temp=keygen_get_std_prefs();
tty_printf(_("Current preference list:\n"));
show_prefs(temp,1);
m_free(temp);
}
if (cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("keyedit.updpref.okay",
count_selected_uids (keyblock)?
_("Really update the preferences"
" for the selected user IDs? "):
_("Really update the preferences? "))){
if ( menu_set_preferences (keyblock, sec_keyblock) ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
}
break;
case cmdPREFKS:
if( menu_set_keyserver_url ( keyblock, sec_keyblock ) ) {
merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
modified = 1;
redisplay = 1;
}
break;
case cmdNOP:
break;
case cmdREVSIG:
if( menu_revsig( keyblock ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
break;
case cmdENABLEKEY:
case cmdDISABLEKEY:
if( enable_disable_key( keyblock, cmd == cmdDISABLEKEY ) ) {
redisplay = 1;
modified = 1;
}
break;
case cmdSHOWPHOTO:
menu_showphoto(keyblock);
break;
case cmdQUIT:
if( have_commands )
goto leave;
if( !modified && !sec_modified )
goto leave;
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.save.okay",
_("Save changes? ")) ) {
if( cpr_enabled()
|| cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.cancel.okay",
_("Quit without saving? ")) )
goto leave;
break;
}
/* fall thru */
case cmdSAVE:
do_cmd_save:
if( modified || sec_modified ) {
if( modified ) {
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (kdbhd, keyblock);
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("update failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
break;
}
}
if( sec_modified ) {
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (sec_kdbhd, sec_keyblock );
if( rc ) {
log_error( _("update secret failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(rc) );
break;
}
}
}
else
tty_printf(_("Key not changed so no update needed.\n"));
if( update_trust )
{
revalidation_mark ();
update_trust=0;
}
goto leave;
case cmdINVCMD:
default:
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_("Invalid command (try \"help\")\n"));
break;
}
} /* end main loop */
leave:
release_kbnode( keyblock );
release_kbnode( sec_keyblock );
keydb_release (kdbhd);
m_free(answer);
}
/****************
* show preferences of a public keyblock.
*/
static void
show_prefs (PKT_user_id *uid, int verbose)
{
const prefitem_t fake={0,0};
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int i;
if( !uid )
return;
if( uid->prefs )
prefs=uid->prefs;
else if(verbose)
prefs=&fake;
else
return;
if (verbose) {
int any, des_seen=0, sha1_seen=0, uncomp_seen=0;
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (_("Cipher: "));
for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
tty_printf ("%s", s );
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == CIPHER_ALGO_3DES )
des_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!des_seen) {
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s",cipher_algo_to_string(CIPHER_ALGO_3DES));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Digest: "));
for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
const char *s = digest_algo_to_string (prefs[i].value);
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
tty_printf ("%s", s );
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 )
sha1_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!sha1_seen) {
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf ("%s",digest_algo_to_string(DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1));
}
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Compression: "));
for(i=any=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
if( prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
const char *s=compress_algo_to_string(prefs[i].value);
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
any = 1;
/* We don't want to display strings for experimental algos */
if (s && prefs[i].value < 100 )
tty_printf ("%s", s );
else
tty_printf ("[%d]", prefs[i].value);
if (prefs[i].value == 0 )
uncomp_seen = 1;
}
}
if (!uncomp_seen) {
if (any)
tty_printf (", ");
else {
tty_printf ("%s",compress_algo_to_string(1));
tty_printf (", ");
}
tty_printf ("%s",compress_algo_to_string(0));
}
if(uid->mdc_feature || !uid->ks_modify)
{
tty_printf ("\n ");
tty_printf (_("Features: "));
any=0;
if(uid->mdc_feature)
{
tty_printf ("MDC");
any=1;
}
if(!uid->ks_modify)
{
if(any)
tty_printf (", ");
tty_printf (_("Keyserver no-modify"));
}
}
tty_printf("\n");
}
else {
tty_printf(" ");
for(i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
tty_printf( " %c%d", prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[i].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z':'?',
prefs[i].value);
}
if (uid->mdc_feature)
tty_printf (" [mdc]");
if (!uid->ks_modify)
tty_printf (" [no-ks-modify]");
tty_printf("\n");
}
}
/* This is the version of show_key_with_all_names used when
opt.with_colons is used. It prints all available data in a easy to
parse format and does not translate utf8 */
static void
show_key_with_all_names_colon (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i, j, ulti_hack=0;
byte pk_version=0;
PKT_public_key *primary=NULL;
/* the keys */
for ( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
u32 keyid[2];
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
pk_version = pk->version;
primary=pk;
}
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
fputs (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY?"pub:":"sub:", stdout);
if (!pk->is_valid)
putchar ('i');
else if (pk->is_revoked)
putchar ('r');
else if (pk->has_expired)
putchar ('e');
else if (!(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ))
{
int trust = get_validity_info (pk, NULL);
if(trust=='u')
ulti_hack=1;
putchar (trust);
}
printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%lu:%lu:",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
(ulong)pk->timestamp,
(ulong)pk->expiredate );
if (pk->local_id)
printf ("%lu", pk->local_id);
putchar (':');
if (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& !(opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks ))
putchar(get_ownertrust_info (pk));
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 0);
/* print the revoker record */
if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
BUG();
else
{
for (i=0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
byte *p;
printf ("rvk:::%d::::::", pk->revkey[i].algid);
p = pk->revkey[i].fpr;
for (j=0; j < 20; j++, p++ )
printf ("%02X", *p);
printf (":%02x%s:\n", pk->revkey[i].class,
(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)?"s":"");
}
}
}
}
/* the user ids */
i = 0;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
if(uid->attrib_data)
printf("uat:");
else
printf("uid:");
if ( uid->is_revoked )
printf("r::::::::");
else if ( uid->is_expired )
printf("e::::::::");
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
printf("::::::::");
else
{
int uid_validity;
if( primary && !ulti_hack )
uid_validity = get_validity_info( primary, uid );
else
uid_validity = 'u';
printf("%c::::::::",uid_validity);
}
if(uid->attrib_data)
printf ("%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
else
print_string (stdout, uid->name, uid->len, ':');
putchar (':');
/* signature class */
putchar (':');
/* capabilities */
putchar (':');
/* preferences */
if (pk_version>3 || uid->selfsigversion>3)
{
const prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
for (j=0; prefs && prefs[j].type; j++)
{
if (j)
putchar (' ');
printf ("%c%d", prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_SYM ? 'S' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_HASH ? 'H' :
prefs[j].type == PREFTYPE_ZIP ? 'Z':'?',
prefs[j].value);
}
if (uid->mdc_feature)
printf (",mdc");
if (!uid->ks_modify)
printf (",no-ks-modify");
}
putchar (':');
/* flags */
printf ("%d,", i);
if (uid->is_primary)
putchar ('p');
if (uid->is_revoked)
putchar ('r');
if (uid->is_expired)
putchar ('e');
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
putchar ('s');
if ((node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))
putchar ('m');
putchar (':');
putchar('\n');
}
}
}
/****************
* Display the key a the user ids, if only_marked is true, do only
* so for user ids with mark A flag set and dont display the index number
*/
static void
show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs )
{
KBNODE node;
int i, rc;
int do_warn = 0;
byte pk_version=0;
PKT_public_key *primary=NULL;
if (opt.with_colons)
{
show_key_with_all_names_colon (keyblock);
return;
}
/* the keys */
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) ) {
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
const char *otrust="err",*trust="err";
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
/* do it here, so that debug messages don't clutter the
* output */
static int did_warn = 0;
trust = get_validity_string (pk, NULL);
otrust = get_ownertrust_string (pk);
/* Show a warning once */
if (!did_warn
&& (get_validity (pk, NULL) & TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK)) {
did_warn = 1;
do_warn = 1;
}
pk_version=pk->version;
primary=pk;
}
if(with_revoker) {
if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
BUG();
else
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++) {
u32 r_keyid[2];
char *user;
const char *algo=
pubkey_algo_to_string(pk->revkey[i].algid);
keyid_from_fingerprint(pk->revkey[i].fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,r_keyid);
user=get_user_id_string (r_keyid);
tty_printf (_("This key may be revoked by %s key "),
algo?algo:"?");
tty_print_utf8_string (user, strlen (user));
if ((pk->revkey[i].class&0x40))
tty_printf (_(" (sensitive)"));
tty_printf ("\n");
m_free(user);
}
}
keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
tty_printf("%s%c %4u%c/",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)? '*':' ',
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
tty_printf("%08lX",(ulong)pk->keyid[0]);
tty_printf("%08lX ",(ulong)pk->keyid[1]);
tty_printf(_("created: %s expires: %s"),
datestr_from_pk(pk),
expirestr_from_pk(pk) );
tty_printf("\n");
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
{
tty_printf(" ");
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
tty_printf(" ");
tty_printf(_("trust: %-13s"), otrust);
tty_printf(_("validity: %s"), trust );
tty_printf("\n");
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& (get_ownertrust (pk)&TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
{
tty_printf("*** ");
tty_printf(_("This key has been disabled"));
tty_printf("\n");
}
}
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY && with_fpr )
{
print_fingerprint ( pk, NULL, 2 );
tty_printf("\n");
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| (with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
tty_printf(_("%s%c %4u%c/%08lX created: %s expires: %s"),
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
(node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY)? '*':' ',
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_sk(sk,NULL),
datestr_from_sk(sk),
expirestr_from_sk(sk) );
tty_printf("\n");
}
else if( with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc )
tty_printf( _("rev! subkey has been revoked: %s\n"),
datestr_from_sig( sig ) );
else if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN )
tty_printf( _("rev- faked revocation found\n") );
else if( rc )
tty_printf( _("rev? problem checking revocation: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(rc) );
}
}
/* the user ids */
i = 0;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
if( !only_marked || (only_marked && (node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A))){
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY && primary)
tty_printf("[%8.8s] ",
trust_value_to_string(get_validity(primary,uid)));
if( only_marked )
tty_printf(" ");
else if( node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID )
tty_printf("(%d)* ", i);
else if( uid->is_primary )
tty_printf("(%d). ", i);
else
tty_printf("(%d) ", i);
if ( uid->is_revoked )
tty_printf (_("[revoked] "));
if ( uid->is_expired )
tty_printf (_("[expired] "));
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
tty_printf("\n");
if( with_prefs )
{
if(pk_version>3 || uid->selfsigversion>3)
show_prefs (uid, with_prefs == 2);
else
tty_printf(_("There are no preferences on a "
"PGP 2.x-style user ID.\n"));
}
}
}
}
if (do_warn)
tty_printf (_("Please note that the shown key validity "
"is not necessarily correct\n"
"unless you restart the program.\n"));
}
/* Display basic key information. This fucntion is suitable to show
information on the key without any dependencies on the trustdb or
any other internal GnuPG stuff. KEYBLOCK may either be a public or
a secret key.*/
void
show_basic_key_info ( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
/* The primary key */
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
{
PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* Note, we use the same format string as in other show
functions to make the translation job easier. */
tty_printf (_("%s%c %4u%c/%08lX created: %s expires: %s"),
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY? "pub":"sub",
' ',
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL),
datestr_from_pk(pk),
expirestr_from_pk(pk) );
tty_printf("\n");
print_fingerprint ( pk, NULL, 3 );
tty_printf("\n");
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
tty_printf(_("%s%c %4u%c/%08lX created: %s expires: %s"),
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
' ',
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_sk(sk,NULL),
datestr_from_sk(sk),
expirestr_from_sk(sk) );
tty_printf("\n");
print_fingerprint (NULL, sk, 3 );
tty_printf("\n");
}
}
/* The user IDs. */
for (i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
++i;
tty_printf (" ");
if (uid->is_revoked)
tty_printf ("[revoked] ");
if ( uid->is_expired )
tty_printf ("[expired] ");
tty_print_utf8_string (uid->name, uid->len);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
}
}
static void
show_key_and_fingerprint( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
tty_printf("pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL),
datestr_from_pk(pk) );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
break;
}
}
tty_printf("\n");
if( pk )
print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 2 );
}
/* Show a warning if no uids on the key have the primary uid flag
set. */
static void
no_primary_warning(KBNODE keyblock, int uids)
{
KBNODE node;
int select_all=1,have_uid=0,uid_count=0;
if(uids)
select_all=!count_selected_uids(keyblock);
/* TODO: if we ever start behaving differently with a primary or
non-primary attribute ID, we will need to check for attributes
here as well. */
for(node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data==NULL)
{
uid_count++;
if((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary==2)
have_uid|=2;
else
have_uid|=1;
}
}
if(uid_count>1 && have_uid&1 && !(have_uid&2))
log_info(_("WARNING: no user ID has been marked as primary. This command "
"may\n cause a different user ID to become the assumed primary.\n"));
}
/****************
* Ask for a new user id, do the selfsignature and put it into
* both keyblocks.
* Return true if there is a new user id
*/
static int
menu_adduid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock, int photo)
{
PKT_user_id *uid;
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk=NULL;
PKT_signature *sig=NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
KBNODE node;
KBNODE pub_where=NULL, sec_where=NULL;
int rc;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; pub_where = node, node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break;
}
if( !node ) /* no subkey */
pub_where = NULL;
for( node = sec_keyblock; node; sec_where = node, node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
}
if( !node ) /* no subkey */
sec_where = NULL;
assert(pk && sk);
if(photo) {
int hasattrib=0;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
{
hasattrib=1;
break;
}
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a photo ID to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a photo on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a photo - any
damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
if(pk->version==3 && !hasattrib)
{
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf(_("WARNING: This is a PGP2-style key. "
"Adding a photo ID may cause some versions\n"
" of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.v3_photo.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
tty_printf(_("You may not add a photo ID to "
"a PGP2-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
uid = generate_photo_id(pk);
} else
uid = generate_user_id();
if( !uid )
return 0;
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, uid, NULL, sk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0, 0,
keygen_add_std_prefs, pk );
free_secret_key( sk );
if( rc ) {
log_error("signing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
free_user_id(uid);
return 0;
}
/* insert/append to secret keyblock */
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
pkt->pkt.user_id = scopy_user_id(uid);
node = new_kbnode(pkt);
if( sec_where )
insert_kbnode( sec_where, node, 0 );
else
add_kbnode( sec_keyblock, node );
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
if( sec_where )
insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
else
add_kbnode( sec_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt) );
/* insert/append to public keyblock */
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_USER_ID;
pkt->pkt.user_id = uid;
node = new_kbnode(pkt);
if( pub_where )
insert_kbnode( pub_where, node, 0 );
else
add_kbnode( pub_keyblock, node );
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
if( pub_where )
insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
else
add_kbnode( pub_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt) );
return 1;
}
/****************
* Remove all selceted userids from the keyrings
*/
static void
menu_deluid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int selected=0;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
if( selected ) {
/* Only cause a trust update if we delete a
non-revoked user id */
if(!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
update_trust=1;
delete_kbnode( node );
if( sec_keyblock ) {
KBNODE snode;
int s_selected = 0;
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
for( snode = sec_keyblock; snode; snode = snode->next ) {
if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *suid = snode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
s_selected =
(uid->len == suid->len
&& !memcmp( uid->name, suid->name, uid->len));
if( s_selected )
delete_kbnode( snode );
}
else if( s_selected
&& snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
delete_kbnode( snode );
else if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
s_selected = 0;
}
}
}
}
else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
delete_kbnode( node );
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
selected = 0;
}
commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
if( sec_keyblock )
commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );
}
static int
menu_delsig( KBNODE pub_keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
PKT_user_id *uid = NULL;
int changed=0;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid = (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)? node->pkt->pkt.user_id : NULL;
}
else if( uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
int okay, valid, selfsig, inv_sig, no_key, other_err;
tty_printf("uid ");
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
tty_printf("\n");
okay = inv_sig = no_key = other_err = 0;
valid = print_and_check_one_sig( pub_keyblock, node,
&inv_sig, &no_key, &other_err,
&selfsig, 1 );
if( valid ) {
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
"keyedit.delsig.valid",
_("Delete this good signature? (y/N/q)"));
/* Only update trust if we delete a good signature.
The other two cases do not affect trust. */
if(okay)
update_trust=1;
}
else if( inv_sig || other_err )
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
"keyedit.delsig.invalid",
_("Delete this invalid signature? (y/N/q)"));
else if( no_key )
okay = cpr_get_answer_yes_no_quit(
"keyedit.delsig.unknown",
_("Delete this unknown signature? (y/N/q)"));
if( okay == -1 )
break;
if( okay && selfsig && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.delsig.selfsig",
_("Really delete this self-signature? (y/N)") ))
okay = 0;
if( okay ) {
delete_kbnode( node );
changed++;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
uid = NULL;
}
if( changed ) {
commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
tty_printf( changed == 1? _("Deleted %d signature.\n")
: _("Deleted %d signatures.\n"), changed );
}
else
tty_printf( _("Nothing deleted.\n") );
return changed;
}
/****************
* Remove some of the secondary keys
*/
static void
menu_delkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int selected=0;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY;
if( selected ) {
delete_kbnode( node );
if( sec_keyblock ) {
KBNODE snode;
int s_selected = 0;
u32 ki[2];
keyid_from_pk( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, ki );
for( snode = sec_keyblock; snode; snode = snode->next ) {
if( snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 ki2[2];
keyid_from_sk( snode->pkt->pkt.secret_key, ki2 );
s_selected = (ki[0] == ki2[0] && ki[1] == ki2[1]);
if( s_selected )
delete_kbnode( snode );
}
else if( s_selected
&& snode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
delete_kbnode( snode );
else
s_selected = 0;
}
}
}
}
else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
delete_kbnode( node );
else
selected = 0;
}
commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
if( sec_keyblock )
commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys are no
longer used to certify other keys, so there is no change in
trust when revoking/removing them */
}
/****************
* Ask for a new revoker, do the selfsignature and put it into
* both keyblocks.
* Return true if there is a new revoker
*/
static int
menu_addrevoker( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock, int sensitive )
{
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL,*revoker_pk=NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk=NULL;
PKT_signature *sig=NULL;
PACKET *pkt;
struct revocation_key revkey;
size_t fprlen;
int rc;
assert(pub_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
assert(sec_keyblock->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_KEY);
pk=pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if(pk->numrevkeys==0 && pk->version==3)
{
/* It is legal but bad for compatibility to add a revoker to a
v3 key as it means that PGP2 will not be able to use that key
anymore. Also, PGP may not expect a revoker on a v3 key.
Don't bother to ask this if the key already has a revoker -
any damage has already been done at that point. -dms */
if(opt.expert)
{
tty_printf(_("WARNING: This is a PGP 2.x-style key. "
"Adding a designated revoker may cause\n"
" some versions of PGP to reject this key.\n"));
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.v3_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you still want "
"to add it? (y/N) ")))
return 0;
}
else
{
tty_printf(_("You may not add a designated revoker to "
"a PGP 2.x-style key.\n"));
return 0;
}
}
sk=copy_secret_key(NULL,sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
for(;;)
{
char *answer;
u32 keyid[2];
char *p;
size_t n;
if(revoker_pk)
free_public_key(revoker_pk);
revoker_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*revoker_pk));
tty_printf("\n");
answer=cpr_get_utf8("keyedit.add_revoker",
_("Enter the user ID of the designated revoker: "));
if(answer[0]=='\0' || answer[0]=='\004')
{
m_free(answer);
goto fail;
}
rc=get_pubkey_byname(revoker_pk,answer,NULL,NULL,1);
if(rc)
{
log_error (_("key `%s' not found: %s\n"),answer,g10_errstr(rc));
m_free(answer);
continue;
}
m_free(answer);
fingerprint_from_pk(revoker_pk,revkey.fpr,&fprlen);
if(fprlen!=20)
{
log_error(_("cannot appoint a PGP 2.x style key as a "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
revkey.class=0x80;
if(sensitive)
revkey.class|=0x40;
revkey.algid=revoker_pk->pubkey_algo;
if(cmp_public_keys(revoker_pk,pk)==0)
{
/* This actually causes no harm (after all, a key that
designates itself as a revoker is the same as a
regular key), but it's easy enough to check. */
log_error(_("you cannot appoint a key as its own "
"designated revoker\n"));
continue;
}
keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL);
/* Does this revkey already exist? */
if(!pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys)
BUG();
else
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
{
if(memcmp(&pk->revkey[i],&revkey,
sizeof(struct revocation_key))==0)
{
char buf[50];
log_error(_("this key has already been designated "
"as a revoker\n"));
sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)pk->keyid[0],(ulong)pk->keyid[1]);
write_status_text(STATUS_ALREADY_SIGNED,buf);
break;
}
}
if(i<pk->numrevkeys)
continue;
}
keyid_from_pk(revoker_pk,keyid);
tty_printf("\npub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk( revoker_pk ),
pubkey_letter( revoker_pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk(pk) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\n");
print_fingerprint(revoker_pk,NULL,2);
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_("WARNING: appointing a key as a designated revoker "
"cannot be undone!\n"));
tty_printf("\n");
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keyedit.add_revoker.okay",
_("Are you sure you want to appoint this "
"key as a designated revoker? (y/N): ")))
continue;
free_public_key(revoker_pk);
revoker_pk=NULL;
break;
}
/* The 1F signature must be at least v4 to carry the revocation key
subpacket. */
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, sk, 0x1F, 0, 4, 0, 0,
keygen_add_revkey,&revkey );
if( rc )
{
log_error("signing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
goto fail;
}
free_secret_key(sk);
sk=NULL;
/* insert into secret keyblock */
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature(NULL, sig);
insert_kbnode( sec_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
/* insert into public keyblock */
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode( pub_keyblock, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
return 1;
fail:
if(sk)
free_secret_key(sk);
if(sig)
free_seckey_enc(sig);
if(revoker_pk)
free_public_key(revoker_pk);
return 0;
}
static int
menu_expire( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
int n1, signumber, rc;
u32 expiredate;
int mainkey=0;
PKT_secret_key *sk; /* copy of the main sk */
PKT_public_key *main_pk, *sub_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
if( count_selected_keys( sec_keyblock ) ) {
tty_printf(_("Please remove selections from the secret keys.\n"));
return 0;
}
n1 = count_selected_keys( pub_keyblock );
if( n1 > 1 ) {
tty_printf(_("Please select at most one secondary key.\n"));
return 0;
}
else if( n1 )
tty_printf(_("Changing expiration time for a secondary key.\n"));
else {
tty_printf(_("Changing expiration time for the primary key.\n"));
mainkey=1;
}
no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock,0);
expiredate = ask_expiredate();
node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = sub_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
signumber = 0;
for( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
main_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY ) ) {
sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sub_pk->expiredate = expiredate;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
else if( main_pk && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ( mainkey || sub_pk ) ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& ( (mainkey && uid
&& uid->created && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
|| (!mainkey && sig->sig_class == 0x18) ) ) {
/* this is a selfsignature which is to be replaced */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
KBNODE sn;
int signumber2 = 0;
signumber++;
if( (mainkey && main_pk->version < 4)
|| (!mainkey && sub_pk->version < 4 ) ) {
log_info(_(
"You can't change the expiration date of a v3 key\n"));
free_secret_key( sk );
return 0;
}
/* find the corresponding secret self-signature */
for( sn=sec_keyblock; sn; sn = sn->next ) {
if( sn->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *b = sn->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( keyid[0] == b->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == b->keyid[1]
&& sig->sig_class == b->sig_class
&& ++signumber2 == signumber )
break;
}
}
if( !sn )
log_info(_("No corresponding signature in secret ring\n"));
if( mainkey )
rc = update_keysig_packet(&newsig, sig, main_pk, uid, NULL,
sk, keygen_add_key_expire, main_pk);
else
rc = update_keysig_packet(&newsig, sig, main_pk, NULL, sub_pk,
sk, keygen_add_key_expire, sub_pk );
if( rc ) {
log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
free_secret_key( sk );
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet( node->pkt );
m_free( node->pkt );
node->pkt = newpkt;
if( sn ) {
newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = copy_signature( NULL, newsig );
free_packet( sn->pkt );
m_free( sn->pkt );
sn->pkt = newpkt;
}
sub_pk = NULL;
}
}
}
free_secret_key( sk );
update_trust=1;
return 1;
}
static int
change_primary_uid_cb ( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque )
{
byte buf[1];
/* first clear all primary uid flags so that we are sure none are
* lingering around */
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
delete_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID);
/* if opaque is set,we want to set the primary id */
if (opaque) {
buf[0] = 1;
build_sig_subpkt (sig, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, buf, 1 );
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the primary uid flag for the selected UID. We will also reset
* all other primary uid flags. For this to work with have to update
* all the signature timestamps. If we would do this with the current
* time, we lose quite a lot of information, so we use a a kludge to
* do this: Just increment the timestamp by one second which is
* sufficient to updated a signature during import.
*/
static int
menu_set_primary_uid ( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk; /* copy of the main sk */
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected;
int attribute = 0;
int modified = 0;
if ( count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock) != 1 ) {
tty_printf(_("Please select exactly one user ID.\n"));
return 0;
}
node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
/* Is our selected uid an attribute packet? */
for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)
attribute = (node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL);
for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
}
else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID;
}
else if ( main_pk && uid && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10)
&& attribute == (uid->attrib_data!=NULL)) {
if(sig->version < 4) {
char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user id \"%s\"\n"),
user);
m_free(user);
}
else {
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced.
We can just ignore v3 signatures because they are
not able to carry the primary ID flag. We also
ignore self-sigs on user IDs that are not of the
same type that we are making primary. That is, if
we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs.
If we are making an attribute packet primary, we
alter attribute packets. */
/* FIXME: We must make sure that we only have one
self-signature per user ID here (not counting
revocations) */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
const byte *p;
int action;
/* see whether this signature has the primary UID flag */
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
if ( !p )
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->unhashed,
SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
if ( p && *p ) /* yes */
action = selected? 0 : -1;
else /* no */
action = selected? 1 : 0;
if (action) {
int rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
sk,
change_primary_uid_cb,
action > 0? "x":NULL );
if( rc ) {
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
free_secret_key( sk );
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet( node->pkt );
m_free( node->pkt );
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
free_secret_key( sk );
return modified;
}
/*
* Set preferences to new values for the selected user IDs
*/
static int
menu_set_preferences (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk; /* copy of the main sk */
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock,1);
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
}
else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if ( main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10) ) {
if( sig->version < 4 ) {
char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user id \"%s\"\n"),
user);
m_free(user);
}
else {
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the preferences */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
sk,
keygen_upd_std_prefs,
NULL );
if( rc ) {
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
free_secret_key( sk );
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet( node->pkt );
m_free( node->pkt );
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
free_secret_key( sk );
return modified;
}
static int
menu_set_keyserver_url (KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk; /* copy of the main sk */
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
PKT_user_id *uid;
KBNODE node;
u32 keyid[2];
int selected, select_all;
int modified = 0;
char *answer;
no_primary_warning(pub_keyblock,1);
answer=cpr_get_utf8("keyedit.add_keyserver",
_("Enter your preferred keyserver URL: "));
if(answer[0]=='\0' || answer[0]=='\004')
{
m_free(answer);
return 0;
}
select_all = !count_selected_uids (pub_keyblock);
node = find_kbnode( sec_keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY );
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
/* Now we can actually change the self signature(s) */
main_pk = NULL;
uid = NULL;
selected = 0;
for ( node=pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
main_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( main_pk, keyid );
}
else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
selected = select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID);
}
else if ( main_pk && uid && selected
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (uid && (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10) ) {
if( sig->version < 4 ) {
char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
log_info(_("skipping v3 self-signature on user id \"%s\"\n"),
user);
m_free(user);
}
else {
/* This is a selfsignature which is to be replaced
* We have to ignore v3 signatures because they are
* not able to carry the preferences */
PKT_signature *newsig;
PACKET *newpkt;
int rc;
rc = update_keysig_packet (&newsig, sig,
main_pk, uid, NULL,
sk,
keygen_add_keyserver_url,
answer );
if( rc ) {
log_error ("update_keysig_packet failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc));
m_free(answer);
free_secret_key( sk );
return 0;
}
/* replace the packet */
newpkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *newpkt );
newpkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
newpkt->pkt.signature = newsig;
free_packet( node->pkt );
m_free( node->pkt );
node->pkt = newpkt;
modified = 1;
}
}
}
}
m_free(answer);
free_secret_key( sk );
return modified;
}
/****************
* Select one user id or remove all selection if index is 0.
* Returns: True if the selection changed;
*/
static int
menu_select_uid( KBNODE keyblock, int idx )
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
/* first check that the index is valid */
if( idx ) {
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( ++i == idx )
break;
}
}
if( !node ) {
tty_printf(_("No user ID with index %d\n"), idx );
return 0;
}
}
else { /* reset all */
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
}
return 1;
}
/* and toggle the new index */
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( ++i == idx ) {
if( (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID) )
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELUID;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
/****************
* Select secondary keys
* Returns: True if the selection changed;
*/
static int
menu_select_key( KBNODE keyblock, int idx )
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
/* first check that the index is valid */
if( idx ) {
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( ++i == idx )
break;
}
}
if( !node ) {
tty_printf(_("No secondary key with index %d\n"), idx );
return 0;
}
}
else { /* reset all */
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
return 1;
}
/* and set the new index */
for( i=0, node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( ++i == idx ) {
if( (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) )
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
else
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELKEY;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
static int
count_uids_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag )
{
KBNODE node;
int i=0;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & flag) )
i++;
return i;
}
static int
count_keys_with_flag( KBNODE keyblock, unsigned flag )
{
KBNODE node;
int i=0;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
&& (node->flag & flag) )
i++;
return i;
}
static int
count_uids( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int i=0;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
i++;
return i;
}
/****************
* Returns true if there is at least one selected user id
*/
static int
count_selected_uids( KBNODE keyblock )
{
return count_uids_with_flag( keyblock, NODFLG_SELUID);
}
static int
count_selected_keys( KBNODE keyblock )
{
return count_keys_with_flag( keyblock, NODFLG_SELKEY);
}
/* returns how many real (i.e. not attribute) uids are unmarked */
static int
real_uids_left( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int real=0;
for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag&NODFLG_SELUID) &&
!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
real++;
return real;
}
/*
* Ask whether the signature should be revoked. If the user commits this,
* flag bit MARK_A is set on the signature and the user ID.
*/
static void
ask_revoke_sig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node )
{
int doit=0;
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID );
if( !unode ) {
log_error("Oops: no user ID for signature\n");
return;
}
tty_printf(_("user ID: \""));
tty_print_utf8_string( unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
if(sig->flags.exportable)
tty_printf(_("\"\nsigned with your key %08lX at %s\n"),
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig) );
else
tty_printf(_("\"\nlocally signed with your key %08lX at %s\n"),
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig) );
if(sig->flags.expired)
{
tty_printf(_("This signature expired on %s.\n"),
expirestr_from_sig(sig));
/* Use a different question so we can have different help text */
doit=cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.expired",
_("Are you sure you still want to revoke it? (y/N) "));
}
else
doit=cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.one",
_("Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N) "));
if(doit) {
node->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
unode->flag |= NODFLG_MARK_A;
}
}
/****************
* Display all user ids of the current public key together with signatures
* done by one of our keys. Then walk over all this sigs and ask the user
* whether he wants to revoke this signature.
* Return: True when the keyblock has changed.
*/
static int
menu_revsig( KBNODE keyblock )
{
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc, any, skip=1, all=!count_selected_uids(keyblock);
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
/* FIXME: detect duplicates here */
tty_printf(_("You have signed these user IDs:\n"));
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_SELSIG | NODFLG_MARK_A);
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( node->flag&NODFLG_SELUID || all ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
/* Hmmm: Should we show only UIDs with a signature? */
tty_printf(" ");
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
tty_printf("\n");
skip=0;
}
else
skip=1;
}
else if( !skip && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& ((sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature),
!seckey_available(sig->keyid) ) ) {
if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) {
tty_printf(_(" signed by %08lX at %s%s%s\n"),
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig),
sig->flags.exportable?"":" (non-exportable)",
sig->flags.revocable?"":" (non-revocable)");
if(sig->flags.revocable)
node->flag |= NODFLG_SELSIG;
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
tty_printf(_(" revoked by %08lX at %s\n"),
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig) );
}
}
}
/* ask */
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_SELSIG) )
continue;
ask_revoke_sig( keyblock, node );
}
/* present selected */
any = 0;
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A) )
continue;
if( !any ) {
any = 1;
tty_printf(_("You are about to revoke these signatures:\n"));
}
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
tty_printf(" ");
tty_print_utf8_string( uid->name, uid->len );
tty_printf("\n");
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
tty_printf(_(" signed by %08lX at %s%s\n"),
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig),
sig->flags.exportable?"":_(" (non-exportable)") );
}
}
if( !any )
return 0; /* none selected */
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("ask_revoke_sig.okay",
_("Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N) ")) )
return 0; /* forget it */
reason = ask_revocation_reason( 0, 1, 0 );
if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
return 0;
}
/* now we can sign the user ids */
reloop: /* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
primary_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
KBNODE unode;
PACKET *pkt;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
if( !(node->flag & NODFLG_MARK_A)
|| node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, node, PKT_USER_ID );
assert( unode ); /* we already checked this */
memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
attrib.reason = reason;
attrib.non_exportable=!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_MARK_A;
sk = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *sk );
if( get_seckey( sk, node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid ) ) {
log_info(_("no secret key\n"));
continue;
}
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, primary_pk,
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
NULL,
sk,
0x30, 0, 0, 0, 0,
sign_mk_attrib,
&attrib );
free_secret_key(sk);
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return changed;
}
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
update_trust = 1;
/* Are we revoking our own uid? */
if(primary_pk->keyid[0]==sig->keyid[0] &&
primary_pk->keyid[1]==sig->keyid[1])
unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked=1;
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode( unode, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
goto reloop;
}
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return changed;
}
/* Revoke a user ID (i.e. revoke a user ID selfsig). Return true if
keyblock changed. */
static int
menu_revuid( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
PKT_secret_key *sk = copy_secret_key( NULL,
sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
/* Note that this is correct as per the RFCs, but nevertheless
somewhat meaningless in the real world. 1991 did define the 0x30
sig class, but PGP 2.x did not actually implement it, so it would
probably be safe to use v4 revocations everywhere. -ds */
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if(pk->version>3 || (node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->selfsigversion>3))
{
if((reason = ask_revocation_reason( 0, 1, 4 )))
break;
else
goto leave;
}
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID))
{
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if(uid->is_revoked)
{
char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,uid->len,0);
log_info(_("user ID \"%s\" is already revoked\n"),user);
m_free(user);
}
else
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
u32 timestamp=make_timestamp();
if(uid->created>=timestamp)
{
/* Okay, this is a problem. The user ID selfsig was
created in the future, so we need to warn the user and
set our revocation timestamp one second after that so
everything comes out clean. */
log_info(_("WARNING: a user ID signature is dated %d"
" seconds in the future\n"),uid->created-timestamp);
timestamp=uid->created+1;
}
memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
attrib.reason = reason;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, uid, NULL, sk, 0x30, 0,
(reason==NULL)?3:0, timestamp, 0,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
if( rc )
{
log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
else
{
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
/* If the trustdb has an entry for this key+uid then the
trustdb needs an update. */
if(!update_trust
&& (get_validity(pk,uid)&TRUST_MASK)>=TRUST_UNDEFINED)
update_trust=1;
changed = 1;
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked=1;
goto reloop;
}
}
}
if(changed)
commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
leave:
free_secret_key(sk);
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return changed;
}
/****************
* Revoke some of the secondary keys.
* Hmmm: Should we add a revocation to the secret keyring too?
* Does its all make sense to duplicate most of the information?
*/
static int
menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
PKT_public_key *mainpk;
KBNODE node;
int changed = 0;
int rc;
struct revocation_reason_info *reason = NULL;
reason = ask_revocation_reason( 1, 0, 0 );
if( !reason ) { /* user decided to cancel */
return 0;
}
reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& (node->flag & NODFLG_SELKEY) ) {
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
PKT_public_key *subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
struct sign_attrib attrib;
memset( &attrib, 0, sizeof attrib );
attrib.reason = reason;
node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sec_keyblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, sk,
0x28, 0, 0, 0, 0,
sign_mk_attrib, &attrib );
free_secret_key(sk);
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("signing failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return changed;
}
changed = 1; /* we changed the keyblock */
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
goto reloop;
}
}
commit_kbnode( &pub_keyblock );
/*commit_kbnode( &sec_keyblock );*/
/* No need to set update_trust here since signing keys no longer
are used to certify other keys, so there is no change in trust
when revoking/removing them */
release_revocation_reason_info( reason );
return changed;
}
/* Note that update_ownertrust is going to mark the trustdb dirty when
enabling or disabling a key. This is arguably sub-optimal as
disabled keys are still counted in the web of trust, but perhaps
not worth adding extra complexity to change. -ds */
static int
enable_disable_key( KBNODE keyblock, int disable )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
->pkt->pkt.public_key;
unsigned int trust, newtrust;
trust = newtrust = get_ownertrust (pk);
newtrust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if( disable )
newtrust |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if( trust == newtrust )
return 0; /* already in that state */
update_ownertrust(pk, newtrust );
return 0;
}
static void
menu_showphoto( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node;
int select_all = !count_selected_uids(keyblock);
int count=0;
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
/* Look for the public key first. We have to be really, really,
explicit as to which photo this is, and what key it is a UID on
since people may want to sign it. */
for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
{
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
{
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk(pk, keyid);
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
{
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
count++;
if((select_all || (node->flag & NODFLG_SELUID)) &&
uid->attribs!=NULL)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
{
byte type;
u32 size;
if(uid->attribs[i].type==ATTRIB_IMAGE &&
parse_image_header(&uid->attribs[i],&type,&size))
{
tty_printf(_("Displaying %s photo ID of size %ld for "
"key 0x%08lX (uid %d)\n"),
image_type_to_string(type,1),
(ulong)size,(ulong)keyid[1],count);
show_photos(&uid->attribs[i],1,pk,NULL);
}
}
}
}
}
}
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