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gnupg/g10/import.c

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/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "gpg.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "keyserver-internal.h"
#include "call-agent.h"
#include "../common/membuf.h"
struct stats_s {
ulong count;
ulong no_user_id;
ulong imported;
ulong imported_rsa;
ulong n_uids;
ulong n_sigs;
ulong n_subk;
ulong unchanged;
ulong n_revoc;
ulong secret_read;
ulong secret_imported;
ulong secret_dups;
ulong skipped_new_keys;
ulong not_imported;
ulong n_sigs_cleaned;
ulong n_uids_cleaned;
ulong skipped_v3_keys;
ulong skipped_v3_subkeys;
};
static int import (ctrl_t ctrl,
IOBUF inp, const char* fname, struct stats_s *stats,
unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options);
static int read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root );
static void revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
static int import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,struct stats_s *stats,
unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,
unsigned int options,int from_sk);
static int import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options);
static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node,
struct stats_s *stats);
static int chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self );
static int delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, unsigned int options );
static int delete_v3_subkeys (kbnode_t keyblock);
static int merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig,
KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid,
int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk );
static int append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int append_key( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
static int merge_keysigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
int
parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
{
struct parse_options import_opts[]=
{
{"import-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
N_("import signatures that are marked as local-only")},
{"repair-pks-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,
N_("repair damage from the pks keyserver during import")},
{"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST,NULL,
N_("do not update the trustdb after import")},
{"merge-only",IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY,NULL,
N_("only accept updates to existing keys")},
{"import-clean",IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
N_("remove unusable parts from key after import")},
{"import-minimal",IMPORT_MINIMAL|IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
N_("remove as much as possible from key after import")},
/* Aliases for backward compatibility */
{"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
{"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,NULL},
/* dummy */
{"import-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
{"import-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
{"import-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
{"convert-sk-to-pk",0, NULL,NULL}, /* Not anymore needed due to
the new design. */
{NULL,0,NULL,NULL}
};
return parse_options(str,options,import_opts,noisy);
}
void *
import_new_stats_handle (void)
{
return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
}
void
import_release_stats_handle (void *p)
{
xfree (p);
}
/****************
* Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
* This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
* least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
* Other signatures are not checked.
*
* Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
*
* - get the keyblock
* - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
* without/invalid self-signatures.
* - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
* - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
* If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
* - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
* our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
* ask what to do.
* - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
* ask the user what to do.
* - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
* - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* - Proceed with next signature.
*
* Key revocation certificates have special handling.
*
*/
static int
import_keys_internal (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
void *stats_handle, unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
unsigned int options )
{
int i, rc = 0;
struct stats_s *stats = stats_handle;
if (!stats)
stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
if (inp) {
rc = import (ctrl, inp, "[stream]", stats, fpr, fpr_len, options);
}
else {
if( !fnames && !nnames )
nnames = 1; /* Ohh what a ugly hack to jump into the loop */
for(i=0; i < nnames; i++ ) {
const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
IOBUF inp2 = iobuf_open(fname);
if( !fname )
fname = "[stdin]";
if (inp2 && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp2)))
{
iobuf_close (inp2);
inp2 = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if( !inp2 )
log_error(_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) );
else
{
rc = import (ctrl, inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options);
iobuf_close(inp2);
/* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE,
0, (char*)fname);
if( rc )
log_error("import from '%s' failed: %s\n", fname,
g10_errstr(rc) );
}
if( !fname )
break;
}
}
if (!stats_handle) {
import_print_stats (stats);
import_release_stats_handle (stats);
}
/* If no fast import and the trustdb is dirty (i.e. we added a key
or userID that had something other than a selfsig, a signature
that was other than a selfsig, or any revocation), then
update/check the trustdb if the user specified by setting
interactive or by not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */
if(!(options&IMPORT_FAST))
trustdb_check_or_update();
return rc;
}
void
import_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, char **fnames, int nnames,
void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
{
import_keys_internal (ctrl, NULL, fnames, nnames, stats_handle,
NULL, NULL, options);
}
int
import_keys_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, void *stats_handle,
unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options)
{
return import_keys_internal (ctrl, inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle,
fpr, fpr_len, options);
}
/* Variant of import_keys_stream reading from an estream_t. */
int
import_keys_es_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, void *stats_handle,
unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
unsigned int options)
{
int rc;
iobuf_t inp;
inp = iobuf_esopen (fp, "r", 1);
if (!inp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error ("iobuf_esopen failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
}
rc = import_keys_internal (ctrl, inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle,
fpr, fpr_len, options);
iobuf_close (inp);
return rc;
}
static int
import (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options )
{
PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL; /* Need to initialize because gcc can't
grasp the return semantics of
read_block. */
int rc = 0;
getkey_disable_caches();
if( !opt.no_armor ) { /* armored reading is not disabled */
armor_filter_context_t *afx;
afx = new_armor_context ();
afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
release_armor_context (afx);
}
while( !(rc = read_block( inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock) )) {
if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
rc = import_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock,
stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0);
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
rc = import_secret_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock, stats, options);
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
rc = import_revoke_cert( fname, keyblock, stats );
else {
log_info( _("skipping block of type %d\n"),
keyblock->pkt->pkttype );
}
release_kbnode(keyblock);
/* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but this
does only make sense if we keep on going despite of errors. */
if( rc )
break;
if( !(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );
}
if( rc == -1 )
rc = 0;
else if( rc && rc != G10ERR_INV_KEYRING )
log_error( _("error reading '%s': %s\n"), fname, g10_errstr(rc));
return rc;
}
void
import_print_stats (void *hd)
{
struct stats_s *stats = hd;
if( !opt.quiet ) {
log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"), stats->count );
if( stats->skipped_new_keys )
log_info(_(" skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
stats->skipped_new_keys );
if( stats->skipped_v3_keys )
log_info(_(" skipped v3 keys: %lu\n"),
stats->skipped_v3_keys);
if( stats->no_user_id )
log_info(_(" w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
if( stats->imported || stats->imported_rsa ) {
log_info(_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
if (stats->imported_rsa)
log_printf (" (RSA: %lu)", stats->imported_rsa );
log_printf ("\n");
}
if( stats->unchanged )
log_info(_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
if( stats->n_uids )
log_info(_(" new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
if( stats->n_subk )
log_info(_(" new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
if( stats->skipped_v3_subkeys)
log_info(_(" skipped v3 subkeys: %lu\n"),
stats->skipped_v3_subkeys);
if( stats->n_sigs )
log_info(_(" new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
if( stats->n_revoc )
log_info(_(" new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
if( stats->secret_read )
log_info(_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
if( stats->secret_imported )
log_info(_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
if( stats->secret_dups )
log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
if( stats->not_imported )
log_info(_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
if( stats->n_sigs_cleaned)
log_info(_(" signatures cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_sigs_cleaned);
if( stats->n_uids_cleaned)
log_info(_(" user IDs cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_uids_cleaned);
}
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[16*20];
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
"%lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu"
" %lu %lu",
stats->count,
stats->no_user_id,
stats->imported,
stats->imported_rsa,
stats->unchanged,
stats->n_uids,
stats->n_subk,
stats->n_sigs,
stats->n_revoc,
stats->secret_read,
stats->secret_imported,
stats->secret_dups,
stats->skipped_new_keys,
stats->not_imported,
stats->skipped_v3_keys,
stats->skipped_v3_subkeys);
write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf );
}
}
/****************
* Read the next keyblock from stream A.
* PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
* and not chnaged form the caller.
* Return: 0 = okay, -1 no more blocks or another errorcode.
*/
static int
read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root )
{
int rc;
PACKET *pkt;
KBNODE root = NULL;
int in_cert;
if( *pending_pkt ) {
root = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
*pending_pkt = NULL;
in_cert = 1;
}
else
in_cert = 0;
pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
if( rc ) { /* ignore errors */
if( rc != G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET ) {
log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
goto ready;
}
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
continue;
}
if( !root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
/* this is a revocation certificate which is handled
* in a special way */
root = new_kbnode( pkt );
pkt = NULL;
goto ready;
}
/* make a linked list of all packets */
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_COMPRESSED:
if(check_compress_algo(pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm))
{
rc = G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
goto ready;
}
else
{
compress_filter_context_t *cfx = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *cfx );
pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
push_compress_filter2(a,cfx,pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm,1);
}
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
/* skip those packets */
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
break;
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
if( in_cert ) { /* store this packet */
*pending_pkt = pkt;
pkt = NULL;
goto ready;
}
in_cert = 1;
default:
if( in_cert ) {
if( !root )
root = new_kbnode( pkt );
else
add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
}
init_packet(pkt);
break;
}
}
ready:
if( rc == -1 && root )
rc = 0;
if( rc )
release_kbnode( root );
else
*ret_root = root;
free_packet( pkt );
xfree( pkt );
return rc;
}
/* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the PKS
disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey. That is,
instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
"pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1". We can't do anything about sub2
and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
sub2 sub3". Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */
static int
fix_pks_corruption(KBNODE keyblock)
{
int changed=0,keycount=0;
KBNODE node,last=NULL,sknode=NULL;
/* First determine if we have the problem at all. Look for 2 or
more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
for(node=keyblock;node;last=node,node=node->next)
{
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
keycount++;
if(!sknode)
sknode=node;
}
else if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x18 &&
keycount>=2 && node->next==NULL)
{
/* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
a row without any intervening packets. */
/* Sanity check */
if(last==NULL)
break;
/* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
node->next=sknode->next;
sknode->next=node;
last->next=NULL;
/* Note we aren't checking whether this binding sig is a
selfsig. This is not necessary here as the subkey and
binding sig will be rejected later if that is the
case. */
if(check_key_signature(keyblock,node,NULL))
{
/* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
sknode->next=node->next;
last->next=node;
node->next=NULL;
break;
}
else
{
sknode->flag |= 1; /* Mark it good so we don't need to
check it again */
changed=1;
break;
}
}
else
keycount=0;
}
return changed;
}
/* Versions of GnuPG before 1.4.11 and 2.0.16 allowed to import bogus
direct key signatures. A side effect of this was that a later
import of the same good direct key signatures was not possible
because the cmp_signature check in merge_blocks considered them
equal. Although direct key signatures are now checked during
import, there might still be bogus signatures sitting in a keyring.
We need to detect and delete them before doing a merge. This
function returns the number of removed sigs. */
static int
fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
int count = 0;
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
err = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO )
{
/* If we don't know the error, we can't decide; this is
not a problem because cmp_signature can't compare the
signature either. */
log_info ("key %s: invalid direct key signature removed\n",
keystr (keyid));
delete_kbnode (node);
count++;
}
}
}
return count;
}
static void
print_import_ok (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int reason)
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+30], *p;
size_t i, n;
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%u ", reason);
p = buf + strlen (buf);
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
s = array;
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);
write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
}
static void
print_import_check (PKT_public_key * pk, PKT_user_id * id)
{
char * buf;
byte fpr[24];
u32 keyid[2];
size_t i, pos = 0, n;
buf = xmalloc (17+41+id->len+32);
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
sprintf (buf, "%08X%08X ", keyid[0], keyid[1]);
pos = 17;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &n);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++, pos += 2)
sprintf (buf+pos, "%02X", fpr[i]);
strcat (buf, " ");
pos += 1;
strcat (buf, id->name);
write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK, buf);
xfree (buf);
}
static void
check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
{
log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"
"algorithms on these user IDs:\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
}
static void
check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
int problem=0;
merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
{
if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created
&& node->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs)
{
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
prefitem_t *prefs=uid->prefs;
char *user=utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
for(;prefs->type;prefs++)
{
char num[10]; /* prefs->value is a byte, so we're over
safe here */
sprintf(num,"%u",prefs->value);
if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_SYM)
{
if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value))
{
const char *algo =
(openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value)
? num
: openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs->value));
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for cipher"
" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
problem=1;
}
}
else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
{
if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
{
const char *algo =
(gcry_md_test_algo (prefs->value)
? num
: gcry_md_algo_name (prefs->value));
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for digest"
" algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
problem=1;
}
}
else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
{
if(check_compress_algo (prefs->value))
{
const char *algo=compress_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for compression"
" algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
problem=1;
}
}
}
xfree(user);
}
}
if(problem)
{
log_info(_("it is strongly suggested that you update"
" your preferences and\n"));
log_info(_("re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm"
" mismatch problems\n"));
if(!opt.batch)
{
strlist_t sl=NULL,locusr=NULL;
size_t fprlen=0;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],*p;
char username[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+1];
unsigned int i;
p=fingerprint_from_pk(pk,fpr,&fprlen);
for(i=0;i<fprlen;i++,p++)
sprintf(username+2*i,"%02X",*p);
add_to_strlist(&locusr,username);
append_to_strlist(&sl,"updpref");
append_to_strlist(&sl,"save");
keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 1, 1 );
free_strlist(sl);
free_strlist(locusr);
}
else if(!opt.quiet)
log_info(_("you can update your preferences with:"
" gpg --edit-key %s updpref save\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
}
}
/****************
* Try to import one keyblock. Return an error only in serious cases, but
* never for an invalid keyblock. It uses log_error to increase the
* internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by programs
* which called gpg.
*/
static int
import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len,unsigned int options,
int from_sk )
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
KBNODE keyblock_orig = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
int new_key = 0;
int mod_key = 0;
int same_key = 0;
int non_self = 0;
int count;
/* get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
if( opt.verbose && !opt.interactive )
{
log_info( "pub %4u%c/%s %s ",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
if (uidnode)
print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (),
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
log_printf ("\n");
}
/* We don't allow to import v3 keys unless the --allow-v3-keys
option is active. Note that this checks only the primary key.
v3 subkeys will be removed later. */
if (pk->version <= 3 && !opt.allow_v3_keys)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: v3 keys are not allowed - skipped\n"),
keystr (keyid));
stats->skipped_new_keys++;
stats->skipped_v3_keys++;
return 0;
}
if( !uidnode )
{
log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
return 0;
}
if (opt.interactive) {
if(is_status_enabled())
print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
tty_printf ("\n");
show_basic_key_info (keyblock);
tty_printf ("\n");
if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
"Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
return 0;
}
collapse_uids(&keyblock);
/* Clean the key that we're about to import, to cut down on things
that we have to clean later. This has no practical impact on
the end result, but does result in less logging which might
confuse the user. */
if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
clean_key(keyblock,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
if((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG) && fix_pks_corruption(keyblock)
&& opt.verbose)
log_info(_("key %s: PKS subkey corruption repaired\n"),
keystr_from_pk(pk));
rc = chk_self_sigs( fname, keyblock , pk, keyid, &non_self );
if( rc )
return rc== -1? 0:rc;
/* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
if( opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid )
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 1) )
{
char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
node->flag |= 1;
log_info( _("key %s: accepted non self-signed user ID \"%s\"\n"),
keystr_from_pk(pk),user);
xfree(user);
}
if( !delete_inv_parts( fname, keyblock, keyid, options ) ) {
log_error( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
stats->no_user_id++;
return 0;
}
if (!opt.allow_v3_keys && (count = delete_v3_subkeys (keyblock)))
{
stats->skipped_v3_subkeys += count;
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("key %s: removed v3 subkeys: %d\n"),
keystr (keyid), count);
}
/* do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
pk_orig = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk_orig );
rc = get_pubkey_fast ( pk_orig, keyid );
if( rc && rc != G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && rc != G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY )
{
log_error( _("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
}
else if ( rc && (opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
{
if( opt.verbose )
log_info( _("key %s: new key - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
rc = 0;
stats->skipped_new_keys++;
}
else if( rc ) { /* insert this key */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new ();
rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
if (rc) {
log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
keydb_release (hd);
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );
rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc));
else
{
/* This should not be possible since we delete the
ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
the keyring and trustdb are out of sync. It can also
be made to happen with the trusted-key command. */
clear_ownertrusts (pk);
if(non_self)
revalidation_mark ();
}
keydb_release (hd);
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet )
{
char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
log_info( _("key %s: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
keystr(keyid),p);
xfree(p);
}
if( is_status_enabled() )
{
char *us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
xfree(us);
print_import_ok (pk, 1);
}
stats->imported++;
if( is_RSA( pk->pubkey_algo ) )
stats->imported_rsa++;
new_key = 1;
}
else { /* merge */
KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk, n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;
/* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
* weird is going on */
if( cmp_public_keys( pk_orig, pk ) )
{
log_error( _("key %s: doesn't match our copy\n"),keystr(keyid));
goto leave;
}
/* now read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new ();
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk_orig, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
if( rc )
{
log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock_orig );
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
/* Make sure the original direct key sigs are all sane. */
n_sigs_cleaned = fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (keyblock_orig, keyid);
if (n_sigs_cleaned)
commit_kbnode (&keyblock_orig);
/* and try to merge the block */
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = n_uids_cleaned = 0;
rc = merge_blocks( fname, keyblock_orig, keyblock,
keyid, &n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
if( rc )
{
keydb_release (hd);
goto leave;
}
if(options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
clean_key(keyblock_orig,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,
&n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);
if( n_uids || n_sigs || n_subk || n_sigs_cleaned || n_uids_cleaned) {
mod_key = 1;
/* keyblock_orig has been updated; write */
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock_orig);
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
else if(non_self)
revalidation_mark ();
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet )
{
char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
if( n_uids == 1 )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
keystr(keyid),p);
else if( n_uids )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
keystr(keyid),p,n_uids);
if( n_sigs == 1 )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
keystr(keyid), p);
else if( n_sigs )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
keystr(keyid), p, n_sigs );
if( n_subk == 1 )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
keystr(keyid), p);
else if( n_subk )
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
keystr(keyid), p, n_subk );
if(n_sigs_cleaned==1)
log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signature cleaned\n"),
keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
else if(n_sigs_cleaned)
log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signatures cleaned\n"),
keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
if(n_uids_cleaned==1)
log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user ID cleaned\n"),
keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
else if(n_uids_cleaned)
log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user IDs cleaned\n"),
keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
xfree(p);
}
stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, ((n_uids?2:0)|(n_sigs?4:0)|(n_subk?8:0)));
}
else
{
same_key = 1;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, 0);
if( !opt.quiet )
{
char *p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" not changed\n"),keystr(keyid),p);
xfree(p);
}
stats->unchanged++;
}
keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
}
leave:
if (mod_key || new_key || same_key)
{
/* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
name). However, in cases where we're importing more than
one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not
fingerprinting at all, and we must hope the user ID on the
keys are useful. Note that we need to do this for new
keys, merged keys and even for unchanged keys. This is
required because for example the --auto-key-locate feature
may import an already imported key and needs to know the
fingerprint of the key in all cases. */
if (fpr)
{
xfree (*fpr);
/* Note that we need to compare against 0 here because
COUNT gets only incremented after returning form this
function. */
if (stats->count == 0)
*fpr = fingerprint_from_pk (pk, NULL, fpr_len);
else
*fpr = NULL;
}
}
/* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb, we
need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */
if (mod_key)
{
revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
}
else if (new_key)
{
revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock);
if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock);
}
release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
free_public_key( pk_orig );
return rc;
}
/* Extract one MPI value from the S-expression PKEY which is expected
to hold a "public-key". Returns NULL on error. */
static gcry_mpi_t
one_mpi_from_pkey (gcry_sexp_t pkey, const char *name, size_t namelen)
{
gcry_sexp_t list, l2;
gcry_mpi_t a;
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (pkey, "public-key", 0);
if (!list)
return NULL;
l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = l2;
if (!list)
return NULL;
l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, name, namelen);
if (!l2)
{
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return NULL;
}
a = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
gcry_sexp_release (l2);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return a;
}
/* Transfer all the secret keys in SEC_KEYBLOCK to the gpg-agent. The
function prints diagnostics and returns an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
void *kek = NULL;
size_t keklen;
kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *main_pk, *pk;
struct seckey_info *ski;
int nskey;
membuf_t mbuf;
int i, j;
unsigned int n;
void *format_args_buf_ptr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
int format_args_buf_int[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
void *format_args[2*PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
gcry_sexp_t skey, prot, tmpsexp;
unsigned char *transferkey = NULL;
size_t transferkeylen;
gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t ecc_params[5] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
/* Get the current KEK. */
err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 0, &kek, &keklen);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Prepare a cipher context. */
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
if (err)
goto leave;
xfree (kek);
kek = NULL;
main_pk = NULL;
while ((node = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
&& node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
continue;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (!main_pk)
main_pk = pk;
/* Make sure the keyids are available. */
keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
pk->main_keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
}
else
{
pk->main_keyid[0] = main_pk->keyid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = main_pk->keyid[1];
}
ski = pk->seckey_info;
if (!ski)
BUG ();
stats->count++;
stats->secret_read++;
/* We ignore stub keys. The way we handle them in other parts
of the code is by asking the agent whether any secret key is
available for a given keyblock and then concluding that we
have a secret key; all secret (sub)keys of the keyblock the
agent does not know of are then stub keys. This works also
for card stub keys. The learn command or the card-status
command may be used to check with the agent whether a card
has been inserted and a stub key is in turn generated by the
agent. */
if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 || ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
continue;
/* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. */
nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (pk->pubkey_algo);
if (!nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
log_error ("internal error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
init_membuf (&mbuf, 50);
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey");
if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
{
/* We need special treatment for ECC algorithms. OpenPGP
stores only the curve name but the agent expects a full
key. This is so that we can keep all curve name
validation code out of gpg-agent. */
#if PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY < 7
#error PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY too low for ECC
#endif
char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
if (!curve)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
gcry_sexp_t cparam = gcry_pk_get_param (GCRY_PK_ECDSA, curve);
xfree (curve);
if (!cparam)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
else
{
const char *s;
/* Append the curve parameters P, A, B, G and N. */
for (i=j=0; !err && *(s = "pabgn"+i); i++)
{
ecc_params[i] = one_mpi_from_pkey (cparam, s, 1);
if (!ecc_params[i])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = ecc_params+i;
}
}
gcry_sexp_release (cparam);
if (!err)
{
/* Append the public key element Q. */
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1;
/* Append the secret key element D. Note that
for ECDH we need to skip PKEY[2] because this
holds the KEK which is not needed. */
i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2;
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
format_args_buf_ptr[i]
= gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i],&n);
format_args_buf_int[i] = (n+7)/8;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int + i;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr + i;
}
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
/* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */
for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++)
{
if (!pk->pkey[i])
; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */
else if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
format_args_buf_ptr[i] = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i],&n);
format_args_buf_int[i] = (n+7)/8;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int + i;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr + i;
}
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
}
}
}
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")\n");
put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1);
if (err)
xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL));
else
{
char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL);
if (!format)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args);
xfree (format);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
if (ski->is_protected)
{
char countbuf[35];
/* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
thus we send dummy data for the IV. */
snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu",
(unsigned long)ski->s2k.count);
err = gcry_sexp_build
(&prot, NULL,
" (protection %s %s %b %d %s %b %s)\n",
ski->sha1chk? "sha1":"sum",
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (ski->algo),
ski->ivlen? (int)ski->ivlen:1,
ski->ivlen? ski->iv: (const unsigned char*)"X",
ski->s2k.mode,
openpgp_md_algo_name (ski->s2k.hash_algo),
(int)sizeof (ski->s2k.salt), ski->s2k.salt,
countbuf);
}
else
err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, " (protection none)\n");
tmpsexp = NULL;
xfree (transferkey);
transferkey = NULL;
if (!err)
err = gcry_sexp_build (&tmpsexp, NULL,
"(openpgp-private-key\n"
" (version %d)\n"
" (algo %s)\n"
" %S\n"
" (csum %d)\n"
" %S)\n",
pk->version,
openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo),
skey, (int)(unsigned long)ski->csum, prot);
gcry_sexp_release (skey);
gcry_sexp_release (prot);
if (!err)
err = make_canon_sexp_pad (tmpsexp, 1, &transferkey, &transferkeylen);
gcry_sexp_release (tmpsexp);
if (err)
{
log_error ("error building transfer key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Wrap the key. */
wrappedkeylen = transferkeylen + 8;
xfree (wrappedkey);
wrappedkey = xtrymalloc (wrappedkeylen);
if (!wrappedkey)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipherhd, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen,
transferkey, transferkeylen);
if (err)
goto leave;
xfree (transferkey);
transferkey = NULL;
/* Send the wrapped key to the agent. */
{
char *desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, 1, 1);
err = agent_import_key (ctrl, desc, &cache_nonce,
wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
xfree (desc);
}
if (!err)
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
stats->secret_imported++;
}
else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST )
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: secret key already exists\n"),
keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
err = 0;
stats->secret_dups++;
}
else
{
log_error (_("key %s: error sending to agent: %s\n"),
keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk),
gpg_strerror (err));
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
break; /* Don't try the other subkeys. */
}
}
leave:
for (i=0; i < DIM (ecc_params); i++)
gcry_mpi_release (ecc_params[i]);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (wrappedkey);
xfree (transferkey);
gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
xfree (kek);
return err;
}
/* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it.
Returns a new node or NULL on error. */
static kbnode_t
sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
{
kbnode_t pub_keyblock = NULL;
kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
kbnode_t secnode, pubnode;
while ((secnode = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
{
if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
/* Make a public key. */
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_public_key *pk;
pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
pk = pkt? copy_public_key (NULL, secnode->pkt->pkt.public_key): NULL;
if (!pk)
{
xfree (pkt);
release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
return NULL;
}
if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
else
pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
pubnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
}
else
{
pubnode = clone_kbnode (secnode);
}
if (!pub_keyblock)
pub_keyblock = pubnode;
else
add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, pubnode);
}
return pub_keyblock;
}
/****************
* Ditto for secret keys. Handling is simpler than for public keys.
* We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
* that a secret key can not be imported accidently and thereby tampering
* with the trust calculation.
*/
static int
import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
struct seckey_info *ski;
KBNODE node, uidnode;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
int nr_prev;
kbnode_t pub_keyblock;
/* Get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
uidnode = find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_USER_ID);
if (opt.verbose)
{
log_info ("sec %4u%c/%s %s ",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));
if (uidnode)
print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (), uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
log_printf ("\n");
}
stats->secret_read++;
if (!uidnode)
{
log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
return 0;
}
ski = pk->seckey_info;
if (!ski)
{
/* Actually an internal error. */
log_error ("key %s: secret key info missing\n", keystr_from_pk (pk));
return 0;
}
/* A quick check to not import keys with an invalid protection
cipher algorithm (only checks the primary key, though). */
if (ski->algo > 110)
{
log_error (_("key %s: secret key with invalid cipher %d"
" - skipped\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk), ski->algo);
return 0;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
if (1)
{
/* We don't allow to import secret keys because that may be used
to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
be tricked into signing stuff with that key. */
log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
return 0;
}
#endif
clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
nr_prev = stats->skipped_new_keys;
/* Make a public key out of the key. */
pub_keyblock = sec_to_pub_keyblock (keyblock);
if (!pub_keyblock)
log_error ("key %s: failed to create public key from secret key\n",
keystr_from_pk (pk));
else
{
/* Note that this outputs an IMPORT_OK status message for the
public key block, and below we will output another one for
the secret keys. FIXME? */
import_one (ctrl, fname, pub_keyblock, stats,
NULL, NULL, options, 1);
/* Fixme: We should check for an invalid keyblock and
cancel the secret key import in this case. */
release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
/* At least we cancel the secret key import when the public key
import was skipped due to MERGE_ONLY option and a new
key. */
if (stats->skipped_new_keys <= nr_prev)
{
/* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge. */
/* Fixme: we should do this based on the fingerprint or
even better let import_one return the merged
keyblock. */
node = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
if (!node)
log_error ("key %s: failed to re-lookup public key\n",
keystr_from_pk (pk));
else
{
nr_prev = stats->secret_imported;
if (!transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, stats, keyblock))
{
int status = 16;
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
if (stats->secret_imported > nr_prev)
status |= 1;
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, status);
check_prefs (ctrl, node);
}
release_kbnode (node);
}
}
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
*/
static int
import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s *stats )
{
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
KBNODE onode, keyblock = NULL;
KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
(void)fname;
assert( !node->next );
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
assert( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 );
keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY )
{
log_error(_("key %s: no public key -"
" can't apply revocation certificate\n"), keystr(keyid));
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
else if( rc )
{
log_error(_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* read the original keyblock */
hd = keydb_new ();
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
* check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 in this
* special case. */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
if( rc )
{
log_error( _("key %s: invalid revocation certificate"
": %s - rejected\n"), keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
/* check whether we already have this */
for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& !cmp_signatures(node->pkt->pkt.signature,
onode->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
rc = 0;
goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
}
}
/* insert it */
insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );
/* and write the keyblock back */
rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
if (rc)
log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
keydb_get_resource_name (hd), g10_errstr(rc) );
keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
/* we are ready */
if( !opt.quiet )
{
char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
keystr(keyid),p);
xfree(p);
}
stats->n_revoc++;
/* If the key we just revoked was ultimately trusted, remove its
ultimate trust. This doesn't stop the user from putting the
ultimate trust back, but is a reasonable solution for now. */
if(get_ownertrust(pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
clear_ownertrusts(pk);
revalidation_mark ();
leave:
keydb_release (hd);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}
/*
* Loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
* Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
* Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
* This works also for subkeys, here the subkey is marked. Invalid or
* extra subkey sigs (binding or revocation) are marked for deletion.
* non_self is set to true if there are any sigs other than self-sigs
* in this keyblock.
*/
static int
chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self )
{
kbnode_t n, knode = NULL;
PKT_signature *sig;
int rc;
u32 bsdate=0, rsdate=0;
kbnode_t bsnode = NULL, rsnode = NULL;
(void)fname;
(void)pk;
for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
{
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
knode = n;
bsdate = 0;
rsdate = 0;
bsnode = NULL;
rsnode = NULL;
continue;
}
if ( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
{
*non_self = 1;
continue;
}
/* This just caches the sigs for later use. That way we
import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
if (!opt.no_sig_cache)
check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( IS_UID_SIG(sig) || IS_UID_REV(sig) )
{
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
if ( !unode )
{
log_error( _("key %s: no user ID for signature\n"),
keystr(keyid));
return -1; /* The complete keyblock is invalid. */
}
/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying. */
if (!(unode->flag&1))
{
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if ( opt.verbose )
{
char *p = utf8_to_native
(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
strlen (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
log_info (gpg_err_code(rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %s: unsupported public key "
"algorithm on user ID \"%s\"\n"):
_("key %s: invalid self-signature "
"on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
keystr (keyid),p);
xfree (p);
}
}
else
unode->flag |= 1; /* Mark that signature checked. */
}
}
else if (IS_KEY_SIG (sig))
{
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %s: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
_("key %s: invalid direct key signature\n"),
keystr (keyid));
n->flag |= 4;
}
}
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
{
/* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps like
the rest of gpg. If the standard gets revocation
targets, this may need to be revised. */
if ( !knode )
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key binding\n"),
keystr (keyid));
n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
}
else
{
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %s: unsupported public key"
" algorithm\n"):
_("key %s: invalid subkey binding\n"),
keystr (keyid));
n->flag |= 4;
}
else
{
/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
{
knode->flag |= 1; /* The subkey is valid. */
if (bsnode)
{
/* Delete the last binding sig since this
one is newer */
bsnode->flag |= 4;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
" binding\n"),keystr(keyid));
}
bsnode = n;
bsdate = sig->timestamp;
}
else
n->flag |= 4; /* older */
}
}
}
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) )
{
/* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right now,
so just check that the revocation sig is the most recent
valid one. Note that we don't care if the binding sig is
newer than the revocation sig. See the comment in
getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for more. */
if ( !knode )
{
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key revocation\n"),
keystr(keyid));
n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
}
else
{
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if(opt.verbose)
log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
_("key %s: unsupported public"
" key algorithm\n"):
_("key %s: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
keystr(keyid));
n->flag |= 4;
}
else
{
/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
if (sig->timestamp >= rsdate)
{
if (rsnode)
{
/* Delete the last revocation sig since
this one is newer. */
rsnode->flag |= 4;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
" revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
}
rsnode = n;
rsdate = sig->timestamp;
}
else
n->flag |= 4; /* older */
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
* public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
* but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
* about it.
* returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
*/
static int
delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, unsigned int options)
{
KBNODE node;
int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;
(void)fname;
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
uid_seen = 1;
if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
if( opt.verbose )
{
char *p=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
log_info( _("key %s: skipped user ID \"%s\"\n"),
keystr(keyid),p);
xfree(p);
}
delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
/* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
while( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
delete_kbnode( node->next );
node = node->next;
}
}
else
nvalid++;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
if( (node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info( _("key %s: skipped subkey\n"),keystr(keyid));
delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
/* and all following signature packets */
while( node->next
&& node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
delete_kbnode( node->next );
node = node->next;
}
}
else
subkey_seen = 1;
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& openpgp_pk_test_algo (node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable &&
!(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS) &&
!have_secret_key_with_kid (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
{
/* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
* to import non-exportable signature when we have the
* the secret key used to create this signature - it
* seems that this makes sense */
if(opt.verbose)
log_info( _("key %s: non exportable signature"
" (class 0x%02X) - skipped\n"),
keystr(keyid), node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
if( uid_seen )
{
if(opt.verbose)
log_info( _("key %s: revocation certificate"
" at wrong place - skipped\n"),keystr(keyid));
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else {
/* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
the one we're working on don't check it - it's
probably from a revocation key and won't be
verifiable with this key anyway. */
if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
{
int rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
if( rc )
{
if(opt.verbose)
log_info( _("key %s: invalid revocation"
" certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
keystr(keyid), g10_errstr(rc));
delete_kbnode( node );
}
}
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE &&
(node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18 ||
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28) &&
!subkey_seen )
{
if(opt.verbose)
log_info( _("key %s: subkey signature"
" in wrong place - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
delete_kbnode( node );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& !IS_CERT(node->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
if(opt.verbose)
log_info(_("key %s: unexpected signature class (0x%02X) -"
" skipped\n"),keystr(keyid),
node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class);
delete_kbnode(node);
}
else if( (node->flag & 4) ) /* marked for deletion */
delete_kbnode( node );
}
/* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
* for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
return nvalid;
}
/* Remove all v3 public subkeys from KEYBLOCK. Returns the number of
* removed subkeys. */
static int
delete_v3_subkeys (kbnode_t keyblock)
{
kbnode_t node;
int count = 0;
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node = node->next )
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& node->pkt->pkt.public_key->version == 3)
{
delete_kbnode (node);
while (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
delete_kbnode (node->next);
node = node->next;
}
count++;
}
}
/* Because KEYBLOCK is the primary public key, it is never marked
* for deletion and thus commit_keyblock won't change KEYBLOCK. */
if (count)
commit_kbnode (&keyblock);
return count;
}
/****************
* It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
* We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
* sigs into one.
* Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
*/
int
collapse_uids( KBNODE *keyblock )
{
KBNODE uid1;
int any=0;
for(uid1=*keyblock;uid1;uid1=uid1->next)
{
KBNODE uid2;
if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid1))
continue;
if(uid1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
for(uid2=uid1->next;uid2;uid2=uid2->next)
{
if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid2))
continue;
if(uid2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
continue;
if(cmp_user_ids(uid1->pkt->pkt.user_id,
uid2->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0)
{
/* We have a duplicated uid */
KBNODE sig1,last;
any=1;
/* Now take uid2's signatures, and attach them to
uid1 */
for(last=uid2;last->next;last=last->next)
{
if(is_deleted_kbnode(last))
continue;
if(last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
}
/* Snip out uid2 */
(find_prev_kbnode(*keyblock,uid2,0))->next=last->next;
/* Now put uid2 in place as part of uid1 */
last->next=uid1->next;
uid1->next=uid2;
delete_kbnode(uid2);
/* Now dedupe uid1 */
for(sig1=uid1->next;sig1;sig1=sig1->next)
{
KBNODE sig2;
if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig1))
continue;
if(sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
if(sig1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
for(sig2=sig1->next,last=sig1;sig2;last=sig2,sig2=sig2->next)
{
if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig2))
continue;
if(sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
|| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
break;
if(sig2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
continue;
if(cmp_signatures(sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
sig2->pkt->pkt.signature)==0)
{
/* We have a match, so delete the second
signature */
delete_kbnode(sig2);
sig2=last;
}
}
}
}
}
}
commit_kbnode(keyblock);
if(any && !opt.quiet)
{
const char *key="???";
if ((uid1 = find_kbnode (*keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)) )
key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
else if ((uid1 = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY)) )
key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
log_info (_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"), key);
}
return any;
}
/* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
present. This may be called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so
you can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
static void
revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
kbnode_t onode, inode;
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
{
/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x1F &&
onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
{
int idx;
PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;
for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
{
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_fingerprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
{
/* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x20 &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
{
/* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
revocation issued by it. Do we have the key
itself? */
int rc;
rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
{
char *tempkeystr=xstrdup(keystr_from_pk(pk));
/* No, so try and get it */
if(opt.keyserver
&& (opt.keyserver_options.options
& KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
{
log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
" fetching revocation key %s\n"),
tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl,
sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,
opt.keyserver);
/* Do we have it now? */
rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,
sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
}
if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY || rc==G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY)
log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
" revocation key %s not present.\n"),
tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
xfree(tempkeystr);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
/****************
* compare and merge the blocks
*
* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
*/
static int
merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
u32 *keyid, int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk )
{
KBNODE onode, node;
int rc, found;
/* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
/* check whether we already have this */
found = 0;
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
node->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
n2->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
if(!opt.quiet)
{
char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" revocation"
" certificate added\n"), keystr(keyid),p);
xfree(p);
}
}
}
}
/* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F ) {
/* check whether we already have this */
found = 0;
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
else if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F
&& !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
node->pkt->pkt.signature)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if( !found )
{
KBNODE n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
n2->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
if(!opt.quiet)
log_info( _("key %s: direct key signature added\n"),
keystr(keyid));
}
}
}
/* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( !(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
/* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
break;
if( node ) { /* found: merge */
rc = merge_sigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
if( rc )
return rc;
}
}
}
/* 4th: add new user-ids */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
&& !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new user id: append */
rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_uids;
}
}
}
/* 5th: add new subkeys */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
onode = NULL;
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_subk;
}
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
/* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
&& !cmp_public_keys (onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
node->pkt->pkt.public_key) )
break;
if( !onode ) { /* this is a new subkey: append */
rc = append_key( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
if( rc )
return rc;
++*n_subk;
}
}
}
/* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( !(onode->flag & 1)
&& ( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) ) {
/* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next ) {
if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
&& !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
break;
}
if( node ) { /* found: merge */
rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
if( rc )
return rc;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
*/
static int
append_uid (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n, n_where=NULL;
(void)fname;
(void)keyid;
assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
/* find the position */
for( n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
}
if( !n )
n_where = NULL;
/* and append/insert */
while( node ) {
/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n = clone_kbnode(node);
if( n_where ) {
insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
n_where = n;
}
else
add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
n->flag |= 1;
node->flag |= 1;
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
++*n_sigs;
node = node->next;
if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
break;
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
* (how should we handle comment packets here?)
*/
static int
merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int found=0;
(void)fname;
(void)keyid;
assert(dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
assert(src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
for(n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
if( n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
|| n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 )
continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */
found = 0;
for(n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
if(!cmp_signatures(n->pkt->pkt.signature,n2->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
found++;
break;
}
if( !found ) {
/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
n2->flag |= 1;
n->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
}
}
return 0;
}
/****************
* Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
*/
static int
merge_keysigs (KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid)
{
KBNODE n, n2;
int found=0;
(void)fname;
(void)keyid;
assert( dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
for(n=src->next; n ; n = n->next ) {
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
break;
if( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
found = 0;
for(n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next){
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
break;
if( n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
<= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
&& n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
== n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class ) {
found++;
break;
}
}
if( !found ) {
/* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
* We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
n2->flag |= 1;
n->flag |= 1;
++*n_sigs;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
*/
static int
append_key (KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
const char *fname, u32 *keyid)
{
KBNODE n;
(void)fname;
(void)keyid;
assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
while( node ) {
/* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
* one is released first */
n = clone_kbnode(node);
add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
n->flag |= 1;
node->flag |= 1;
if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
++*n_sigs;
node = node->next;
if( node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
break;
}
return 0;
}
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