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gnupg/g10/trustdb.c

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/* trustdb.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "errors.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#include "tdbio.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#if MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN > 20
#error Must change structure of trustdb
#endif
struct keyid_list {
struct keyid_list *next;
u32 keyid[2];
};
struct local_id_item {
struct local_id_item *next;
ulong lid;
unsigned flag;
};
struct local_id_table {
struct local_id_table *next; /* only used to keep a list of unused tables */
struct local_id_item *items[16];
};
typedef struct local_id_table *LOCAL_ID_TABLE;
struct enum_cert_paths_ctx {
int init;
int idx;
};
struct recno_list_struct {
struct recno_list_struct *next;
ulong recno;
int type;
};
typedef struct recno_list_struct *RECNO_LIST;
typedef struct trust_node *TN;
struct trust_node {
TN back; /* parent */
TN list; /* list of other node (should all be of the same type)*/
TN next; /* used to build the list */
int is_uid; /* set if this is an uid node */
ulong lid; /* key or uid recordnumber */
union {
struct {
int ownertrust;
int validity;
/* helper */
int buckstop;
} k;
struct {
int marginal_count;
int fully_count;
int validity;
} u;
} n;
};
static TN used_tns;
static int alloced_tns;
static int max_alloced_tns;
static struct keyid_list *trusted_key_list;
static LOCAL_ID_TABLE new_lid_table(void);
static int ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag );
static int qry_lid_table_flag( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned *flag );
static int propagate_validity( TN root, TN node,
int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs );
static void print_user_id( FILE *fp, const char *text, u32 *keyid );
static int do_check( TRUSTREC *drec, unsigned *trustlevel,
const char *nhash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong),
unsigned *retflgs);
static int get_dir_record( PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec );
static int do_update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, TRUSTREC *drec,
int sigs_only, int *modified );
static int check_trust_record( TRUSTREC *drec, int sigs_only );
static void mark_fresh_keys(void);
/* a table used to keep track of ultimately trusted keys
* which are the ones from our secrings and the trusted keys */
static LOCAL_ID_TABLE ultikey_table;
/* a table to keep track of newly importted keys. This one is
* create by the insert_trust_record function and from time to time
* used to verify key signature which have been done with these new keys */
static LOCAL_ID_TABLE fresh_imported_keys;
static int fresh_imported_keys_count;
#define FRESH_KEY_CHECK_THRESHOLD 200
/* list of unused lid items and tables */
static LOCAL_ID_TABLE unused_lid_tables;
static struct local_id_item *unused_lid_items;
static struct {
int init;
int level;
char *dbname;
} trustdb_args;
/**********************************************
*********** record read write **************
**********************************************/
/****************
* Read a record but die if it does not exist
*/
static void
read_record( ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
{
int rc = tdbio_read_record( recno, rec, rectype );
if( !rc )
return;
log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
recno, rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
tdbio_invalid();
}
/****************
* Wirte a record but die on error
*/
static void
write_record( TRUSTREC *rec )
{
int rc = tdbio_write_record( rec );
if( !rc )
return;
log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
rec->recnum, rec->rectype, g10_errstr(rc) );
tdbio_invalid();
}
/****************
* Delete a record but die on error
*/
static void
delete_record( ulong recno )
{
int rc = tdbio_delete_record( recno );
if( !rc )
return;
log_error(_("trust record %lu: delete failed: %s\n"),
recno, g10_errstr(rc) );
tdbio_invalid();
}
/****************
* sync the db
*/
static void
do_sync(void)
{
int rc = tdbio_sync();
if( !rc )
return;
log_error(_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
g10_exit(2);
}
/**********************************************
***************** helpers ******************
**********************************************/
static LOCAL_ID_TABLE
new_lid_table(void)
{
LOCAL_ID_TABLE a;
a = unused_lid_tables;
if( a ) {
unused_lid_tables = a->next;
memset( a, 0, sizeof *a );
}
else
a = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *a );
return a;
}
#if 0
static void
release_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl )
{
struct local_id_item *a, *a2;
int i;
for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
for(a=tbl->items[i]; a; a = a2 ) {
a2 = a->next;
a->next = unused_lid_items;
unused_lid_items = a;
}
}
tbl->next = unused_lid_tables;
unused_lid_tables = tbl;
}
#endif
/****************
* Remove all items from a LID table
*/
static void
clear_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl )
{
struct local_id_item *a, *a2;
int i;
for(i=0; i < 16; i++ ) {
for(a=tbl->items[i]; a; a = a2 ) {
a2 = a->next;
a->next = unused_lid_items;
unused_lid_items = a;
}
tbl->items[i] = NULL;
}
}
/****************
* Add a new item to the table or return 1 if we already have this item
*/
static int
ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag )
{
struct local_id_item *a;
for( a = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f]; a; a = a->next )
if( a->lid == lid )
return 1;
a = unused_lid_items;
if( a )
unused_lid_items = a->next;
else
a = m_alloc( sizeof *a );
a->lid = lid;
a->flag = flag;
a->next = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f];
tbl->items[lid & 0x0f] = a;
return 0;
}
static int
qry_lid_table_flag( LOCAL_ID_TABLE tbl, ulong lid, unsigned *flag )
{
struct local_id_item *a;
for( a = tbl->items[lid & 0x0f]; a; a = a->next )
if( a->lid == lid ) {
if( flag )
*flag = a->flag;
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
static TN
new_tn(void)
{
TN t;
if( used_tns ) {
t = used_tns;
used_tns = t->next;
memset( t, 0, sizeof *t );
}
else
t = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *t );
if( ++alloced_tns > max_alloced_tns )
max_alloced_tns = alloced_tns;
return t;
}
static void
release_tn( TN t )
{
if( t ) {
t->next = used_tns;
used_tns = t;
alloced_tns--;
}
}
static void
release_tn_tree( TN kr )
{
TN kr2;
for( ; kr; kr = kr2 ) {
release_tn_tree( kr->list );
kr2 = kr->next;
release_tn( kr );
}
}
/**********************************************
****** access by LID and other helpers *******
**********************************************/
/****************
* Return the keyid from the primary key identified by LID.
*/
int
keyid_from_lid( ulong lid, u32 *keyid )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
int rc;
init_trustdb();
keyid[0] = keyid[1] = 0;
rc = tdbio_read_record( lid, &rec, 0 );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("error reading dir record for LID %lu: %s\n"),
lid, g10_errstr(rc));
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
if( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_SDIR )
return 0;
if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR ) {
log_error(_("lid %lu: expected dir record, got type %d\n"),
lid, rec.rectype );
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
if( !rec.r.dir.keylist ) {
log_error(_("no primary key for LID %lu\n"), lid );
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
rc = tdbio_read_record( rec.r.dir.keylist, &rec, RECTYPE_KEY );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("error reading primary key for LID %lu: %s\n"),
lid, g10_errstr(rc));
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
keyid_from_fingerprint( rec.r.key.fingerprint, rec.r.key.fingerprint_len,
keyid );
return 0;
}
ulong
lid_from_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock )
{
KBNODE node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
PKT_public_key *pk;
if( !node )
BUG();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !pk->local_id ) {
TRUSTREC rec;
init_trustdb();
get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
}
return pk->local_id;
}
static int
get_dir_record( PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec )
{
int rc=0;
if( pk->local_id ) {
read_record( pk->local_id, rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
}
else { /* no local_id: scan the trustdb */
if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, rec )) && rc != -1 )
log_error(_("get_dir_record: search_record failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(rc));
}
return rc;
}
static ulong
lid_from_keyid_no_sdir( u32 *keyid )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
TRUSTREC rec;
ulong lid = 0;
int rc;
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( !rc ) {
if( pk->local_id )
lid = pk->local_id;
else {
rc = tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec );
if( !rc )
lid = rec.recnum;
}
}
free_public_key( pk );
return lid;
}
/***********************************************
************* Initialization ****************
***********************************************/
void
register_trusted_key( const char *string )
{
u32 keyid[2];
struct keyid_list *r;
if( classify_user_id( string, keyid, NULL, NULL, NULL ) != 11 ) {
log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
return;
}
for( r = trusted_key_list; r; r = r->next )
if( r->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && r->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
return;
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
r->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
r->next = trusted_key_list;
trusted_key_list = r;
}
static void
add_ultimate_key( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
{
int rc;
/* first make sure that the pubkey is in the trustdb */
rc = query_trust_record( pk );
if( rc == -1 && opt.dry_run )
return;
if( rc == -1 ) { /* put it into the trustdb */
rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("key %08lX: can't put it into the trustdb\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
return;
}
}
else if( rc ) {
log_error(_("key %08lX: query record failed\n"), (ulong)keyid[1] );
return;
}
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("key %08lX.%lu: stored into ultikey_table\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
if( ins_lid_table_item( ultikey_table, pk->local_id, 0 ) )
log_error(_("key %08lX: already in trusted key table\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
else if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("key %08lX: accepted as trusted key.\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1]);
}
/****************
* Verify that all our public keys are in the trustdb.
*/
static int
verify_own_keys(void)
{
int rc;
void *enum_context = NULL;
PKT_secret_key *sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
u32 keyid[2];
struct keyid_list *kl;
/* put the trusted keys into the ultikey table */
for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
keyid[0] = kl->keyid[0];
keyid[1] = kl->keyid[1];
/* get the public key */
memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( rc ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
}
else {
add_ultimate_key( pk, keyid );
release_public_key_parts( pk );
}
}
/* And now add all secret keys to the ultikey table */
while( !(rc=enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, sk, 0 ) ) ) {
int have_pk = 0;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("key %08lX: checking secret key\n", (ulong)keyid[1] );
if( !opt.quiet && is_secret_key_protected( sk ) < 1 )
log_info(_("NOTE: secret key %08lX is NOT protected.\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl->next ) {
if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
goto skip; /* already in trusted key table */
}
/* see whether we can access the public key of this secret key */
memset( pk, 0, sizeof *pk );
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( rc ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: secret key without public key - skipped\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
goto skip;
}
have_pk=1;
if( cmp_public_secret_key( pk, sk ) ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: secret and public key don't match\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1] );
goto skip;
}
add_ultimate_key( pk, keyid );
skip:
release_secret_key_parts( sk );
if( have_pk )
release_public_key_parts( pk );
}
if( rc != -1 )
log_error(_("enumerate secret keys failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
else
rc = 0;
/* release the trusted keyid table */
{ struct keyid_list *kl2;
for( kl = trusted_key_list; kl; kl = kl2 ) {
kl2 = kl->next;
m_free( kl );
}
trusted_key_list = NULL;
}
enum_secret_keys( &enum_context, NULL, 0 ); /* free context */
free_secret_key( sk );
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Perform some checks over the trustdb
* level 0: only open the db
* 1: used for initial program startup
*/
int
setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
{
/* just store the args */
if( trustdb_args.init )
return 0;
trustdb_args.level = level;
trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? m_strdup(dbname): NULL;
return 0;
}
void
init_trustdb()
{
int rc=0;
int level = trustdb_args.level;
const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
if( trustdb_args.init )
return;
trustdb_args.init = 1;
if( !ultikey_table )
ultikey_table = new_lid_table();
if( !level || level==1 ) {
rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level );
if( !rc ) {
if( !level )
return;
/* verify that our own keys are in the trustDB
* or move them to the trustdb. */
rc = verify_own_keys();
/* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted
* key in the database? */
}
}
else
BUG();
if( rc )
log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
}
/****************
* This function should be called in certain cases to sync the internal state
* of the trustdb with the file image. Currently it is needed after
* a sequence of insert_trust_record() calls.
*/
void
sync_trustdb()
{
if( fresh_imported_keys && fresh_imported_keys_count )
mark_fresh_keys();
}
/***********************************************
************* Print helpers ****************
***********************************************/
static void
print_user_id( FILE *fp, const char *text, u32 *keyid )
{
char *p;
size_t n;
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
if( fp ) {
fprintf( fp, "%s \"", text );
print_utf8_string( fp, p, n );
putc('\"', fp);
putc('\n', fp);
}
else {
tty_printf( "%s \"", text );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
tty_printf( "\"\n" );
}
m_free(p);
}
/****************
* This function returns a letter for a trustvalue Trust flags
* are ignore.
*/
int
trust_letter( unsigned value )
{
switch( (value & TRUST_MASK) ) {
case TRUST_UNKNOWN: return '-';
case TRUST_EXPIRED: return 'e';
case TRUST_UNDEFINED: return 'q';
case TRUST_NEVER: return 'n';
case TRUST_MARGINAL: return 'm';
case TRUST_FULLY: return 'f';
case TRUST_ULTIMATE: return 'u';
default: return 0 ;
}
}
#if 0
static void
print_path( int pathlen, TN ME .........., FILE *fp, ulong highlight )
{
int rc, c, i;
u32 keyid[2];
char *p;
size_t n;
for( i = 0; i < pathlen; i++ ) {
if( highlight )
fputs(highlight == path[i].lid? "* ":" ", fp );
rc = keyid_from_lid( path[i].lid, keyid );
if( rc )
fprintf(fp, "????????.%lu:", path[i].lid );
else
fprintf(fp,"%08lX.%lu:", (ulong)keyid[1], path[i].lid );
c = trust_letter(path[i].otrust);
if( c )
putc( c, fp );
else
fprintf( fp, "%02x", path[i].otrust );
putc('/', fp);
c = trust_letter(path[i].trust);
if( c )
putc( c, fp );
else
fprintf( fp, "%02x", path[i].trust );
putc(' ', fp);
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
putc(' ', fp);
putc('\"', fp);
print_utf8_string( fp, p, n > 40? 40:n );
putc('\"', fp);
m_free(p);
putc('\n', fp );
}
}
#endif
static void
print_default_uid( FILE *fp, ulong lid )
{
u32 keyid[2];
if( !keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid ) )
print_user_id( fp, "", keyid );
}
static void
print_uid_from_keyblock( FILE *fp, KBNODE keyblock, ulong urecno )
{
TRUSTREC urec;
KBNODE node;
byte uhash[20];
read_record( urecno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
PKT_user_id *uidpkt = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if( uidpkt->photo )
rmd160_hash_buffer( uhash, uidpkt->photo, uidpkt->photolen );
else
rmd160_hash_buffer( uhash, uidpkt->name, uidpkt->len );
if( !memcmp( uhash, urec.r.uid.namehash, 20 ) ) {
print_string( fp, uidpkt->name, uidpkt->len, ':' );
return;
}
}
}
fputs("[?]", fp );
}
static void
dump_tn_tree( FILE *fp, int level, TN tree )
{
TN kr, ur;
for( kr=tree; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
if( fp ) {
fprintf( fp, "%*s", level*4, "" );
fprintf( fp, "K%lu(ot=%d,val=%d) ", kr->lid,
kr->n.k.ownertrust,
kr->n.k.validity );
}
else {
tty_printf("%*s", level*4, "" );
tty_printf("K%lu(ot=%d,val=%d) ", kr->lid,
kr->n.k.ownertrust,
kr->n.k.validity );
}
print_default_uid( fp, kr->lid );
for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
if( fp ) {
fprintf(fp, "%*s ", level*4, "" );
fprintf(fp, "U%lu(mc=%d,fc=%d,val=%d)\n", ur->lid,
ur->n.u.marginal_count,
ur->n.u.fully_count,
ur->n.u.validity
);
}
else {
tty_printf("%*s ", level*4, "" );
tty_printf("U%lu(mc=%d,fc=%d,val=%d)\n", ur->lid,
ur->n.u.marginal_count,
ur->n.u.fully_count,
ur->n.u.validity
);
}
dump_tn_tree( fp, level+1, ur->list );
}
}
}
/****************
* Special version of dump_tn_tree, which prints it colon delimited.
* Format:
* level:keyid:type:recno:ot:val:mc:cc:name:
* With TYPE = U for a user ID
* K for a key
* The RECNO is either the one of the dir record or the one of the uid record.
* OT is the the usual trust letter and only availabel on K lines.
* VAL is the calcualted validity
* MC is the marginal trust counter and only available on U lines
* CC is the same for the complete count
* NAME ist the username and only printed on U lines
*/
static void
dump_tn_tree_with_colons( int level, TN tree )
{
TN kr, ur;
for( kr=tree; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
KBNODE kb = NULL;
u32 kid[2];
keyid_from_lid( kr->lid, kid );
get_keyblock_bylid( &kb, kr->lid );
printf( "%d:%08lX%08lX:K:%lu:%c:%c::::\n",
level, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], kr->lid,
trust_letter( kr->n.k.ownertrust ),
trust_letter( kr->n.k.validity ) );
for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
printf( "%d:%08lX%08lX:U:%lu::%c:%d:%d:",
level, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], ur->lid,
trust_letter( kr->n.u.validity ),
ur->n.u.marginal_count,
ur->n.u.fully_count );
print_uid_from_keyblock( stdout, kb, ur->lid );
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
dump_tn_tree_with_colons( level+1, ur->list );
}
release_kbnode( kb );
}
}
/***********************************************
************* trustdb maintenance ***********
***********************************************/
/****************
* Create or update shadow dir record and return the LID of the record
*/
static ulong
create_shadow_dir( PKT_signature *sig )
{
TRUSTREC sdir;
int rc;
/* first see whether we already have such a record */
rc = tdbio_search_sdir( sig->keyid, sig->pubkey_algo, &sdir );
if( rc && rc != -1 ) {
log_error("tdbio_search_sdir failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
tdbio_invalid();
}
if( rc == -1 ) { /* not found: create */
memset( &sdir, 0, sizeof sdir );
sdir.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
sdir.rectype= RECTYPE_SDIR;
sdir.r.sdir.lid = sdir.recnum;
sdir.r.sdir.keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
sdir.r.sdir.keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
sdir.r.sdir.pubkey_algo = sig->pubkey_algo;
write_record( &sdir );
}
return sdir.recnum;
}
static ulong
find_or_create_lid( PKT_signature *sig )
{
ulong lid;
lid = lid_from_keyid_no_sdir( sig->keyid );
if( !lid )
lid = create_shadow_dir( sig );
return lid;
}
/****************
* Check the validity of a key and calculate the keyflags
* keynode points to
* a node with a [sub]key. mainkid has the key ID of the primary key
* keyblock is the complete keyblock which is needed for signature
* checking. LID and PK is only used in verbose mode.
*/
static unsigned int
check_keybinding( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE keynode, u32 *mainkid,
ulong lid, PKT_public_key *pk )
{
KBNODE node;
int keybind_seen = 0;
int revoke_seen = 0;
unsigned int keyflags=0;
int is_main = (keynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY);
int rc;
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("check_keybinding: %08lX.%lu\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], lid );
if( is_main ) {
/* a primary key is always valid (user IDs are handled elsewhere)*/
keyflags = KEYF_CHECKED | KEYF_VALID;
}
for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
PKT_signature *sig;
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue; /* don't care about other packets */
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we only care about self-signatures */
if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 && !keybind_seen && !is_main ) {
/* check until we find a valid keybinding */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: Good subkey binding\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid );
keyflags |= KEYF_CHECKED | KEYF_VALID;
}
else {
log_info(_(
"key %08lX.%lu: Invalid subkey binding: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, g10_errstr(rc) );
keyflags |= KEYF_CHECKED;
keyflags &= ~KEYF_VALID;
}
keybind_seen = 1;
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 && !revoke_seen ) {
/* this is a key revocation certificate: check it */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: Valid key revocation\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk, NULL), lid );
keyflags |= KEYF_REVOKED;
}
else {
log_info(_(
"key %08lX.%lu: Invalid key revocation: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, g10_errstr(rc) );
}
revoke_seen = 1;
}
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 && !revoke_seen && !is_main ) {
/* this is a subkey revocation certificate: check it */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_(
"key %08lX.%lu: Valid subkey revocation\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid );
keyflags |= KEYF_REVOKED;
}
else {
log_info(_(
"key %08lX.%lu: Invalid subkey binding: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL), lid, g10_errstr(rc) );
}
revoke_seen = 1;
}
/* Hmmm: should we handle direct key signatures here? */
}
return keyflags;
}
static ulong
make_key_records( KBNODE keyblock, ulong lid, u32 *keyid, int *mainrev )
{
TRUSTREC *krecs, **kend, *k, *k2;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fprlen;
ulong keyrecno;
*mainrev = 0;
krecs = NULL; kend = &krecs;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
&& node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
continue;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
/* create the key record */
k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *k );
k->rectype = RECTYPE_KEY;
k->r.key.lid = lid;
k->r.key.pubkey_algo = pk->pubkey_algo;
k->r.key.fingerprint_len = fprlen;
memcpy(k->r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen );
k->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*kend = k;
kend = &k->next;
k->r.key.keyflags = check_keybinding( keyblock, node, keyid, lid, pk );
if( (k->r.key.keyflags & KEYF_REVOKED)
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
*mainrev = 1;
}
keyrecno = krecs? krecs->recnum : 0;
/* write the keylist and release the memory */
for( k = krecs; k ; k = k2 ) {
if( k->next )
k->r.key.next = k->next->recnum;
write_record( k );
k2 = k->next;
m_free( k );
}
return keyrecno;
}
/****************
* Check the validity of a user ID and calculate the uidflags
* keynode points to a node with a user ID.
* mainkid has the key ID of the primary key, keyblock is the complete
* keyblock which is needed for signature checking.
* Returns: The uid flags and the self-signature which is considered to
* be the most current.
*/
static unsigned int
check_uidsigs( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE keynode, u32 *mainkid, ulong lid,
PKT_signature **bestsig )
{
KBNODE node;
unsigned int uidflags = 0;
PKT_signature *sig;
PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL; /* the latest valid self signature */
int rc;
if( DBG_TRUST ) {
PKT_user_id *uid;
log_debug("check_uidsigs: %08lX.%lu \"",
(ulong)mainkid[1], lid );
assert(keynode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
uid = keynode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
print_string( log_stream(), uid->name, uid->len, '\"' );
fputs("\"\n", log_stream());
}
/* first we check only the selfsignatures */
for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue; /* don't care about other packets */
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */
if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) { /* regular self signature */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], lid, _("Good self-signature") );
uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED | UIDF_VALID;
if( !selfsig )
selfsig = sig; /* use the first valid sig */
else if( sig->timestamp > selfsig->timestamp
&& sig->sig_class >= selfsig->sig_class )
selfsig = sig; /* but this one is newer */
}
else {
log_info( "uid %08lX: %s: %s\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], _("Invalid self-signature"),
g10_errstr(rc) );
uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED;
}
}
}
/* and now check for revocations - we must do this after the
* self signature check because a self-signature which is newer
* than a revocation makes the revocation invalid.
* RFC2440 is quiet about tis but I feel this is reasonable for
* non-primary-key revocations. */
for( node=keynode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue; /* don't care about other packets */
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */
if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* cert revocation */
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
if( !rc && selfsig && selfsig->timestamp > sig->timestamp ) {
log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], lid,
_("Valid user ID revocation skipped "
"due to a newer self signature") );
}
else if( !rc ) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info( "uid %08lX.%lu: %s\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], lid, _("Valid user ID revocation") );
uidflags |= UIDF_CHECKED | UIDF_VALID | UIDF_REVOKED;
}
else {
log_info("uid %08lX: %s: %s\n",
(ulong)mainkid[1], _("Invalid user ID revocation"),
g10_errstr(rc) );
}
}
}
*bestsig = selfsig;
return uidflags;
}
static unsigned int
check_sig_record( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE signode,
ulong siglid, int sigidx, u32 *keyid, ulong lid,
u32 *r_expiretime, int *mod_down, int *mod_up )
{
PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
unsigned int sigflag = 0;
TRUSTREC tmp;
int revocation=0, expired=0, rc;
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("check_sig_record: %08lX.%lu %lu[%d]\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx );
*r_expiretime = 0;
if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) /* regular certification */
;
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) /* cert revocation */
revocation = 1;
else
return SIGF_CHECKED | SIGF_IGNORED;
read_record( siglid, &tmp, 0 );
if( tmp.rectype == RECTYPE_DIR ) {
/* the public key is in the trustdb: check sig */
rc = check_key_signature2( keyblock, signode, NULL,
r_expiretime, &expired );
if( !rc ) { /* valid signature */
if( opt.verbose )
log_info("sig %08lX.%lu/%lu[%d]/%08lX: %s\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx,
(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
revocation? _("Valid certificate revocation")
: _("Good certificate") );
sigflag |= SIGF_CHECKED | SIGF_VALID;
if( expired ) {
sigflag |= SIGF_EXPIRED;
/* We have to reset the expiretime, so that this signature
* does not get checked over and over due to the reached
* expiretime */
*r_expiretime = 0;
}
if( revocation ) {
sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
*mod_down = 1;
}
else
*mod_up = 1;
}
else if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
/* This may happen if the key is still in the trustdb
* but not available in the keystorage */
sigflag |= SIGF_NOPUBKEY;
*mod_down = 1;
if( revocation )
sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
}
else {
log_info("sig %08lX.%lu/%lu[%d]/%08lX: %s: %s\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], lid, siglid, sigidx,
(ulong)sig->keyid[1],
revocation? _("Invalid certificate revocation")
: _("Invalid certificate"),
g10_errstr(rc));
sigflag |= SIGF_CHECKED;
if( revocation ) {
sigflag |= SIGF_REVOKED;
*mod_down = 1;
}
}
}
else if( tmp.rectype == RECTYPE_SDIR ) {
/* better check that it is the right one */
if( tmp.r.sdir.keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0]
&& tmp.r.sdir.keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1]
&& (!tmp.r.sdir.pubkey_algo
|| tmp.r.sdir.pubkey_algo == sig->pubkey_algo ))
sigflag |= SIGF_NOPUBKEY;
else
log_error(_("sig record %lu[%d] points to wrong record.\n"),
siglid, sigidx );
}
else {
log_error(_("sig record %lu[%d] points to wrong record.\n"),
siglid, sigidx );
tdbio_invalid();
}
return sigflag;
}
/****************
* Make the sig records for the given uid record
* We don't set flags here or even check the signatures; this will
* happen latter.
*/
static ulong
make_sig_records( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode,
ulong lid, u32 *mainkid, u32 *min_expire,
int *mod_down, int *mod_up )
{
TRUSTREC *srecs, **s_end, *s=NULL, *s2;
KBNODE node;
PKT_signature *sig;
ulong sigrecno, siglid;
int i, sigidx = 0;
u32 expiretime;
srecs = NULL; s_end = &srecs;
for( node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break; /* ready */
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue; /* don't care about other packets */
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if( mainkid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && mainkid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we don't care about self-signatures here */
siglid = find_or_create_lid( sig );
/* smash dups */
/* FIXME: Here we have a problem:
* We can't distinguish between a certification and a certification
* revocation without looking at class of the signature - we have
* to see how we can store the sigclass in the sigrecord..
* Argg- I hope I can get rid of this ugly trustdb ASAP.
*/
for( s2 = s; s2 ; s2 = s2->next ) {
for(i=0; i < sigidx; i++ ) {
if( s2->r.sig.sig[i].lid == siglid )
goto leaveduptest;
}
}
for( s2 = srecs; s2 ; s2 = s2->next ) {
for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
if( s2->r.sig.sig[i].lid == siglid )
goto leaveduptest;
}
}
leaveduptest:
if( s2 ) {
log_info( "sig %08lX.%lu: %s\n", (ulong)mainkid[1], lid,
_("duplicated certificate - deleted") );
continue;
}
/* create the sig record */
if( !sigidx ) {
s = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s );
s->rectype = RECTYPE_SIG;
s->r.sig.lid = lid;
}
s->r.sig.sig[sigidx].lid = siglid;
s->r.sig.sig[sigidx].flag= check_sig_record( keyblock, node,
siglid, sigidx,
mainkid, lid, &expiretime,
mod_down, mod_up );
sigidx++;
if( sigidx == SIGS_PER_RECORD ) {
s->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*s_end = s;
s_end = &s->next;
sigidx = 0;
}
/* keep track of signers pk expire time */
if( expiretime && (!*min_expire || *min_expire > expiretime ) )
*min_expire = expiretime;
}
if( sigidx ) {
s->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*s_end = s;
s_end = &s->next;
}
sigrecno = srecs? srecs->recnum : 0;
/* write the keylist and release the memory */
for( s = srecs; s ; s = s2 ) {
if( s->next )
s->r.sig.next = s->next->recnum;
write_record( s );
s2 = s->next;
m_free( s );
}
return sigrecno;
}
/****************
* Make a preference record (or a list of them) according to the supplied
* signature.
* Returns: The record number of the first pref record.
*/
static ulong
make_pref_record( PKT_signature *sig, ulong lid )
{
static struct {
sigsubpkttype_t subpkttype;
int preftype;
} ptable[] = {
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, PREFTYPE_SYM },
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, PREFTYPE_HASH },
{ SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, PREFTYPE_COMPR },
{ 0, 0 }
};
TRUSTREC *precs, **p_end, *p=NULL, *p2;
ulong precno;
int k, idx=0;
const byte *s;
size_t n;
#if (ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD % 2) != 0
#error ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD must have an even value
#endif
precs = NULL; p_end = &precs;
for(k=0; ptable[k].subpkttype; k++ ) {
s = parse_sig_subpkt2( sig, ptable[k].subpkttype, &n );
if( !s )
continue;
for( ; n; n--, s++ ) {
if( !idx ) {
p = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *p );
p->rectype = RECTYPE_PREF;
p->r.pref.lid = lid;
}
p->r.pref.data[idx++] = ptable[k].preftype;
p->r.pref.data[idx++] = *s;
if( idx >= ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD ) {
p->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*p_end = p;
p_end = &p->next;
idx = 0;
}
}
}
if( idx ) {
p->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*p_end = p;
p_end = &p->next;
}
precno = precs? precs->recnum : 0;
/* write the precs and release the memory */
for( p = precs; p ; p = p2 ) {
if( p->next )
p->r.pref.next = p->next->recnum;
write_record( p );
p2 = p->next;
m_free( p );
}
return precno;
}
static ulong
make_uid_records( KBNODE keyblock, ulong lid, u32 *keyid, u32 *min_expire,
int *mod_down, int *mod_up )
{
TRUSTREC *urecs, **uend, *u, *u2;
KBNODE node;
PKT_user_id *uid;
byte uidhash[20];
ulong uidrecno;
urecs = NULL; uend = &urecs;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
PKT_signature *bestsig;
if( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if( uid->photo )
rmd160_hash_buffer( uidhash, uid->photo, uid->photolen );
else
rmd160_hash_buffer( uidhash, uid->name, uid->len );
/* create the uid record */
u = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *u );
u->rectype = RECTYPE_UID;
u->r.uid.lid = lid;
memcpy(u->r.uid.namehash, uidhash, 20 );
u->recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
*uend = u;
uend = &u->next;
u->r.uid.uidflags = check_uidsigs( keyblock, node, keyid,
lid, &bestsig );
if( (u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED)
&& (u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID) ) {
u->r.uid.prefrec = bestsig? make_pref_record( bestsig, lid ) : 0;
}
/* the next test is really bad because we should modify
* out modification timestamps only if we really have a change.
* But because we are deleting the uid records first it is somewhat
* difficult to track those changes. fixme */
if( !( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID )
|| ( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_REVOKED ) )
*mod_down=1;
else
*mod_up=1;
/* create the list of signatures */
u->r.uid.siglist = make_sig_records( keyblock, node,
lid, keyid, min_expire,
mod_down, mod_up );
}
uidrecno = urecs? urecs->recnum : 0;
/* write the uidlist and release the memory */
for( u = urecs; u ; u = u2 ) {
if( u->next )
u->r.uid.next = u->next->recnum;
write_record( u );
u2 = u->next;
m_free( u );
}
return uidrecno;
}
/****************
* Update all the info from the public keyblock.
* The key must already exist in the keydb.
*/
int
update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, int recheck, int *modified )
{
TRUSTREC drec;
int rc;
/* NOTE: We don't need recheck anymore, but this might chnage again in
* the future */
if( opt.dry_run )
return 0;
if( modified )
*modified = 0;
init_trustdb();
rc = get_dir_record( find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
->pkt->pkt.public_key, &drec );
if( rc )
return rc;
rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, &drec, 0, modified );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Same as update_trust_record, but this functions expects the dir record.
* On exit the dir record will reflect any changes made.
* With sigs_only set only foreign key signatures are checked.
*/
static int
do_update_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock, TRUSTREC *drec,
int sigs_only, int *modified )
{
PKT_public_key *primary_pk;
TRUSTREC krec, urec, prec, helprec;
int i, rc = 0;
u32 keyid[2]; /* keyid of primary key */
int mod_up = 0;
int mod_down = 0;
ulong recno, r2;
u32 expiretime;
primary_pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !primary_pk->local_id )
primary_pk->local_id = drec->recnum;
keyid_from_pk( primary_pk, keyid );
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("do_update_trust_record: %08lX.%lu\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], drec->recnum );
rc = tdbio_begin_transaction();
if( rc )
return rc;
/* delete the old stuff FIXME: implementend sigs_only */
for( recno=drec->r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
delete_record( recno );
}
drec->r.dir.keylist = 0;
for( recno=drec->r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = urec.r.uid.next ) {
read_record( recno, &urec, RECTYPE_UID );
for(r2=urec.r.uid.prefrec ; r2; r2 = prec.r.pref.next ) {
read_record( r2, &prec, RECTYPE_PREF );
delete_record( r2 );
}
for(r2=urec.r.uid.siglist ; r2; r2 = helprec.r.sig.next ) {
read_record( r2, &helprec, RECTYPE_SIG );
delete_record( r2 );
}
delete_record( recno );
}
drec->r.dir.uidlist = 0;
/* insert new stuff */
drec->r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_REVOKED;
drec->r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_NEWKEYS;
drec->r.dir.keylist = make_key_records( keyblock, drec->recnum, keyid, &i );
if( i ) /* primary key has been revoked */
drec->r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_REVOKED;
expiretime = 0;
drec->r.dir.uidlist = make_uid_records( keyblock, drec->recnum, keyid,
&expiretime, &mod_down, &mod_up );
if( rc )
rc = tdbio_cancel_transaction();
else {
if( modified && tdbio_is_dirty() )
*modified = 1;
drec->r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_CHECKED;
drec->r.dir.valcheck = 0;
drec->r.dir.checkat = expiretime;
write_record( drec );
tdbio_write_modify_stamp( mod_up, mod_down );
rc = tdbio_end_transaction();
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Insert a trust record into the TrustDB
* This function assumes that the record does not yet exist.
*/
int
insert_trust_record( KBNODE keyblock )
{
TRUSTREC dirrec;
TRUSTREC shadow;
KBNODE node;
int rc = 0;
PKT_public_key *pk;
if( opt.dry_run )
return 0;
init_trustdb();
pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( pk->local_id ) {
log_debug("insert_trust_record with pk->local_id=%lu (2)\n",
pk->local_id );
rc = update_trust_record( keyblock, 1, NULL );
return rc;
}
/* We have to look for a shadow dir record which must be reused
* as the dir record. */
rc = tdbio_search_sdir( pk->keyid, pk->pubkey_algo, &shadow );
if( rc && rc != -1 ) {
log_error(_("tdbio_search_dir failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
tdbio_invalid();
}
memset( &dirrec, 0, sizeof dirrec );
dirrec.rectype = RECTYPE_DIR;
if( !rc ) /* we have a shadow dir record - convert to dir record */
dirrec.recnum = shadow.recnum;
else
dirrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum();
dirrec.r.dir.lid = dirrec.recnum;
write_record( &dirrec );
/* put the LID into the keyblock */
pk->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
PKT_public_key *a_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
a_pk->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *a_sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
a_sig->local_id = dirrec.r.dir.lid;
}
}
/* mark tdb as modified upwards */
tdbio_write_modify_stamp( 1, 0 );
/* and put all the other stuff into the keydb */
rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, &dirrec, 0, NULL );
do_sync();
/* keep track of new keys */
if( !fresh_imported_keys )
fresh_imported_keys = new_lid_table();
ins_lid_table_item( fresh_imported_keys, pk->local_id, 0 );
if( ++fresh_imported_keys_count > FRESH_KEY_CHECK_THRESHOLD )
mark_fresh_keys();
return rc;
}
/****************
* Insert a trust record indentified by a PK into the TrustDB
*/
int
insert_trust_record_by_pk( PKT_public_key *pk )
{
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fingerlen;
int rc;
/* get the keyblock */
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
log_debug( "insert_trust_record_by_pk: keyblock not found: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc) );
}
else {
rc = insert_trust_record( keyblock );
if( !rc ) /* copy the LID into the PK */
pk->local_id = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
->pkt->pkt.public_key->local_id;
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Check one trust record. This function is called for every
* directory record which is to be checked. The supplied
* dir record is modified according to the performed actions.
* Currently we only do an update_trust_record.
*/
static int
check_trust_record( TRUSTREC *drec, int sigs_only )
{
KBNODE keyblock;
int modified, rc;
rc = get_keyblock_bylid( &keyblock, drec->recnum );
if( rc ) {
log_debug( "check_trust_record %lu: keyblock not found: %s\n",
drec->recnum, g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
rc = do_update_trust_record( keyblock, drec, sigs_only, &modified );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
return rc;
}
/****************
* Walk over the keyrings and create trustdb records for all keys
* which are not currently in the trustdb.
* It is intended to be used after a fast-import operation.
*/
void
update_trustdb()
{
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBPOS kbpos;
int rc;
if( opt.dry_run )
return;
init_trustdb();
rc = enum_keyblocks( 0, &kbpos, &keyblock );
if( !rc ) {
ulong count=0, err_count=0, new_count=0;
while( !(rc = enum_keyblocks( 1, &kbpos, &keyblock )) ) {
/*int modified;*/
TRUSTREC drec;
PKT_public_key *pk = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
->pkt->pkt.public_key;
rc = get_dir_record( pk, &drec );
if( rc == -1 ) { /* not in trustdb: insert */
rc = insert_trust_record( keyblock );
if( rc && !pk->local_id ) {
log_error(_("lid ?: insert failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(rc) );
err_count++;
}
else if( rc ) {
log_error(_("lid %lu: insert failed: %s\n"),
pk->local_id, g10_errstr(rc) );
err_count++;
}
else {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("lid %lu: inserted\n"), pk->local_id );
new_count++;
}
}
else if( rc ) {
log_error(_("error reading dir record: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
err_count++;
}
release_kbnode( keyblock ); keyblock = NULL;
if( !(++count % 100) )
log_info(_("%lu keys so far processed\n"), count);
}
log_info(_("%lu keys processed\n"), count);
if( err_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu keys with errors\n"), err_count);
if( new_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu keys inserted\n"), new_count);
}
if( rc && rc != -1 )
log_error(_("enumerate keyblocks failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
enum_keyblocks( 2, &kbpos, &keyblock ); /* close */
release_kbnode( keyblock );
}
/****************
* Do all required checks in the trustdb. This function walks over all
* records in the trustdb and does scheduled processing.
*/
void
check_trustdb( const char *username )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
ulong recnum;
ulong count=0, upd_count=0, err_count=0, skip_count=0, sigonly_count=0;
ulong current_time = make_timestamp();
if( username )
log_info("given user IDs ignored in check_trustdb\n");
init_trustdb();
for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) {
int sigs_only;
if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR )
continue; /* we only want the dir records */
if( count && !(count % 100) && !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("%lu keys so far processed\n"), count);
count++;
sigs_only = 0;
if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) )
;
else if( !rec.r.dir.checkat || rec.r.dir.checkat > current_time ) {
if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
skip_count++;
continue; /* not scheduled for checking */
}
sigs_only = 1; /* new public keys - check them */
sigonly_count++;
}
if( !rec.r.dir.keylist ) {
log_info(_("lid %lu: dir record w/o key - skipped\n"), recnum);
skip_count++;
continue;
}
check_trust_record( &rec, sigs_only );
}
log_info(_("%lu keys processed\n"), count);
if( sigonly_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu due to new pubkeys\n"), sigonly_count);
if( skip_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu keys skipped\n"), skip_count);
if( err_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu keys with errors\n"), err_count);
if( upd_count )
log_info(_("\t%lu keys updated\n"), upd_count);
}
/***********************************************
********* Trust calculation *****************
***********************************************/
/****************
* Find all certification paths of a given LID.
* Limit the search to MAX_DEPTH. stack is a helper variable which
* should have been allocated with size max_depth, stack[0] should
* be setup to the key we are investigating, so the minimal depth
* we should ever see in this function is 1.
* Returns: a new tree
* certchain_set must be a valid set or point to NULL; this function
* may modifiy it.
*
* Hmmm: add a fastscan mode which stops at valid validity nodes.
*/
static TN
build_cert_tree( ulong lid, int depth, int max_depth, TN helproot )
{
TRUSTREC dirrec;
TRUSTREC uidrec;
ulong uidrno;
TN keynode;
if( depth >= max_depth )
return NULL;
keynode = new_tn();
if( !helproot )
helproot = keynode;
keynode->lid = lid;
if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, lid, NULL ) ) {
/* this is an ultimately trusted key;
* which means that we have found the end of the chain:
* We do this here prior to reading the dir record
* because we don't really need the info from that record */
keynode->n.k.ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
keynode->n.k.buckstop = 1;
return keynode;
}
read_record( lid, &dirrec, 0 );
if( dirrec.rectype != RECTYPE_DIR ) {
if( dirrec.rectype != RECTYPE_SDIR )
log_debug("lid %lu, has rectype %d"
" - skipped\n", lid, dirrec.rectype );
m_free(keynode);
return NULL;
}
if( dirrec.r.dir.checkat && dirrec.r.dir.checkat <= make_timestamp() ) {
check_trust_record( &dirrec, 0 );
}
else if( (dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
check_trust_record( &dirrec, 1 );
}
keynode->n.k.ownertrust = dirrec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK;
/* loop over all user ids */
for( uidrno = dirrec.r.dir.uidlist; uidrno; uidrno = uidrec.r.uid.next ) {
TRUSTREC sigrec;
ulong sigrno;
TN uidnode = NULL;
read_record( uidrno, &uidrec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_CHECKED) )
continue; /* user id has not been checked */
if( !(uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID) )
continue; /* user id is not valid */
if( (uidrec.r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_REVOKED) )
continue; /* user id has been revoked */
/* loop over all signature records */
for(sigrno=uidrec.r.uid.siglist; sigrno; sigrno = sigrec.r.sig.next ) {
int i;
TN tn;
read_record( sigrno, &sigrec, RECTYPE_SIG );
for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
if( !sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid )
continue; /* skip deleted sigs */
if( !(sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_CHECKED) )
continue; /* skip unchecked signatures */
if( !(sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_VALID) )
continue; /* skip invalid signatures */
if( (sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_EXPIRED) )
continue; /* skip expired signatures */
if( (sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_REVOKED) )
continue; /* skip revoked signatures */
/* check for cycles */
for( tn=keynode; tn && tn->lid != sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid;
tn = tn->back )
;
if( tn )
continue; /* cycle found */
tn = build_cert_tree( sigrec.r.sig.sig[i].lid,
depth+1, max_depth, helproot );
if( !tn )
continue; /* cert chain too deep or error */
if( !uidnode ) {
uidnode = new_tn();
uidnode->back = keynode;
uidnode->lid = uidrno;
uidnode->is_uid = 1;
uidnode->next = keynode->list;
keynode->list = uidnode;
}
tn->back = uidnode;
tn->next = uidnode->list;
uidnode->list = tn;
if( tn->n.k.buckstop ) {
/* ultimately trusted key found:
* no need to check more signatures of this uid */
sigrec.r.sig.next = 0;
break;
}
}
} /* end loop over sig recs */
} /* end loop over user ids */
if( !keynode->list ) {
release_tn_tree( keynode );
keynode = NULL;
}
return keynode;
}
static void
upd_one_ownertrust( ulong lid, unsigned new_trust, unsigned *retflgs )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("upd_one_ownertrust of %lu from %u to %u\n",
lid, (unsigned)rec.r.dir.ownertrust, new_trust );
if( retflgs ) {
if( (new_trust & TRUST_MASK) > (rec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) )
*retflgs |= 16; /* modified up */
else
*retflgs |= 32; /* modified down */
}
/* we preserve the disabled state here */
if( (rec.r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust | TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
else
rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust & ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
write_record( &rec );
}
/****************
* Update the ownertrust in the complete tree.
*/
static void
propagate_ownertrust( TN kr, ulong lid, unsigned trust )
{
TN ur;
for( ; kr; kr = kr->next ) {
if( kr->lid == lid )
kr->n.k.ownertrust = trust;
for( ur=kr->list; ur; ur = ur->next )
propagate_ownertrust( ur->list, lid, trust );
}
}
/****************
* Calculate the validity of all keys in the tree and especially
* the one of the top key. If add_fnc is not NULL, it is used to
* ask for missing ownertrust values (but only if this will help
* us to increase the validity.
* add_fnc is expected to take the LID of the key under question
* and return a ownertrust value or an error: positive values
* are assumed to be the new ownertrust value; a 0 does mean no change,
* a -1 is a request to cancel this validation procedure, a -2 requests
* a listing of the sub-tree using the tty functions.
*
*
* Returns: 0 = okay
*/
static int
propagate_validity( TN root, TN node, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
{
TN kr, ur;
int max_validity = 0;
assert( !node->is_uid );
if( node->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
/* this is one of our keys */
assert( !node->list ); /* it should be a leaf */
node->n.k.validity = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
if( retflgs )
*retflgs |= 1; /* found a path to an ultimately trusted key */
return 0;
}
/* loop over all user ids */
for( ur=node->list; ur && max_validity <= TRUST_FULLY; ur = ur->next ) {
assert( ur->is_uid );
/* loop over all signators */
for(kr=ur->list; kr && max_validity <= TRUST_FULLY; kr = kr->next ) {
if( propagate_validity( root, kr, add_fnc, retflgs ) )
return -1; /* quit */
if( kr->n.k.validity == TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
ur->n.u.fully_count = opt.completes_needed;
}
else if( kr->n.k.validity == TRUST_FULLY ) {
if( add_fnc && !kr->n.k.ownertrust ) {
int rc;
if( retflgs )
*retflgs |= 2; /* found key with undefined ownertrust*/
do {
rc = add_fnc( kr->lid );
switch( rc ) {
case TRUST_NEVER:
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
case TRUST_FULLY:
propagate_ownertrust( root, kr->lid, rc );
upd_one_ownertrust( kr->lid, rc, retflgs );
if( retflgs )
*retflgs |= 4; /* changed */
break;
case -1:
return -1; /* cancel */
case -2:
dump_tn_tree( NULL, 0, kr );
tty_printf("\n");
break;
default:
break;
}
} while( rc == -2 );
}
if( kr->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY )
ur->n.u.fully_count++;
else if( kr->n.k.ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL )
ur->n.u.marginal_count++;
}
if( ur->n.u.fully_count >= opt.completes_needed
|| ur->n.u.marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
ur->n.u.validity = TRUST_FULLY;
else if( ur->n.u.fully_count || ur->n.u.marginal_count )
ur->n.u.validity = TRUST_MARGINAL;
if( ur->n.u.validity >= max_validity )
max_validity = ur->n.u.validity;
}
}
node->n.k.validity = max_validity;
return 0;
}
/****************
* Given the directory record of a key, check whether we can
* find a path to an ultimately trusted key. We do this by
* checking all key signatures up to a some depth.
*/
static int
verify_key( int max_depth, TRUSTREC *drec, const char *namehash,
int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
{
TN tree;
int keytrust;
int pv_result;
tree = build_cert_tree( drec->r.dir.lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, NULL );
if( !tree )
return TRUST_UNDEFINED;
pv_result = propagate_validity( tree, tree, add_fnc, retflgs );
if( namehash && tree->n.k.validity != TRUST_ULTIMATE ) {
/* find the matching user id.
* We don't do this here if the key is ultimately trusted; in
* this case there will be no lids for the user IDs and frankly
* it does not make sense to compare by the name if we do
* have the secret key.
* fixme: the way we handle this is too inefficient */
TN ur;
TRUSTREC rec;
keytrust = 0;
for( ur=tree->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
read_record( ur->lid, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( !memcmp( namehash, rec.r.uid.namehash, 20 ) ) {
keytrust = ur->n.u.validity;
break;
}
}
}
else
keytrust = tree->n.k.validity;
/* update the cached validity values */
if( !pv_result
&& keytrust >= TRUST_UNDEFINED
&& tdbio_db_matches_options()
&& ( !drec->r.dir.valcheck || drec->r.dir.validity != keytrust ) ) {
TN ur;
TRUSTREC rec;
for( ur=tree->list; ur; ur = ur->next ) {
read_record( ur->lid, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( rec.r.uid.validity != ur->n.u.validity ) {
rec.r.uid.validity = ur->n.u.validity;
write_record( &rec );
}
}
drec->r.dir.validity = tree->n.k.validity;
drec->r.dir.valcheck = make_timestamp();
write_record( drec );
do_sync();
}
release_tn_tree( tree );
return keytrust;
}
/****************
* we have the pubkey record and all needed informations are in the trustdb
* but nothing more is known.
*/
static int
do_check( TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *validity,
const char *namehash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
{
if( !dr->r.dir.keylist ) {
log_error(_("Ooops, no keys\n"));
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
if( !dr->r.dir.uidlist ) {
log_error(_("Ooops, no user IDs\n"));
return G10ERR_TRUSTDB;
}
if( retflgs )
*retflgs &= ~(16|32); /* reset the 2 special flags */
if( (dr->r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
*validity = 0; /* no need to check further */
else if( namehash ) {
/* Fixme: use a cache */
*validity = verify_key( opt.max_cert_depth, dr, namehash,
add_fnc, retflgs );
}
else if( !add_fnc
&& tdbio_db_matches_options()
/* FIXME, TODO: This comparision is WRONG ! */
&& dr->r.dir.valcheck
> tdbio_read_modify_stamp( (dr->r.dir.validity < TRUST_FULLY) )
&& dr->r.dir.validity )
*validity = dr->r.dir.validity;
else
*validity = verify_key( opt.max_cert_depth, dr, NULL,
add_fnc, retflgs );
if( !(*validity & TRUST_MASK) )
*validity = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
if( (dr->r.dir.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
*validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
if( dr->r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_REVOKED )
*validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
/* If we have changed some ownertrusts, set the trustdb timestamps
* and do a sync */
if( retflgs && (*retflgs & (16|32)) ) {
tdbio_write_modify_stamp( (*retflgs & 16), (*retflgs & 32) );
do_sync();
}
return 0;
}
/***********************************************
********* Change trustdb values **************
***********************************************/
int
update_ownertrust( ulong lid, unsigned new_trust )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
init_trustdb();
read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("update_ownertrust of %lu from %u to %u\n",
lid, (unsigned)rec.r.dir.ownertrust, new_trust );
rec.r.dir.ownertrust = new_trust;
write_record( &rec );
do_sync();
return 0;
}
int
clear_trust_checked_flag( PKT_public_key *pk )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
int rc;
if( opt.dry_run )
return 0;
init_trustdb();
rc = get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
if( rc )
return rc;
/* check whether they are already reset */
if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) && !rec.r.dir.valcheck )
return 0;
/* reset the flag */
rec.r.dir.dirflags &= ~DIRF_CHECKED;
rec.r.dir.valcheck = 0;
write_record( &rec );
do_sync();
return 0;
}
/***********************************************
********* Query trustdb values **************
***********************************************/
/****************
* This function simply looks for the key in the trustdb
* and makes sure that pk->local_id is set to the correct value.
* Return: 0 = found
* -1 = not found
* other = error
*/
int
query_trust_record( PKT_public_key *pk )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
init_trustdb();
return get_dir_record( pk, &rec );
}
/****************
* Get the trustlevel for this PK.
* Note: This does not ask any questions
* Returns: 0 okay of an errorcode
*
* It operates this way:
* locate the pk in the trustdb
* found:
* Do we have a valid cache record for it?
* yes: return trustlevel from cache
* no: make a cache record and all the other stuff
* not found:
* try to insert the pubkey into the trustdb and check again
*
* Problems: How do we get the complete keyblock to check that the
* cache record is actually valid? Think we need a clever
* cache in getkey.c to keep track of this stuff. Maybe it
* is not necessary to check this if we use a local pubring. Hmmmm.
*/
int
check_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned *r_trustlevel,
const byte *namehash, int (*add_fnc)(ulong), unsigned *retflgs )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
unsigned trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
int rc=0;
u32 cur_time;
u32 keyid[2];
init_trustdb();
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
/* get the pubkey record */
if( pk->local_id ) {
read_record( pk->local_id, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
}
else { /* no local_id: scan the trustdb */
if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec )) && rc != -1 ) {
log_error(_("check_trust: search dir record failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(rc));
return rc;
}
else if( rc == -1 && opt.dry_run )
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
else if( rc == -1 ) { /* not found - insert */
rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("key %08lX: insert trust record failed: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: inserted into trustdb\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
/* and re-read the dir record */
read_record( pk->local_id, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
}
}
cur_time = make_timestamp();
if( pk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: created in future "
"(time warp or clock problem)\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id );
if( !opt.ignore_time_conflict )
return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
}
if( !(rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_CHECKED) )
check_trust_record( &rec, 0 );
else if( rec.r.dir.checkat && rec.r.dir.checkat <= cur_time )
check_trust_record( &rec, 0 );
else if( (rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) )
check_trust_record( &rec, 1 );
if( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate <= cur_time ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX.%lu: expired at %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id,
asctimestamp( pk->expiredate) );
trustlevel = TRUST_EXPIRED;
}
else {
rc = do_check( &rec, &trustlevel, namehash, add_fnc, retflgs );
if( rc ) {
log_error(_("key %08lX.%lu: trust check failed: %s\n"),
(ulong)keyid[1], pk->local_id, g10_errstr(rc));
return rc;
}
}
/* is a subkey has been requested, we have to check its keyflags */
if( !rc ) {
TRUSTREC krec;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN] = {0}; /* to avoid compiler warnings */
size_t fprlen = 0;
ulong recno;
int kcount=0;
for( recno = rec.r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
if( ++kcount == 1 )
continue; /* skip the primary key */
if( kcount == 2 ) /* now we need the fingerprint */
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
if( krec.r.key.fingerprint_len == fprlen
&& !memcmp( krec.r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen ) ) {
/* found the subkey */
if( (krec.r.key.keyflags & KEYF_REVOKED) )
trustlevel |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
/* should we check for keybinding here??? */
/* Hmmm: Maybe this whole checking stuff should not go
* into the trustdb, but be done direct from the keyblock.
* Chnage this all when we add an abstarction layer around
* the way certificates are handled by different standards */
break;
}
}
}
leave:
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("check_trust() returns trustlevel %04x.\n", trustlevel);
*r_trustlevel = trustlevel;
return 0;
}
/****************
* scan the whole trustdb and mark all signature records whose keys
* are freshly imported.
*/
static void
mark_fresh_keys()
{
TRUSTREC dirrec, rec;
ulong recnum, lid;
int i;
memset( &dirrec, 0, sizeof dirrec );
for(recnum=0; !tdbio_read_record( recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ ) {
if( rec.rectype != RECTYPE_SIG )
continue;
/* if we have already have the dir record, we can check it now */
if( dirrec.recnum == rec.r.sig.lid
&& (dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) )
continue; /* flag is already set */
for(i=0; i < SIGS_PER_RECORD; i++ ) {
if( !(lid=rec.r.sig.sig[i].lid) )
continue; /* skip deleted sigs */
if( !(rec.r.sig.sig[i].flag & SIGF_CHECKED) )
continue; /* skip checked signatures */
if( qry_lid_table_flag( fresh_imported_keys, lid, NULL ) )
continue; /* not in the list of new keys */
read_record( rec.r.sig.lid, &dirrec, RECTYPE_DIR );
if( !(dirrec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_NEWKEYS) ) {
dirrec.r.dir.dirflags |= DIRF_NEWKEYS;
write_record( &dirrec );
}
break;
}
}
do_sync();
clear_lid_table( fresh_imported_keys );
fresh_imported_keys_count = 0;
}
int
query_trust_info( PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash )
{
unsigned trustlevel;
int c;
init_trustdb();
if( check_trust( pk, &trustlevel, namehash, NULL, NULL ) )
return '?';
if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED )
return 'd';
if( trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED )
return 'r';
c = trust_letter( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) );
if( !c )
c = '?';
return c;
}
/****************
* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given LID
*/
unsigned
get_ownertrust( ulong lid )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
init_trustdb();
read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
return rec.r.dir.ownertrust;
}
int
get_ownertrust_info( ulong lid )
{
unsigned otrust;
int c;
init_trustdb();
otrust = get_ownertrust( lid );
c = trust_letter( (otrust & TRUST_MASK) );
if( !c )
c = '?';
return c;
}
void
list_trust_path( const char *username )
{
int rc;
ulong lid;
TRUSTREC rec;
TN tree;
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
init_trustdb();
if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname(NULL, pk, username, NULL )) )
log_error(_("user '%s' not found: %s\n"), username, g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( (rc=tdbio_search_dir_bypk( pk, &rec )) && rc != -1 )
log_error(_("problem finding '%s' in trustdb: %s\n"),
username, g10_errstr(rc));
else if( rc == -1 ) {
log_info(_("user '%s' not in trustdb - inserting\n"), username);
rc = insert_trust_record_by_pk( pk );
if( rc )
log_error(_("failed to put '%s' into trustdb: %s\n"),
username, g10_errstr(rc));
else {
assert( pk->local_id );
}
}
lid = pk->local_id;
tree = build_cert_tree( lid, 0, opt.max_cert_depth, NULL );
if( tree )
propagate_validity( tree, tree, NULL, NULL );
if( opt.with_colons )
dump_tn_tree_with_colons( 0, tree );
else
dump_tn_tree( stdout, 0, tree );
/*printf("(alloced tns=%d max=%d)\n", alloced_tns, max_alloced_tns );*/
release_tn_tree( tree );
/*printf("Ownertrust=%c Validity=%c\n", get_ownertrust_info( lid ),
query_trust_info( pk, NULL ) ); */
free_public_key( pk );
}
/****************
* Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
* the given key. This function does not return the key itself or
* the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only
* certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
* are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
* value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
*
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
* Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
* so that it can free its context.
*
* Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
*/
int
enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
{
return -1;
#if 0
struct enum_cert_paths_ctx *ctx;
fixme: ..... tsl;
init_trustdb();
if( !lid ) { /* release the context */
if( *context ) {
FIXME: ........tsl2;
ctx = *context;
for(tsl = ctx->tsl_head; tsl; tsl = tsl2 ) {
tsl2 = tsl->next;
m_free( tsl );
}
*context = NULL;
}
return -1;
}
if( !*context ) {
FIXME .... *tmppath;
TRUSTREC rec;
if( !*lid )
return -1;
ctx = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *ctx );
*context = ctx;
/* collect the paths */
#if 0
read_record( *lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
tmppath = m_alloc_clear( (opt.max_cert_depth+1)* sizeof *tmppath );
tsl = NULL;
collect_paths( 0, opt.max_cert_depth, 1, &rec, tmppath, &tsl );
m_free( tmppath );
sort_tsl_list( &tsl );
#endif
/* setup the context */
ctx->tsl_head = tsl;
ctx->tsl = ctx->tsl_head;
ctx->idx = 0;
}
else
ctx = *context;
while( ctx->tsl && ctx->idx >= ctx->tsl->pathlen ) {
ctx->tsl = ctx->tsl->next;
ctx->idx = 0;
}
tsl = ctx->tsl;
if( !tsl )
return -1; /* eof */
if( ownertrust )
*ownertrust = tsl->path[ctx->idx].otrust;
if( validity )
*validity = tsl->path[ctx->idx].trust;
*lid = tsl->path[ctx->idx].lid;
ctx->idx++;
return ctx->idx-1;
#endif
}
/****************
* Print the current path
*/
void
enum_cert_paths_print( void **context, FILE *fp,
int refresh, ulong selected_lid )
{
return;
#if 0
struct enum_cert_paths_ctx *ctx;
FIXME......... tsl;
if( !*context )
return;
init_trustdb();
ctx = *context;
if( !ctx->tsl )
return;
tsl = ctx->tsl;
if( !fp )
fp = stderr;
if( refresh ) { /* update the ownertrust and if possible the validity */
int i;
int match = tdbio_db_matches_options();
for( i = 0; i < tsl->pathlen; i++ ) {
TRUSTREC rec;
read_record( tsl->path[i].lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
tsl->path[i].otrust = rec.r.dir.ownertrust;
/* update validity only if we have it in the cache
* calculation is too time consuming */
if( match && rec.r.dir.valcheck && rec.r.dir.validity ) {
tsl->path[i].trust = rec.r.dir.validity;
if( rec.r.dir.dirflags & DIRF_REVOKED )
tsl->path[i].trust = TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
}
}
}
print_path( tsl->pathlen, tsl->path, fp, selected_lid );
#endif
}
/*
* Return an allocated buffer with the preference values for
* the key with LID and the userid which is identified by the
* HAMEHASH or the first one if namehash is NULL. ret_n receives
* the length of the allocated buffer. Structure of the buffer is
* a repeated sequences of 2 bytes; where the first byte describes the
* type of the preference and the second one the value. The constants
* PREFTYPE_xxxx should be used to reference a type.
*/
byte *
get_pref_data( ulong lid, const byte *namehash, size_t *ret_n )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
ulong recno;
init_trustdb();
read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
for( recno=rec.r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = rec.r.uid.next ) {
read_record( recno, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( rec.r.uid.prefrec
&& ( !namehash || !memcmp(namehash, rec.r.uid.namehash, 20) )) {
byte *buf;
/* found the correct one or the first one */
read_record( rec.r.uid.prefrec, &rec, RECTYPE_PREF );
if( rec.r.pref.next )
log_info(_("WARNING: can't yet handle long pref records\n"));
buf = m_alloc( ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD );
memcpy( buf, rec.r.pref.data, ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD );
*ret_n = ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD;
return buf;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/****************
* Check whether the algorithm is in one of the pref records
*/
int
is_algo_in_prefs( ulong lid, int preftype, int algo )
{
TRUSTREC rec;
ulong recno;
int i;
byte *pref;
init_trustdb();
read_record( lid, &rec, RECTYPE_DIR );
for( recno=rec.r.dir.uidlist; recno; recno = rec.r.uid.next ) {
read_record( recno, &rec, RECTYPE_UID );
if( rec.r.uid.prefrec ) {
read_record( rec.r.uid.prefrec, &rec, RECTYPE_PREF );
if( rec.r.pref.next )
log_info(_("WARNING: can't yet handle long pref records\n"));
pref = rec.r.pref.data;
for(i=0; i+1 < ITEMS_PER_PREF_RECORD; i+=2 ) {
if( pref[i] == preftype && pref[i+1] == algo )
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
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