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gnupg/g10/pkclist.c
David Shaw 92cefb688e * options.skel, options.h, main.h, keydb.h, pkclist.c (build_pk_list, 
expand_groups), g10.c (main, add_group): Add new "group" command to allow
one name to expand into multiple keys. For simplicity, and to avoid
potential loops, we only expand once - you can't make an alias that points
to an alias.

* main.h, g10.c (main), keygen.c (build_personal_digest_list): Simplify
the default digest list - there is really no need for the other hashes
since they will never be used after SHA-1 in the list.

* options.skel, options.h, g10.c (main), hkp.c (hkp_ask_import,
hkp_export, hkp_search), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options,
parse_keyserver_uri, keyserver_work, keyserver_refresh): Make the
"x-broken-hkp" keyserver scheme into keyserver-option "broken-http-proxy".
Move honor_http_proxy into keyserver_options.  Canonicalize the three
variations of "hkp", "x-hkp", and "x-broken-hkp" into "hkp".
2002-06-07 19:38:27 +00:00

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/* pkclist.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "memory.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "trustdb.h"
#include "ttyio.h"
#include "status.h"
#include "i18n.h"
#define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
/****************
* Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
*/
static void
do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
{
size_t n, nn;
const byte *p, *pp;
int seq = 0;
const char *text;
while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
&n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
if( !n )
continue; /* invalid - just skip it */
if( *p == 0 )
text = _("No reason specified");
else if( *p == 0x01 )
text = _("Key is superseded");
else if( *p == 0x02 )
text = _("Key has been compromised");
else if( *p == 0x03 )
text = _("Key is no longer used");
else if( *p == 0x20 )
text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
else
text = NULL;
log_info( _("reason for revocation: ") );
if( text )
fputs( text, log_stream() );
else
fprintf( log_stream(), "code=%02x", *p );
putc( '\n', log_stream() );
n--; p++;
pp = NULL;
do {
/* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
p++;
n--;
}
if( n ) {
pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
nn = pp? pp - p : n;
log_info( _("revocation comment: ") );
print_string( log_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
putc( '\n', log_stream() );
p += nn; n -= nn;
}
} while( pp );
}
}
/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
subkeys, etc.) Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */
void
show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
/* Hmmm, this is not so easy becuase we have to duplicate the code
* used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags. We need to find
* a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
* signatures. And there should be no duplicate code. Because we
* enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
* a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
* display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
* until we have a better solution. */
KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fingerlen;
int rc;
/* get the keyblock */
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
return;
}
for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
&& !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
break;
}
if( !node ) {
log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
release_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
/* now find the revocation certificate */
for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
break;
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
|| node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
/* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
break;
}
}
/* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
if(!node && !mode)
show_revocation_reason(pk,1);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
}
static void
show_paths (const PKT_public_key *pk, int only_first )
{
log_debug("not yet implemented\n");
#if 0
void *context = NULL;
unsigned otrust, validity;
int last_level, level;
last_level = 0;
while( (level=enum_cert_paths( &context, &lid, &otrust, &validity)) != -1){
char *p;
int c, rc;
size_t n;
u32 keyid[2];
PKT_public_key *pk ;
if( level < last_level && only_first )
break;
last_level = level;
rc = keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid );
if( rc ) {
log_error("ooops: can't get keyid for lid %lu\n", lid);
return;
}
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
if( rc ) {
log_error("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n",
(ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
return;
}
tty_printf("%*s%4u%c/%08lX.%lu %s \"",
level*2, "",
nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], lid, datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
c = trust_letter(otrust);
if( c )
putchar( c );
else
printf( "%02x", otrust );
putchar('/');
c = trust_letter(validity);
if( c )
putchar( c );
else
printf( "%02x", validity );
putchar(' ');
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\"\n");
free_public_key( pk );
}
enum_cert_paths( &context, NULL, NULL, NULL ); /* release context */
#endif
tty_printf("\n");
}
/****************
* mode: 0 = standard
* 1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
* this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
* Returns:
* -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
* -1 = quit operation
* 0 = nothing changed
* 1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
*/
static int
do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
{
char *p;
size_t n;
u32 keyid[2];
int changed=0;
int quit=0;
int show=0;
int did_help=defer_help;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
for(;;) {
/* a string with valid answers */
const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
if( !did_help )
{
if( !mode )
{
tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to:\n"
"%4u%c/%08lX %s \""),
nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\"\n");
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
}
tty_printf (_(
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"));
tty_printf (_(" %d = Don't know\n"), 1);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
if (mode)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
tty_printf (_(" i = please show me more information\n") );
if( mode )
tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
else
{
tty_printf(_(" s = skip this key\n"));
tty_printf(_(" q = quit\n"));
}
tty_printf("\n");
did_help = 1;
}
if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
BUG();
p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
trim_spaces(p);
cpr_kill_prompt();
if( !*p )
did_help = 0;
else if( *p && p[1] )
;
else if( !p[1] && (*p >= '1' && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) )
{
unsigned int trust;
switch( *p )
{
case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER ; break;
case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY ; break;
case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
default: BUG();
}
if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
_("Do you really want to set this key"
" to ultimate trust? ")))
; /* no */
else
{
*new_trust = trust;
changed = 1;
break;
}
}
else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] )
{
tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
show = 1;
break;
}
else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) )
{
break ; /* back to the menu */
}
else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
{
break; /* skip */
}
else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
{
quit = 1;
break ; /* back to the menu */
}
m_free(p); p = NULL;
}
m_free(p);
return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
}
/*
* Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
* be a primary key).
* For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
*/
int
edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
{
unsigned int trust;
int no_help = 0;
for(;;)
{
switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
{
case -1: /* quit */
return -1;
case -2: /* show info */
show_paths(pk, 1);
no_help = 1;
break;
case 1: /* trust value set */
trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
}
/****************
* Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
* Returns: true if we trust.
*/
static int
do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int *trustlevel )
{
unsigned int trustmask = 0;
/* FIXME: get_pubkey_byname already checks the validity and won't
* return keys which are either expired or revoked - so these
* question here won't get triggered. We have to find a solution
* for this. It might make sense to have a function in getkey.c
* which does only the basic checks and returns even revoked and
* expired keys. This fnction could then also returhn a list of
* keys if the speicified name is ambiguous
*/
if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: key has been revoked!\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
if( opt.batch )
return 0; /* no */
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
_("Use this key anyway? ")) )
return 0; /* no */
trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
}
if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: subkey has been revoked!\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
if( opt.batch )
return 0;
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
_("Use this key anyway? ")) )
return 0;
trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
}
*trustlevel &= ~trustmask;
if( opt.always_trust) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info("No trust check due to --always-trust option\n");
return 1;
}
switch( (*trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("%08lX: key has expired\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 0; /* no */
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
*trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
log_info(_("%08lX: There is no indication that this key "
"really belongs to the owner\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_NEVER:
log_info(_("%08lX: We do NOT trust this key\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
log_info(
_("%08lX: It is not sure that this key really belongs to the owner\n"
"but it is accepted anyway\n"), (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 1; /* yes */
case TRUST_FULLY:
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the owner\n"));
return 1; /* yes */
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
return 1; /* yes */
}
return 1; /* yes */
}
/****************
* wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
* key anyway.
*/
static int
do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
int rc;
rc = do_we_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) && !rc )
return 0;
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) && !rc )
return 0;
if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
char *p;
u32 keyid[2];
size_t n;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\"\n");
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
tty_printf(_(
"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
"If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
"the next question with yes\n\n") );
if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
_("Use this key anyway? ")) )
rc = 1;
/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
* his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
*/
}
else if( opt.always_trust && !rc ) {
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
rc = 1;
}
return rc;
}
/****************
* Check whether we can trust this signature.
* Returns: Error if we shall not trust this signatures.
*/
int
check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
unsigned int trustlevel;
int rc=0;
if ( opt.always_trust)
{
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
goto leave;
}
rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
if (rc)
{ /* this should not happen */
log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n");
rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
log_info(_(" This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
}
else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
}
if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
{
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" a trusted signature!\n"));
log_info(_(" There is no indication that the "
"signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_NEVER:
/* currently we won't get that status */
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
log_info(_(" The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
break;
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
log_info(_(" It is not certain that the"
" signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_FULLY:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
}
leave:
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}
void
release_pk_list( PK_LIST pk_list )
{
PK_LIST pk_rover;
for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_rover ) {
pk_rover = pk_list->next;
free_public_key( pk_list->pk );
m_free( pk_list );
}
}
static int
key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
return 0;
return -1;
}
/****************
* Return a malloced string with a default reciepient if there is any
*/
static char *
default_recipient(void)
{
PKT_secret_key *sk;
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
size_t n;
char *p;
int i;
if( opt.def_recipient )
return m_strdup( opt.def_recipient );
if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
return NULL;
sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
i = get_seckey_byname( sk, NULL, 0 );
if( i ) {
free_secret_key( sk );
return NULL;
}
n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
fingerprint_from_sk( sk, fpr, &n );
free_secret_key( sk );
p = m_alloc( 2*n+3 );
*p++ = '0';
*p++ = 'x';
for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
p -= 2;
return p;
}
/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
static STRLIST
expand_groups(STRLIST input)
{
STRLIST output=NULL,rover;
struct groupitem *groups;
for(rover=input;rover;rover=rover->next)
{
for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
{
/* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
if(strcasecmp(groups->name,rover->d)==0)
{
STRLIST each;
/* maintain current utf8-ness */
for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
add_to_strlist(&output,each->d);
break;
}
}
/* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
if(!groups)
add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
}
return output;
}
int
build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
{
PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
int rc=0;
int any_recipients=0;
STRLIST rov,remusr;
char *def_rec = NULL;
if(opt.grouplist)
remusr=expand_groups(rcpts);
else
remusr=rcpts;
/* check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
* list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them) */
for( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next ) {
if( !(rov->flags & 1) )
any_recipients = 1;
else if( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) {
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = use;
if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL )) ) {
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
}
else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
* in the list */
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
rov->d);
}
else {
PK_LIST r;
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
}
else {
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
}
}
}
if( !any_recipients && !opt.batch ) { /* ask */
int have_def_rec;
char *answer=NULL;
def_rec = default_recipient();
have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
if( !have_def_rec )
tty_printf(_(
"You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));
for(;;) {
rc = 0;
m_free(answer);
if( have_def_rec ) {
answer = def_rec;
def_rec = NULL;
}
else {
answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
_("\nEnter the user ID. End with an empty line: "));
trim_spaces(answer);
cpr_kill_prompt();
}
if( !answer || !*answer ) {
m_free(answer);
break;
}
if( pk )
free_public_key( pk );
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = use;
rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, answer, NULL, NULL );
if( rc )
tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
if( have_def_rec ) {
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("skipped: public key "
"already set as default recipient\n") );
}
else {
PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
continue;
}
else {
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
tty_printf(_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
}
else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
* in the list */
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
}
else {
PK_LIST r;
char *p;
size_t n;
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
tty_printf("Added %4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
tty_printf("\"\n");
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
any_recipients = 1;
continue;
}
}
}
m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
have_def_rec = 0;
}
if( pk ) {
free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL;
}
}
else if( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient()) ) {
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = use;
rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL );
if( rc )
log_error(_("unknown default recipient `%s'\n"), def_rec );
else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
/* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
would have been used if it wasn't already there. It
doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
recipient or an encrypt-to. */
any_recipients = 1;
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
log_info(_("skipped: public key already set as default recipient\n"));
else {
PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
}
if( pk ) {
free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL;
}
m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
}
else {
any_recipients = 0;
for(; remusr; remusr = remusr->next ) {
if( (remusr->flags & 1) )
continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled */
pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
pk->req_usage = use;
if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, remusr->d, NULL, NULL )) ) {
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
remusr->d, strlen (remusr->d),
-1);
}
else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->namehash);
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"),
remusr->d);
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
remusr->d,
strlen (remusr->d),
-1);
}
else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
/* note: do_we_trust may have changed the trustlevel */
/* We have at least one valid recipient. It doesn't matters
* if this recipient is already present. */
any_recipients = 1;
/* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
* in the list */
if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
remusr->d);
}
else {
PK_LIST r;
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
r->next = pk_list;
r->mark = 0;
pk_list = r;
}
}
else { /* we don't trust this pk */
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
remusr->d,
strlen (remusr->d),
-1);
}
}
else {
free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
remusr->d,
strlen (remusr->d),
-1);
log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
}
}
}
if( !rc && !any_recipients ) {
log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
rc = G10ERR_NO_USER_ID;
}
if( rc )
release_pk_list( pk_list );
else
*ret_pk_list = pk_list;
if(opt.grouplist)
free_strlist(remusr);
return rc;
}
/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1). pgp7 mode
expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8), AES256
(9), and TWOFISH (10). For a true PGP key all of this is unneeded
as they are the only items present in the preferences subpacket,
but checking here covers the weird case of encrypting to a key that
had preferences from a different implementation which was then used
with PGP. I am not completely comfortable with this as the right
thing to do, as it slightly alters the list of what the user is
supposedly requesting. It is not against the RFC however, as the
preference chosen will never be one that the user didn't specify
somewhere ("The implementation may use any mechanism to pick an
algorithm in the intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix
such a broken preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
static int
algo_available( int preftype, int algo, void *hint )
{
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
if( opt.pgp6 && ( algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
return 0;
if( opt.pgp7 && (algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3 &&
algo != 7 && algo != 8 && algo != 9 && algo != 10) )
return 0;
return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
int bits=0;
if(hint)
bits=*(int *)hint;
if(bits && (bits != md_digest_length(algo)))
return 0;
if( (opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7 ) && ( algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
return 0;
return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
if ( ( opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7 ) && ( algo !=0 && algo != 1) )
return 0;
return !algo || algo == 1 || algo == 2;
}
else
return 0;
}
/****************
* Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
*/
int
select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, void *hint )
{
PK_LIST pkr;
u32 bits[8];
const prefitem_t *prefs;
int i, j;
int compr_hack=0;
int any;
if( !pk_list )
return -1;
memset( bits, ~0, 8 * sizeof *bits );
for( pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next ) {
u32 mask[8];
memset( mask, 0, 8 * sizeof *mask );
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
if( opt.pgp2 &&
pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys
with v3 selfsigs (rfc2440:12.1) if
--pgp2 mode is on. This doesn't
mean it's actually available, of
course. */
else
mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* 3DES is implicitly there for everyone else */
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
/* While I am including this code for completeness, note
that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
function will never even be called. Even if the hash
wasn't locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in
--pgp2 mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is
used anyway. -dms */
if( opt.pgp2 &&
pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* MD5 is there for v3 keys with v3
selfsigs when --pgp2 is on. */
else
mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* SHA1 is there for everyone else */
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
mask[0] |= (1<<0); /* Uncompressed is implicit */
if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
else
prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;
any = 0;
if( prefs ) {
for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
if( prefs[i].type == preftype ) {
mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1 << (prefs[i].value%32);
any = 1;
}
}
}
if( (!prefs || !any) && preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
mask[0] |= 3; /* asume no_compression and old pgp */
compr_hack = 1;
}
#if 0
log_debug("pref mask=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
(ulong)mask[7], (ulong)mask[6], (ulong)mask[5], (ulong)mask[4],
(ulong)mask[3], (ulong)mask[2], (ulong)mask[1], (ulong)mask[0]);
#endif
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
bits[i] &= mask[i];
#if 0
log_debug("pref bits=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
(ulong)bits[7], (ulong)bits[6], (ulong)bits[5], (ulong)bits[4],
(ulong)bits[3], (ulong)bits[2], (ulong)bits[1], (ulong)bits[0]);
#endif
}
/* usable algorithms are now in bits
* We now use the last key from pk_list to select
* the algorithm we want to use. there are no
* preferences for the last key, we select the one
* corresponding to first set bit.
*/
i = -1;
any = 0;
/* If we have personal prefs set, use them instead of the last key */
if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;
if( prefs ) {
for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ ) {
if( prefs[j].type == preftype ) {
if( (bits[prefs[j].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[j].value%32))) ) {
if( algo_available( preftype, prefs[j].value, hint ) ) {
any = 1;
i = prefs[j].value;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if( !prefs || !any ) {
for(j=0; j < 256; j++ )
if( (bits[j/32] & (1<<(j%32))) ) {
if( algo_available( preftype, j, hint ) ) {
i = j;
break;
}
}
}
#if 0
log_debug("prefs of type %d: selected %d\n", preftype, i );
#endif
if( compr_hack && !i ) {
/* selected no compression, but we should check whether
* algorithm 1 is also available (the ordering is not relevant
* in this case). */
if( bits[0] & (1<<1) )
i = 1; /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
}
/* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer
would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the
recipient requests it." RFC2440:13. If we settle on MD5, and
SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead. Of course, if the
user intentinally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
prefs), then we should do what they say. */
if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
i==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && (bits[0] & (1<<DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)))
{
i=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ )
if(opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].type==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].value==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
{
i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
break;
}
}
return i;
}
/*
* Select the MDC flag from the pk_list. We can only use MDC if all recipients
* support this feature
*/
int
select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
{
PK_LIST pkr;
if( !pk_list )
return 0;
for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next) {
int mdc;
if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->mdc_feature;
else
mdc = pkr->pk->mdc_feature;
if (!mdc)
return 0; /* at least one recipient does not support it */
}
return 1; /* can be used */
}
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