mirror of
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96 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
96 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
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* I noticed, that we sometimes have only 3 items in atrustrecord, but
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a next pointer ro more records - check wehther the reuse code really
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works. Maybe this is the reason for the "Hmmm puiblic key lost"
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* Update the keyring at ftp.ggug.de
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* expire date is not shown in --edit-key for subkeys.
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and prefs are not correctly listed for some keys???? (Brian)
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* support for mpi/powerpc split is still combined or whatever
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* add a note, that gettext 10.35 is needed (for gettext) - and install
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it on tobold.
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* use zlib 1.1.13 to avoid a bug with 13 bit windows
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but there are more problems with large files
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* FreeBSD:
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#define USE_DYNAMIC_LINKING
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#define HAVE_DL_DLOPEN
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and the ld option -export-dynamic.
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* clearsig: keep lineendings as they are. Remember that trailings
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blanks are not hashed.
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* Check revocation and expire stuff.
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* check preferences (cipher and compress)
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* OpenBSD: dynamic loading with dlopen works on OpenBSD, but:
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OpenBSD binaries are a.out, so every symbol begins with "_"
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* should we flush the getkey.c caches while doing an import?
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* The critical bit of signature subpackets is not yet supported; i.e.
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it is ignored.
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* We need a maintainence pass over the trustdb which flags
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signatures as expired if the key used to make the signature has
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expired. Maybe it is a good idea to store the exiration time
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in the key record of the trustdb.
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* write a tool to extract selected keys from a file.
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* new menu to delete signatures and list signature in menu
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* commandline controlled --edit-key with assumed save.
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* -rdynamic auf Solaris Problem
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* Replace the SIGUSR1 stuff by semaphores to avoid loss of a signal.
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* add test cases for invalid data (scrambled armor or other random data)
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* add some sanity checks to read_keyblock, so that we are sure that
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the minimal requirements are met (?)
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* decryption of message with multiple recipients does not work.
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* preferences of hash algorithms are not yet used.
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* rewrite --list-packets or put it into another tool.
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* Burn the buffers used by fopen(), or use read(2). Does this
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really make sense?
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* Change the buffering to a mbuf like scheme? Need it for PSST anyway.
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* add checking of armor trailers
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* remove all "Fixmes"
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* Change the internal represention of keyid into a struct which
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can also hold the localid and extend the localid to hold information
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of the subkey number because two subkeys may have the same keyid.
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* add an option to re-create a public key from a secret key; we
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can do this in trustdb.c:verify_own_keys.
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* signature verification is done duplicated on import: in import.c and
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tehn in trustdb.c too. Maybe we can use a flag to skip the actual
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verification process (this should work if we use the same keyblock,
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but I'm not sure how to accomplish that). Another way is to allow
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the import of bogus data and let trustdb mark these keys as invalid;
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I see an advantage in this that it may help to prevent a DoS on a
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keyserver by sending him a lot of bogus signatures which he has
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to check - Needs further investigation.
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* change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque
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* Is it okay to use gettext for the help system?
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* Add some stuff for DU cc
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* Use "user ID", "trustdb" and "WARNING".
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