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82146af85b
* g10/trustdb.c (tdb_check_trustdb_stale): avoid log_info() when
opt.quiet
--
gpg(1) says:
-q, --quiet
Try to be as quiet as possible.
While the mentions about the stale trustdb information are edifying,
they aren't necessary, and shouldn't be emitted when the user requests
--quiet.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
1990 lines
50 KiB
C
1990 lines
50 KiB
C
/* trustdb.c
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
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* 2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <regex.h>
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#endif /* !DISABLE_REGEX */
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#include "gpg.h"
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#include "status.h"
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#include "iobuf.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "tdbio.h"
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#include "trustdb.h"
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typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
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/*
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* Structure to keep track of keys, this is used as an array wherre
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* the item right after the last one has a keyblock set to NULL.
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* Maybe we can drop this thing and replace it by key_item
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*/
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struct key_array
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{
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KBNODE keyblock;
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};
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/* Control information for the trust DB. */
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static struct
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{
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int init;
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int level;
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char *dbname;
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int no_trustdb;
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} trustdb_args;
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/* Some globals. */
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static struct key_item *user_utk_list; /* temp. used to store --trusted-keys */
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static struct key_item *utk_list; /* all ultimately trusted keys */
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static int pending_check_trustdb;
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static int validate_keys (int interactive);
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/**********************************************
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************* some helpers *******************
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**********************************************/
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static struct key_item *
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new_key_item (void)
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{
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struct key_item *k;
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k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *k);
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return k;
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}
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static void
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release_key_items (struct key_item *k)
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{
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struct key_item *k2;
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for (; k; k = k2)
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{
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k2 = k->next;
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xfree (k->trust_regexp);
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xfree (k);
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}
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}
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/*
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* For fast keylook up we need a hash table. Each byte of a KeyIDs
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* should be distributed equally over the 256 possible values (except
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* for v3 keyIDs but we consider them as not important here). So we
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* can just use 10 bits to index a table of 1024 key items.
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* Possible optimization: Don not use key_items but other hash_table when the
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* duplicates lists gets too large.
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*/
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static KeyHashTable
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new_key_hash_table (void)
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{
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struct key_item **tbl;
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tbl = xmalloc_clear (1024 * sizeof *tbl);
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return tbl;
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}
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static void
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release_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl)
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{
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int i;
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if (!tbl)
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return;
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for (i=0; i < 1024; i++)
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release_key_items (tbl[i]);
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xfree (tbl);
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}
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/*
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* Returns: True if the keyID is in the given hash table
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*/
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static int
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test_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
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{
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struct key_item *k;
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for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
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if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Add a new key to the hash table. The key is identified by its key ID.
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*/
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static void
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add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
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{
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struct key_item *k, *kk;
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for (k = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)]; k; k = k->next)
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if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
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return; /* already in table */
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kk = new_key_item ();
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kk->kid[0] = kid[0];
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kk->kid[1] = kid[1];
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kk->next = tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)];
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tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk;
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}
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/*
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* Release a key_array
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*/
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static void
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release_key_array ( struct key_array *keys )
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{
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struct key_array *k;
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if (keys) {
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for (k=keys; k->keyblock; k++)
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release_kbnode (k->keyblock);
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xfree (keys);
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}
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}
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/*********************************************
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********** Initialization *****************
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*********************************************/
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/*
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* Used to register extra ultimately trusted keys - this has to be done
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* before initializing the validation module.
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* FIXME: Should be replaced by a function to add those keys to the trustdb.
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*/
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void
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tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid)
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{
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struct key_item *k;
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k = new_key_item ();
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k->kid[0] = keyid[0];
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k->kid[1] = keyid[1];
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k->next = user_utk_list;
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user_utk_list = k;
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}
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void
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tdb_register_trusted_key( const char *string )
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
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err = classify_user_id (string, &desc, 1);
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if (err || desc.mode != KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID )
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{
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log_error(_("'%s' is not a valid long keyID\n"), string );
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return;
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}
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register_trusted_keyid(desc.u.kid);
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}
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/*
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* Helper to add a key to the global list of ultimately trusted keys.
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* Retruns: true = inserted, false = already in in list.
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*/
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static int
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add_utk (u32 *kid)
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{
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struct key_item *k;
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for (k = utk_list; k; k = k->next)
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{
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if (k->kid[0] == kid[0] && k->kid[1] == kid[1])
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{
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return 0;
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}
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}
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k = new_key_item ();
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k->kid[0] = kid[0];
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k->kid[1] = kid[1];
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k->ownertrust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
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k->next = utk_list;
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utk_list = k;
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if( opt.verbose > 1 )
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log_info(_("key %s: accepted as trusted key\n"), keystr(kid));
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return 1;
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}
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/****************
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* Verify that all our secret keys are usable and put them into the utk_list.
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*/
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static void
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verify_own_keys(void)
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{
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TRUSTREC rec;
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ulong recnum;
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int rc;
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struct key_item *k;
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if (utk_list)
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return;
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/* scan the trustdb to find all ultimately trusted keys */
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for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
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{
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if ( rec.rectype == RECTYPE_TRUST
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&& (rec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
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{
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byte *fpr = rec.r.trust.fingerprint;
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int fprlen;
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u32 kid[2];
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/* Problem: We do only use fingerprints in the trustdb but
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* we need the keyID here to indetify the key; we can only
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* use that ugly hack to distinguish between 16 and 20
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* butes fpr - it does not work always so we better change
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* the whole validation code to only work with
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* fingerprints */
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fprlen = (!fpr[16] && !fpr[17] && !fpr[18] && !fpr[19])? 16:20;
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keyid_from_fingerprint (fpr, fprlen, kid);
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if (!add_utk (kid))
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log_info(_("key %s occurs more than once in the trustdb\n"),
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keystr(kid));
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}
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}
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/* Put any --trusted-key keys into the trustdb */
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for (k = user_utk_list; k; k = k->next)
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{
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if ( add_utk (k->kid) )
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{ /* not yet in trustDB as ultimately trusted */
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PKT_public_key pk;
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memset (&pk, 0, sizeof pk);
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rc = get_pubkey (&pk, k->kid);
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if (rc)
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log_info(_("key %s: no public key for trusted key - skipped\n"),
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keystr(k->kid));
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else
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{
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tdb_update_ownertrust (&pk,
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((tdb_get_ownertrust (&pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
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| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
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release_public_key_parts (&pk);
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}
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log_info (_("key %s marked as ultimately trusted\n"),keystr(k->kid));
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}
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}
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/* release the helper table table */
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release_key_items (user_utk_list);
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user_utk_list = NULL;
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return;
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}
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/*********************************************
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*********** TrustDB stuff *******************
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*********************************************/
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/*
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* Read a record but die if it does not exist
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*/
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static void
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read_record (ulong recno, TRUSTREC *rec, int rectype )
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{
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int rc = tdbio_read_record (recno, rec, rectype);
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if (rc)
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{
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log_error(_("trust record %lu, req type %d: read failed: %s\n"),
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recno, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
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tdbio_invalid();
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}
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if (rectype != rec->rectype)
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{
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log_error(_("trust record %lu is not of requested type %d\n"),
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rec->recnum, rectype);
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tdbio_invalid();
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}
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}
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/*
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* Write a record and die on error
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*/
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static void
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write_record (TRUSTREC *rec)
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{
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int rc = tdbio_write_record (rec);
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if (rc)
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{
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log_error(_("trust record %lu, type %d: write failed: %s\n"),
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rec->recnum, rec->rectype, gpg_strerror (rc) );
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tdbio_invalid();
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}
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}
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/*
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* sync the TrustDb and die on error
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*/
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static void
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do_sync(void)
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{
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int rc = tdbio_sync ();
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if(rc)
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{
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log_error (_("trustdb: sync failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) );
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g10_exit(2);
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}
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}
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static const char *
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trust_model_string(void)
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{
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switch(opt.trust_model)
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{
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case TM_CLASSIC: return "classic";
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case TM_PGP: return "PGP";
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case TM_EXTERNAL: return "external";
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case TM_ALWAYS: return "always";
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case TM_DIRECT: return "direct";
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default: return "unknown";
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}
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}
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/****************
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* Perform some checks over the trustdb
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* level 0: only open the db
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* 1: used for initial program startup
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*/
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int
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setup_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
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{
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/* just store the args */
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if( trustdb_args.init )
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return 0;
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trustdb_args.level = level;
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trustdb_args.dbname = dbname? xstrdup(dbname): NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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void
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how_to_fix_the_trustdb ()
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{
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const char *name = trustdb_args.dbname;
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if (!name)
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name = "trustdb.gpg";
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log_info (_("You may try to re-create the trustdb using the commands:\n"));
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log_info (" cd %s\n", default_homedir ());
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log_info (" gpg2 --export-ownertrust > otrust.tmp\n");
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#ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM
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log_info (" del %s\n", name);
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#else
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log_info (" rm %s\n", name);
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#endif
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log_info (" gpg2 --import-ownertrust < otrust.tmp\n");
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log_info (_("If that does not work, please consult the manual\n"));
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}
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void
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init_trustdb ()
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{
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int level = trustdb_args.level;
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const char* dbname = trustdb_args.dbname;
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if( trustdb_args.init )
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return;
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trustdb_args.init = 1;
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if(level==0 || level==1)
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{
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int rc = tdbio_set_dbname( dbname, !!level, &trustdb_args.no_trustdb);
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if( rc )
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log_fatal("can't init trustdb: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
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}
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else
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BUG();
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if(opt.trust_model==TM_AUTO)
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{
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/* Try and set the trust model off of whatever the trustdb says
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it is. */
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opt.trust_model=tdbio_read_model();
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/* Sanity check this ;) */
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if(opt.trust_model!=TM_CLASSIC
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&& opt.trust_model!=TM_PGP
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&& opt.trust_model!=TM_EXTERNAL)
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{
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log_info(_("unable to use unknown trust model (%d) - "
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"assuming %s trust model\n"),opt.trust_model,"PGP");
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opt.trust_model=TM_PGP;
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}
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if(opt.verbose)
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log_info(_("using %s trust model\n"),trust_model_string());
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}
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if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
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{
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/* Verify the list of ultimately trusted keys and move the
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--trusted-keys list there as well. */
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if(level==1)
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verify_own_keys();
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if(!tdbio_db_matches_options())
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pending_check_trustdb=1;
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}
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}
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/****************
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* Recreate the WoT but do not ask for new ownertrusts. Special
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* feature: In batch mode and without a forced yes, this is only done
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* when a check is due. This can be used to run the check from a crontab
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*/
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void
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check_trustdb ()
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{
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init_trustdb();
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if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
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{
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if (opt.batch && !opt.answer_yes)
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{
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ulong scheduled;
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scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
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if (!scheduled)
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{
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log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check\n"));
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return;
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}
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if (scheduled > make_timestamp ())
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{
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log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
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strtimestamp (scheduled));
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return;
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}
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}
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validate_keys (0);
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}
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else
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log_info (_("no need for a trustdb check with '%s' trust model\n"),
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trust_model_string());
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}
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/*
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* Recreate the WoT.
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*/
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void
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update_trustdb()
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{
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init_trustdb();
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if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
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validate_keys (1);
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else
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log_info (_("no need for a trustdb update with '%s' trust model\n"),
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trust_model_string());
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}
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void
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tdb_revalidation_mark (void)
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{
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init_trustdb();
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if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
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return;
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/* We simply set the time for the next check to 1 (far back in 1970)
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so that a --update-trustdb will be scheduled. */
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if (tdbio_write_nextcheck (1))
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do_sync ();
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pending_check_trustdb = 1;
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}
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int
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trustdb_pending_check(void)
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{
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return pending_check_trustdb;
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}
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/* If the trustdb is dirty, and we're interactive, update it.
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Otherwise, check it unless no-auto-check-trustdb is set. */
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void
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tdb_check_or_update (void)
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{
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if(trustdb_pending_check())
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{
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if(opt.interactive)
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update_trustdb();
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else if(!opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
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check_trustdb();
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||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void
|
||
read_trust_options(byte *trust_model,ulong *created,ulong *nextcheck,
|
||
byte *marginals,byte *completes,byte *cert_depth,
|
||
byte *min_cert_level)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC opts;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb();
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
memset (&opts, 0, sizeof opts);
|
||
else
|
||
read_record (0, &opts, RECTYPE_VER);
|
||
|
||
if(trust_model)
|
||
*trust_model=opts.r.ver.trust_model;
|
||
if(created)
|
||
*created=opts.r.ver.created;
|
||
if(nextcheck)
|
||
*nextcheck=opts.r.ver.nextcheck;
|
||
if(marginals)
|
||
*marginals=opts.r.ver.marginals;
|
||
if(completes)
|
||
*completes=opts.r.ver.completes;
|
||
if(cert_depth)
|
||
*cert_depth=opts.r.ver.cert_depth;
|
||
if(min_cert_level)
|
||
*min_cert_level=opts.r.ver.min_cert_level;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/***********************************************
|
||
*********** Ownertrust et al. ****************
|
||
***********************************************/
|
||
|
||
static int
|
||
read_trust_record (PKT_public_key *pk, TRUSTREC *rec)
|
||
{
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb();
|
||
rc = tdbio_search_trust_bypk (pk, rec);
|
||
if (rc == -1)
|
||
return -1; /* no record yet */
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("trustdb: searching trust record failed: %s\n",
|
||
gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
return rc;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (rec->rectype != RECTYPE_TRUST)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("trustdb: record %lu is not a trust record\n",
|
||
rec->recnum);
|
||
return GPG_ERR_TRUSTDB;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/****************
|
||
* Return the assigned ownertrust value for the given public key.
|
||
* The key should be the primary key.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int
|
||
tdb_get_ownertrust ( PKT_public_key *pk)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
|
||
if (rc == -1)
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
return rc; /* actually never reached */
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return rec.r.trust.ownertrust;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
unsigned int
|
||
tdb_get_min_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
|
||
if (rc == -1)
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN; /* no record yet */
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
return rc; /* actually never reached */
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Set the trust value of the given public key to the new value.
|
||
* The key should be a primary one.
|
||
*/
|
||
void
|
||
tdb_update_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int new_trust )
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return;
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("update ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust, new_trust );
|
||
if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust != new_trust)
|
||
{
|
||
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
|
||
write_record( &rec );
|
||
tdb_revalidation_mark ();
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else if (rc == -1)
|
||
{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
|
||
size_t dummy;
|
||
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("insert ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
|
||
|
||
memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
|
||
rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
|
||
rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
|
||
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
|
||
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = new_trust;
|
||
write_record (&rec);
|
||
tdb_revalidation_mark ();
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
rc = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static void
|
||
update_min_ownertrust (u32 *kid, unsigned int new_trust )
|
||
{
|
||
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return;
|
||
|
||
pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
|
||
rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error(_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),keystr(kid),gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("key %08lX%08lX: update min_ownertrust from %u to %u\n",
|
||
(ulong)kid[0],(ulong)kid[1],
|
||
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust,
|
||
new_trust );
|
||
if (rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust != new_trust)
|
||
{
|
||
rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
|
||
write_record( &rec );
|
||
tdb_revalidation_mark ();
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else if (rc == -1)
|
||
{ /* no record yet - create a new one */
|
||
size_t dummy;
|
||
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("insert min_ownertrust %u\n", new_trust );
|
||
|
||
memset (&rec, 0, sizeof rec);
|
||
rec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
|
||
rec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
|
||
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, rec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
|
||
rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = new_trust;
|
||
write_record (&rec);
|
||
tdb_revalidation_mark ();
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
rc = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Clear the ownertrust and min_ownertrust values. Return true if a
|
||
change actually happened. */
|
||
int
|
||
tdb_clear_ownertrusts (PKT_public_key *pk)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb ();
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return 0;
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &rec);
|
||
if (!rc)
|
||
{
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
{
|
||
log_debug ("clearing ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.ownertrust);
|
||
log_debug ("clearing min_ownertrust (old value %u)\n",
|
||
(unsigned int)rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust);
|
||
}
|
||
if (rec.r.trust.ownertrust || rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
|
||
{
|
||
rec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
|
||
rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust = 0;
|
||
write_record( &rec );
|
||
tdb_revalidation_mark ();
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
return 1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else if (rc != -1)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
}
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Note: Caller has to do a sync
|
||
*/
|
||
static void
|
||
update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
|
||
int depth, int validity)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
ulong recno;
|
||
|
||
namehash_from_uid(uid);
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
|
||
if (rc && rc != -1)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
if (rc == -1) /* no record yet - create a new one */
|
||
{
|
||
size_t dummy;
|
||
|
||
rc = 0;
|
||
memset (&trec, 0, sizeof trec);
|
||
trec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
|
||
trec.rectype = RECTYPE_TRUST;
|
||
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, trec.r.trust.fingerprint, &dummy);
|
||
trec.r.trust.ownertrust = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* locate an existing one */
|
||
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
|
||
while (recno)
|
||
{
|
||
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
|
||
if ( !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
|
||
break;
|
||
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!recno) /* insert a new validity record */
|
||
{
|
||
memset (&vrec, 0, sizeof vrec);
|
||
vrec.recnum = tdbio_new_recnum ();
|
||
vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
|
||
memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
|
||
vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
|
||
trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
|
||
}
|
||
vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
|
||
vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
|
||
vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
|
||
write_record (&vrec);
|
||
trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
|
||
write_record (&trec);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/***********************************************
|
||
********* Query trustdb values **************
|
||
***********************************************/
|
||
|
||
/* Return true if key is disabled. Note that this is usually used via
|
||
the pk_is_disabled macro. */
|
||
int
|
||
tdb_cache_disabled_value (PKT_public_key *pk)
|
||
{
|
||
int rc;
|
||
TRUSTREC trec;
|
||
int disabled = 0;
|
||
|
||
if (pk->flags.disabled_valid)
|
||
return pk->flags.disabled;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb();
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
|
||
return 0; /* No trustdb => not disabled. */
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
|
||
if (rc && rc != -1)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
if (rc == -1) /* no record found, so assume not disabled */
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
|
||
if (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED)
|
||
disabled = 1;
|
||
|
||
/* Cache it for later so we don't need to look at the trustdb every
|
||
time */
|
||
pk->flags.disabled = disabled;
|
||
pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
|
||
|
||
leave:
|
||
return disabled;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
void
|
||
tdb_check_trustdb_stale (void)
|
||
{
|
||
static int did_nextcheck=0;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb ();
|
||
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb)
|
||
return; /* No trustdb => can't be stale. */
|
||
|
||
if (!did_nextcheck
|
||
&& (opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC))
|
||
{
|
||
ulong scheduled;
|
||
|
||
did_nextcheck = 1;
|
||
scheduled = tdbio_read_nextcheck ();
|
||
if ((scheduled && scheduled <= make_timestamp ())
|
||
|| pending_check_trustdb)
|
||
{
|
||
if (opt.no_auto_check_trustdb)
|
||
{
|
||
pending_check_trustdb = 1;
|
||
if (!opt.quiet)
|
||
log_info (_("please do a --check-trustdb\n"));
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
if (!opt.quiet)
|
||
log_info (_("checking the trustdb\n"));
|
||
validate_keys (0);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Return the validity information for PK. This is the core of
|
||
* get_validity.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int
|
||
tdb_get_validity_core (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
|
||
PKT_public_key *main_pk)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
ulong recno;
|
||
unsigned int validity;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb ();
|
||
|
||
/* If we have no trustdb (which also means it has not been created)
|
||
and the trust-model is always, we don't know the validity -
|
||
return immediately. If we won't do that the tdbio code would try
|
||
to open the trustdb and run into a fatal error. */
|
||
if (trustdb_args.no_trustdb && opt.trust_model == TM_ALWAYS)
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
|
||
|
||
check_trustdb_stale();
|
||
|
||
if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
|
||
{
|
||
/* Note that this happens BEFORE any user ID stuff is checked.
|
||
The direct trust model applies to keys as a whole. */
|
||
validity = tdb_get_ownertrust (main_pk);
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
|
||
if (rc && rc != -1)
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_invalid ();
|
||
return 0;
|
||
}
|
||
if (rc == -1) /* no record found */
|
||
{
|
||
validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* loop over all user IDs */
|
||
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
|
||
validity = 0;
|
||
while (recno)
|
||
{
|
||
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
|
||
|
||
if(uid)
|
||
{
|
||
/* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
|
||
user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then there
|
||
is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
|
||
signed). */
|
||
if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
|
||
{
|
||
validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
/* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity
|
||
over all user IDs */
|
||
if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
|
||
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
|
||
{
|
||
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
|
||
pk->flags.disabled = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
pk->flags.disabled = 0;
|
||
pk->flags.disabled_valid = 1;
|
||
|
||
leave:
|
||
if (pending_check_trustdb)
|
||
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_PENDING_CHECK;
|
||
|
||
return validity;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static void
|
||
get_validity_counts (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC trec, vrec;
|
||
ulong recno;
|
||
|
||
if(pk==NULL || uid==NULL)
|
||
BUG();
|
||
|
||
namehash_from_uid(uid);
|
||
|
||
uid->help_marginal_count=uid->help_full_count=0;
|
||
|
||
init_trustdb ();
|
||
|
||
if(read_trust_record (pk, &trec)!=0)
|
||
return;
|
||
|
||
/* loop over all user IDs */
|
||
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
|
||
while (recno)
|
||
{
|
||
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
|
||
|
||
if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
|
||
{
|
||
uid->help_marginal_count=vrec.r.valid.marginal_count;
|
||
uid->help_full_count=vrec.r.valid.full_count;
|
||
/* es_printf("Fetched marginal %d, full %d\n",uid->help_marginal_count,uid->help_full_count); */
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void
|
||
list_trust_path( const char *username )
|
||
{
|
||
(void)username;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/****************
|
||
* Enumerate all keys, which are needed to build all trust paths for
|
||
* the given key. This function does not return the key itself or
|
||
* the ultimate key (the last point in cerificate chain). Only
|
||
* certificate chains which ends up at an ultimately trusted key
|
||
* are listed. If ownertrust or validity is not NULL, the corresponding
|
||
* value for the returned LID is also returned in these variable(s).
|
||
*
|
||
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
|
||
* 2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function.
|
||
* Set lid to the key you want to enumerate and pass it by reference.
|
||
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
|
||
* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
|
||
* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
|
||
* so that it can free its context.
|
||
*
|
||
* Returns: -1 on EOF or the level of the returned LID
|
||
*/
|
||
int
|
||
enum_cert_paths( void **context, ulong *lid,
|
||
unsigned *ownertrust, unsigned *validity )
|
||
{
|
||
(void)context;
|
||
(void)lid;
|
||
(void)ownertrust;
|
||
(void)validity;
|
||
return -1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/****************
|
||
* Print the current path
|
||
*/
|
||
void
|
||
enum_cert_paths_print (void **context, FILE *fp,
|
||
int refresh, ulong selected_lid)
|
||
{
|
||
(void)context;
|
||
(void)fp;
|
||
(void)refresh;
|
||
(void)selected_lid;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
/****************************************
|
||
*********** NEW NEW NEW ****************
|
||
****************************************/
|
||
|
||
static int
|
||
ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid,int minimum)
|
||
{
|
||
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
int ot;
|
||
|
||
pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
|
||
rc = get_pubkey (pk, kid);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error (_("public key %s not found: %s\n"),
|
||
keystr(kid), gpg_strerror (rc) );
|
||
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if(opt.force_ownertrust)
|
||
{
|
||
log_info("force trust for key %s to %s\n",
|
||
keystr(kid),trust_value_to_string(opt.force_ownertrust));
|
||
tdb_update_ownertrust (pk, opt.force_ownertrust);
|
||
ot=opt.force_ownertrust;
|
||
}
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
ot=edit_ownertrust(pk,0);
|
||
if(ot>0)
|
||
ot = tdb_get_ownertrust (pk);
|
||
else if(ot==0)
|
||
ot = minimum?minimum:TRUST_UNDEFINED;
|
||
else
|
||
ot = -1; /* quit */
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
free_public_key( pk );
|
||
|
||
return ot;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static void
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
|
||
{
|
||
for ( ;node; node = node->next )
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
|
||
{
|
||
u32 aki[2];
|
||
|
||
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
|
||
add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static void
|
||
dump_key_array (int depth, struct key_array *keys)
|
||
{
|
||
struct key_array *kar;
|
||
|
||
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
|
||
{
|
||
KBNODE node = kar->keyblock;
|
||
u32 kid[2];
|
||
|
||
keyid_from_pk(node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
|
||
es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:K::%c::::\n",
|
||
depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1], '?');
|
||
|
||
for (; node; node = node->next)
|
||
{
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
||
{
|
||
int len = node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
|
||
|
||
if (len > 30)
|
||
len = 30;
|
||
es_printf ("%d:%08lX%08lX:U:::%c:::",
|
||
depth, (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1],
|
||
(node->flag & 4)? 'f':
|
||
(node->flag & 2)? 'm':
|
||
(node->flag & 1)? 'q':'-');
|
||
es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
||
len, ":", NULL);
|
||
es_putc (':', es_stdout);
|
||
es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static void
|
||
store_validation_status (int depth, KBNODE keyblock, KeyHashTable stored)
|
||
{
|
||
KBNODE node;
|
||
int status;
|
||
int any = 0;
|
||
|
||
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
|
||
{
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
||
{
|
||
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
||
if (node->flag & 4)
|
||
status = TRUST_FULLY;
|
||
else if (node->flag & 2)
|
||
status = TRUST_MARGINAL;
|
||
else if (node->flag & 1)
|
||
status = TRUST_UNDEFINED;
|
||
else
|
||
status = 0;
|
||
|
||
if (status)
|
||
{
|
||
update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
|
||
uid, depth, status);
|
||
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen(stored,keyblock);
|
||
|
||
any = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (any)
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/* Returns a sanitized copy of the regexp (which might be "", but not
|
||
NULL). */
|
||
#ifndef DISABLE_REGEX
|
||
static char *
|
||
sanitize_regexp(const char *old)
|
||
{
|
||
size_t start=0,len=strlen(old),idx=0;
|
||
int escaped=0,standard_bracket=0;
|
||
char *new=xmalloc((len*2)+1); /* enough to \-escape everything if we
|
||
have to */
|
||
|
||
/* There are basically two commonly-used regexps here. GPG and most
|
||
versions of PGP use "<[^>]+[@.]example\.com>$" and PGP (9)
|
||
command line uses "example.com" (i.e. whatever the user specfies,
|
||
and we can't expect users know to use "\." instead of "."). So
|
||
here are the rules: we're allowed to start with "<[^>]+[@.]" and
|
||
end with ">$" or start and end with nothing. In between, the
|
||
only legal regex character is ".", and everything else gets
|
||
escaped. Part of the gotcha here is that some regex packages
|
||
allow more than RFC-4880 requires. For example, 4880 has no "{}"
|
||
operator, but GNU regex does. Commenting removes these operators
|
||
from consideration. A possible future enhancement is to use
|
||
commenting to effectively back off a given regex to the Henry
|
||
Spencer syntax in 4880. -dshaw */
|
||
|
||
/* Are we bracketed between "<[^>]+[@.]" and ">$" ? */
|
||
if(len>=12 && strncmp(old,"<[^>]+[@.]",10)==0
|
||
&& old[len-2]=='>' && old[len-1]=='$')
|
||
{
|
||
strcpy(new,"<[^>]+[@.]");
|
||
idx=strlen(new);
|
||
standard_bracket=1;
|
||
start+=10;
|
||
len-=2;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Walk the remaining characters and ensure that everything that is
|
||
left is not an operational regex character. */
|
||
for(;start<len;start++)
|
||
{
|
||
if(!escaped && old[start]=='\\')
|
||
escaped=1;
|
||
else if(!escaped && old[start]!='.')
|
||
new[idx++]='\\';
|
||
else
|
||
escaped=0;
|
||
|
||
new[idx++]=old[start];
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
new[idx]='\0';
|
||
|
||
/* Note that the (sub)string we look at might end with a bare "\".
|
||
If it does, leave it that way. If the regexp actually ended with
|
||
">$", then it was escaping the ">" and is fine. If the regexp
|
||
actually ended with the bare "\", then it's an illegal regexp and
|
||
regcomp should kick it out. */
|
||
|
||
if(standard_bracket)
|
||
strcat(new,">$");
|
||
|
||
return new;
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /*!DISABLE_REGEX*/
|
||
|
||
/* Used by validate_one_keyblock to confirm a regexp within a trust
|
||
signature. Returns 1 for match, and 0 for no match or regex
|
||
error. */
|
||
static int
|
||
check_regexp(const char *expr,const char *string)
|
||
{
|
||
#ifdef DISABLE_REGEX
|
||
(void)expr;
|
||
(void)string;
|
||
/* When DISABLE_REGEX is defined, assume all regexps do not
|
||
match. */
|
||
return 0;
|
||
#else
|
||
int ret;
|
||
char *regexp;
|
||
|
||
regexp=sanitize_regexp(expr);
|
||
|
||
#ifdef __riscos__
|
||
ret=riscos_check_regexp(expr, string, DBG_TRUST);
|
||
#else
|
||
{
|
||
regex_t pat;
|
||
|
||
ret=regcomp(&pat,regexp,REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB|REG_EXTENDED);
|
||
if(ret==0)
|
||
{
|
||
ret=regexec(&pat,string,0,NULL,0);
|
||
regfree(&pat);
|
||
ret=(ret==0);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
if(DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug("regexp '%s' ('%s') on '%s': %s\n",
|
||
regexp,expr,string,ret==0?"YES":"NO");
|
||
|
||
xfree(regexp);
|
||
|
||
return ret;
|
||
#endif
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Return true if the key is signed by one of the keys in the given
|
||
* key ID list. User IDs with a valid signature are marked by node
|
||
* flags as follows:
|
||
* flag bit 0: There is at least one signature
|
||
* 1: There is marginal confidence that this is a legitimate uid
|
||
* 2: There is full confidence that this is a legitimate uid.
|
||
* 8: Used for internal purposes.
|
||
* 9: Ditto (in mark_usable_uid_certs())
|
||
* 10: Ditto (ditto)
|
||
* This function assumes that all kbnode flags are cleared on entry.
|
||
*/
|
||
static int
|
||
validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
|
||
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
|
||
{
|
||
struct key_item *kr;
|
||
KBNODE node, uidnode=NULL;
|
||
PKT_user_id *uid=NULL;
|
||
PKT_public_key *pk = kb->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
||
u32 main_kid[2];
|
||
int issigned=0, any_signed = 0;
|
||
|
||
keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
|
||
for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
|
||
{
|
||
/* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
|
||
to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a
|
||
self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
|
||
intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
|
||
signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
|
||
even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
|
||
key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm
|
||
going with the latter. However, if the user ID was
|
||
explicitly revoked, or passively allowed to expire, that
|
||
should stop validity through the user ID until it is
|
||
resigned. -dshaw */
|
||
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|
||
&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
|
||
&& !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
|
||
{
|
||
if (uidnode && issigned)
|
||
{
|
||
if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
|
||
|| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 4;
|
||
else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 2;
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 1;
|
||
any_signed = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
uidnode = node;
|
||
uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
||
|
||
/* If the selfsig is going to expire... */
|
||
if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
|
||
*next_expire = uid->expiredate;
|
||
|
||
issigned = 0;
|
||
get_validity_counts(pk,uid);
|
||
mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
|
||
curtime, next_expire);
|
||
}
|
||
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
||
&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
|
||
{
|
||
/* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
|
||
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
||
|
||
kr = is_in_klist (klist, sig);
|
||
/* If the trust_regexp does not match, it's as if the sig
|
||
did not exist. This is safe for non-trust sigs as well
|
||
since we don't accept a regexp on the sig unless it's a
|
||
trust sig. */
|
||
if (kr && (!kr->trust_regexp
|
||
|| opt.trust_model != TM_PGP
|
||
|| (uidnode
|
||
&& check_regexp(kr->trust_regexp,
|
||
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name))))
|
||
{
|
||
/* Are we part of a trust sig chain? We always favor
|
||
the latest trust sig, rather than the greater or
|
||
lesser trust sig or value. I could make a decent
|
||
argument for any of these cases, but this seems to be
|
||
what PGP does, and I'd like to be compatible. -dms */
|
||
if (opt.trust_model == TM_PGP
|
||
&& sig->trust_depth
|
||
&& pk->trust_timestamp <= sig->timestamp)
|
||
{
|
||
unsigned char depth;
|
||
|
||
/* If the depth on the signature is less than the
|
||
chain currently has, then use the signature depth
|
||
so we don't increase the depth beyond what the
|
||
signer wanted. If the depth on the signature is
|
||
more than the chain currently has, then use the
|
||
chain depth so we use as much of the signature
|
||
depth as the chain will permit. An ultimately
|
||
trusted signature can restart the depth to
|
||
whatever level it likes. */
|
||
|
||
if (sig->trust_depth < kr->trust_depth
|
||
|| kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
|
||
depth = sig->trust_depth;
|
||
else
|
||
depth = kr->trust_depth;
|
||
|
||
if (depth)
|
||
{
|
||
if(DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("trust sig on %s, sig depth is %d,"
|
||
" kr depth is %d\n",
|
||
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
||
sig->trust_depth,
|
||
kr->trust_depth);
|
||
|
||
/* If we got here, we know that:
|
||
|
||
this is a trust sig.
|
||
|
||
it's a newer trust sig than any previous trust
|
||
sig on this key (not uid).
|
||
|
||
it is legal in that it was either generated by an
|
||
ultimate key, or a key that was part of a trust
|
||
chain, and the depth does not violate the
|
||
original trust sig.
|
||
|
||
if there is a regexp attached, it matched
|
||
successfully.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
if (DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug ("replacing trust value %d with %d and "
|
||
"depth %d with %d\n",
|
||
pk->trust_value,sig->trust_value,
|
||
pk->trust_depth,depth);
|
||
|
||
pk->trust_value = sig->trust_value;
|
||
pk->trust_depth = depth-1;
|
||
|
||
/* If the trust sig contains a regexp, record it
|
||
on the pk for the next round. */
|
||
if (sig->trust_regexp)
|
||
pk->trust_regexp = sig->trust_regexp;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
|
||
uid->help_full_count = opt.completes_needed;
|
||
else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
|
||
uid->help_full_count++;
|
||
else if (kr->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
|
||
uid->help_marginal_count++;
|
||
issigned = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (uidnode && issigned)
|
||
{
|
||
if (uid->help_full_count >= opt.completes_needed
|
||
|| uid->help_marginal_count >= opt.marginals_needed )
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 4;
|
||
else if (uid->help_full_count || uid->help_marginal_count)
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 2;
|
||
uidnode->flag |= 1;
|
||
any_signed = 1;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return any_signed;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
static int
|
||
search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid, PKT_user_id *dummy)
|
||
{
|
||
(void)dummy;
|
||
return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Scan all keys and return a key_array of all suitable keys from
|
||
* kllist. The caller has to pass keydb handle so that we don't use
|
||
* to create our own. Returns either a key_array or NULL in case of
|
||
* an error. No results found are indicated by an empty array.
|
||
* Caller hast to release the returned array.
|
||
*/
|
||
static struct key_array *
|
||
validate_key_list (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable full_trust,
|
||
struct key_item *klist, u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
|
||
{
|
||
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
|
||
struct key_array *keys = NULL;
|
||
size_t nkeys, maxkeys;
|
||
int rc;
|
||
KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC desc;
|
||
|
||
maxkeys = 1000;
|
||
keys = xmalloc ((maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
|
||
nkeys = 0;
|
||
|
||
rc = keydb_search_reset (hd);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("keydb_search_reset failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
xfree (keys);
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
memset (&desc, 0, sizeof desc);
|
||
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
|
||
desc.skipfnc = search_skipfnc;
|
||
desc.skipfncvalue = full_trust;
|
||
rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL);
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
|
||
{
|
||
keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
|
||
return keys;
|
||
}
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
xfree (keys);
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
desc.mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT; /* change mode */
|
||
do
|
||
{
|
||
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
||
|
||
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY)
|
||
continue;
|
||
|
||
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
|
||
if (rc)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
xfree (keys);
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
|
||
{
|
||
log_debug ("ooops: invalid pkttype %d encountered\n",
|
||
keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
|
||
dump_kbnode (keyblock);
|
||
release_kbnode(keyblock);
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* prepare the keyblock for further processing */
|
||
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
|
||
clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
|
||
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
||
if (pk->has_expired || pk->flags.revoked)
|
||
{
|
||
/* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
|
||
}
|
||
else if (validate_one_keyblock (keyblock, klist, curtime, next_expire))
|
||
{
|
||
KBNODE node;
|
||
|
||
if (pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= curtime
|
||
&& pk->expiredate < *next_expire)
|
||
*next_expire = pk->expiredate;
|
||
|
||
if (nkeys == maxkeys) {
|
||
maxkeys += 1000;
|
||
keys = xrealloc (keys, (maxkeys+1) * sizeof *keys);
|
||
}
|
||
keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
|
||
|
||
/* Optimization - if all uids are fully trusted, then we
|
||
never need to consider this key as a candidate again. */
|
||
|
||
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 4))
|
||
break;
|
||
|
||
if(node==NULL)
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
|
||
|
||
keyblock = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
release_kbnode (keyblock);
|
||
keyblock = NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
while (!(rc = keydb_search (hd, &desc, 1, NULL))
|
||
|| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY);
|
||
|
||
if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
xfree (keys);
|
||
return NULL;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
keys[nkeys].keyblock = NULL;
|
||
return keys;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Caller must sync */
|
||
static void
|
||
reset_trust_records(void)
|
||
{
|
||
TRUSTREC rec;
|
||
ulong recnum;
|
||
int count = 0, nreset = 0;
|
||
|
||
for (recnum=1; !tdbio_read_record (recnum, &rec, 0); recnum++ )
|
||
{
|
||
if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_TRUST)
|
||
{
|
||
count++;
|
||
if(rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust)
|
||
{
|
||
rec.r.trust.min_ownertrust=0;
|
||
write_record(&rec);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
}
|
||
else if(rec.rectype==RECTYPE_VALID
|
||
&& ((rec.r.valid.validity&TRUST_MASK)
|
||
|| rec.r.valid.marginal_count
|
||
|| rec.r.valid.full_count))
|
||
{
|
||
rec.r.valid.validity &= ~TRUST_MASK;
|
||
rec.r.valid.marginal_count=rec.r.valid.full_count=0;
|
||
nreset++;
|
||
write_record(&rec);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (opt.verbose)
|
||
log_info (_("%d keys processed (%d validity counts cleared)\n"),
|
||
count, nreset);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Run the key validation procedure.
|
||
*
|
||
* This works this way:
|
||
* Step 1: Find all ultimately trusted keys (UTK).
|
||
* mark them all as seen and put them into klist.
|
||
* Step 2: loop max_cert_times
|
||
* Step 3: if OWNERTRUST of any key in klist is undefined
|
||
* ask user to assign ownertrust
|
||
* Step 4: Loop over all keys in the keyDB which are not marked seen
|
||
* Step 5: if key is revoked or expired
|
||
* mark key as seen
|
||
* continue loop at Step 4
|
||
* Step 6: For each user ID of that key signed by a key in klist
|
||
* Calculate validity by counting trusted signatures.
|
||
* Set validity of user ID
|
||
* Step 7: If any signed user ID was found
|
||
* mark key as seen
|
||
* End Loop
|
||
* Step 8: Build a new klist from all fully trusted keys from step 6
|
||
* End Loop
|
||
* Ready
|
||
*
|
||
*/
|
||
static int
|
||
validate_keys (int interactive)
|
||
{
|
||
int rc = 0;
|
||
int quit=0;
|
||
struct key_item *klist = NULL;
|
||
struct key_item *k;
|
||
struct key_array *keys = NULL;
|
||
struct key_array *kar;
|
||
KEYDB_HANDLE kdb = NULL;
|
||
KBNODE node;
|
||
int depth;
|
||
int ot_unknown, ot_undefined, ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate;
|
||
KeyHashTable stored,used,full_trust;
|
||
u32 start_time, next_expire;
|
||
|
||
/* Make sure we have all sigs cached. TODO: This is going to
|
||
require some architectual re-thinking, as it is agonizingly slow.
|
||
Perhaps combine this with reset_trust_records(), or only check
|
||
the caches on keys that are actually involved in the web of
|
||
trust. */
|
||
keydb_rebuild_caches(0);
|
||
|
||
start_time = make_timestamp ();
|
||
next_expire = 0xffffffff; /* set next expire to the year 2106 */
|
||
stored = new_key_hash_table ();
|
||
used = new_key_hash_table ();
|
||
full_trust = new_key_hash_table ();
|
||
|
||
kdb = keydb_new ();
|
||
reset_trust_records();
|
||
|
||
/* Fixme: Instead of always building a UTK list, we could just build it
|
||
* here when needed */
|
||
if (!utk_list)
|
||
{
|
||
if (!opt.quiet)
|
||
log_info (_("no ultimately trusted keys found\n"));
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* mark all UTKs as used and fully_trusted and set validity to
|
||
ultimate */
|
||
for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
|
||
{
|
||
KBNODE keyblock;
|
||
PKT_public_key *pk;
|
||
|
||
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
|
||
if (!keyblock)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
|
||
" trusted key %s not found\n"), keystr(k->kid));
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (used, keyblock);
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (stored, keyblock);
|
||
mark_keyblock_seen (full_trust, keyblock);
|
||
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
|
||
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
|
||
{
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
||
update_validity (pk, node->pkt->pkt.user_id, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
|
||
}
|
||
if ( pk->expiredate && pk->expiredate >= start_time
|
||
&& pk->expiredate < next_expire)
|
||
next_expire = pk->expiredate;
|
||
|
||
release_kbnode (keyblock);
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
klist = utk_list;
|
||
|
||
log_info(_("%d marginal(s) needed, %d complete(s) needed, %s trust model\n"),
|
||
opt.marginals_needed,opt.completes_needed,trust_model_string());
|
||
|
||
for (depth=0; depth < opt.max_cert_depth; depth++)
|
||
{
|
||
int valids=0,key_count;
|
||
/* See whether we should assign ownertrust values to the keys in
|
||
klist. */
|
||
ot_unknown = ot_undefined = ot_never = 0;
|
||
ot_marginal = ot_full = ot_ultimate = 0;
|
||
for (k=klist; k; k = k->next)
|
||
{
|
||
int min=0;
|
||
|
||
/* 120 and 60 are as per RFC2440 */
|
||
if(k->trust_value>=120)
|
||
min=TRUST_FULLY;
|
||
else if(k->trust_value>=60)
|
||
min=TRUST_MARGINAL;
|
||
|
||
if(min!=k->min_ownertrust)
|
||
update_min_ownertrust(k->kid,min);
|
||
|
||
if (interactive && k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
|
||
{
|
||
k->ownertrust = ask_ownertrust (k->kid,min);
|
||
|
||
if (k->ownertrust == (unsigned int)(-1))
|
||
{
|
||
quit=1;
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* This can happen during transition from an old trustdb
|
||
before trust sigs. It can also happen if a user uses two
|
||
different versions of GnuPG or changes the --trust-model
|
||
setting. */
|
||
if(k->ownertrust<min)
|
||
{
|
||
if(DBG_TRUST)
|
||
log_debug("key %08lX%08lX:"
|
||
" overriding ownertrust '%s' with '%s'\n",
|
||
(ulong)k->kid[0],(ulong)k->kid[1],
|
||
trust_value_to_string(k->ownertrust),
|
||
trust_value_to_string(min));
|
||
|
||
k->ownertrust=min;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN)
|
||
ot_unknown++;
|
||
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED)
|
||
ot_undefined++;
|
||
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_NEVER)
|
||
ot_never++;
|
||
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_MARGINAL)
|
||
ot_marginal++;
|
||
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_FULLY)
|
||
ot_full++;
|
||
else if (k->ownertrust == TRUST_ULTIMATE)
|
||
ot_ultimate++;
|
||
|
||
valids++;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* Find all keys which are signed by a key in kdlist */
|
||
keys = validate_key_list (kdb, full_trust, klist,
|
||
start_time, &next_expire);
|
||
if (!keys)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error ("validate_key_list failed\n");
|
||
rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
|
||
goto leave;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
for (key_count=0, kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++, key_count++)
|
||
;
|
||
|
||
/* Store the calculated valididation status somewhere */
|
||
if (opt.verbose > 1)
|
||
dump_key_array (depth, keys);
|
||
|
||
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
|
||
store_validation_status (depth, kar->keyblock, stored);
|
||
|
||
log_info (_("depth: %d valid: %3d signed: %3d"
|
||
" trust: %d-, %dq, %dn, %dm, %df, %du\n"),
|
||
depth, valids, key_count, ot_unknown, ot_undefined,
|
||
ot_never, ot_marginal, ot_full, ot_ultimate );
|
||
|
||
/* Build a new kdlist from all fully valid keys in KEYS */
|
||
if (klist != utk_list)
|
||
release_key_items (klist);
|
||
klist = NULL;
|
||
for (kar=keys; kar->keyblock; kar++)
|
||
{
|
||
for (node=kar->keyblock; node; node = node->next)
|
||
{
|
||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && (node->flag & 4))
|
||
{
|
||
u32 kid[2];
|
||
|
||
/* have we used this key already? */
|
||
keyid_from_pk (kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
|
||
if(test_key_hash_table(used,kid)==0)
|
||
{
|
||
/* Normally we add both the primary and subkey
|
||
ids to the hash via mark_keyblock_seen, but
|
||
since we aren't using this hash as a skipfnc,
|
||
that doesn't matter here. */
|
||
add_key_hash_table (used,kid);
|
||
k = new_key_item ();
|
||
k->kid[0]=kid[0];
|
||
k->kid[1]=kid[1];
|
||
k->ownertrust =
|
||
(tdb_get_ownertrust
|
||
(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key) & TRUST_MASK);
|
||
k->min_ownertrust = tdb_get_min_ownertrust
|
||
(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key);
|
||
k->trust_depth=
|
||
kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_depth;
|
||
k->trust_value=
|
||
kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_value;
|
||
if(kar->keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->trust_regexp)
|
||
k->trust_regexp=
|
||
xstrdup(kar->keyblock->pkt->
|
||
pkt.public_key->trust_regexp);
|
||
k->next = klist;
|
||
klist = k;
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
release_key_array (keys);
|
||
keys = NULL;
|
||
if (!klist)
|
||
break; /* no need to dive in deeper */
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
leave:
|
||
keydb_release (kdb);
|
||
release_key_array (keys);
|
||
release_key_items (klist);
|
||
release_key_hash_table (full_trust);
|
||
release_key_hash_table (used);
|
||
release_key_hash_table (stored);
|
||
if (!rc && !quit) /* mark trustDB as checked */
|
||
{
|
||
if (next_expire == 0xffffffff || next_expire < start_time )
|
||
tdbio_write_nextcheck (0);
|
||
else
|
||
{
|
||
tdbio_write_nextcheck (next_expire);
|
||
log_info (_("next trustdb check due at %s\n"),
|
||
strtimestamp (next_expire));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if(tdbio_update_version_record()!=0)
|
||
{
|
||
log_error(_("unable to update trustdb version record: "
|
||
"write failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
|
||
tdbio_invalid();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
do_sync ();
|
||
pending_check_trustdb = 0;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return rc;
|
||
}
|