gnupg/TODO

  * Describe some pitfalls when using EGD.  Check that ~/.gnupg/entropy
    really is the default.  What about needed permission?  

  * Using an expired key for signing should give an error message
    "expired key"and not "unusable key'.  Furthermore the error should
    also be thrown when the defaultkey has expired.  Reported by
    Eric.VanBuggenhaut@AdValvas.be.

  * Update the manual pages and NEWS (David's new features)

  * update GPH

  * pause scrolling help in --edit-key and elsewhere.

  * getkey does not return revoked/expired keys - therefore it is not
    possible to override it.

  * Selection using +wordlist does not work.
    What about adding a feature -word to the +wordlist search mode.

  * add listing of notation data

  * Check the changes to the gpg random gatherer on all W32 platforms.

  * Put a note into readme.w32 that there is a man page and a options
    file;  write the registry stuff in regedit format.

  * Show more info does not work from edit->trust

  * set default charset from nl_langinfo.

  * Check that no secret temporary results are stored in the result parameter
    of the mpi functions.  We have already done this for mpi-mul.c 

  * We need another special packet at the end of a clearsign message to mark
    it's end and allow for multiple signature for one message.  And
    add a real grammar to the code in mainproc.c

  * option to set the signature expiration time for key sigs.
    Rework the way we create signature subpackets - the current code
    is not easy to understand.

  * Option to warn when a non MDC message is decrypted?

  * If there is no secure memory, allocate more memory for the secure
    memory block or do it in all cases.

  * add some minor things vor VMS.

  * Use DSA keys with the test suite (partly done)

  * Fix the bug in the mips assembler code

  * Add a way to show the fingerprint of an key signator's keys

  * Add an is_valid flag to each user ID.

  * Do not create a secring.gpg if it is not needed; I have fixed this
    sometime ago but it has later reappeared.

  * Check for consistent spelling of user ID, key ID etc.
    Replace "user id not found" in getkey.c by "no valid user ID found".
 
  * Replace the printing of the user name by [self-signature] when
    appropriate so that a key listing does not get clobbered.

  * Using --list-only to check for recipients while decrypting may
    yield an error about an unknown packet.

  * Check that the way we select cipher and digest algorithms w/o
    preferences is okay and make AES the default.

  * Concatenated encryption messages don't work corectly - only the
    first one is processed.

  * Add option to put the list of recipients (from the encryption
    layer) into the signatures notation data.

  * Allow to update key signatures.  It is also not possible to resign
    an already revoked key signature.

  * For FreeBSD only: spit out a message that rndcontrol (8) should be
    used to enable the use of IRQs for entropy gathering.

  * --passphrase-fd  can't work with -cs: document this or find a way
    to work around.

  * With option -i prompt before adding a key to the keyring and show some
    info what we are about to add.

  * --disable-asm should still assemble _udiv_qrnnd when needed

  * replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
    utility and SOCKSify this utility.
    [David is working on this]

  * Check the beginning of file to detect already compressed files (gzip,
    bzip2, xdelta and some picture formats)  [Timo has some code for this]

  * Get new assembler stuff from gmp 3.1

  * Use new-format headers for compressed packets.
    The advantage is that a garbled zip files can be better detected.
 
  * use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
    or better readline.

  * Print a warning if the directory mode is wrong.

  * preferences of hash algorithms are not yet used.

  * add test cases for invalid data (scrambled armor or other random data)

  * add checking of armor trailers

  * the pubkey encrypt functions should do some sanity checks.

  * "gpg filename.tar.gz.asc" should work like --verify (-sab).

  * for messages created with "-t", it might make sense to append the
    verification status of the message to the output (i.e. write something to
    the --output file and not only to stderr.

  * The user is asked for a revocation reasons even if this one can't
    be used with v3 keys.

  * keyflags don't distinguish between {certify,signature}-only.

  * Instead of issuing a "signature packet without keyid" gpg should
    try to get the keyID from a corresponding one-pass signature
    packet (See bug report 817).  This is not easy to do as we don't
    store the one-pass packets.



Things we won't do
------------------

  * New option --file-remove path-to-wipe-program ?