mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
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265 lines
8.7 KiB
C
265 lines
8.7 KiB
C
/* seckey-cert.c - Not anymore used
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
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* 2006, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#error Not anymore used - only kept for reference in the repository.
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "gpg.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "cipher.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "status.h"
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#include "pkglue.h"
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static int
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xxxx_do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
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int *canceled )
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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byte *buffer;
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u16 csum=0;
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int i, res;
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size_t nbytes;
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if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
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DEK *dek = NULL;
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u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
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gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd=NULL;
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PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
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if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
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log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
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return G10ERR_UNU_SECKEY;
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}
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if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
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BUG();
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if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
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log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
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sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
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if (sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
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{
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write_status (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA);
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idea_cipher_warn (0);
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}
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return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
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}
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if(gcry_md_test_algo (sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo))
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{
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log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"),
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sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo);
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return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO;
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}
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keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
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keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
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if (!sk->flags.primary)
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{
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keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
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keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
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}
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dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
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&sk->protect.s2k, mode,
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tryagain_text, canceled );
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if (!dek && canceled && *canceled)
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return GPG_ERR_CANCELED;
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err = openpgp_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo,
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GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
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(GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
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| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
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0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC)));
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if (err)
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log_fatal ("cipher open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) );
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err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
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if (err)
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log_fatal ("set key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err) );
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xfree(dek);
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save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
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gcry_cipher_setiv ( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
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csum = 0;
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if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
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int ndata;
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unsigned int ndatabits;
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byte *p, *data;
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u16 csumc = 0;
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i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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assert ( gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ));
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque ( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
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ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
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if ( ndata > 1 )
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csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
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data = xmalloc_secure ( ndata );
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gcry_cipher_decrypt ( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
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gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
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p = data;
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if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
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/* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
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tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
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attack */
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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if( ndata < 20 )
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log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
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else {
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gcry_md_hd_t h;
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if ( gcry_md_open (&h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1))
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BUG(); /* Algo not available. */
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gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
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gcry_md_final (h);
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if (!memcmp (gcry_md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
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data + ndata - 20, 20) )
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{
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/* Digest does match. We have to keep the old
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style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
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test used for unprotected keys does work.
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This test gets used when we are adding new
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keys. */
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sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
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}
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gcry_md_close (h);
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}
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}
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else {
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if( ndata < 2 ) {
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log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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}
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else {
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csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
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sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
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if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
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/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
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sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
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}
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}
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}
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/* Must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
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because the length may have an arbitrary value */
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if( sk->csum == csum ) {
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for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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if ( gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
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p, ndata, &nbytes))
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{
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/* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
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decrypted. */
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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break;
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}
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ndata -= nbytes;
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p += nbytes;
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}
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/* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
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checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
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}
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xfree(data);
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}
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else {
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for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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byte *p;
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size_t ndata;
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unsigned int ndatabits;
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assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (sk->skey[i], &ndatabits);
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ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
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assert (ndata >= 2);
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assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
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buffer = xmalloc_secure (ndata);
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gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
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buffer[0] = p[0];
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buffer[1] = p[1];
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gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, ndata-2,
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p+2, ndata-2);
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csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
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gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]);
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err = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
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buffer, ndata, &ndata );
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xfree (buffer);
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if (err)
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{
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/* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
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decrypted. */
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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break;
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}
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/* csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
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}
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}
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gcry_cipher_close ( cipher_hd );
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/* Now let's see whether we have used the correct passphrase. */
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if( csum != sk->csum ) {
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copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
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passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
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}
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/* The checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself. */
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res = pk_check_secret_key ( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
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if( res ) {
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copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
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passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, NULL, sk->pubkey_algo );
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
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}
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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sk->is_protected = 0;
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}
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else { /* not protected, assume it is okay if the checksum is okay */
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csum = 0;
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for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
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}
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if( csum != sk->csum )
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return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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