/* mainproc.c - handle packets * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, * 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "iobuf.h" #include "memory.h" #include "options.h" #include "util.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "filter.h" #include "main.h" #include "status.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "keyserver-internal.h" #include "photoid.h" struct kidlist_item { struct kidlist_item *next; u32 kid[2]; int pubkey_algo; int reason; }; /**************** * Structure to hold the context */ typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX; struct mainproc_context { struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* may be useful in the future */ PKT_public_key *last_pubkey; PKT_secret_key *last_seckey; PKT_user_id *last_user_id; md_filter_context_t mfx; int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */ int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */ STRLIST signed_data; const char *sigfilename; DEK *dek; int last_was_session_key; KBNODE list; /* the current list of packets */ int have_data; IOBUF iobuf; /* used to get the filename etc. */ int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */ ulong symkeys; struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* list of encryption packets */ struct { int op; int stop_now; } pipemode; }; static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ); static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ); static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ); static void release_list( CTX c ) { if( !c->list ) return; proc_tree(c, c->list ); release_kbnode( c->list ); while( c->pkenc_list ) { struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; m_free( c->pkenc_list ); c->pkenc_list = tmp; } c->pkenc_list = NULL; c->list = NULL; c->have_data = 0; c->last_was_session_key = 0; c->pipemode.op = 0; c->pipemode.stop_now = 0; m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } static int add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { KBNODE node; if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */ /* We can only append another onepass packet if the list * does contain only onepass packets */ for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; node = node->next ) ; if( node ) { /* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and * allow this packet to start a new verification thing */ release_list( c ); c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); } else add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); } else /* insert the first one */ c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt ); return 1; } static int add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { /* New clear text signature. * Process the last one and reset everything */ release_list(c); } else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) { /* Pipemode control packet */ if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n"); if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) { /* start the whole thing */ assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */ assert ( !c->pipemode.op ); c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1]; } else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) { /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */ assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); } else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) { assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); release_list (c); /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */ c->pipemode.stop_now = 1; } else log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n"); return 0; /* no need to store the packet */ } if( c->list ) /* add another packet */ add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); else /* insert the first one */ c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); return 1; } static int add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("orphaned user ID\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { KBNODE node; if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method * of prepending the signature to the data is * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ node = new_kbnode( pkt ); c->list = node; return 1; } else if( !c->list ) return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ else if( !c->list->pkt ) BUG(); /* so nicht */ /* add a new signature node id at the end */ node = new_kbnode( pkt ); add_kbnode( c->list, node ); return 1; } static int symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen ) { CIPHER_HANDLE hd; unsigned int n; if ( slen < 17 || slen > 33 ) { log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"), (int)slen); return G10ERR_BAD_KEY; } hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 ); cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ); cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 ); cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen ); cipher_close( hd ); /* check first byte (the cipher algo) */ if(check_cipher_algo(seskey[0])) { /* There is no way to tell the difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we don't have. */ log_error(_("bad passphrase or unknown cipher algorithm (%d)\n"), seskey[0]); if(seskey[0]==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) idea_cipher_warn(0); return G10ERR_PASSPHRASE; } n = cipher_get_keylen (seskey[0]) / 8; if (n > DIM(dek->key)) BUG (); /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key to decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */ dek->keylen = cipher_get_keylen( seskey[0] ) / 8; dek->algo = seskey[0]; memcpy( dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen ); /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/ return 0; } static void proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_symkey_enc *enc; enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; if (!enc) log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n"); else if(!c->dek) { int algo = enc->cipher_algo; const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo); if(s) { if(!opt.quiet) { if(enc->seskeylen) log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s ); else log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s ); } } else log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo ); if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo)) { log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest" " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo); s=NULL; } c->last_was_session_key = 2; if(!s || opt.list_only) goto leave; if(opt.override_session_key) { c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key)) { m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } else { c->dek=passphrase_to_dek(NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL); if(c->dek) { /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key comes before a public key in the message - if the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that come later. */ if(enc->seskeylen) { if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen)) { m_free(c->dek); c->dek=NULL; } } else c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; } } } leave: c->symkeys++; free_packet(pkt); } static void proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; int result = 0; /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */ c->last_was_session_key = 1; enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is * function to check it. */ if( opt.verbose ) log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) ); if( is_status_enabled() ) { char buf[50]; sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo ); write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf ); } if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) { /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in * secure memory because it has already been passed on the * command line and the GCHQ knows about it */ c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key ); if ( result ) { m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) { if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) || opt.try_all_secrets || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) { if( opt.list_only ) result = -1; else { c->dek = m_alloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) { /* error: delete the DEK */ m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } } else result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; } else result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; if( result == -1 ) ; else { /* store it for later display */ struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x ); x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; x->reason = result; x->next = c->pkenc_list; c->pkenc_list = x; if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 ) log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") ); } free_packet(pkt); } /**************** * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could * not decrypt. */ static void print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed ) { for( ; list; list = list->next ) { PKT_public_key *pk; const char *algstr; if ( failed && !list->reason ) continue; if ( !failed && list->reason ) continue; algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo ); pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk ); if( !algstr ) algstr = "[?]"; pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) { size_t n; char *p; log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"), nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk), strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) ); fputs(" \"", log_stream() ); p = get_user_id( list->kid, &n ); print_utf8_string2 ( log_stream(), p, n, '"' ); m_free(p); fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); } else log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"), algstr,keystr(list->kid)); free_public_key( pk ); if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) { if( is_status_enabled() ) { char buf[20]; sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1] ); write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf ); } } else if (list->reason) log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(list->reason)); } } static void proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { int result = 0; if (!opt.quiet) { if(c->symkeys>1) log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys); else if(c->symkeys==1) log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n")); print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); } write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION ); /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ if( opt.list_only ) result = -1; else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) { int algo; STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL; if(opt.override_session_key) { c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key); if(result) { m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } else { /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */ if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo)) log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), cipher_algo_to_string(algo)); else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) { algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; if (!algo) algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo; idea_cipher_warn(1); log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, " "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"), cipher_algo_to_string(algo)); } else { algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) { /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */ s2kbuf.mode = 0; s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5; s2k = &s2kbuf; } log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA"); } c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL ); if (c->dek) c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; } } else if( !c->dek ) result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; if( !result ) result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); if( result == -1 ) ; else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) { write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY ); if( opt.verbose > 1 ) log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result ) write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC ); else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn) log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); if(opt.show_session_key) { int i; char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 ); sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo ); for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ ) sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] ); log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf ); write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf ); } } else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); write_status( STATUS_BADMDC ); write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); } else { write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result)); /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/ } m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION ); } static void proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc; KBNODE n; if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); else if( opt.verbose ) log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0); /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 * and no armoring - Not yet tested * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 */ any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0; for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) { if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) { md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ); if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ) only_md5 = 1; else only_md5 = 0; any = 1; } if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) only_md5 = 0; } else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */ if ( datalen < 2 ) log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped * documents */ clearsig = (*data == 0x01); for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ ) md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data ); any = 1; break; /* no pass signature pakets are expected */ } } if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) { /* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */ md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 ); md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 ); md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ); } if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) { /* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only * catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet * in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch. */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0); } if ( DBG_HASHING ) { md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); if ( c->mfx.md2 ) md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); } if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 ); else { rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig ); if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) { /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to * check the signature */ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig ); } } if( rc ) log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet. * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */ n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0)); if (c->list) add_kbnode (c->list, n); else c->list = n; } static int proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) { return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data, ((CTX)info)->sigfilename ); } static int proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) { return proc_encryption_packets( info, a ); } static void proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed; int rc; /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/ if( c->sigs_only ) rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c ); else if( c->encrypt_only ) rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c ); else rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL ); if( rc ) log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; } /**************** * check the signature * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code */ static int do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig, int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey ) { PKT_signature *sig; MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL; int algo, rc; assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ); if( is_selfsig ) *is_selfsig = 0; sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; algo = sig->digest_algo; if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) ) return rc; if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) { if( c->mfx.md ) md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); else /* detached signature */ md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ } else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ if( c->mfx.md ) { md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); if( c->mfx.md2 ) md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 ); } else { /* detached signature */ log_debug("Do we really need this here?"); md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ md2 = md_open( 0, 0 ); } } else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 || sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x1f || sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); } else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { log_info(_("standalone revocation - " "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; } else { log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class); return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; } } else return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 ) rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); md_close(md); md_close(md2); return rc; } static void print_userid( PACKET *pkt ) { if( !pkt ) BUG(); if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) { printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); return; } if( opt.with_colons ) { if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) printf("%u %lu", pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len); else print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':'); } else print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); } /**************** * List the certificate in a user friendly way */ static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { int any=0; int mainkey; if( !node ) ; else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ) || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if( opt.with_colons ) { u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); if( mainkey ) c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode? 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL ); printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" ); if( c->trustletter ) putchar( c->trustletter ); printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::", nbits_from_pk( pk ), pk->pubkey_algo, (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ), colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) ); if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode ) putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) ); putchar(':'); if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) { putchar('\n'); any=1; if( opt.fingerprint ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); printf("rtv:1:%u:\n", node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); } } else printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s%s", mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ), datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":""); if( mainkey ) { /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { if( !any ) { if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) puts("[revoked]"); else putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { if( any ) { if( opt.with_colons ) printf("%s:::::::::", node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); else printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); } print_userid( node->pkt ); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); putchar('\n'); if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) { printf("rtv:2:%u:\n", node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); } any=1; } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { if( !any ) { putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } } } else { /* of subkey */ if( pk->is_revoked ) printf(" [%s]",_("revoked")); else if( pk->expiredate ) printf(" [%s:%s]",_("expires"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) ); } if( !any ) putchar('\n'); if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); } else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) ) || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; if( opt.with_colons ) { u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::", mainkey? "sec":"ssb", nbits_from_sk( sk ), sk->pubkey_algo, (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ), colon_strtime (sk->expiredate) /* fixme: add LID */ ); } else printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb", nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk )); if( mainkey ) { /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { if( !any ) { if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) puts("[revoked]"); else putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { if( any ) { if( opt.with_colons ) printf("%s:::::::::", node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); else printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); } print_userid( node->pkt ); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); putchar('\n'); if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); any=1; } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { if( !any ) { putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } } } if( !any ) putchar('\n'); if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int is_selfsig = 0; int rc2=0; size_t n; char *p; int sigrc = ' '; if( !opt.verbose ) return; if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) fputs("rev", stdout); else fputs("sig", stdout); if( opt.check_sigs ) { fflush(stdout); switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) { case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break; case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break; default: sigrc = '%'; break; } } else { /* check whether this is a self signature */ u32 keyid[2]; if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid ); else keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid ); if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) is_selfsig = 1; } } if( opt.with_colons ) { putchar(':'); if( sigrc != ' ' ) putchar(sigrc); printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], colon_datestr_from_sig(sig), colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig)); if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value) printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value); printf(":"); if(sig->trust_regexp) print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp, strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':'); printf(":"); } else printf("%c %s %s ", sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig)); if( sigrc == '%' ) printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) ); else if( sigrc == '?' ) ; else if( is_selfsig ) { if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); } else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) { p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n ); print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons ); m_free(p); } if( opt.with_colons ) printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l'); putchar('\n'); } else log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype); } int proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) { int rc; CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); c->anchor = anchor; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a, STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename ) { CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); int rc; c->anchor = anchor; c->sigs_only = 1; c->signed_data = signedfiles; c->sigfilename = sigfilename; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) { CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); int rc; c->anchor = anchor; c->encrypt_only = 1; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ) { PACKET *pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt ); int rc=0; int any_data=0; int newpkt; c->iobuf = a; init_packet(pkt); while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) { any_data = 1; if( rc ) { free_packet(pkt); /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packet. */ if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 ) break; continue; } newpkt = -1; if( opt.list_packets ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else if( c->sigs_only ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: case PKT_USER_ID: case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; goto leave; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else if( c->encrypt_only ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: case PKT_USER_ID: write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; goto leave; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: release_list( c ); c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); newpkt = 1; break; case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just * an extra layer. * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? */ if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC ) c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT; if( newpkt == -1 ) ; else if( newpkt ) { pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt ); init_packet(pkt); } else free_packet(pkt); if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) { /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to * break the loop here */ rc = -1; break; } } if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET ) write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" ); if( any_data ) rc = 0; else if( rc == -1 ) write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" ); leave: release_list( c ); m_free(c->dek); free_packet( pkt ); m_free( pkt ); free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); return rc; } static int check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; const char *astr; int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0; if( opt.skip_verify ) { log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n")); return 0; } /* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures: * PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet * sequence: sig+data, OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG * sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig. * Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with * different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might * not be possible to get it right: let's say we have: * data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last * data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then * data+sig. * To protect against this we check that all signatures follow * without any intermediate packets. Note, that we won't get this * error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because * we reset the list every time * * FIXME: Now that we have these marker packets, we should create a * real grammar and check against this. */ { KBNODE n; int n_sig=0; for (n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) { if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) n_sig++; } if (n_sig > 1) { /* more than one signature - check sequence */ int tmp, onepass; for (tmp=onepass=0,n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) { if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) onepass++; else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { onepass++; /* handle the same way as a onepass */ } else if ( (tmp && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) ) { log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n")); return 0; } else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) tmp = 1; else if (!tmp && !onepass && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { /* plaintext before signatures but no one-pass packets*/ log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n")); return 0; } } } } astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo ); if(keystrlen()>8) { log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp)); log_info(_(" using %s key %s\n"), astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid)); } else log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid)); rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */ if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks) { const byte *p; int seq=0; size_t n; while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL))) { /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to even try to make two strings here :) */ log_info(_("Key available at: ") ); print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n ); putc( '\n', log_stream() ); if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL) { struct keyserver_spec *spec; spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig); if(spec) { int res; glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++; res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec); glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; if(!res) rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); free_keyserver_spec(spec); if(!rc) break; } } } } /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, this is a second try. */ if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)) { int res; glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++; res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver ); glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--; if(!res) rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); } if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { KBNODE un, keyblock; int count=0, statno; char keyid_str[50]; PKT_public_key *pk=NULL; if(rc) statno=STATUS_BADSIG; else if(sig->flags.expired) statno=STATUS_EXPSIG; else if(is_expkey) statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG; else if(is_revkey) statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG; else statno=STATUS_GOODSIG; keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid ); sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ", (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]); /* find and print the primary user ID */ for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { int valid; if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) { pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key; continue; } if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) continue; if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created ) continue; if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked ) continue; if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired ) continue; if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) continue; /* We want the textual primary user ID here */ if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) continue; assert(pk); /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" line. */ valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id); keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, -1 ); log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") : sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"") : _("Good signature from \"")); print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY) fprintf(log_stream(),"\" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid)); else fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); count++; } if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual userid */ /* Try for an invalid textual userid */ for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) break; } /* Try for any userid at all */ if(!un) { for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) break; } } if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un) keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]", un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, -1 ); log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") : sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"") : _("Good signature from \"")); if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un) { fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() ); putc(' ', log_stream() ); } print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]", un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3 ); fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); } /* If we have a good signature and already printed * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */ if ( count && !rc ) { for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) continue; if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired) && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS)) continue; /* Only skip textual primaries */ if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) continue; if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) { dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL); if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS) show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL); } log_info( _(" aka \"")); print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY) { const char *valid; if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked) valid=_("revoked"); else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired) valid=_("expired"); else valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk, un->pkt-> pkt.user_id)); fprintf(log_stream(),"\" [%s]\n",valid); } else fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); } } release_kbnode( keyblock ); if( !rc ) { if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS) show_policy_url(sig,0,1); else show_policy_url(sig,0,2); if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS) show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1); else show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2); if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS) show_notation(sig,0,1, ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+ ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)); else show_notation(sig,0,2,0); } if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) { /* print a status response with the fingerprint */ PKT_public_key *vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk ); if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp; size_t i, n; bufp = buf; fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); p = array; for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to match! */ sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ", strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ), (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate, sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class); bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp); if (!vpk->is_primary) { u32 akid[2]; akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0]; akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1]; free_public_key (vpk); vpk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *vpk ); if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) { /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */ n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20; memset (array, 0, n); } else fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); } p = array; for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf ); } free_public_key( vpk ); } if( !rc ) rc = check_signatures_trust( sig ); if(sig->flags.expired) { log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */ } else if(sig->expiredate) log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); if(opt.verbose) log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"), sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"): sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"), digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo)); if( rc ) g10_errors_seen = 1; if( opt.batch && rc ) g10_exit(1); } else { char buf[50]; sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d", (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc ); write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf ); if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) { buf[16] = 0; write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf ); } if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED ) log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) ); } return rc; } /**************** * Process the tree which starts at node */ static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { KBNODE n1; int rc; if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only ) return; /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */ while ( node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { node = node->next; } if (!node) return; c->trustletter = ' '; if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); list_node( c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); list_node( c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { /* check all signatures */ if( !c->have_data ) { free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); /* prepare to create all requested message digests */ c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0); /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/ for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) { md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); } /* ask for file and hash it */ if( c->sigs_only ) { rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL, c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); } else { rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); } if( rc ) { log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); return; } } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { /* clear text signed message */ if( !c->have_data ) { log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" ); return; } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int multiple_ok=1; n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE); if(n1) { byte class=sig->sig_class; byte hash=sig->digest_algo; for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) { /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have to run a different hash context for each), but if they are all the same, make an exception. */ if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash) { multiple_ok=0; log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. " "Only the first will be checked.\n")); break; } } } if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class); else if( !c->have_data ) { /* detached signature */ free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0); if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds ) ; else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) { /* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 ); } else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { /* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached * signature has been created in textmode */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 ); } #if 0 /* workaround disabled */ /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures; * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should * then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others) */ /* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */ #endif if ( DBG_HASHING ) { md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); if ( c->mfx.md2 ) md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); } if( c->sigs_only ) { rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); } else { rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); } if( rc ) { log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); return; } } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */ else if (!opt.quiet) log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); if(multiple_ok) for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) ) check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); else check_sig_and_print( c, node ); } else { dump_kbnode (c->list); log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n")); dump_kbnode (node); } }