/* mainproc.c - handle packets * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "iobuf.h" #include "memory.h" #include "options.h" #include "util.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "keydb.h" #include "filter.h" #include "main.h" #include "status.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "trustdb.h" #include "hkp.h" struct kidlist_item { struct kidlist_item *next; u32 kid[2]; int pubkey_algo; int reason; }; /**************** * Structure to hold the context */ typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX; struct mainproc_context { struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* may be useful in the future */ PKT_public_key *last_pubkey; PKT_secret_key *last_seckey; PKT_user_id *last_user_id; md_filter_context_t mfx; int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */ int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */ STRLIST signed_data; const char *sigfilename; DEK *dek; int last_was_session_key; KBNODE list; /* the current list of packets */ int have_data; IOBUF iobuf; /* used to get the filename etc. */ int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */ ulong local_id; /* ditto */ struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* list of encryption packets */ struct { int op; int stop_now; } pipemode; }; static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ); static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ); static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ); static void release_list( CTX c ) { if( !c->list ) return; proc_tree(c, c->list ); release_kbnode( c->list ); while( c->pkenc_list ) { struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; m_free( c->pkenc_list ); c->pkenc_list = tmp; } c->pkenc_list = NULL; c->list = NULL; c->have_data = 0; c->last_was_session_key = 0; c->pipemode.op = 0; c->pipemode.stop_now = 0; m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } static int add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { KBNODE node; if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */ /* We can only append another onepass packet if the list * does contain only onepass packets */ for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; node = node->next ) ; if( node ) { /* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and * allow this packet to start a new verification thing */ release_list( c ); c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); } else add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); } else /* insert the first one */ c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt ); return 1; } static int add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == 1 ) { /* New clear text signature. * Process the last one and reset everything */ release_list(c); } else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == 2 ) { /* Pipemode control packet */ #warning We have to do some sanity checks all over the place if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n"); if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) { /* start the whole thing */ assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */ assert ( !c->pipemode.op ); c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1]; } else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) { /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */ assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); } else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) { assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); release_list (c); /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */ c->pipemode.stop_now = 1; } else log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n"); return 0; /* no need to store the packet */ } if( c->list ) /* add another packet */ add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); else /* insert the first one */ c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); return 1; } static int add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("orphaned user ID\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { if( !c->list ) { log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" ); return 0; } add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); return 1; } static int add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { KBNODE node; if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. * G10 does not write such packets; instead it always uses * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method * of prepending the signature to the data is * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read * from stdin. (G10 is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ node = new_kbnode( pkt ); c->list = node; return 1; } else if( !c->list ) return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ else if( !c->list->pkt ) BUG(); /* so nicht */ /* add a new signature node id at the end */ node = new_kbnode( pkt ); add_kbnode( c->list, node ); return 1; } static void proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_symkey_enc *enc; enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; if( enc->seskeylen ) log_error( "symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n"); else { c->last_was_session_key = 2; c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 ); } free_packet(pkt); } static void proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; int result = 0; /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */ c->last_was_session_key = 1; enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is * function to check it. */ if( opt.verbose ) log_info(_("public key is %08lX\n"), (ulong)enc->keyid[1] ); if( is_status_enabled() ) { char buf[50]; sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo ); write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf ); } if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) { /* It does not make nuch sense to store the session key in * secure memory because it has already been passed on the * command line and the GCHQ knows about it */ c->dek = m_alloc( sizeof *c->dek ); result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key ); if ( result ) { m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) { if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) { if( opt.list_only ) result = -1; else { c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek ); if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) { /* error: delete the DEK */ m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; } } } else result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; } else result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; if( result == -1 ) ; else { if( !result ) { if( opt.verbose > 1 ) log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") ); if ( opt.show_session_key ) { int i; char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 ); sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo ); for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ ) sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] ); log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf ); write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf ); } } /* store it for later display */ { struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x ); x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; x->reason = result; x->next = c->pkenc_list; c->pkenc_list = x; } } free_packet(pkt); } /**************** * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could * not decrypt. */ static void print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed ) { for( ; list; list = list->next ) { PKT_public_key *pk; const char *algstr; if ( failed && !list->reason ) continue; if ( !failed && list->reason ) continue; algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo ); pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk ); if( !algstr ) algstr = "[?]"; pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) { size_t n; char *p; log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %08lX, created %s\n"), nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, (ulong)list->kid[1], strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) ); fputs(" \"", log_stream() ); p = get_user_id( list->kid, &n ); print_string( log_stream(), p, n, '"' ); m_free(p); fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); } else { log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %08lX\n"), algstr, (ulong) list->kid[1] ); } free_public_key( pk ); if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) { if( is_status_enabled() ) { char buf[20]; sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1] ); write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf ); } } else if (list->reason) log_error(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(list->reason)); } } static void proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { int result = 0; print_pkenc_list( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); print_pkenc_list( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION ); /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ if( opt.list_only ) result = -1; else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) { /* assume this is old conventional encrypted data * Actually we should use IDEA and MD5 in this case, but because * IDEA is patented we can't do so */ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo : DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO, NULL, 0 ); } else if( !c->dek ) result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; if( !result ) result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; if( result == -1 ) ; else if( !result ) { write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY ); if( opt.verbose > 1 ) log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method ) write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC ); } else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); write_status( STATUS_BADMDC ); } else { write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result)); /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/ } free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION ); } static void proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc; KBNODE n; if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); else if( opt.verbose ) log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0); /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 * and no armoring - Not yet tested * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 */ any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0; for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) { if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) { md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ); if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ) only_md5 = 1; else only_md5 = 0; any = 1; } if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) only_md5 = 0; } else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == 1 ) { size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */ if ( datalen < 2 ) log_fatal("invalid control packet of type 1\n"); /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped * documents */ clearsig = (*data == 0x01); for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ ) md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data ); any = 1; break; /* no pass signature pakets are expected */ } } if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) { /* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */ md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 ); md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 ); md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ); } if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) { /* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only * catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet * in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch. */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0); } if ( DBG_HASHING ) { md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); if ( c->mfx.md2 ) md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); } rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig ); if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) { /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to * check the signature */ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig ); } if( rc ) log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; } static int proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) { return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data, ((CTX)info)->sigfilename ); } static int proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) { return proc_encryption_packets( info, a ); } static void proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed; int rc; /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/ if( c->sigs_only ) rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c ); else if( c->encrypt_only ) rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c ); else rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL ); if( rc ) log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); free_packet(pkt); c->last_was_session_key = 0; } /**************** * check the signature * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code */ static int do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig ) { PKT_signature *sig; MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL; int algo, rc; assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ); if( is_selfsig ) *is_selfsig = 0; sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; algo = sig->digest_algo; if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) ) return rc; if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) { if( c->mfx.md ) md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); else /* detached signature */ md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ } else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ if( c->mfx.md ) { md = md_copy( c->mfx.md ); if( c->mfx.md2 ) md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 ); } else { /* detached signature */ log_debug("Do we really need this here?"); md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ md2 = md_open( 0, 0 ); } } else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 || sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* classes 0x10..0x17,0x20,0x30 */ if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); } else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { log_info(_("standalone revocation - " "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; } else { log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class); return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; } } else return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; rc = signature_check( sig, md ); if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 ) rc = signature_check( sig, md2 ); md_close(md); md_close(md2); return rc; } static void print_userid( PACKET *pkt ) { if( !pkt ) BUG(); if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) { printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); return; } if( opt.with_colons ) print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':'); else print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); } static void print_fingerprint( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk ) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; size_t i, n; if( sk ) fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n ); else fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n ); p = array; if( opt.with_colons ) { printf("fpr:::::::::"); for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) printf("%02X", *p ); putchar(':'); } else { printf(" Key fingerprint ="); if( n == 20 ) { for(i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) { if( i == 10 ) putchar(' '); printf(" %02X%02X", *p, p[1] ); } } else { for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) { if( i && !(i%8) ) putchar(' '); printf(" %02X", *p ); } } } putchar('\n'); } static void print_notation_data( PKT_signature *sig ) { size_t n, n1, n2; const byte *p; int seq = 0; while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION, &n, &seq )) ) { if( n < 8 ) { log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n")); return; } if( !(*p & 0x80) ) return; /* not human readable */ n1 = (p[4] << 8) | p[5]; n2 = (p[6] << 8) | p[7]; p += 8; if( 8+n1+n2 != n ) { log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n")); return; } log_info(_("Notation: ") ); print_string( log_stream(), p, n1, 0 ); putc( '=', log_stream() ); print_string( log_stream(), p+n1, n2, 0 ); putc( '\n', log_stream() ); write_status_buffer ( STATUS_NOTATION_NAME, p , n1, 0 ); write_status_buffer ( STATUS_NOTATION_DATA, p+n1, n2, 20 ); } if( (p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, &n ) )) { log_info(_("Policy: ") ); print_string( log_stream(), p, n, 0 ); putc( '\n', log_stream() ); write_status_buffer ( STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, n, 0 ); } /* Now check wheter the key of this signature has some * notation data */ /* TODO */ } /**************** * List the certificate in a user friendly way */ static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { int any=0; int mainkey; if( !node ) ; else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ) || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; if( opt.with_colons ) { u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); if( mainkey ) { c->local_id = pk->local_id; c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode? 0 : query_trust_info( pk, NULL ); } printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" ); if( c->trustletter ) putchar( c->trustletter ); printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", nbits_from_pk( pk ), pk->pubkey_algo, (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ), pk->expiredate? strtimestamp(pk->expiredate):"" ); if( c->local_id ) printf("%lu", c->local_id ); putchar(':'); if( c->local_id && !opt.fast_list_mode ) putchar( get_ownertrust_info( c->local_id ) ); putchar(':'); if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) { putchar('\n'); any=1; if( opt.fingerprint ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL ); printf("rtv:1:%u:\n", node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); } } else printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ", mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL ), datestr_from_pk( pk ) ); if( mainkey ) { /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { if( !any ) { if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) puts("[revoked]"); else putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { if( any ) { if( opt.with_colons ) printf("uid:::::::::"); else printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); } print_userid( node->pkt ); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); putchar('\n'); if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL ); if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) { printf("rtv:2:%u:\n", node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); } any=1; } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { if( !any ) { putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } } } else if( pk->expiredate ) { /* of subkey */ printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) ); } if( !any ) putchar('\n'); if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) print_fingerprint( pk, NULL ); } else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) ) || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; if( opt.with_colons ) { u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::", mainkey? "sec":"ssb", nbits_from_sk( sk ), sk->pubkey_algo, (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_sk( sk ), sk->expiredate? strtimestamp(sk->expiredate):"" /* fixme: add LID */ ); } else printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb", nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ), (ulong)keyid_from_sk( sk, NULL ), datestr_from_sk( sk ) ); if( mainkey ) { /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { if( !any ) { if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) puts("[revoked]"); else putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { if( any ) { if( opt.with_colons ) printf("uid:::::::::"); else printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); } print_userid( node->pkt ); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); putchar('\n'); if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) print_fingerprint( NULL, sk ); any=1; } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { if( !any ) { putchar('\n'); any = 1; } list_node(c, node ); } } } if( !any ) putchar('\n'); if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) print_fingerprint( NULL, sk ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; int is_selfsig = 0; int rc2=0; size_t n; char *p; int sigrc = ' '; if( !opt.list_sigs ) return; if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) fputs("rev", stdout); else fputs("sig", stdout); if( opt.check_sigs ) { fflush(stdout); switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig )) ) { case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break; case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break; default: sigrc = '%'; break; } } else { /* check whether this is a self signature */ u32 keyid[2]; if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid ); else keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid ); if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) is_selfsig = 1; } } if( opt.with_colons ) { putchar(':'); if( sigrc != ' ' ) putchar(sigrc); printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s::::", sig->pubkey_algo, (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig)); } else printf("%c %08lX %s ", sigrc, (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig)); if( sigrc == '%' ) printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) ); else if( sigrc == '?' ) ; else if( is_selfsig ) { if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout); if( opt.with_colons ) putchar(':'); } else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) { p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n ); print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons ); m_free(p); } if( opt.with_colons ) printf(":%02x:", sig->sig_class ); putchar('\n'); } else log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype); } int proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) { int rc; CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); c->anchor = anchor; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a, STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename ) { CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); int rc; c->anchor = anchor; c->sigs_only = 1; c->signed_data = signedfiles; c->sigfilename = sigfilename; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a ) { CTX c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c ); int rc; c->anchor = anchor; c->encrypt_only = 1; rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); m_free( c ); return rc; } int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ) { PACKET *pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt ); int rc=0; int any_data=0; int newpkt; c->iobuf = a; init_packet(pkt); while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) { any_data = 1; if( rc ) { free_packet(pkt); if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET ) break; continue; } newpkt = -1; if( opt.list_packets ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else if( c->sigs_only ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: case PKT_USER_ID: case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; goto leave; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else if( c->encrypt_only ) { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: case PKT_USER_ID: rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; goto leave; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } else { switch( pkt->pkttype ) { case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: release_list( c ); c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); newpkt = 1; break; case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } } /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just * an extra layer. * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? */ if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC ) c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT; if( newpkt == -1 ) ; else if( newpkt ) { pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt ); init_packet(pkt); } else free_packet(pkt); if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) { /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to * break the loop here */ rc = -1; break; } } if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET ) write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" ); if( any_data ) rc = 0; else if( rc == -1 ) write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" ); leave: release_list( c ); m_free(c->dek); free_packet( pkt ); m_free( pkt ); free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); return rc; } /* fixme: This code is a duplicate fro keylist.c and should be replaced * by flags set in getkey.c. gpg 1.1 already does this */ static int is_uid_revoked ( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode, u32 *mainkid ) { KBNODE node; PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL; /* the latest valid self signature */ assert ( uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ); /* first find out about the latest valid self-signature */ for ( node = uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) { PKT_signature *sig; if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PHOTO_ID || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) break; if ( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE ) continue; sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if ( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] ) continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */ if ( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) { /* regular self signature */ if ( !check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL ) ) { if ( !selfsig ) selfsig = sig; /* use the first valid sig */ else if ( sig->timestamp > selfsig->timestamp && sig->sig_class >= selfsig->sig_class ) selfsig = sig; /* but this one is newer */ } } } /* watch out for a newer revocation */ for ( node = uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) { PKT_signature *sig; if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PHOTO_ID || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) break; if ( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE ) continue; sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if ( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] ) continue; /* we only care about self-signatures */ if ( sig->sig_class == 0x30 && (!selfsig || sig->timestamp >= selfsig->timestamp) ) { if ( !check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL ) ) return 1; } } return 0; } static int check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; const char *astr, *tstr; int rc; if( opt.skip_verify ) { log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n")); return 0; } /* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures: * PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet * sequence: sig+data, OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG * sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig. * Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with * different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might * not be possible to get it right: let's say we have: * data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last * data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then * data+sig. * To protect against this we check that we all signatures follow * without any intermediate packets. Note, that we won't get this * error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because * we reset the list every time */ { KBNODE n; int tmp=0; for(n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) { if ( tmp && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { log_error("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"); return 0; } else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) tmp = 1; } } tstr = asctimestamp(sig->timestamp); astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo ); log_info(_("Signature made %.*s using %s key ID %08lX\n"), (int)strlen(tstr), tstr, astr? astr: "?", (ulong)sig->keyid[1] ); rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL ); if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver_name && opt.auto_key_retrieve) { if( !hkp_ask_import( sig->keyid ) ) rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL ); } if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { KBNODE un, keyblock; char *us; int count=0; u32 mainkid[2]; int mainkid_ok = 0; keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid ); us = get_long_user_id_string( sig->keyid ); write_status_text( rc? STATUS_BADSIG : STATUS_GOODSIG, us ); m_free(us); /* fixme: list only user ids which are valid and add information * about the trustworthiness of each user id, sort them. * Integrate this with check_signatures_trust(). */ for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { if ( !mainkid_ok && un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) { keyid_from_pk( un->pkt->pkt.public_key, mainkid ); mainkid_ok = 1; } if( !mainkid_ok || un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) continue; if ( is_uid_revoked (keyblock, un, mainkid ) ) continue; if( !count++ ) log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") : _("Good signature from \"")); else log_info( _(" aka \"")); print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); fputs("\"\n", log_stream() ); if( rc ) break; /* print only one id in this case */ } if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no userid */ log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") : _("Good signature from \"")); fputs("[?]\"\n", log_stream() ); } release_kbnode( keyblock ); if( !rc ) print_notation_data( sig ); if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) { /* print a status response with the fingerprint */ PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk ); if( !get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) ) { byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+61]; size_t i, n; fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n ); p = array; for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) sprintf(buf+2*i, "%02X", *p ); sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), " %s %lu", strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ), (ulong)sig->timestamp ); write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf ); } free_public_key( pk ); } if( !rc ) rc = check_signatures_trust( sig ); if( rc ) g10_errors_seen = 1; if( opt.batch && rc ) g10_exit(1); } else { char buf[50]; sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d", (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc ); write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf ); if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) { buf[16] = 0; write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf ); } if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED ) log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) ); } return rc; } /**************** * Process the tree which starts at node */ static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ) { KBNODE n1; int rc; if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only ) return; c->local_id = 0; c->trustletter = ' '; if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); list_node( c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); list_node( c, node ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { /* check all signatures */ if( !c->have_data ) { free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); /* prepare to create all requested message digests */ c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0); /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/ for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) { md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); } /* ask for file and hash it */ if( c->sigs_only ) { rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL, c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); } else { rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, iobuf_get_fname(c->iobuf), n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); } if( rc ) { log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); return; } } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == 1 ) { /* clear text signed message */ if( !c->have_data ) { log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" ); return; } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); } else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class); else if( !c->have_data ) { /* detached signature */ free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0); if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds ) ; else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) { /* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 ); } else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { /* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached * signature has been created in textmode */ c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 ); } #if 0 /* workaround disabled */ /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures; * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should * then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others) */ /* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */ #endif if ( DBG_HASHING ) { md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); if ( c->mfx.md2 ) md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); } if( c->sigs_only ) { rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); } else { rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, iobuf_get_fname(c->iobuf), (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); } if( rc ) { log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); return; } } else if ( c->signed_data ) { log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); return; } else log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); check_sig_and_print( c, node ); } else log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n")); }