EGD ==== Oh, and on embedding egd into the gpg package: I think if you just unpack it into, say, util/egd/* then you can put something like this into configure.in: AC_CHECK_PROG(perl_present, perl, true, false) if $perl_present; then AC_PATH_PROG(PERL, perl) (cd util/egd; $PERL Makefile.PL FULLPERL=$PERL INSTALLBIN=$sbindir) fi AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_EGD, $perl_present) and add util/egd to the top-level Makefile directory list inside a WITH_EGD conditional. * What shall we do if we have a valid subkey revocation certificate but no subkey binding? Is this a valid but revoked key? * use a mmaped file for secure memory if mlock does not work and make sure that this file is always wiped out. Is this really more secure than swapping out to the swap disk? I don't believe so because if an attacker has access to the physical box (and he needs this to look at the swap area) he can also leave a trojan horse which is far more easier than to analyze memory dumps. Question: Is it possible that a Unix pages an old (left over by some other process) swap page in for another process - this should be considered a serious design flow/bug. Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1999 19:34:29 -0800 (PST) From: Matthew Skala - Signing with an expired key doesn't work by default, does work with a special option. - Verifying a signature that appears to have been made by an expired key after its expiry date but is otherwise good reports the signature as BAD, preferably with a message indicating that it's a key-expiry problem rather than a cryptographically bad signature. - Verifying a signature from a key that is now expired, where the signature was made before the expiry date, reports the signature as GOOD, possibly with a warning that the key has since expired. - Encrypting to an expired key doesn't work by default, does work with a special option. - Decrypting always works, if you have the appropriate secret key and passphrase. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi Werner.. I was looking at some of the PROJECTS items in the recent gpg CVS and wanted to comment on one of them: * Add a way to override the current cipher/md implementations by others (using extensions) As you know I've been thinking about how to use a PalmPilot or an iButton in some useful way in GPG. The two things that seem reasonable are: 1) keep the secret key in the device, only transferring it to the host computer for the duration of the secret-key operation (sign or decrypt). The key is never kept on disk, only in RAM. This removes the chance that casual snooping on your office workstation will reveal your key (it doesn't help against an active attack, but the attacker must leave a tampered version of GPG around or otherwise get their code to run while the key-storage device is attached to attack the key) 2) perform the secret-key operation on the device, so the secret key never leaves the confines of that device. There are still attacks possible, based upon talking to the device while it is connected and trying to convince the device (and possibly the user) that it is the real GPG, but in general this protects the key pretty strongly. Any individual message is still vulnerable, but that's a tradeoff of the convenience of composing that message on a full-sized screen+keyboard (plus the added speed of encryption) vs. the security of writing the message on a secure device. I think there are a variety of ways of implementing these things, but a few extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on. 1) pass an argument string to loadable extension modules (maybe gpg --load-extension foofish=arg1,arg2,arg3 ?) 2) allow multiple instances of the same extension module (presumably with different arguments) 3) allow extension modules to use stdin/stdout/stderr as normal (probably already in there), for giving feedback to the user, or possibly asking them for a password of some sort 4) have an extension to provide secret keys: It looks like most of the hooks for this are already in place, it just needs an extension module which can register itself as a keyblock resource. I'm thinking of a module for this that is given an external program name as an argument. When the keyblock resource is asked to enumerate its keys, it runs the external program (first with a "0" argument, then a "1", and so on until the program reports that no more keys are available). The external program returns one (possibly armored) secret key block each time. The program might have some kind of special protocol to talk to the storage device. One thing that comes to mind is to simply include a random number in the message sent over the serial port: the program would display this number, the Pilot at the other end would display the number it receives, if the user sees that both are the same they instruct the Pilot to release the key, as basic protection against someone else asking for the key while it is attached. More sophisticated schemes are possible depending upon how much processing power and IO is available on the device. But the same extension module should be able to handle as complex a scheme as one could wish. The current keyblock-resource interface would work fine, although it might be more convenient if a resource could be asked for a key by id instead of enumerating all of them and then searching through the resulting list for a match. A module that provided public keys would have to work this way (imagine a module that could automatically do an http fetch for a particular key.. easily-added automatic key fetching). Without that ability to fetch by id (which would require it to fall back to the other keyblock resources if it failed), the user's device might be asked to release the key even though some other secret key was the one needed. 5) have an extension to perform a secret-key operation without the actual secret key material basically something to indicate that any decrypt or sign operations that occur for a specific keyid should call the extension module instead. The secret key would not be extracted (it wouldn't be available anyway). The module is given the keyid and the MPI of the block it is supposed to sign or decrypt. The module could then run an external program to do the operation. I'm imagining a Pilot program which receives the data, asks the user if it can go along with the operation (after displaying a hash of the request, which is also displayed by the extension module's program to make sure the Pilot is being asked to do the right operation), performs the signature or decryption, then returns the data. This protocol could be made arbitrarily complex, with a D-H key to encrypt the link, and both sides signing requests to authenticate one to the other (although this transforms the the problem of getting your secret key off your office workstation into the problem of your workstation holding a key tells your Pilot that it is allowed to perform the secret key operation, and if someone gets a hold of that key they may be able to trick your pilot [plugged in somewhere else] to do the same thing for them). This is basically red/black separation, with the Pilot or iButton having the perimeter beyond which the red data doesn't pass. Better than the secret-key storage device but requires a lot more power on the device (the new iButtons with the exponentiator could do it, but it would take way too much code space on the old ones, although they would be fine for just carrying the keys). The signature code might need to be extended to verify the signature you just made, since an active intruder pretending to the the Pilot wouldn't be able to make a valid signature (but they might sign your message with a different key just to be annoying). Anyway, just wanted to share my thoughts on some possibilities. I've been carrying this little Java iButton on my keyring for months now, looking for something cool to do with it, and I think that secure storage for my GPG key would be just the right application. cheers, -Brian -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v0.4.5 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info finger gcrypt@ftp.guug.de iD8DBQE2c5oZkDmgv9E5zEwRArAwAKDWV5fpTtbGPiMPgl2Bpp0gvhbfQgCgzJuY AmIQTk4s62/y2zMAHDdOzK0= =jr7m -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- About a new Keyserver (discussion with Allan Clark ): ===================== Some ideas: o the KS should verify signatures and only accept those which are good. o Keep a blacklist of known bad signatures to minimize the time needed to check them o Should be fast - I currently designing a new storage system called keybox which takes advantage of the fact that the keyID is highly random and can be directly be used as a hash value and this keyID is (for v4 keys) part of the fingerprint: So it is possible to use the fingerprint as key but do an lookup by the keyID. o To be used as the "public keyring" in a LAN so that there is no need to keep one on every machine. o Allow more that one file for key storage. o Use the HKS protocol and enhance it in a way that binary keyrings can be transmitted. (I already wrote some http server and client code which can be used for this) And extend it to allow reuse of a connection. o Keep a checksum (hash) of the entire keyblock so that a client can easy check whether this keyblock has changed. (keyblock = the entire key with all certificates etc.) Transmitted in the HEAD info. o Allow efficient propagation of new keys and revocation certificates. Probably more things but this keyserver is not a goal for the 1.0 release. Someone should be able to fix some of the limitations of the existing key servers (I think they bail out on some rfc2440 packet formats). Suggested things which I will not do: ===================================== * Let take --help an option to select some topics. Using grep is much easier