/* sysutils.c - system helpers * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, * 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program; if not, see . */ #include #ifdef WITHOUT_GNU_PTH /* Give the Makefile a chance to build without Pth. */ # undef HAVE_PTH # undef USE_GNU_PTH #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STAT # include #endif #if defined(__linux__) && defined(__alpha__) && __GLIBC__ < 2 # include # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT # include # include # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM # define WINVER 0x0500 /* Required for AllowSetForegroundWindow. */ # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PTH # include #endif #include #include "util.h" #include "i18n.h" #include "sysutils.h" #define tohex(n) ((n) < 10 ? ((n) + '0') : (((n) - 10) + 'A')) #if defined(__linux__) && defined(__alpha__) && __GLIBC__ < 2 #warning using trap_unaligned static int setsysinfo(unsigned long op, void *buffer, unsigned long size, int *start, void *arg, unsigned long flag) { return syscall(__NR_osf_setsysinfo, op, buffer, size, start, arg, flag); } void trap_unaligned(void) { unsigned int buf[2]; buf[0] = SSIN_UACPROC; buf[1] = UAC_SIGBUS | UAC_NOPRINT; setsysinfo(SSI_NVPAIRS, buf, 1, 0, 0, 0); } #else void trap_unaligned(void) { /* dummy */ } #endif int disable_core_dumps (void) { #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM return 0; #else # ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit limit; /* We only set the current limit unless we were not able to retrieve the old value. */ if (getrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &limit)) limit.rlim_max = 0; limit.rlim_cur = 0; if( !setrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &limit) ) return 0; if( errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOSYS ) log_fatal (_("can't disable core dumps: %s\n"), strerror(errno) ); #endif return 1; #endif } int enable_core_dumps (void) { #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM return 0; #else # ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit limit; if (getrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &limit)) return 1; limit.rlim_cur = limit.rlim_max; setrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &limit); return 1; /* We always return true because this function is merely a debugging aid. */ # endif return 1; #endif } /* Return a string which is used as a kind of process ID */ const byte * get_session_marker( size_t *rlen ) { static byte marker[SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG*2]; static int initialized; if ( !initialized ) { volatile ulong aa, bb; /* we really want the uninitialized value */ ulong a, b; initialized = 1; /* Although this marker is guessable it is not easy to use * for a faked control packet because an attacker does not * have enough control about the time the verification does * take place. Of course, we can add just more random but * than we need the random generator even for verification * tasks - which does not make sense. */ a = aa ^ (ulong)getpid(); b = bb ^ (ulong)time(NULL); memcpy( marker, &a, SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG ); memcpy( marker+SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG, &b, SIZEOF_UNSIGNED_LONG ); } *rlen = sizeof(marker); return marker; } #if 0 /* not yet needed - Note that this will require inclusion of cmacros.am in Makefile.am */ int check_permissions(const char *path,int extension,int checkonly) { #if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM) char *tmppath; struct stat statbuf; int ret=1; int isdir=0; if(opt.no_perm_warn) return 0; if(extension && path[0]!=DIRSEP_C) { if(strchr(path,DIRSEP_C)) tmppath=make_filename(path,NULL); else tmppath=make_filename(GNUPG_LIBDIR,path,NULL); } else tmppath=m_strdup(path); /* It's okay if the file doesn't exist */ if(stat(tmppath,&statbuf)!=0) { ret=0; goto end; } isdir=S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode); /* Per-user files must be owned by the user. Extensions must be owned by the user or root. */ if((!extension && statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) || (extension && statbuf.st_uid!=0 && statbuf.st_uid!=getuid())) { if(!checkonly) log_info(_("Warning: unsafe ownership on %s \"%s\"\n"), isdir?"directory":extension?"extension":"file",path); goto end; } /* This works for both directories and files - basically, we don't care what the owner permissions are, so long as the group and other permissions are 0 for per-user files, and non-writable for extensions. */ if((extension && (statbuf.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) !=0) || (!extension && (statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != 0)) { char *dir; /* However, if the directory the directory/file is in is owned by the user and is 700, then this is not a problem. Theoretically, we could walk this test up to the root directory /, but for the sake of sanity, I'm stopping at one level down. */ dir= make_dirname (tmppath); if(stat(dir,&statbuf)==0 && statbuf.st_uid==getuid() && S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO))==0) { xfree (dir); ret=0; goto end; } m_free(dir); if(!checkonly) log_info(_("Warning: unsafe permissions on %s \"%s\"\n"), isdir?"directory":extension?"extension":"file",path); goto end; } ret=0; end: m_free(tmppath); return ret; #endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM */ return 0; } #endif /* Wrapper around the usual sleep fucntion. This one won't wake up before the sleep time has really elapsed. When build with Pth it merely calls pth_sleep and thus suspends only the current thread. */ void gnupg_sleep (unsigned int seconds) { #ifdef HAVE_PTH /* With Pth we force a regular sleep for seconds == 0 so that also the process will give up its timeslot. */ if (!seconds) { # ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM Sleep (0); # else sleep (0); # endif } pth_sleep (seconds); #else /* Fixme: make sure that a sleep won't wake up to early. */ # ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM Sleep (seconds*1000); # else sleep (seconds); # endif #endif } /* This function is a NOP for POSIX systems but required under Windows as the file handles as returned by OS calls (like CreateFile) are different from the libc file descriptors (like open). This function translates system file handles to libc file handles. FOR_WRITE gives the direction of the handle. */ int translate_sys2libc_fd (gnupg_fd_t fd, int for_write) { #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM int x; if (fd == GNUPG_INVALID_FD) return -1; /* Note that _open_osfhandle is currently defined to take and return a long. */ x = _open_osfhandle ((long)fd, for_write ? 1 : 0); if (x == -1) log_error ("failed to translate osfhandle %p\n", (void *) fd); return x; #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM */ return fd; #endif } /* This is the same as translate_sys2libc_fd but takes an integer which is assumed to be such an system handle. */ int translate_sys2libc_fd_int (int fd, int for_write) { #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM if (fd <= 2) return fd; /* Do not do this for error, stdin, stdout, stderr. */ return translate_sys2libc_fd ((void*)fd, for_write); #else return fd; #endif } /* Replacement for tmpfile(). This is required because the tmpfile function of Windows' runtime library is broken, insecure, ignores TMPDIR and so on. In addition we create a file with an inheritable handle. */ FILE * gnupg_tmpfile (void) { #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM int attempts, n; char buffer[MAX_PATH+7+12+1]; char *name, *p; HANDLE file; int pid = GetCurrentProcessId (); unsigned int value; int i; SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sec_attr; memset (&sec_attr, 0, sizeof sec_attr ); sec_attr.nLength = sizeof sec_attr; sec_attr.bInheritHandle = TRUE; n = GetTempPath (MAX_PATH+1, buffer); if (!n || n > MAX_PATH || strlen (buffer) > MAX_PATH) { errno = ENOENT; return NULL; } p = buffer + strlen (buffer); p = stpcpy (p, "_gnupg"); /* We try to create the directory but don't care about an error as it may already exist and the CreateFile would throw an error anyway. */ CreateDirectory (buffer, NULL); *p++ = '\\'; name = p; for (attempts=0; attempts < 10; attempts++) { p = name; value = (GetTickCount () ^ ((pid<<16) & 0xffff0000)); for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { *p++ = tohex (((value >> 28) & 0x0f)); value <<= 4; } strcpy (p, ".tmp"); file = CreateFile (buffer, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, &sec_attr, CREATE_NEW, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TEMPORARY | FILE_FLAG_DELETE_ON_CLOSE, NULL); if (file != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { FILE *fp; int fd = _open_osfhandle ((long)file, 0); if (fd == -1) { CloseHandle (file); return NULL; } fp = fdopen (fd, "w+b"); if (!fp) { int save = errno; close (fd); errno = save; return NULL; } return fp; } Sleep (1); /* One ms as this is the granularity of GetTickCount. */ } errno = ENOENT; return NULL; #else /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ return tmpfile (); #endif /*!HAVE_W32_SYSTEM*/ } /* Make sure that the standard file descriptors are opened. Obviously some folks close them before an exec and the next file we open will get one of them assigned and thus any output (i.e. diagnostics) end up in that file (e.g. the trustdb). Not actually a gpg problem as this will hapen with almost all utilities when called in a wrong way. However we try to minimize the damage here and raise awareness of the problem. Must be called before we open any files! */ void gnupg_reopen_std (const char *pgmname) { #if defined(HAVE_STAT) && !defined(HAVE_W32_SYSTEM) struct stat statbuf; int did_stdin = 0; int did_stdout = 0; int did_stderr = 0; FILE *complain; if (fstat (STDIN_FILENO, &statbuf) == -1 && errno ==EBADF) { if (open ("/dev/null",O_RDONLY) == STDIN_FILENO) did_stdin = 1; else did_stdin = 2; } if (fstat (STDOUT_FILENO, &statbuf) == -1 && errno == EBADF) { if (open ("/dev/null",O_WRONLY) == STDOUT_FILENO) did_stdout = 1; else did_stdout = 2; } if (fstat (STDERR_FILENO, &statbuf)==-1 && errno==EBADF) { if (open ("/dev/null", O_WRONLY) == STDERR_FILENO) did_stderr = 1; else did_stderr = 2; } /* It's hard to log this sort of thing since the filehandle we would complain to may be closed... */ if (!did_stderr) complain = stderr; else if (!did_stdout) complain = stdout; else complain = NULL; if (complain) { if (did_stdin == 1) fprintf (complain, "%s: WARNING: standard input reopened\n", pgmname); if (did_stdout == 1) fprintf (complain, "%s: WARNING: standard output reopened\n", pgmname); if (did_stderr == 1) fprintf (complain, "%s: WARNING: standard error reopened\n", pgmname); if (did_stdin == 2 || did_stdout == 2 || did_stderr == 2) fprintf(complain,"%s: fatal: unable to reopen standard input," " output, or error\n", pgmname); } if (did_stdin == 2 || did_stdout == 2 || did_stderr == 2) exit (3); #endif /* HAVE_STAT && !HAVE_W32_SYSTEM */ } /* Hack required for Windows. */ void gnupg_allow_set_foregound_window (pid_t pid) { if (!pid || pid == (pid_t)(-1)) log_info ("%s called with invalid pid %lu\n", "gnupg_allow_set_foregound_window", (unsigned long)pid); #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM else if (!AllowSetForegroundWindow (pid)) log_info ("AllowSetForegroundWindow(%lu) failed: %s\n", (unsigned long)pid, w32_strerror (-1)); #endif }