* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO): Use SHA256 in --gnupg and SHA1 in
strict RFC or PGP modes.
* g10/sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Use DEFAULT_DIGEST_ALGO also for
RSA key signatures.
* configure.ac: Do not allow to disable sha256.
* g10/gpg.c (aFullKeygen): New.
(opts): Add command --full-key-gen.
(main): Implement it.
* g10/keygen.c (DEFAULT_STD_ALGO): Replace wrong GCRY_PK_RSA although
the value is identical.
(DEFAULT_STD_CURVE): New.
(DEFAULT_STD_SUBALGO): New.
(DEFAULT_STD_SUBKEYSIZE): New.
(DEFAULT_STD_SUBCURVE): New.
(quick_generate_keypair): Use new macros here.
(generate_keypair): Add arg "full" and fix call callers. Do not ask
for keysize in non-full node.
(ask_user_id): Add arg "full" and simplify for non-full mode.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Pass option names to obsolete_option without
double dash.
* g10/misc.c (obsolete_option, obsolete_scdaemon_option): Print double
dash only for command line options.
* g10/gpg.c: Add config options that should belong in scdaemon.conf
* g10/main.h, g10/misc.c (obsolete_scdaemon_option): New.
--
In gpg2, the following options are only relevant for scdaemon:
reader-port
ctapi-driver
pcsc-driver
disable-ccid
but in gpg1, they are options for gpg itself.
Some users of gpg1 might have these options in their
~/.gnupg/gpg.conf, which causes gpg2 to fail hard if it reads that
config file.
gpg2 should not fail hard, though giving a warning (and suggesting a
move to scdaemon.conf) seems OK.
This patch does *not* reintroduce any documentation for these options
in gpg.texi, even to indicate that they are "dummy" options, since
scdaemon.texi contains the appropriate documentation.
Debian-bug-id: 762844
- Program names factored out from obsolete_scdaemon_option to make
reuse without new translations easier. -wk
* g10/keydb.c (maybe_create_keyring_or_box): Rename arg for clarity.
(keydb_add_resource): Fix order of args to maybe_create_keyring_or_box
and check and create .kbx.
* g10/gpg.c (print_mds): Replace openpgp_md_test_algo.
--
This is actually not required because as of now the used OpenPGP and
Gcrypt hash algorithm numbers are identical. But that might change in
the future.
This changes the behavior of GnuPG in case it has been build with
some algorithms disabled: If those algorithms are available in
Libgcrypt, their results will be used printed anyway.
* g10/keyedit.c (subkey_expire_warning): New.
(keyedit_menu): Call it when needed.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1715
The heuristic to detect a problem is not very advanced but it should
catch the most common cases.
* agent/cache.c (last_stored_cache_key): New.
(agent_get_cache): Allow NULL for KEY.
(agent_store_cache_hit): New.
* agent/findkey.c (unprotect): Call new function and try to use the
last stored key.
* g10/revoke.c (create_revocation): Add arg CACHE_NONCE and pass to
make_keysig_packet.
(gen_standard_revoke): Add arg CACHE_NONCE and pass to
create_revocation.
* g10/keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Call gen_standard_revoke with
cache nonce.
--
This patch adds two features:
1. The key for the last passphrase successfully used for unprotecting
a key is stored away. On a cache miss the stored away passphrase is
tried as well. This helps for the common GPG use case of having a
signing and encryption (sub)key with the same passphrase. See the
code for more comments.
2. The now auto-generated revocation certificate does not anymore
popup a passphrase prompt. Thus for standard key generation the
passphrase needs to be given only once (well, two with the
confirmation).
* common/openpgpdefs.h (PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA): Change to 22.
* g10/keygen.c (ask_curve): Reword the Curve25519 warning note.
--
In the hope that the IETF will eventually assign 22 for EdDSA using
the draft-koch-eddsa-for-openpgp-01 specs we start using this number.
* g10/passphrase.c (passphrase_get): Replace sprintf by xasprintf.
--
Without that at least the French translation does not always work
because it requires positional parameters. Windows for example does
not support them as they are not defined by C99 but by POSIX.
* g10/main.h (DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO): Chhange to AES or CAST5 or 3DES
depending on configure option.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Set opt.s2k_cipher_algo to DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO.
* g10/main.h (import_screener_t): New.
* g10/import.c (import): Add screener callbacks to param list.
(import_one): Ditto.
(import_secret_one): Ditto.
(import_keys_internal): Ditto.
(import_keys_stream): Ditto.
* g10/keyserver.c (struct ks_retrieval_screener_arg_s): New.
(keyserver_retrieval_screener): New.
(keyserver_get): Pass screener to import_keys_es_stream().
--
These changes introduces import functions that apply a constraining
filter to imported keys. These filters can verify the fingerprints of
the keys returned before importing them into the keyring, ensuring
that the keys fetched from the keyserver are in fact those selected by
the user beforehand.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Tomanek <tomanek@internet-sicherheit.de>
This is an extended and fixed versions of Stefan's patch. In addition
to the changes done in gnupg 2.0, namely the commits
5e933008be044847a0e2088f82c0b5
the symbol names have been changed to "screener" to void mixing them
up with the iobuf filter feature and it has been changed to be used
with the dirmngr based keyserver lookup.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/sig-check.c (do_check): Move some code to ...
* g10/misc.c (print_md5_rejected_note): new function.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_tree, proc_plaintext): Enable MD5 workaround
only if option --allow-weak-digest-algos is used.
* g10/gpg.c (oRFC1991, oPGP2): Remove
(opts): Remove --pgp2 and --rfc1991.
* g10/options.h (CO_PGP2, CO_RFC1991): Remove. Remove all users.
(RFC2440, PGP2): Remove. Remove all code only enabled by these
conditions.
* tests/openpgp/clearsig.test: Remove --rfc1991 test.
--
The use of PGP 2.c is considered insecure for quite some time
now (e.g. due to the use of MD5). Thus we remove all support for
_creating_ PGP 2 compatible messages.
* g10/gpg.c (oCompressKeys, oCompressSigs): Remove.
(opts): Turn --compress-keys and --compress-signs in NOPs.
* g10/options.h (opt): Remove fields compress_keys and compress_sigs.
* g10/export.c (do_export): Remove compress_keys feature.
* g10/sign.c (sign_file): Remove compress_sigs feature.
--
These features are disabled in GnuPG since the very early days and
they fulfill no real purpose. For now we keep the command line
options as dummys.
* g10/gpg.c (aQuickKeygen): New.
* g10/misc.c (is_valid_user_id): New stub.
* g10/keygen.c (quickgen_set_para): New.
(quick_generate_keypair): New.
--
Note that the validation of the specified user id has not yet been
implemented.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_attribute): Avoid xmalloc failure and cap
size of packet.
--
Tavis Ormandy reported a fatal error for attribute packets with a zero
length payload. This is due to a check in Libgcrypt's xmalloc which
rejects a malloc(0) instead of silently allocating 1 byte. The fix is
obvious.
In addition we cap the size of attribute packets similar to what we do
with user id packets. OpenPGP keys are not the proper way to store
movies.
* common/iobuf.c (direct_open): Add arg MODE700.
(iobuf_create): Ditto.
* g10/openfile.c (open_outfile): Add arg RESTRICTEDPERM. Change call
callers to pass 0 for it.
* g10/revoke.c (gen_desig_revoke, gen_revoke): Here pass true for new
arg.
* g10/export.c (do_export): Pass true for new arg if SECRET is true.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 1653.
Note that this works only if --output has been used.
* g10/keygen.c (gen_elg): Enforce keysize 1024 to 4096.
(gen_rsa): Enforce keysize 1024 to 4096.
(gen_dsa): Enforce keysize 768 to 3072.
--
It was possible to create 16k RSA keys in batch mode. In addition to the
silliness of such keys, they have the major drawback that under GnuPG
and Libgcrypt, with their limited amount of specially secured memory
areas, the use of such keys may lead to an "out of secure memory"
condition.
* agent/cvt-openpgp.c (convert_to_openpgp): Use the curve name instead
of the curve parameters.
* g10/export.c (canon_pubkey_algo): Rename to ...
(canon_pk_algo): this. Support ECC.
(transfer_format_to_openpgp): Expect curve name.
* g10/compress.c (do_uncompress): Limit the number of extra FF bytes.
--
A packet like (a3 01 5b ff) leads to an infinite loop. Using
--max-output won't help if it is a partial packet. This patch
actually fixes a regression introduced on 1999-05-31 (c34c6769).
Actually it would be sufficient to stuff just one extra 0xff byte.
Given that this problem popped up only after 15 years, I feel safer to
allow for a very few FF bytes.
Thanks to Olivier Levillain and Florian Maury for their detailed
report.
Werner Koch