* g10/gpg.c (opts): New options --auto-key-import,
--no-auto-key-import, and --no-include-key-block.
(gpgconf_list): Add them.
* g10/options.h (opt): Add field flags.auto_key_import.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use flag to enable that
feature.
* tools/gpgconf-comp.c: Give the new options a Basic config level.
--
Note that the --no variants of the options are intended for easy
disabling at the command line.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4856
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/import.c (read_key_from_file): Rename to ...
(read_key_from_file_or_buffer): this and add new parameters. Adjust
callers.
(import_included_key_block): New.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_signature): Add field flags.key_block.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set that flags.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add parm forced_pk and change
all callers.
* g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto.
(check_sig_and_print): Try the included key block if no key is
available.
--
This is is the second part to support the new Key Block subpacket.
The idea is that after having received a signed mail, it is instantly
possible to reply encrypted - without the need for any centralized
infrastructure.
There is one case where this does not work: A signed mail is received
using a specified signer ID (e.g. using gpg --sender option) and the
key block with only that user ID is thus imported. The next time a
mail is received using the same key but with a different user ID; the
signatures checks out using the key imported the last time. However,
the new user id is not imported. Now when trying to reply to that
last mail, no key will be found. We need to see whether we can update
a key in such a case.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4856
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/parse-packet.c (enum_sig_subpkt): Replace first arg by two args
so that the entire signature packet is available. Change all callers.
(parse_sig_subpkt): Ditto.
--
This patch is a prerequisite to support the new attestation key
signatures.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Report status of STATUS_NO_SECKEY
only when some error occurred.
--
Fixes-commit: 6cc4119ec03be61c78189a0bec99372035289b91
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/dek.h (DEK): Use debugger friendly type of unsigned int.
* g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Add another check.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Only call get_session_key when
PKENC_LIST is not NULL.
Return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY, instead of GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY, when
it's encrypted only by symmetric key.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a hint on how to make
use of the preferred keyserver. Remove keyserver lookup just by the
keyid. Try a WKD lookup before a keyserver lookup.
--
The use of the the keyid for lookups does not make much sense anymore
since for quite some time we do have the fingerprint as part of the
signature.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4595
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Check ->result against -1.
When c->dek == NULL, put GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY only when not set.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_session_key): Set k->result by the result of
get_it.
When no secret key is available for some reasons, return the last
specific error, if any.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4561
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Simplify.
--
This changes the output from
# ------------------------ >8 ------------------------
gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key, ID D20073D46DF6C97D, created 2019-04-02
"Test with PIV card"
to
gpg: encrypted with rsa2048 key, ID D20073D46DF6C97D, created 2019-04-02
"Test with PIV card"
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
# ------------------------ 8< ------------------------
* g10/build-packet.c (gpg_mpi_write): New optional arg
R_NWRITTEN. Allow NULL for OUT. Change all callers.
(do_key): Support v5 keys.
(build_sig_subpkt_from_sig): Support 32 byte fingerprints.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): First try to set the keyid
from the issuer fingerprint.
(parse_key): Support v5 keys.
(create_gpg_control): Better make sure to always allocate the static
size of the struct in case future compilers print warnings.
* g10/keyid.c (hash_public_key): Add v5 support.
(keyid_from_pk): Ditto.
(keyid_from_fingerprint): Ditto.
(fingerprint_from_pk): Ditto.
* g10/keygen.c (KEYGEN_FLAG_CREATE_V5_KEY): New.
(pVERSION, pSUBVERSION): New.
(add_feature_v5): New.
(keygen_upd_std_prefs): Call it.
(do_create_from_keygrip): Add arg keygen_flags and support the v5
flag.
(common_gen): Support the v5 flag.
(parse_key_parameter_part): New flags v4 and v5.
(parse_key_parameter_string): Add args for version and subversion.
(read_parameter_file): New keywords "Key-Version" and
"Subkey-Version".
(quickgen_set_para): Add arg 'version'.
(quick_generate_keypair, generate_keypair): Support version parms.
(do_generate_keypair): Support v5 key flag.
(generate_subkeypair): Ditto.
(generate_card_subkeypair): Preparse for keyflags.
(gen_card_key): Ditto.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add args extrahash and
extrahashlen.
(check_signature_end): Ditto.
(check_signature_end_simple): Ditto. Use them.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Put extra hash infor into the
control packet.
(do_check_sig): Add args extrahas and extrahashlen and pass them on.
(issuer_fpr_raw): Support 32 byte fingerprint.
(check_sig_and_print): get extra hash data and pass it on.
--
Note that this is only basic support and requires more fine
tuning/fixing.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (mainproc_context): New member
'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'.
(release_list): Clear 'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'.
(proc_encrypted): Set 'seen_pkt_encrypted_aead'.
(have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead): New.
(proc_plaintext): Do not enable extra hash contexts when decryption
AEAD input.
--
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
* g10/mainproc.c (struct mainproc_context): It's now pubkey_enc_list.
(do_proc_packets): Remove the first arg CTRL. Fix call of
proc_pubkey_enc.
(release_list): Handle pubkey_enc_list.
(proc_pubkey_enc): Remove the first arg CTRL. Simply put the packet
to pubkey_enc_list.
(print_pkenc_list): Remove the last arg FAILED.
(proc_encrypted): Only call print_pkenc_list once.
Handle DEK here.
(proc_packets, proc_signature_packets, proc_signature_packets_by_fd)
(proc_encryption_packets): Fix call of do_proc_packets.
* g10/packet.h (struct pubkey_enc_list): Define.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Change the second argument K.
(get_session_key): Select session key by LIST, using enum_secret_keys.
* g10/gpgv.c (get_session_key): Change the second argument K.
* g10/test-stubs.c (get_session_key): Likewise.
--
Collect all PKT_PUBKEY_ENC packets, and then, process the
PKT_ENCRYPTED* packet.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): New.
(get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): New.
* g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): Give global scope.
(check_sig_and_print): Use get_pubkeyblock_for_sig.
* g10/pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use get_pubkey_for_sig.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Ditto.
(check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Ditto.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4046
The whole getkey stuff is still a mess with way to much duplication
and missing caching of already fetched data.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Sanitize verbose output.
--
This fixes a forgotten sanitation of user supplied data in a verbose
mode diagnostic. The mention CVE is about using this to inject
status-fd lines into the stderr output. Other harm good as well be
done. Note that GPGME based applications are not affected because
GPGME does not fold status output into stderr.
CVE-id: CVE-2018-12020
GnuPG-bug-id: 4012
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print warning and later force an
error.
--
Note that when this error is triggered the plaintext from the literal
data packet has already been outputted before the BEGIN_DECRYPTION
status line. We fail only later to get more information. Callers
need to check and act upon the decryption error code anyway.
Thanks to Marcus for pointing out this case.
GnuPG-bug-id: 4000
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Remove a comment.
--
GnuPG always uses the OpenPGP algo number in its status report.
We can find a function in GPGME, it's _gpgme_map_pk_algo.
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print a hint for legacy ciphers w/o
MDC. Also print a dedicated status error code
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (oAllowMultisigVerification)
(oAllowMultipleMessages, oNoAllowMultipleMessages): Remove.
(opts): Turn --allow-multisig-verification, --allow-multiple-messages
and --no-allow-multiple-messages into NOPs
* g10/options.h (struct opt): Remove flags.allow_multiple_messages.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Assume allow_multiple_messages is
false.
--
These options are very old compatibility hacks and should not be used
anymore. We keep them as dummy options in case someone has them in
the conf file.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Require an MDC or AEAD
* tests/openpgp/defs.scm (create-gpghome): Use --ignore-mdc-error to
allow testing with the current files.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/gpg.c (oNoMDCWarn): Remove.
(opts): Make --no-mdc-warn a NOP.
(main): Don't set var.
* g10/options.h (struct opt): Remove 'no_mdc_var'.
* g10/cipher-cfb.c (write_header): Assume opt.no_mdc_warn is false.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Ditto.
--
Users should not be allowed to suppress the warning that they are
shooting into their foot.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/getkey.c (get_user_id_string): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call
callers.
(get_user_id): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call callers.
* g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_string): Make global.
* g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Print a '?' for a missing key
also in --list-mode. Print the "issuer fpr" field also if there is an
issuer fingerprint subpacket.
--
Scripts used to rely on the "User ID not found" string even in the
--with-colons listing. However, that is not a good idea because that
string is subject to translations etc. Now we have an explicit way of
telling that a key is missing. For example:
gpg --list-sigs --with-colons | \
awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" {if($13){print $13}else{print $5}}'
Prints all keyids or fingerprint of signing keys for which we do not
have the key in our local keyring.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): New.
(issuer_fpr_string): Re-implement using issuer_fpr_rtaw.
(check_sig_and_print): Don't free ISSUER_FPR. Use ISSUER_FPR_RAW.
Use write_status_printf. Extend ERRSIG status.
--
Modern OpenPGP implementations put the ISSUER_FPR into the signature
to make it easier to discover the, public needed to check the
signature. This is also useful in error messages and thus we add it.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Clear the symmetric key cache on
error.
(proc_encrypted): Need to take are of the checksum error.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/packet.h (PKT_symkey_enc): Add field aead_algo.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_symkey_enc): Support version 5 packets.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Ditto.
* g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_symmetric): Force using a random session
key in AEAD mode.
(encrypt_seskey): Add and support arg aead_algo.
(write_symkey_enc): Ditto.
(encrypt_simple): Adjust accordingly.
(encrypt_filter): Ditto.
* g10/gpgcompose.c (sk_esk): For now call encrypt_seskey without AEAD
support.
* g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Support AEAD. Nver call BUG
but return an error.
(proc_symkey_enc): Call symkey_decrypt_seskey in a bug compatible way.
* g10/import.c (check_prefs): Check AEAD preferences.
* g10/keyedit.c (show_prefs): Print AEAD preferences.
--
For easier debugging this patch also changes some diagnostics to also
print the encryption mode with the cipher algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/openpgpdefs.h (PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD): New const.
* g10/dek.h (DEK): Increase size of use_aead to 4 bits.
* g10/filter.h (cipher_filter_context_t): Add new fields for AEAD.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_encrypted): Add fields aead_algo, cipher_algo, and
chunkbyte.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_encrypted_aead): New.
(build_packet): Call it.
* g10/parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Handle SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt, can_handle_critical): Ditto.
(parse_encrypted): Clear new PKT_ENCRYPTED fields.
(parse_encrypted_aead): New.
(parse): Call it.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Take care of --rfc4880bis option when checking
compliance.
* g10/cipher-aead.c: Replace the stub by real code.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (decode_filter_ctx_t): Add fields for use with
AEAD.
(aead_set_nonce): New.
(aead_set_ad): New.
(decrypt_data): Support AEAD.
(aead_underflow): New.
(aead_decode_filter): New.
* g10/encrypt.c (use_aead): Make that new fucntion work.
(encrypt_simple): Use default_aead_algo() instead of EAX.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Support AEAD.
(do_proc_packets): Support PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD.
--
This code has seen only a very few manual tests. Encrypting always
uses a 64k chunks and decryption has not been tested with larger
chunks. Those small chunks make debugging much faster.
Tests can be done using:
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase abc \
--force-aead --aead-algo ocb --s2k-mode 0 --cipher AES \
-v -z 0 --status-fd 2 -c <INFILE >OUTFILE
and
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase=abc \
--status-fd 2 -v -d <INFILE >OUTFILE
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Use dedicated error code for
list-only and put the key into PKENC_LIST.
(print_pkenc_list): Take care of the new error code.
--
If the secret keys exist in --list-only mode it was not printed in
--list-only mode.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3718
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Rework to always allow
verification.
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a con-compliant warning.
* g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Use log_error instead of
log_info.
--
We should be able to verify all signatures. So we only print a
warning. That is the same beheavour as for untrusted keys etc.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3311
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): If error code is GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO,
assume the symmetric passphrase was wrong and invalidate the cache.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <mb@g10code.com>
GnuPG-bug-id: 2270
* g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Track key server request via
fingerprint.
--
New signatures carry the fingerprint and thus --auto-key-retrieve tries
to lookup the key by fingerprint. If that failed it used to also ask
the same thing by KEYID - but the keyid is part of the fingerprint and
thus it will either get no response or the wrong key back. We can
easily avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Swap P and Q for DSA
check. Explicitly check for allowed ECC algos.
(gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Swap P and Q for DSA check.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Simplify SYMKEYS check. Replace
assert by debug message.
--
Note that in mainproc.c SYMKEYS is unsigned and thus a greater than 0
condition is surprising because it leads to the assumption SYMKEYS
could be negative. Better use a boolean test.
The assert could have lead to a regression for no good reason. Not
being compliant is better than breaking existing users.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Symmetric encryption is also in
compliance with CO_DE_VS.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3059
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
* common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add DSA with certain
parameters.
(gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New function.
(gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise.
* common/compliance.h (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New prototype.
(gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise.
* common/status.h (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): New status.
(STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): Likewise.
* doc/DETAILS: Document the new status lines.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS
and report that using the new status line.
(check_sig_and_print): Likewise.
* sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Likewise.
* sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Likewise.
--
When decrypting data and verifying signatures, report whether the
operations are in compliance with the criteria for data classified as
VS-NfD. This information will be picked up by the frontend and
presented to the user.
GnuPG-bug-id: 3059
Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>
--
For proper operations as a server we need to avoid global variables.
Thus we need to pass the session state CTRL to most functions. Quite
a lot of changes but fortunately straightforward to do.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Rename to ...
(parse_ring_trust): this. Change args and implement new ring trust
packet format.
(parse): Add special ring trust packet handling.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): New fields KEYUPDATE, UPDATEURL, and
KEYSRC.
(PKT_public_key): Ditto.
(RING_TRUST_SIG, RING_TRUST_KEY, RING_TRUST_UID): New consts.
(PKT_ring_trust): New.
(struct packet_struct): Remove member RING_TRUST.
(strcu parse_packet_ctx_s): Add field SKIP_META.
(init_parse_packet): Init SKIPT_META.
* g10/free-packet.c (release_public_key_parts): Free UDPATEURL.
(free_user_id): Ditto.
* g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Remove printing of non-documented "rtv"
lines.
* g10/build-packet.c (build_packet_and_meta): New.
(do_ring_trust): New.
* g10/export.c (write_keyblock_to_output): Use build_packet_and_meta
in backup mode.
(do_export_one_keyblock): Ditto.
* g10/import.c (read_block): Add arg WITH_META. Skip ring trust
packets if that ism not set.
(import): Call read_block WITH_META in restore mode.
* g10/keydb.h (KEYSRC_UNKNOWN, KEYSRC_FILE, KEYSRC_KS, KEYSRC_PREF_KS)
(KEYSRC_WKD, KEYSRC_WKD_SD, KEYSRC_DANE): New constants. They are not
yet used, though.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Allow ring trust packets.
(build_keyblock_image): Ditto. Use build_packet_and_meta.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Remove specila treatment of
ring trust packets.
(write_keyblock): Use build_packet_and_meta. Remove special treatment
of ring trust packets and initialization of the signature caches.
--
This patch introduced the framework to store meta data for keys and
user ids in the keyrings/keyboxes. Ring trust packets are
implementation defined and have always been used in gpg to cache the
signature verification status.
Ring trust packets are only exported with the export option "backup"
and only imported with the import option "restore".
The new code uses a cleaner way to handle the ring trust packets: When
the parser reads a ring trust packet and the previously read packet
matches the type of that ring trust packet, the information is stored
in that previously read packet (signature, user id, or primary key)
and the next packet is read immediately. Thus only the parser sees
the ring trust packets. Ring trust packets are written by using the
new function build_packet_and_meta instead of build_packet. That
function writes a ring trust packet when the needed information is
available.
As a side-effect of this patch the signature status cache works again
and "gpg --check-sigs" is thus much faster.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/packet.h (struct parse_packet_ctx_s): Add fields LAST_PKT and
FREE_LAST_PKT.
(init_parse_packet): Clear them.
(deinit_parse_packet): New macro. Change all users if
init_parse_packet to also call this macro.
* g10/free-packet.c (free_packet): Add arg PARSECTX and handle shallow
packet copies in the context. Change all callers.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse): Store certain packets in the parse
context.
--
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/packet.h (struct parse_packet_ctx_s): New.
(parse_packet_ctx_t): New type.
(init_parse_packet): New macro.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse_packet, dbg_parse_packet): Change to take
a parse context. Change all callers to provide a context instead of
directly supplying the input stream.
(search_packet, dbg_search_packet): Ditto.
(copy_all_packets, dbg_copy_all_packets): Init an use a parse context.
(copy_some_packets, dbg_copy_some_packets): Ditto.
(skip_some_packets, dbg_skip_some_packets): Ditto.
--
We will need this change to handle ring packets inside the parser.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* g10/trustdb.c (init_trustdb): Add and implement arg NO_CREATE.
Change to return an error code. Change all callers to to pass False
for NO_CREATE.
(tdb_get_ownertrust): New arg NO_CREATE. Call init_trustdb to test
for a non-existing trustdb. Change all callers to to pass False for
NO_CREATE.
(tdb_get_min_ownertrust): Ditto.
* g10/trust.c (get_ownertrust_with_min): Add arg NO_CREATE. Call
init_trustdb for a quick check.
(get_ownertrust_info): Add arg NO_CREATE.
(get_ownertrust_string): Ditto.
* g10/gpgv.c (get_ownertrust_info): Adjust stub.
* g10/test-stubs.c (get_ownertrust_info): Ditto.
* g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Call get_ownertrust_info with NO_CREATE
set.
* g10/pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Ditto.
--
Fixes-commit: effa80e0b5fd8cf9e31a984afe391c2406edee8b
For details see mails on Feb 27 and 28 by dkg, gniibe, and Justus to
gnupg-devel 'test failure on git master with
decrypt-session-key.scm (and: continuous integration?)'
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
